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FOREWORD

Dr. Ying-Jeou Ma was one of my most diligent students, and
this book is an excellent example of his ability to master the complex
problems of boundary delimitation in the East China Sea and to collect the widely scattered and not easily obtainable documentation on
this subject.
In order to make the situation more understandable, Dr. Ma
provides first a description of the geography, geology, and geomorphology of the region. As any careful reader of decisions of the International Court of Justice soon discovers, even when the Court
officially discards most of these factors in a particular case, some of
them are taken by the Court into account. The author, therefore, in
his discussion of the claims of various coastal States, pays close attention to the particular problems faced by each State in defending
its position, emphasizing one factor in one situation, and a different
factor in another.
Dr. Ma analyzes also the existing conflicts between the various
pairs of States, first in general and then in relation to the undersea
oil deposits. He points out that some extraneous factors need also be
considered, such as the territorial dispute between Japan and China
concerning the Tiao-yu-t'ai (Senkaku) Islands. After such factors
have been eliminated (or assuming that they have been settled by
agreements), the question still remains: What are the "relevant circumstances" that need to be considered? To what extent should security and defense interests be taken into account? Are there any
historical rights, and how can they be proven? Are the unity of oil
deposits and the need for their effective management important?
What effect should be given to fishery interests, and should the continental shelf delimitation follow the. boundary of the exclusive economic zone (EEZ), or to the contrary, should the delimitation of the
EEZ be related to the continental shelf delimitation? (It was the latter issue that led the Court in the recent Gu!f of Maine Case to a
decision to use factors other than those that have been devised primarily for the continental shelf or for the EEZ.)
The author had to struggle also with the hotly disputed issue
whether the delimitation should be based on the equidistance principle or some equitable principle such as proportionality. Returning
finally to the various geological and geomorphological factors, the
author explores how they would apply to such situations as the Oki(vii)
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nawa Trough which is an important factor in the Sino-Japanese
dispute.
In the last part of his book, Dr. Ma considers in depth the special problems caused by the Peiping-Taipei rivalry. Assuming that
an oil deposit is being exploited that is situated in a zone claimed by
both governments and the oil is brought to a foreign port, how
should a foreign court determine who is the real owner of that deposit and who is the trespasser?
This short overview of the issues discussed in the book shows its
importance not only for those who are interested in oil exploration
and exploitation in the East China Sea, but also to all of those who
are likely to encounter similar problems in other areas of the world.
As the deposits close to the shore, which are situated clearly in an
area under the jurisdiction of the neighboring coastal state, are exhausted, the oil explorers will have to venture further into the troubled waters where conflicts of jurisdiction already have arisen or are
likely to arise. Dr. Ma's careful analysis of precedents and their applicability to various situations should be of inestimable value to all
who may become involved in these conflicts.
Louis B. Sohn
Woodruff Professor of
International Law
University of Georgia
Bemis Professor of
International Law, Emeritus
Harvard Law School
Athens, Georgia
November 1, 1984
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INTRODUCTION 1

Shortly after dawn in the East China Sea on April 13, 1978, 100
Chinese fishing vessels emerged from the horizon and quietly assembled around Tiao-yu Island. The island is the largest of the eight
uninhabited islets of a group situated 102 miles northeast of Taiwan
and 240 miles southeast of Okinawa and claimed by both Japan and
China (Peking and Taipei). 2 At 10 a.m., 32 of them, some armed
with machine guns, entered the island's 12-mile territorial sea newly
declared by Japan, the country which actually controlled the islets. 3
The crew on board the fishing vessels wielded signs and yelled slogans, claiming Chinese sovereignty over the islets as the fleet repeatedly circled the island. They vehemently defied demands of
Japanese cutters and planes dispatched to the scene to leave the area.
Puzzling over Peking's real intentions, Tokyo reacted with caution to avoid complicating the pending negotiation of a friendship
treaty with Peking. 4 It lodged a protest with the People's Republic of
China (PRC) and demanded an explanation. The PRC simply repeated its position, made public in late 1971, 5 that the islets belonged
I. Unless otherwise indicated, the factual account of the fishing-boat incident
related below is based on the following sources: New York Times, April 14, 1978, p. A3;
"Japanese-Chinese Dispute on Isles Threatens to Delay Peace Treaty," ibid., April 15,
1978, p. I; ibid., April 16, 1978, p. 8, col. 1; Susumu Awanohara, "An Ill Wind from the
Senkakus," Far Eastern Economic Review, April 23, 1978, p.IO; William Glenn, "Cool
Line on the Senkaku 'Bandits'," ibid., May 5, 1978, p. 33; David Bonavia, "The PekingTokyo Minuet of Diplomacy is Inane," ibid., June 23, 1978, p. 79; Tracy Dahl by, "Peace,
Friendship. . and Some Uncertainty," ibid., August 25, 1978, p. II.
A detailed chronicle of events appears in Po-shih-tuen T'ung-hsun (Free Chinese
Monthly), Vol. 7, No. 77 (May 1978), pp. 4-8. The periodical is published in Cambridge,
Massachusettes.
2. "Tiao-yu-t'ai" is the Chinese name for the islet group as a whole and for the
largest island in the group as well. The Japanese call them "Senkaku Gunto." Subsequent references to them as Tiao-yu-t'ai Islands instead of Senkaku Gunto suggest no
preference for the claim of China (Peking and Taipei) or Japan. For detailed descriptions of the group, see Chapter 4 infra and Table 3.
Throughout this writing, the "People's Republic of China" (PRC) refers to the Communist Chinese Government in the Chinese mainland whereas "Republic of China"
(ROC) refers to the Nationalist Chinese Government in Taiwan. "China" and "Taiwan"
are used in their geographical sense only, unless otherwise indicated.
3. Japan declared a 12-mile territorial sea and 200-mile fishing zone on July I, 1977.
For the enabling legislation, see UNLS/19, pp. 56, 215, 218.
4. For an in-depth political analysis, see Daniel Tretiak, "The Sino-Japanese Treaty
of 1978: The Senkaku Incident Prelude," Asian Survey, Vol. 18 (1978), p. 1235.
5. Peking Review, January 7, 1972, p. 12.
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to it, and expressed concern over the incident's impact on the treaty
negotiations. In addition, the Republic of China (ROC) in Taiwan,
the third claimant to the islets, declared that its sovereignty over the
group would not be affected by claims of "any other parties." 6 Subsequently, while PRC leaders tried apologetically to explain away
the "accident" to the Japanese/ the fishing boats doubled their
number to 200. The flotilla cruised in and out of the 12-rnile zone
before it finally left on April26. On the next day, the Japanese further were assured that henceforth Chinese fishermen would refrain
from fishing around the Tiao-yu-t'ai Islands. 8
The incident not only dramatically suspended the PRC-Japan
friendship treaty negotiations, which had been going on since the
previous February, 9 but also revived a territorial dispute between the
two countries. The sovereignty issue was the focus of much attention
in the early 1970s by Japan, the ROC, the PRC, and the United
States. 10 Japan insisted that the islets were a part of the Ryukyu
Islands returned to Japan in 1972 by the U.S. under the 1971 Okinawa Reversion Treaty, 11 whereas both Chinese governments contested that view on historical, geographical, and legal grounds. 12
The issue was understandably shelved when the PRC and Japan established diplomatic ties in September 1972 and had remained dormant until the incident occurred. 13
6. Chung-yang Jih-pao (Central Daily News), April 14, 1978, p. I. The Central
Daily News is a Kuomintang-owned Chinese-language newspaper based in Taipei.
7. This was what Keng Piao, a PRC vice premier, told Hideo Den, leader of Japan's
Democratic Socialist Union Party, in Peking. New York Times, April 16, 1978, p. 8.
8. This was the statement of Liao Ch'eng-chih, Deputy Chairman of the Standing
Committee of the National People's Congress (the PRC's nominal parliament), and the
President of the Sino-Japanese People's Friendship Association, to Utsunomiya Tokuma,
a visiting member of the Japanese Diet (parliament), in Peking. Mainichi Daily News,
April 29, 1978, p. I.
9. Tretiak, supra note 4, pp. 1241-46.
10. For the body of legal literature relating to the Tiao-yu-t'ai Islands, see Ch. 4
infra, at note I.
II. For the official Japanese position, see Statement of Foreign Ministry of Japan,
March 8, 1972. English translation appears in Jerome A. Cohen and Hungdah Chiu,
People's China and International Law, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1974,
pp. 351-52 [hereinafter cited as Cohen & Chiu).
12. For the official position of the ROC, see Chung-yang Jih-pao, June 12, 1971, p. I,
and for that of the PRC, see supra note 5.
13. New York Times, September 30, 1972, p. I. The joint communique issued in
Peking by Chou En-lai, the PRC's premier, and Tanaka, the Japanese premier, made no
mention of the islands. Chou reportedly said to Tanaka that "[l)et's not dispute [the
islands). After all, they are little dots hardly noticeable in a map. The question arose
merely because oil is believed to lie around them." Ming Pao (Ming Daily), October 2.
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In retrospect, the PRC's "fishing-boat diplomacy" seems to h~ve
been intended to prod the Japanese to expedite the treaty negotiations, which were losing momentum at the time. 14 Peking's interest
in the early conclusion of the treaty apparently outweighed its territorial claim to the Tiao-yu-t'ais. 15 Both Peking and Tokyo have expressed interests in jointly developing resources around the islets,
leaving aside the vexing territorial issue. 16 No agreement has thus
far materialized, however. 17
Apart from the political dimension, there are complicated legal
1972, p. 4. Ming Pao is an independent Chinese-language newspaper published in Hong
Kong. The Peking correspondent of Japan's Mainichi Shimbun reported that shelving
the Tiao-yu-t'ais issue was agreed upon by Japan and the PRC as a precondition for
establishing diplomatic ties. Since the islands were in actual control of Japan at the time,
the report continued, the PRC's consent to shelve the issue amount to waiver of its claim.
Chung-yang Jih-pao, April 18, 1978, p. I; New York Times, April 15, 1978, p. I.
14. Tretiak, supra note 4, p. 1246.
15. The PRC's senior Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-p'ing reportedly told Japanese Foreign Minister Sonoda in Peking before signing the treaty in mid-August that "there
would be no recurrence of the Senkaku incident." Washington Post, August 13, 1978, p.
A26. Peking also reacted mildly when Japan was constructing a heliport on the Tiao-yu
Island. New York Times, May 23, 1979, p. A7. A photograph of the heliport by the
Associated Press appeared in Lien-ho Pao (United Daily News), May 25, 1979, p. I.
(The United Daily News is an independent Chinese-language newspaper based in
Taipei.) The PRC stated that the Japanese government should be "prudent" less the
friendship between the two countries be damaged. Hua-chiao Jih-pao (China Daily
News), May 28, 1979, p. I. (The China Daily News is a pro-Peking Chinese-language
newspaper published in New York).
On July 22, 1981, the PRC's Foreign Ministry expressed regrets about a survey of
fishing resources in the Tiao-yu-t'ai Islands and nearby waters conducted by Japan's
Okinawa Prefecture and demanded the incident not happen again. Statement on Japanese Fishery Resources Survey on Our Tiao-yu-t'ai Islands by Spokesman of the Information Department, Foreign Ministry of the People's Republic of China. Chung-kuo
kuo-chi:fa nien-k'an 1982 [Chinese Yearbook of International Law 1982], p. 465.
16. The PRC was reported to have taken the initiative in bringing up the idea
through its ambassador to Japan Fu Hao, while he was visiting Okinawa. Lien-ho Pao,
May 13, 1979, p. 1, citing a May 12 report by Mainichi Shimbun from Tokyo. Japan
reportedly reacted favorably. Lien-ho Pao, July II, 1979, p. I. As of late 1980, governmental negotiations have continued between Peking and Tokyo. Jen-min Jih-pao (People's Daily), Nov. 29, 1980, p. 4. (People's Daily is the official Chinese-language
newspaper of the Chinese Communist Party.)
17. In effect, both sides approached the joint development idea under the assumption
that the islands were their own territory. This was why no agreement had been reached.
George Lauriat and Melinda Liu, "Pouring Trouble on Oily Waters," Far Eastern Economic Review, September 28, 1979, pp. 19, 20-21. In April 1983, Peking again announced, through its vice premier Yao Yi-ling who was visiting Tokyo, that it favored an
international program to jointly develop the oil riches of the Tiao-yu-t'ai Islands while
leaving the sovereignty dispute to be settled later. Lien-ho Pao, April9, 1983, p. 1 (citing
a UPI dispatch from Tokyo).
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issues involved. During the 1970s, a number of studies were done on
these issues. These studies invariably concluded that the territorial
and the seabed issues were inseparable; settlement of the former was
a conditio sine qua non to that of the latter. 18 As nationalistic feelings
ran high in both China and Japan, these commentators seemed pessimistic about the likelihood of a pacific settlement. Their pessimism
was reinforced by the existing vague rules of international law on
continental shelf delimitation and the regime of islands. The latter
half of the 1970s witnessed, however, a revolution of the legal regime
of the ocean, primarily as a result of deliberations at the Third
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III),
beginning in 1974. The Convention on the Law of the Sea (hereinafter the LOS Convention), which was signed at Montego Bay, Jamaica, on December 10, 1982, 19 reflecting the general consensus of
more than 120 signatory states, has substantially altered some of the
assumptions on which previous studies were based. Indeed, the
changing law of the sea calls for a fresh look at the present dispute.
As will be discussed in Chapter 2 infra, the continental shelf
claims of the coastal states in the East China Sea, namely, China (the
ROC and the PRC), the Republic of Korea (ROK), and Japan (the
Democratic Republic of Korea (DPRK) has no coastal front in the
East China Sea) are vague. While the ROC has declared a 200-mile
exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and Japan a 200-mile fishing zone,
the PRC and the ROK have declared neither. 20 Moreover, all of
18. See Chapter 4 infra.
19. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, UN Doc. A/CONF.62/122, 7
August 1982; New York Times, December II, 1982, p. I. There were 117 states that
signed the Convention on December 10, 1982. The number of signatory states has exceeded 130 as of this writing in August 1984.
20. Japan extended its territorial sea from 3 miles to 12 miles and declared a 200mile fishing zone in 1977. See note 3 supra. The ROC also extended its 3-mile territorial
sea to 12 miles and declared a 200-mile EEZ on September 6, 1979. The declaration
states:
I. The territorial sea of the Republic of China shall be measured from the
baselines and shall extend to the outer limits of the water area of twelve
nautical miles from such baselines.
2. The exclusive economic zone of the Republic of China shall be measured
from the baselines from which the territorial sea is measured and shall extend to the outer limits of the water area of two hundred nautical miles
from such baselines.
(I) The Republic of China shall have in the exclusive economic zone sovereign rights for purposes of exploration and exploitation. conservation and utilization of the natural resources, and such jurisdiction the
exercise of which is recognized under international law.
(2) Where the exclusive economic zone of the Republic of China extends
over any part of the exclusive economic zones as proclaimed by other
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them have signed21 the LOS convention of 1982 ~xcept the ROC
whose participation in UNCLOS III has been effectively blocked by
the PRC since 1973 as a result of the expulsion of the ROC from the
United Nations in 197I.22 In view of the practically identical boundary delimitation provisions for the continental shelf (Article 83) and
the EEZ (Article 74) in the LOS Convention and the recent trend
toward delimiting a single boundary that would serve both purposes, 23 one might wonder if a single boundary could be delimited in
the East China Sea. There are essentially two reasons why a single
boundary would be infeasible. First, among the coastal states only
the ROC has thus far declared an EEZ. Before other states follow
suit, 24 no necessity for EEZ delimitations exist. Second, there lies in
the East China Sea such a prominent undersea geological feature as
the 2,000-meter-deep Okinawa Trough, which constitutes a distinct
break in the essential continuity of the continental shelf and is less
relevant to the geographical, distance-oriented concept of the EEZ. 25
Even if all the coastal states had delineated their own EEZs, a single
boundary would hardly accommodate the different considerations
states, the boundaries shall be determined by agreement between the
states concerned or in accordance with generally accepted principles of
international law on delimitation.
(3) Other states may enjoy in the exclusive economic zone of the Republic
of China the freedoms of navigation and overflight and of the laying
of submarine cables and pipelines, and engage in such other activities
with respect to navigation and communication as permitted by international law.
3. The sovereign rights enjoyed by the Republic of China over the continental
shelf contiguous to its coast as recognized by the Convention on the Continental Shelf of 1958 and the general principles of international law shall
not be prejudiced in any manner by the proclamation of the present exclusive economic zone or the establishment of such zones by any other state.
Chung-yang Jih-pao, September 7, 1979, p. I; English translation appeared in Hungdah
Chiu, Rong-jye Chen and Tzu-wen Lee, "Contemporary Practices and Judicial Decisions
of the Republic of China Relating to International Law," Chinese Yearbook of International Law and Affairs, Vol. I (1981), pp. 151-152.
21. The PRC, the ROK and the DPRK signed the LOS Convention on December 10,
1982. United Nations Press Release, SEA/MB/ 13 (December I0, 1982), p. A2. Japan did
not sign at the time, but later signed it in early 1983.
22. For details, see Chapter 4, note 82 and accompanying text.
23. See generally Edward Collins, Jr. and Martin A. Rogoff, "The International Law
of Maritime Boundary Delimitation," Maine Law Review, Vol. 34 (1982), pp. 4-24.
24. There is no urgency for the PRC, the ROK, and Japan to declare an EEZ which,
they fear, might complicate the already intractable continental shelf boundary problems.
For a concise discussion see Choon-ho Park, "Maritime Claims in the China Seas: Current State Practices," San Diego Law Review, Vol. 18 (1981), pp. 445-48.
25. For an elaborate discussion on questions relating to the Okinawa Trough, see
text accompanying notes 223-300 of Chapter 5 infra.
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underlying the EEZ and the continental shelf boundaries. Thus,
only the delimitation of a continental shelf boundary in the East
China Sea is examined in this study.
Given the fact all the East China Sea's coastal states except the
ROC have signed the LOS Convention, one might also wonder why
it is necessary to study the claims and moves of the coastal states, as
will be done in Chapter 2 infra. The delimitation of continental
shelf and the EEZ have been one of the most intractable issues negotiated in UNCLOS III. The rivalry between the "equidistance principle" school and the "equitable principles" school had reached such
a magnitude that a compromise formula tolerable to all was finally
adopted to avert a hopeless deadlock. 26 The compromise was Article
83 of the LOS Convention, the key provision of which states that
"[t]he delimitation of the continental shelf between States with opposite or adjacent coasts shall be effected by agreement on the basis of
international law, as referred to in Article 38 of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice (ICJ), in order to achieve an equitable
solution.' 027 As Article 38 of ICJ's Statute refers to various sources
of internationallaw, 28 it is of little practical help in identifying specific criteria for delimitation. One therefore has to examine the
coastal states' claims and moves qua state practice which is potentially capable of becoming customary law.
Part I of this study sets forth, in three chapters, the geophysical,
political, and economic backgrounds of the East China Sea oil controversy, reviews the conflicting claims and overlapping concessions
of the coastal states, and defines the issues to be pursued in subsequent chapters. Part II deals with the question of title to oil in three
aspects. Chapter 4 examines, in light of various sources of interna26. For an account of the negotiating process, see Bernard H. Oxman, "The United
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: The Tenth Session (1981)," American Journal
of International Law, Vol. 76 (1982), pp. 14-15.
27. Article 83 is quoted in toto in text accompanying note I of Chapter 5 infra.
28. Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice provides:
I. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law
such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply:
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing
rules expressly recognized by the contesting states;
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as
subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.
2. This provision shall not prejudice the power of the Court to decide a case ex
aequo et bono, if the parties agree thereto.
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tionallaw, including the LOS Convention, the relevance of the Tiaoyu-t'ai territorial dispute to the seabed boundary issue. Chapter 5
takes a fresh look at the decade-old seabed boundary problem,
drawing upon recent developments during and after UNCLOS III.
A solution is proposed on the basis of this legal analysis. Chapter 6
analyzes a unique dimension of the present controversy-the relevance of the Peking-Taipei rivalry to the seabed dispute. Questions
of recognition of governments in divided states are considered in the
context of a hypothetical legal battle fought in a third-country court
over the title to oil produced from the disputed seabed.

PART I THE SETTING: THE EAST CHINA
·sEA OIL DISPUTE
CHAPTER 1 EAST CHINA
SEA: GEOPHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT AND THE
POTENTIAL FOR HYDROCARBONS
In the present study, 1 "geography" refers to physical surface
features of the earth; "geomorphology" denotes the topography and
relief features of the earth; "geology" refers to the underlying rock
structure of land or submarine relief features; and "bathymetry" alludes to the measurement of water depth.
A.

Geography
The East China Sea is a marginal, semi-enclosed sea of the Pacific Ocean surrounded by China's mainland and Taiwan, Japan's
Ryukyu Islands and Kyushu, and Korea's Cheju Island (Map 1).
According to the International Hydrographic Bureau, 2 two imaginary lines delimit the northern frontier of the East China Sea: one
runs at a latitude of 33°17 North from the Chinese mainland to
Cheju Island (which is also the East China Sea/Yellow Sea boundary); the other extends from Cheju Island to the Japanese island of
Fukue. The East China Sea's eastern boundary largely follows the
outer limits of the R yukyu Islands which separate it from the Philippine Sea. In the south, the boundary is a line connecting the Hait'an Island of China's Fukien Province and the northern tip of Taiwan. South of this line is the Taiwan Strait. The line extends easterly until it reaches the Yonagami Island of the Ryukyu group.
The East China Sea has an area of 752,000 square kilometers
(sq. km) (or 290,348 square miles (sq. mi)) 3 and is 300 to 400 miles
I. Usage of the terms "geography", "geomorphology", "geology", and "bathymetry", in this study is based on Webster's New World Dictionary of the English Language
Unabridged, 1976.
2. See International Hydrographic Bureau, Limits of the Oceans and Seas, Special
Publication No. 23, 3rd ed., Monte-Carlo: lmprimerie Monegasque, 1953, p. 31. But if.
Su-yu Yeh and Hsiang-tien Liu, Chung-kuo Tsu-jan Ti-li Tsung-lun (A General Treatise
on the Physical Geography of China), Peking: Commercial Press, 1959, p. 37 (the northern limit of the East China Sea is defined as a line connecting the northern bank of the
Yangtze River to Cheju Island, and the East China Sea is defined to include the Taiwan
Strait).
3. Rhodes W. Fairbridge, ed., The Encyclopedia of Geomorphology, Encyclopedia of
Earth Science Series, Vol. 3, New York: Reinhold Book Corporation, 1968, p. 184 (Table 13) [hereinafter cited as Encyclopedia of Geomorphology). Unless otherwise indi-
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long (north-south) and 140-280 miles wide (east-west). Two seaward
curving arcs, formed by the Chinese mainland coast and the Kyushu-Ryukyu islands chain, nearly converge at the southern frontier
of the East China Sea near Taiwan. These two arcs respectively delineate the general configuration of Chinese and Japanese coastlines
in the East China Sea. Although fringes of islands abound along the
coasts of the Chinese mainland4 and K yushu, the East China Sea is
virtually devoid of midway islands other than the R yukyus. The
only exceptions are the disputed Tiao-yu-t'ai Islands in the south
and the Japanese islands of Danjo Gunto and Tori Shima in the
north, off K yushu.

B.

Geomorphology

The seabed of the East China Sea slopes gently seaward from
the mainland Chinese coast (Map 2). The 40- to 60-meter isobaths
are far from shore. The smooth shelf extends in certain localities
more than 250 miles seaward. Two-thirds of the East China Sea is
supported by the continental shelf in waters of less than two hundred
meters. At the 120-meter isobath the flat seabed abruptly plunges
into the Okinawa Trough which has a maximum depth of2,717 meters5 at its deepest part near Taiwan. The Trough, extending from
Taiwan to Kyushu along the inner side of the Ryukyus, has more
than half of its area deeper than 1,000 meters and one-fifth deeper
than 2,000 meters. 6 East of the Ryukyus the seabed steeply slides
cated, "square mile" (sq. mi) refers to square statute mile whereas "mile" refers to
nautical mile. One nautical mile (6,076 feet) equals 1.15 statute miles (5,280 feet) or 1.85
km. One sq. mi equals 2.59 sq. km. Abbreviated forms of these words will be used
hereinafter in texts and notes.
4. According to one early study, 2,252 islands fringe along the Chinese coast in the
East China Sea, which are about two-thirds of China's total islands, i.e., 3,338 islands
excluding Taiwan and nearby islands. See Ch'ing-yuan Li, "Chung-kuo Yen-hai Sanch'ien-san-pai-san-shih-pa Tao-yu Mien-chi Tsu-pu Chi-suan (A Preliminary Areal Calculation of 3,338 islands along China's coast), Ti-Li Hsueh-pao (Journal of Geography).
Vol. 2 (1935), pp. 88-91. Recent geographical publications in the PRC put the figure at
more than 2,500. Editing Group, Shanghai Teacher's College, Chien-ming Chung-kuo TiLi (A Concise Textbook on China's Geography), Shanghai: Shanghai People's Publisher, 197 4, p. 82.
5. Rhodes W. Fairbridge, ed., The Encyclopedia of Oceanography, Encyclopedia of
Earth Sciences Series, Vol. l, New York: Rhinhold Book Corporation, 1966, pp. 238, 240
[hereinafter cited as Encyclopedia of Oceanography].
6. See T. Chase, H. Menard & J. Mammerickx, Bathymetry of the North Pacific,
Chart No. 5, La Jolla: Scripps Institution of Oceanography and Institute of Marine Resources, 1970. This chart and Map 2 in the Appendix are based on largely the same
information.
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again into the Ryukyu Trench which, with most of its floor between
Japan and Taiwan deeper than 6,500 meters, 7 is the deepest part_ of
the region. It is in fact part of the marginal trenches of the Pacific
Ocean, including the Aleutian Trench, Kuril Trench, Japan Trench,
and the Philippine Trench.
Parallel to the Ryukyu Trench, the Okinawa Trough is separated from it by the R yukyu ridge, the peaks of which rise above
water surface to form the R yukyu Islands. The Trough, however, is
connected with the Trench by numerous submarine sills cutting
across the Ryukyu ridge 8 ranging in depth from 500 to 1,000 meters.
North of 30°N latitude, the water depth in the Trough drops to less
than 900 meters. It further shoals up to less than 500 meters before
the Trough reaches the vicinity of Kyushu, leaving a modestly wide
belt of shelf along the coast. The Trough, the ridge, and the Trench
stand out as one of the two geomorphological provinces in the East
China Sea, the other being the vast shelf to its west. 9 The Trough
therefore separates the geological shelf of the East China Sea on its
western part from the R yukyu Islands on its eastern part.
C.

Geology

1.

Introduction

Before discussing the regional geology and oil prospects of the
East China Sea, one must have an elementary understanding of
marine geology, petroleum geology, and offshore oil exploration. 10
7. Ibid. See also K.O. Emery et al., "Geological Structure and Some Water Characteristics of the East China Sea and the Yellow Sea," UNECAFE/CCOP Technical Bulletin, Vol. 2 (1969), pp. 26-27. This is the well-known "Emery Report." It was revised in
John M. Wageman, Thomas W.C. Hilde, and K.O. Emery, "Structural Framework of
East China Sea and Yellow Sea," AAPG Bulletin, Vol. 54, (1970), p. 1611.
8. A submarine sill is a submarine barrier that separates two or more depressions
such as undersea canyons, troughs, or basins. Encyclopedia of Geomorphology, supra
note 3, p. I081.
9. Emery et al, supra note 7, p. 13.
10. The introduction to marine geology is based on the following sources: Encyclopedia of Geomorphology, supra note 3, pp. 1079-97; K.O. Emery, "An Oceanographer's
View of the Law of the Sea," in Symposium on the International Regime ofthe Seabed, ed.
by Jerzy Sztucki, Rome: Accadernia national dei Lincei, 1969, p. 47; Hollis D. Hedberg
"Continental Margin from Viewpoint of the Petrokum Geologist," AAPG Bulletin, Vol.
54 (1970), p. 3 [hereinafter cited as Hedberg (1970)]; Hollis D. Hedberg, "Ocean Floor
Boundaries," Science, Vol. 204, No. 4389 (1979), p. 135.
The introduction to petroleum geology and oil exploration is based on entries on
geophysical exploration (or prospecting) in Encyclopedia Americana, int'l ed., Vol. 17
(1974), pp. 504-08; Encyclopedia Britannica, Vol. 10 (1973), pp. 197-202; and articles on
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(a)

Marine Geology

To the layman, geologists like to compare the earth to a softboiled egg-the yolk being the earth's liquid core, the white its mantle, and the shell its crust. The major features of the earth's surface,
continents and oceans, overlie the continental crust and the oceanic
crust, respectively. Generally speaking, the oceanic crust, more
mafic in composition, is thin (5 km) and dense (2.9 gram/cubic centimeter) and has a high seismic velocity (6.7 km/second). In contrast,
the continental crust contains rocks of a more sialic composition
with a lower density (2.6-2.7 gram/cubic centimeter) and a lower
seismic velocity (6.0 km/second), but with a much greater thickness
(35 km).
The oceanic crust, all covered by the oceans, constitutes about
60 percent of the earth's surface. Approximately a quarter of the
continental crust (i.e., the remaining 40 percent of the earth's surface) is submerged below sea level but still fundamentally is a part of
the continent standing above the general level of the oceanic crust.
This submerged part of the continental crust, mostly overlain by sediments of various depths deposited from continental origin, is known
as the continental margin (See figure). The term "continental margin" suffers from a variety of usage but usually includes:
(1) the continental shelf, which gently slopes from the
shore (gradient: 1:600);
(2) the continental slope, which begins from the edge of
continental shelf where a marked increase of declivity
occurs (gradient: 1: 14) and continues into great
depths; and
(3) the continental rise, which extends from the base or
foot of the continental slope (gradient: 1:40 to 1: 1,000)
petroleum in Encyclopedia Americana, int'l ed., Vol. 21 (1974), pp. 677-78, 681-82; Encyclopedia Britannica, Vol. 17 (1973), pp. 758-62.
Information about offshore operation is based on the following sources: Commission on Marine Science, Engineering and Resources: Report ofthe Panel on Marine Engineering and Technology VI-1, VI-164-169 ( 1969), reprinted in H. Gary Knight, The Law of
the Sea: Cases, Documents and Readings, 1980 ed., Baton Rouge, Louisiana: Claitor's
Law Books and Publishing Division, 1980, pp. 9-12 to 9-16; "Panel Discusses Trends in
Offshore Drilling," Ocean Industry, January 1979, p. 35; P.W.J. Wood, "New Slant on
Potential World Petroleum Resources," ibid, April1979, p. 59; Darryl R. Smith, "Techniques Involved in Drilling in Deepest Water," ibid, June 1979, p. 37 and Roger Lowenstein, "Oil Fims to Drill Deep off Atlantic Coast," Asian Wall Street Journal, February
24, 1983, p. 9.
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and merges imperceptibly with the abyssal plain on
the ocean floor.
Geology of Continental Margin
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The base of the continental slope, one of the most extensive and distinctive geomorphological features of the earth, is generally regarded
as the approximate boundary between continental and oceanic
crusts. The boundary, however, may not be a clearly marked line,
but a zone covering parts of the slope as well as the rise. In some
localities, the crustal structure shows intermediary character in thickness, density, and seismic velocity.
The continental shelf ranges in width from one to 650 miles,

14

CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES

averaging about 37 miles, and in depth from 50 to 550 meters, averaging about 133 meters. The conventional assumption that that
outer limit of the geological continental shelf coincides with an arbitrary isobath variously phrased as 200 meters or 100 fathoms (183
meters or 600 feet) is plainly at variance with geological reality. The
continental slope has an average widtn of 9 to 18 miles and an average depth of 1,830 meters within the range of 1,000 to 5,000 meters.
The continental rise has a width of up to 540 miles, a depth of up to
5,000 meters and a thickness of up to 10 km. Since many continental
margins of the world's continents, including those of East Asia, have
not been thoroughly studied, current knowledge about their geology
is rather limited.
(b)

Petroleum Geology

Most petroleum is found in porous sedimentary rocks several
thousand feet under the surface where organic material deposited
millions of years ago is transformed into oil through long, slow, and
complex chemical changes. The high porosity of sedimentary rocks
(such as sandstone) allows the oil and gas thus formed to migrate
freely until they collect in natural traps sealed by impervious rocks
(such as igneous rock) as a result of crustal movement. Petroleum
traps are of three main types: anticline, fault, and stratigraphic traps.
An oil field is the accumulation of many such traps. The thicker the
sedimentary rock, the greater the potential yield of oil. The most
favorable habitat of petroleum offshore, as onshore, is sedimentary
basins where layers of sediments acquire a thickness of over one km.
Such basins are concentrated along the continental margin, namely,
the shelf, the slope, and the rise.
Past drilling data show that rocks of certain geologic ages are
far more oil-bearing than those of other ages. More than half of the
oil in the world, in fact, is found in rocks of the Cenozoic Era (70
million years ago to the present time), the youngest age in the earth's
history, and especially in rocks of the Tertiary Period (65 to 2 million
years ago). In the Tertiary Period, rocks of the Neogene Epoch (25
to 2 million years ago) account for a large proportion of the world
petroleum production. In general, sedimentary basins of the Tertiary Period are one of the most promising geological environments
for oil.
(c)

Offshore Oil Operation

Petroleum lies hidden under the earth. Except for natural seepage, it cannot be detected from the surface by its physical or chemi-
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cal property. Three scientific methods are currently employed to
prospect for oil from the surface: geological, geophysical, and g~o
chemical methods. The geophysical techniques, such as gravity,
magnetic, and seismic surveys, are the most popular ones. Among
them, the seismic survey, the most expensive and laborious method,
produces the most precise information about the petroleum geology
of the area prospected. Whether oil deposits actually exist, however,
can only be learned by drilling. Offshore oil exploration and production are far more arduous, costly, and risky than those onshore,
the result of the more hostile environment and the ocean engineering
work required. Offshore drilling rigs are supported and/or carried
by fixed or mobile platforms, depending on the water depth at the
drilling site. Drillships, jack-ups, submersibles and semi-submersibles are the commonly used rigs operating throughout the world
today. Current drilling capability may reach more than 6,000 feet
(2, 100 meters) of water, and production capability 980 feet (300 meters). The bulk of offshore drilling and production in the next decade, however, will still take place in waters less than 600 feet deep
(180 meters), the U.S. offshore industry sources predict, unless the
price of crude oil gets to $60 a barrel.
2.

State of Research on East Asia's Seabed

Unlike those of the Persian Gulf and North Sea, the seabed of
the East China Sea was largely neglected in the 1950s and 1960s.
Lack of geological knowledge and regional political stability account
for the inattention. The earliest study was published in 1949 by
American geologists Shepard, Emery, and Gould. 11 Their work was
less useful because it was largely a compilation of data derived from
bottom-sediment notations on navigational chartsP A 1958 study
by Klenova, a Soviet marine geologist who had access to geological
information on the north China seabed prior to the Sino-Soviet rift,
again contained only general discussions.D Not until 1961 did a
II. F.P. Shepard, K.O. Emery, and H.R. Gould, "Distribution of Sediments on East
Asiatic Continental Shelf," Occasional Paper, No. 9, Allan Hancock Fundation, 1949
cited in Hiroshi Niino and K.O. Emery, "Sediments of Shallow Portions of East China
and South China Sea," American Geological Society Bulletin (1961), pp. 731-32, 742-43.
12. This criticism appeared in Yang-chih Huang et al, "Tiao-yu-t'ai Ch'ien-wan
Tiou-pu-teh," (Tens of Thousands of "Noes" to Forsaking the Tiao-yu-t'ais), Ming-pao
Yueh·k'an (Ming-pao Monthly), Vol. 16 (May 1971), pp. 17, 18 [hereinafter cited as
Huang et al (1971)). Mr. Huang got his Ph.D. in geography from Columbia University
in the mid-1970s. Ming-pao Yueh-k'an is a Hong Kong-based, Chinese-language
monthly periodical associated with Ming Pao.
13. M.B. Klenova, "Hai-yang Ti-chih-t'u," (Ocean Bottom Character Chart), Hai-
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more elaborate study come out. This was done by Emery and geologist Niino of Japan. 14 It focused largely on distribution of sediments
of the East China Sea instead of its geological structure and prospects for oil. Only six years later did another effort by them begin to
touch upon petroleum geologyY In 1968, the newly formed Committee for Coordination of Joint Prospecting for Mineral Resources
in Asian Offshore Areas (CCOP [the official acronym]) sponsored,
under the auspices of the U.N. Economic Commission for Asia and
the Far East (ECAFE), a shipbome research program. It was a sixweek geophysical survey in the East China Sea and the Yellow Sea
on board the U.S. R/V R.F. Hunt provided by the U.S. Naval
Oceanographic Office. Its report, written by Emery and scientists
from CCOP member countries, was published in 1969 (hereinafter
referred to as the Emery Report). It contained the most comprehensive data at the time about the East China Sea's geology. Given the
limited time used, the Report has nevertheless to be confirmed by
further seismic surveys and drillings. 16 Its optimistic prediction of
oil deposits in the region 17 has, however, triggered off what one commentator termed the "oil war" in East Asia. 18 Since the Report,
published geological information on the East China Sea has been
scarce.
3.

Regional Geology

A series of parallel northeast-southwest-trending ridges and
sediment-filled depressions outline the East China Sea's regional geology19 (Map 3). Functionally, the ridges serve as tectonic dams to
yang Yu Hu-chao (Oceanologia et Limnologia Sinica), Vol. I (1958), pp. 243-51 (S. Fan
& C. Hsu trans. from Russian).
14. See note II supra.
15. K.O. Emery and Hiroshi Niino, "Stratigraphy and Petroleum Prospects of Korea
Strait and the East China Sea," UNECAFE/CCOP Technical Bulletin, Vol. I (1968), p.
13.
16. K.O. Emery et al, supra note 7, p. 41.
17. For details, see note 38 infra and accompanying text.
18. Choon-ho Park, Continental Shelf Issues in the Yellow-Sea and East China Sea,
Occasional Paper, No. 15, Kingston, Rhode Island: Law of the Sea Institute, University
of Rhode Island, 1972, pp. 3-4, 51 note I [hereinafter cited as Park (1972)]. Dr. Park has
written extensively on problems of East Asian ocean resources, including the seabed controversy under study. The author benefits substantially from his pioneer research in this
area. Part of his analysis remains valid and will be referred to in its place. Part of his
analysis, however, suffers from several drawbacks to be discussed in Chapter 4 infra. In
any event, drastic changes in events and the law of the sea require an updated treatment
of the seabed issues in the East China Sea.
19. K.O. Emery et al, supra note 7, p. 40 (Fig. 17), reproduced as Map 3.
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trap sediments20 derived mostly from China, drained by the Yellow,
Yangtze, and other rivers. 21 In the region, the northwesternmost
ridge is the Fukien-Reinan Massif, a folded zone uplifted during the
Middle to Late Mesozoic Eras (160 to 70 million years ago).2 2 It lies
south to the Yellow sea, trapping, in the Yellow Sea Basin, at least
200,000 cubic km. of sediments23 of Neogene origin. Further down
southeast, the Taiwan-Sinzi Folded Zone coincides with the outer
edge of the vast continental shelf between Taiwan and Japan. 24 The
Zone was formed during the later part of the Tertiary Period25 (60 to
10 million years ago). By damming sediments from the Chinese
mainland the Zone has helped build the present continental shelf
known among geologists as the "Taiwan Basin." Sediments landward of the Zone are estimated at one million cubic km., mostly
Neogene in age. 26 Beyond the Taiwan·Sinzi Folded Zone lies the
Ryukyu Folded Zone with outcropping volcanic islands such as the
Ryukyus. This Zone, believed to have been formed during the Neogene age, 27 has also dammed a continuous belt of sediments in the
Okinawa Trough, 28 the structural depression between the Taiwan·
Sinzi Folded Zone and the Ryukyu Zone. Seaward of the Ryukyu
Folded Zone the seabed slopes downward to a terrace, with thick
sediment, and on to the floor of the Ryukyu Trench, averaging more
than 6,000 meters below sea levei.29 Since the Emery Report made
no mention of the crustal origin of the Okinawa Trough, however, it
is still unclear whether the Trough is a continental or oceanic
structure.

I~

20. For a discussion on how a tectonic dam works, see K.O. Emery, "The Continental Shelves," Scientific American, September 1969, pp. 106, 109-11.
21. The volume of sediments annually discharged from the Yellow and Yangtze rivers is 2,080 and 550 million tons respectively. The two rivers are the first and the fourth
largest contributors of sediments to the ocean in the entire world. See J.N. Holeman,
"The Sediment Yield of Major Rivers of the World," Water Resources Research, Vol. 4
(1968), pp. 737-47, cited in K.O. Emery et al, supra note 7, p. 31.
22. K.O. Emery et al, supra note 7, p. 39. All the geologic times referred to in parenthesis based on Encyclopedia Britannica, Vol. 10 (1973), pp. 161-76; Encyclopedia Americana, int'l ed., Vol. 12 (1974), pp. 462-63; Webster's New World Dictionary ofthe English
Language Unabridged, 1976, p. 949.
23. K.O. Emery et al, supra note 7, p. 31.
24. /hid.. p. 33.
25. /hid.
26. /hid.
27. /hid. p. 38.
28. /hid. p. 35.
29. /hid. p. 38.
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4.

.Distribution

of Sediments

Mud, sand, and their mixture constitute the majority of surface
sediments of the East China Sea. 30 Mud bottom lies close to shore,
followed by sand or mud-and-sand bottoms. Beneath this blanket of
sediment lie the oil-bearing Tertiary strata of the Neogene age. 31
The surface strata are again underlain by Mesozoic and Paleozoic
sedimentary rocks 32 (70 to 620 million years ago). These lowporosity strata often serve as the floor of oil traps. 33
The Neogene strata thicken southwesterly from Tsushima Strait
(between Japan and Korea) to Taiwan. Being less than 200 meters
in thickness in the Strait, the strata's thickness exceeds 2 km. in an
area several times the size of Taiwan (13,948 sq. mi.) located northeast of that island. 34 According to the Emery Report, potential oilbearing features such as anticlines, faults, and unconformities were
found in the Neogene strata. 35 Since sediments landwards of the
Taiwan-Sinzi Folded Zone have filled up the Taiwan Basin and then
surmounted the dam along most of its length, the western slope of
the Okinawa Trough adjacent to the Zone is also rich in sediments
of hydrocarbon potential. The sediments in the Trough exceed 1.2
km. in thickness. 36

D.

Potential for Hydrocarbons

In their 1967 study Emery and Niino concluded that "considered most favorable is the cross-hatch area between Kyushu and
Taiwan, having one reported seep, probably folds.'m In the 1969
Emery Report, they and the others became more specific in the assessment of oil prospects:
The most favorable part of the region for oil and gas is
the 200,000 sq. km. area mostly northeast of Taiwan. Sediment thickness exceeds 2 km., and on Taiwan they reach 9
km., including 5 km. of Neogene sediment. Most of the
sediment fill beneath the continental shelf is believed to be
30. Hiroshi Niino and K.O. Emery, supra note II, pp. 744 (Fig. II), 746 (Fig. 12).
31. K.O. Emery et al, supra note 7, p. 33.
32. K.O. Emery and Hiroshi Niino, supra note 15, p. 19.
33. Petroleum traps such as anticline usually have rocks of low porosity as their
"floor" as well as "ceiling" between which oil, gas, and water collect. See note 10 supra
and the accompanying text.
34. K.O. Emery et al, supra note 7, pp. 33, 35.
35. Ibid, p. 41.
36. Ibid , p. 35.
37. K.O. Emery and Hiroshi Niino, supra note 15, p. 25.
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Neogene in age, ... Nearly all of the oil and gas that is
produced on land in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan comes
from Neogene Strata. A high probability exists that the continental she!f between Taiwan and Japan may be one of the
most prol!fic oil reservoirs in the world. It is also one of the
few large continental shelves of the world that has remained untested by the drill, owing to military and political factors . . . . 38 (emphasis added)
The optimism was shared by some geologists, but challenged by
others? 9 The general consensus seems to support the Emery Report's
appraisal, however. In any event, the Emery Report is, by its own
admission, 40 but the first step toward understanding the oil prospects. No drilling, which would have yielded the most direct information about the undersea petroleum geology, was done in the
survey. Despite this weakness, the Emery Report has generated
much euphoria in capitals of the coastal states. Since then, a number
of Western companies associated with the ROC and the ROK, as
well as the PRC itself, have conducted limited drillings in the Taiwan Strait, southern and northern parts of the East China Sea, and
the eastern section of the Yellow Sea. 41 The results have been carefully guarded by the companies or governments involved. The locations of these drillings suggest, however, that the bulk of the East
China Sea shelf has remained untapped42 due to political factors.
38. Emery eta/., supra note 7, pp. 39, 41. Writing in 1979, Emery still stood by what
he said a decade earlier:
The best prospect for large new petroleum discoveries are [sic] believed to be
the mature and youthful continental margins off eastern Asia and off northern
Asia.
K.O. Emery, "Continental Margins-Classification and Petroleum Prospects," AAPG
Bulletin, Vol. 64 (1980) pp. 297, 309.
39. For a discussion of geologists' reactions to the Emery Report, see Selig S. Harrison, China, Oil and Asia: Conflict Ahead? New York: Columbia University Press, 1977,
pp. 48-52 [hereinafter cited as Harrison].
40. K.O. Emery eta/., supra note 7, p. 51.
41. See Chapter 2 infra.
42. The drilling sites off Taiwan coasts rarely went more than 50 miles offshore. On
the other hand, the PRC's Geology Ministry drilled two exploratory wells in the middle
of the northern part of the East China Sea in February 1981 (Longjing-1), and April
1982 (Longjing-11). The PRC's China National Offshore Oil Company drilled the third
exploration well, Dongtai-1, in 1982 in the same area (Map 10). These were the first wells
the PRC has ever drilled in the East China Sea. Longjing-1 was reported to have tested
2,628 barrels of petroleum per day (BOPD) of high-quality crude. There has been no
confirmation of this, however. Statement of David S. Holland, senior vice president of
Pennzoil, to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on February 24, 1982. United
States-China Economic Relations: A Reappraisal, Washington, D.C.: Government Print-
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The limited understanding of the region's petroleum geology
has not deterred geologists, businessmen, journalists, and even politicians from making estimates of the offshore oil potential of China's
marginal seas. Some figures can be several times larger than others.
For instance, a Japanese Government survey estimated that the oil
deposits in an unidentified area surrounding the Tiao-yu-t'ai Islands
may be as high as 15 billion tons (109.5 billion barrels)43 which alone
exceeds estimates for China's total potential given by others. Here
are some samples of this numbers game:

Estimator (year)

Estimates of China's
Recoverable Offshore
Reserves (billion
barrels)

Soviet geologist F.
Salmanov (1974)44

7.5-11.2

U.S. Major oil
companies (197576)45

10.0-45

Estimator's Own
Remarks

Prof. A.A. Meyerhoff
& Dr. J.O. Willums
(1975, 1979, 1983)46

30-32

Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA)
(1977)47

39

Former U.S.
Secretary of Energy
Schlesinger ( 197 8)48

50

PRC Government
(1981, 1982)49

"pure speculation"
"a subject of
conjecture"

73.7-157.4

(1)

ing Office, April 1982, p. 92; Selig S. Harrison, "Oil Rush in East Asian Waters, Part II:
Claims in Conflict," Asia, July-August, 1982, pp. 8-11; G.L. Fletcher, "Oil and Gas Developments in Far East in 1982: The People's Republic of China," AAPG Bulletin, Vol.
67 (1983), pp. 1896-97.
43. Jan -Olaf Will urns, Prospects for Offshore Oil and Gas Development in the People's
Republic of China, Paper No. 2186, Offshore Technology Conference, Houston, May
1974, 542, cited in Harrison, supra note 39, p. 43.
44. Oil & Gas Journal, October 7, 1974, p. 53.
45. This information was based on interviews conducted by Selig S. Harrison and a
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Here4B,49
These are the total quantities of China's offshore reserves without, except for the Meyerhoff/Willums estimate, a geographical
breakdown. None of them provided the methodology of their estimations, except again the Meyerhoff/Willums estimate. Both the
CIA and Schlesinger estimates were in fact onshore figures adapted
for offshore estimation.
According to Meyerhoff and Willums, the total volume of "economic sediments," i.e., "deposits in which petroleum accumulations
are geologically possible," 50 can be estimated from the information
gathered by companies shooting seismic lines in the East China Sea.
They then compared these data, using a computer simulation model
developed at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, to those
from similar sedimentary basins elsewhere where drilling and oil
production were taking place. The range of hydrocarbon potential
thus could be assessed "within the limits of probability theory." 51
Some of their estimates were as follows. 52

study by Randall W. Hardy (China's Oil Potential). Harrison, supra note 39, pp. 265, 275
n.6.
46. Jan-Olaf Willums, "China's Offshore Petroleum," China Business Review, JulyAugust 1977, pp. 6-14; A.A. Meyerhoff and Jan-OlafWillums, "China's Potential Still A
Guessing Game," Offshore, January 1979, pp. 54, 55-56; A.A. Meyerhoff, "Petroleum in
China's Offshore," Asian Profile, Vol. II, No. I, February, 1983, p. I.
47. Central Intelligency Agency, China: Oil Production Prospects, ER 77-1003 OU,
Arlington, Virginia: Central Intelligence Agency, 1977, p. I.
48. Leonard LeBlanc, "Chinese Officials Ponder Next Move" Offshore, January
1979, pp. 53, 56.
49. Clarence Rivers, "China's 10-billion-tonne Offshore Oil Bananza," Far Eastern
Economic Review, October 2, 1981, p. 57; China Daily, April 10, 1982, p. I. (China Dm{v
is the official English-language newspaper in the PRC); Richard Pascoe, "Foreign Oil
Firms Expecting Long Delays on Bids to China," International Herald Tribune, November 23, 1983, p. 10.
50. Williams, supra note 46, p. 7.
51. Ibid.
52. Ibid., p. 12 (Table 3).
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Area

Total Recoverable
Hydrocarbon
Potential (billions
of barrels)

Total In Place
Hydrocarbon
Potential (billions of
barrels)

Pess. Middle Opt.

Pess. Middle

Opt.

East China Sea
shallow section

0.1

2.1

60.0

0.4

8.5

240.0

East China Sea
deep section

3.7

10.4

175.0

14.8

41.6

700.0

Formosa [Taiwan]
Strait and Taiwan Area

0.8

3.4

7.6

3.2

13.5

30.4

TOTAL

4.6

15.9

242.6

18.4

63.6

970.4

China's total
(emphasis added)

8.7

29.0

283.6

34.8

115.9

1134.9

The hydrocarbon potentials of the East China Sea, the Taiwan
Strait and the Taiwan area combined account for slightly more than
half of China's total potential, if the middle figures are used. By far
the most specific assessment of China's oil potential, the Meyerhoff/
Willums estimate may have been refuted by information from the
PRC's massive geophysical surveys that have taken place since late
1978. 53 But, since drillings in the East China Sea are relatively few,
these figures at least give one a preliminary picture, however sketchy,
of hydrocarbon potentials of the East China Sea. 54

53. Information gathered from these surveys are carefully guarded by the PRC and
the participating Western oil firms. But since the East China Sea is not included in these
massive surveys, the Meyerhoff/Willums estimate will continue to be relevant for the
near future. For a brief discussion of these surveys, see Chapter 2 infra.
54. There have been French, Japanese, and American reports that in view of the
geology of the East China Sea shelf, natural gas is more likely to be found than oil.
Harrison, supra note 39, pp. 53-54.

CHAPTER 2 CLAIMS AND MOVES OF
THE COASTAL STATES
The continental shelf as a geological concept was first used in
1887. 1 Only recently did modem technology permit the exploitation
of seabed petroleum and lawyers begin to pay attention to this vast
submerged land. Prior to 1945, a few states had made continental
shelf claims based on jurisdiction over living resources 2 (free swimming or sedentary) or the contiguity principle associated with the
territorial acquisition of islands. 3 None had ever staked out a general claim to the shelf itself and its living and non-living resources.
One monumental development in the evolution of the continental
shelf as a legal concept was President Truman's 1945 proclamation
on the continental shelF whereby the U.S. asserted 'Jurisdiction and
control" over the natural resources in its adjacent continental shelf
without specifying the seaward extent of such a claim. The proclamation inspired widespread unilateral claims by states over maritime
I. Martinus W. Mouton, The Continental She!f, The Hague: Martinus Nijhotf,
1952, p. 6. But if. Abu Dhabi Arbitral Award (Petroleum Development Ltd. v. Sheikh
Dhabi), International & Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. I (1952), pp. 247, 253 (Lord
Asquith of Bishopstone, the umpire, stated that the term was first used by a geographer
in 1898).
2. In 1910 Portugal issued a decree regulating deep trawling of free-swimming species within the limits of the continental shelf by steam vessels. UNLS/1, p.l9. Ceylon
(now Sri Lanka) promulgated an ordinance in 1925 regulating pearl fisheries (sedentary)
in its adjacent continental shelf, ibid., p. 59. For a discussion, see Edwin J. Cosford, "The
Continental Shelf, 1910-1945," McGill Law Journal, Vol. 4 (1958), pp. 245, 246-53.
3. E.g., Imperial Russia made such a claim in 1916 to islands situated on the "Siberian Continental Upland". The text of the claim appears in W. Lakhtine, Rights over the
Arctic (Moscow, 1928), referred to in W. Lakhtine, "Rights Over the Arctic," American
Journal ofInternational Law, Vol. 24 (1930), pp. 703, 708. For a discussion, see Cosford,
supra note 2, p. 249. In 1942, Great Britain and Venezuela divided and annexed the
submarine areas of the Gulf of Paria by a treaty. See UNLS/1, p. 44. The treaty simply
divided the seabed in the Gulf beyond the parties' territorial seas with no general claim
to these areas or the natural resources contained therein.
4. Presidential Proclamation No. 2667, September 28, 1945, Federal Register, Vol.
10, p. 12302; Code of Federal Regulations, Vol. 3 (1943-48), p. 67; United States Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 13 (1945), p. 485. Due to its novelty, the Truman Proclamation was not considered to have been based on any recognized or established rules of
international law; neither was it counter to any such rules. Rather, as its preamble
showed, it was prompted simply by practical economic considerations. See F.A. Vallat,
"Continental Shelf," British Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 23 (1946), pp. 333, 334;
Edwin Borchard, "Resources of the Continental Shelf," American Journal ofInternational
Law, Vol. 40 (1946), pp. 53, 59, 60; Joseph W. Bingham, "The Continental Shelf and the
Marginal Belt," ibid., Vol. 42, pp. 173, 174, 177.

(23)
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areas of various depths, distances from shore, and legal characters. 5
The United Nations International Law Commission (ILC) in
1949 began to consider the question of the continental shelf. 6 Two
years later, it adopted, in its third session, a draft on the regime of
the continental shelf with a commentary which was then circulated
to member states for comment. 7 Upon the ILC's recommendation,
the U.N. General Assembly convened the first United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS I) at Geneva in 1958, with
86 states represented. 8 The Conference adopted four conventions, 9
including the Convention on the Continental Shelf (hereinafter the
Shelf Convention) based on the ILC's draft. Among the coastal
states in the East China Sea, the ROC, Japan, and the ROK attended the Conference, but only the ROC signed the Shelf Convention.10 No shelf claim was made by any of the coastal states, except
5. For national claims made prior to 1951, see UNLS/l, pp. 3-38.
6. Yearbook of International Law Commission, 1949, pp. 235-237 [hereinafter cited
as YBILC].
7. For the draft articles on the continental shelf, see ILC Report to the General
Assembly, UNGAOR, Vol. 6, Supplement No.9, UN Doc. A/1858 (1951), p. 17, reprinted in YBILC (1951), Vol. 2, p. 141. UN Doc. A/CN 4/SER. A/1951/Add. I. For
the comments of governments, see ILC Report to the General Assembly, UNGAOR,
Vol. 8, Supplement No. 9, UN Doc. A/2456 (1953), p. 42, reprinted in YBILC (1953),
Vol. 2, p. 241, UN Doc. A/CN. 4/SER. A/1953/Add. I.
8. For the General Assembly resolution concerning the Conference, see UNCLOS
I, Official Records, Vol. 2, p. xi, UN Doc. A/CONF. 13/38 (1958). The list of delegations
appears in ibid , p. xiii.
9. The four conventions are: the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, UST, Vol. 15, p. 1606; TIAS, No. 5639; UNTS, Vol. 516, p. 205, the Convention on the High Seas, UST, Vol. 13, p. 2312; TIAS, No. 5200; UNTS, Vol. 450, p. 82, the
Convention on the Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas,
UST, Vol. 17, p. 138; TIAS, No. 5960; UNTS, Vol. 559, p. 285, and the Convention on
the Continental Shelf, UST, Vol. 15, p. 471; TIAS, No. 5578; UNTS, Vol. 449, p. 311.
10. Supra note 8, pp. xv, xix. The ROC ratified the Shelf Convention 12 years later.
See text accompanying notes 89-91 infra. On October 25, 1971, the PRC took over the
ROC's seat at the U.N. under General Assembly Resolution 2758 (XXVI). In a communication to the U.N. Secretary-General who performs depository functions for multilateral treaties including the Shelf Convention, the PRC denounced as illegal and null and
void all the ROC's signatures and ratifications of and accessions to these multilateral
treaties. The PRC further stated that it would study these treaties before deciding
whether to accede to them. United Nations Secretariat, Multilateral Treaties in Respect of
Which the Secretary-General Performs Depository Functions, List of Signatures, Ratifications, Accessions, etc. As at December 31, 1978, pp. iii, iv, UN Doc. ST /LEG/SER.D/12
( 1979) (hereinafter cited as UN Multilateral Treaties]. Since none of the other coastal
states are parties to the Shelf Convention, the question whether the ROC may invoke its
provisions as against Japan or the ROK, despite the PRC's denunciation, is moot.
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the ROK, 11 until 1969, when the Emery Report came out.
None of the coastal states in the East China Sea, except the
PRC, produces enough oil to meet its energy demands. But Japan,
the ROK, and the ROC all fuel their booming economies with oil,
more than 98 rercent of which has to be imported from abroad for
each of them. 2 Against this background, the wave of conflicting
claims and actions by them following the publication of the Emery
Report came as no surprise. The soaring oil prices since the early
1970s helped intensify the competition.
In a strict legal sense, all coastal states but Japan have made
formal continental shelf claims. 13 They have also granted concessions14 to domestic or foreign oil companies for surveys, exploration,
II. On January 18, 1952, the ROK asserted, in a presidential proclamation, its sovereignty over the "shelf adjacent to the peninsular and insular coasts of the national territory, no matter how deep it may be," and the natural resources contained therein. The
proclamation also delineated, subject to future changes, a zone of "control and protection" of natural resources under the ROK's sovereignty. The zone included the seabed
off North Korean coasts in the Yellow Sea and the Sea of Japan. The ROK obviously
acted as if it had sovereignty over all Korea in making this claim. In the East China Sea
(Map 5), the zone (area within the broken line) is much smaller than the zone delineated
18 years later. Text of the proclamation appears in UNLS/6, p. 30, reprinted in UNLS/8,
p. 14.
The claim has not been formally repealed. Neither was it alluded to in later legislation dealing with the same subject, however. Infra, text accompanying notes 17-19.
While Dr. Park made no mention of it in his 1972 article, supra Chapter I, note 18, Oda,
a Japanese writer and now judge of the International Court of Justice, was unsure of its
validity. Shigeru Oda, "The Delimitation of the Continental Shelf in Southeast Asia and
the Far East," Ocean Management, Vol. I (1973), pp. 327, 346 [hereinafter cited as Oda
(1973)].
12. Producing no oil at all, the ROK depends 100 percent on imports. G.L. Fletcher,
"Petroleum Developments in Far East in 1979: South Korea," AAPG Bulletin, Vol. 64
( 1980), pp. 1893, 1896 (Table I).
In 1979, Japan produced 9,836 barrels of petroleum per day (BOPD). roughly 0.2
percent of its oil demands. Ibid, p. 1896. The ROC's oil production (3,980 BOPD) is
about 1.2 percent of its needs. Ibid; Lien-ho Pao, August 21, 1979, p.l.
13. Coastal states in disputed areas are often reluctant to spell out their claims in
detail. The South China Sea and the Aegean Sea are good examples. For the former, see
Hungdah Chiu and Choon-ho Park," Legal Status of the Paracel and Spratly Islands,"
Ocean Development and International Law Journal, Vol. 3 (1974), p. 3, and Hungdah
Chiu, "South China Sea Islands: Implications for Delimiting the Seabed and Future
Shipping Routes," China Quarterly, No. 72 (December 1978), p. 742.
For the latter, see Ying-jeou Ma et al, Greek-Turkish Conflict over the Continental
She!f ofthe Aegean Sea: An Analysis of the Problem and a Proposed Solution (May 1978)
(unpublished paper written under the supervision of the late Prof. R.R. Baxter of the
Harvard Law School). The ROK's present concessions are not necessarily its maximum
claim. Harrison, supra chapter I, note 39, p. 46 (Fig. 7).
14. The distinction between a claim and a concession is worth noting. As used here, a
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and exploitation. For the purpose of this study, the Japanese concession areas are regarded as the extent of its continental shelf claim.
Presented below is an examination of these unilateral claims and actions. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), better
known as North Korea, has no coastal front in the East China Sea
and only will be referred to when necessary.
A.

The Republic of Korea

1.

Claims and Concession Areas

The ROK was quick in translating euphoria into action. Five
months after the CCOP survey ended, but before the Emery Report
came out, Gulf oil obtained two offshore concessions 15 (Map 4).
Shell, Socal/Texaco (Caltex), and Wendell Phillips followed in line
within 17 months} 6 Of the seven concessions, Blocks K-4, K-5, and
K-7 are in the East China Sea and of primary interest. The ROK
concluded the oil contracts with foreign oil firms in such haste that
its governing laws came out only after the contracts had been signed.
The Submarine Mineral Resources Development Law took effect in
January 1970 in which a general claim was made to the continental
shelf "adjacent to the coasts of the Korean Peninsula and its ancilclaim denotes a state's assertion of exclusive sovereign rights over the natural resources
in its adjacent continental shelf. A concession means a grant, made by a government to a
concessionaire, typically a private or state-owned company, to explore a portion of the
continental shelf and/or exploit its natural resources. The legal mechanism for exploration and production of oil takes various contractual forms ranging from traditional concessions, joint ventures and production sharing contracts, to service contracts. The
seabed under a concession is referred to as a "concession area (block or zone)" A state
may not grant an area larger than its claimed continental shelf to concessionaires
whereas a concession granted implies that a claim exists at least to the extent of the
concession. A claim may be implicit and has to be ascertained by concessions actually
granted. As used here, the terms "seabed", "shelf', and "continental shelf' are
interchangeable.
15. The concession areas of Gulf and others in 1970 were as follows:
Operator

Block(s)

Area (km2jmi.2)

Date Granted

4-15-69
70,000/27,000
K-2,K-4
Gulf
K-3,K-6
1-28-70
70,000/27,000
Shell
K-l,K-5
2-27-70
80,000/30,000
Caltex
Wendell
Phillips
K-7
59,000/23,000
9-24-70
J.J. Tanner and W.E. Kennett, "Petroleum Development in Far East in 1971: South
Korea," AAPG Bulletin, Vol. 56 (1972), pp. 1823, 1845 (Table II). Slight changes have
been made from the original table. For the status of these concession blocks as of December 31, 1982, see Map 5 and Table in the Appendix.
16. Ibid
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lary islands." 17 A Presidential Decree delineating the seven blocks
was promulgated in May 1970. 18 Finally, an enforcement regulation
came into effect a year later. 19
2.

Principles

of International Law Employed

Just a few months before the ROK acted, the International
Court of Justice (ICJ) at the Hague handed down the decision of the
North Sea Continental She!f Cases ,20 the first of the only three judicial decisions to date on seabed delimitation. The equidistance principle, a cornerstone of Article 6 of the Shelf Convention,2 1 was not
regarded as a mandatory rule of customary international law in continental shelf delimitation, particularly between adjacent states.Z 2
The Court considered the principle inequitable because of the distorting effect it might give to individual geographical features. 23
Rather, the Court stressed that a
delimitation is to be effected by agreement in accordance
with equitable principles and taking account of all the relevant circumstances in such a way as to leave as much as
possible to each party all those parts of the continental
shelf that constitute a natural prolongation of its land territory into and under the sea without encroachment on the
natural prolongation of the land territory of the other . . .
(emphasis added) 24
The significance of this new principle of "natural prolongation
of land territory" was certainly not lost in the ROK. The geomorphology of the East China Sea was such that application of this principle would be advantageous to the ROK vis-a-vis Japan. 25 The
17. Korean Petroleum Industry Development Center, The Law for Development of
Submarine Mineral Resources, Seoul, 1971, p. 55 (Korean-English bilingual pamphlet in
the author's possession).
18. Ibid, p. 70. The geographical coordinates of the area delineated in the Presidential Decree were quoted in toto in Oda (1973), supra note II, p. 327.
19. Korean Petroleum Industry Development Center, supra note 17, p. 80.
20. I.C.J. Reports 1969, p. 3.
21. Article 6 of the Shelf Convention is quoted in Chapter 4 infra.
22. I.C.J. Reports 1969, pp. 41, 45, 46.
23. Ibid, p. 17.
24. Ibid, p. 53.
25. The ICJ noted, without pronouncing the status of the Norwegian Trough, that
the shelf areas in the North Sea separated from the Norwegian coast by the 80100 kilometres of the Trough cannot in any physical sense be said to be adjacent to it, nor to be its natural prolongation. (emphasis added)
Ibid, p. 32.
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ROK can justifiably argue that Japan's continental shelf jurisdiction
ends at the Okinawa Trough so that Japan may not "jump" over the
Trough to claim the vast shelf on the other side. The ROK has, in
fact, officially advocated this legal position at UNCLOS IIP 6 On
the other hand, the flat and uninterrupted bottom of the Yellow Sea
(Map 1) neutralized the thrust of this principle because the seabed
may be regarded as the natural prolongation of China's as well as
Korea's territories. An equidistance (median-line) boundary seems
justified by the predominantly opposite-coast situation. 27
Against this background lies the legal rationale of the ROK's
claim and concessions. For Blocks K-1 to K-4 (Map 4) facing
China, the equidistance principle must have been the governing rule.
Cheju and other islands along the coast apparently have been used
as basepoints. This presumably is justified in view of their proximity
to shore and the ROK's straight baseline system declared in 1978. 28
While Block K-5 needs no international delimitation (Map 4), Block
K-6 seems also to have entailed the equidistance principle.
Block K-7 is far more complex in delineation. Geographically,
it stretches far south into the East China Sea; its southern tip lies 330
miles from Cheju, the nearest ROK basepoint. In the north, a 12mile zone is allowed for Japan's Danjo Gunto and Tori Shima. 29
Geomorphologically, the block goes beyond the 200-meter isobath
(dotted line in Map 5), which bisects the block, all the way to the
middle of the Okinawa Trough where the water averages 900 meters
26. Statement of Mr. Song (ROK). UNCLOS III, Official Records, Vol. I (1975), p.
90.
27. The ICJ said in dictum that:
The continental shelf area off, and dividing opposite states, can be claimed by
each of them to be a natural prolongation of its territory. These prolongations
meet and overlap, and can therefore only be delimited by means of a median line
.. (emphasis added)
I.C.J. Reports 1969, p. 36.
28. The ROK declared a 12-mile territorial sea in April 1978 and promulgated a
system of straight baselines in September that year. "Straight Baselines: Republic of
Korea," Limits in the Seas, No. 82 (January 23, 1979), p. 3. Cheju Island is 48 miles off
the nearest Korean mainland shore but less than 20 miles from the nearest point (Point
13) on the straight baselines (Map 5). The whole Cheju Strait, the water body between
Cheju Island and the Korean mainland, thus has come under the ROK's territorial jurisdiction. Treating Cheju Island as part of the Korean Peninsula in determining the
ROK's continental shelf seems to present a strong case. For an earlier study on the
ROK's islands, see Donald R. Allen and Patrick H. Mitchell, "The Legal Status of the
Continental Shelf of East China Sea," Oregon Law Review, Vol. 51 (1972), pp. 789, 80102 [hereinafter cited as Allen & Mitchell (1972)).
29. At the time Japan only claimed a 3-mile territorial sea. "National Claims to
Maritime Jurisdictions," Limits in the Seas, No. 36 (December 23, 1975), p. 109.
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in depth (Map 1). The block thus sits on two distinct geomorph~lo.g
ical provinces: the shelf and the Trough. Apparently, the eqmdtstance principle fails to explain the block's location. To go beyond
the geological shelf into an area on the Japanese side of a hypothetical median line drawn regardless of the Okinawa Trough, the Natural prolongation principle must have been employed. Two questions
arise. First, as the block's eastern side largely follows the mid-channel line of the Okinawa Trough, did the ROK apply the thalweg
principle30 by analogy? There seems to be no obvious answer. Second, the block enters an area where the maritime boundaries of
China, Japan, and Korea would converge. The area lies off rather
than between the coasts of China and Korea, to paraphrase the
words of the United Kingdom's counsel in the 1977 Anglo-French
Continental Shelf Arbitration 31 (Map 14) where an analogous situation existed. 32 Are the coasts opposite or adjacent to each other? Or
neither? The ROK seemed to have treated it, as the Anglo-French
Court of Arbitration has done, as an "opposite" situation and applied the equidistance principle accordingly in delineating Block K-7
and, perhaps, part of Block K-4 as well.
In sum, given disparate geophysical environments, the ROK has
relied on the natural prolongation principle vis-a-vis Japan and the
equidistance principle in relation to China. Coastal islands have
been used as basepoints whereas uninhabited mid-ocean islets were
only accorded a 12-mile zone.
3.

Offshore Exploration

Wendell Phillips, a large independent oil firm, 33 "farmed out," 34
30. Under the principle the mid-channel line of a navigable boundary river is the
international boundary between two riparian states. See generally L. Oppenheim, International Law, 8th ed., H. Lauterpacht ed., London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1955, p.
484.
31. The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the French
Republic Delimitation ofthe Continental She(( Arbitration of 10 July 1975; Decision of 30
June 1977 and Decision of 14 March 1978 (Interpretation of the 1977 Decision), Cmd.
7439, March 1979, reprinted in International Legal Materials, Vol. 18 (1979), p. 494
[Judge Waldock's separate opinion and Judge Briggs' dissenting opinion on the second
decision excluded in the reprint] [hereinafter cited as the Anglo-French Award].
32. The analogous area referred to is the "Atlantic region" Anglo-French Award,
para. 89-98. For details, see Chapter 5 infra.
33. In world oil business, the seven giant oil companies, or the "Seven Sisters" are
usually referred to as "majors" whereas smaller companies are known as "independents". The "Seven Sisters" are: Exxon (U.S.), Royal Dutch/Shell (U.K. and the Netherlands), Mobil (U.S.), BP (U.K.), Texaco (U.S.), and Gulf (U.S.). For a historical
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at an early stage, 90 percent of its interest to Korean American Oil
(Koam), a Korean-U.S. joint venture newly established to explore
Block K-7. That block was wholly included in the Japan-ROK Joint
Development Zone (JDZ) to be discussed infra. Caltex (Block K-1
and K-5) conducted seismic surveys in both blocks but was prevented by the State Department from drilling in the politically sensitive Block K-1. 35 Hostility which Gulf and others actually
encountered in the same region served as a further deterrent. 36
Caltex drilled a dry hole in Block K-5 before relinquishing to the
ROK all but part of Block K-5 of its concessions in 1976. 37 Gulfs
two blocks (K-2 and K-4), said to be promising in the Emery Report,
were all in the sensitive area opposite the PRC. Gulf has experienced extensive sabotage by Peking's "fishing" vessels, in addition
to repeated warnings. The company drilled three dry holes during
1972-73 before relinquishing its concessions in 1975; part of Block
K-4 was later granted in August 1981 to Zapata Oil which did some
drillings in 1983.38
account, see Anthony Sampson, The Seven Sisters: The Great Oil Companies and the
World They Shaped, New York: Viking Press, 1975, pp. 5-17, 32-42.
34. To "farm out", in American oil business jargon, means to assign the whole or a
part of a lease (here the concession) by the lessee (here the concessionaire) not interested
in drilling at the time to another operator or operators who are. R.D. Langenkemp,
Handbook of Oil Industry Terms and Phrases, Tulsa, Okla.: The Petroleum Publishing
Company, 1974, p. 47.
35. Harrison writes,
(T]he State Department was instructed to inform oil company representatives in
Washington and U.S. embassies throughout Asia that the American posture in
disputes relating to oil survey operations would thereafter not only be one of
scrupulous noninvolvement but of active discouragement. If American companies nonetheless conducted survey operations in disputed areas they would do
so at their own risk. They were not to use U.S.-ftag survey vessels or drilling
rigs; not to employ U.S. citizens in the crews of such vessels; not to use classified
U.S. technical equipment that might fall into the hands of other military forces;
and not to expect cooperation in using U.S. satellites for navigation purposes.
Harrison, supra chapter I, note 39, pp. 5-6. This policy was made public in a formal
State Department announcement. Murray Marder, "U.S. Cautions Oil Seekers near
China," Washington Post, April 10, 1971, p. I.
36. Since 1971, floating tracer cables used in surveys in the Yellow Sea have been
systematically cut by armed PRC fishing vessels. Gulf in March encountered PRC missile gunboats which remained nearby for three days. Harrison, supra chapter I, note 39,
p. 130.
37. William R. Scheidecker, "Petroleum Developments in Far East in 1976: South
Korea," AAPG Bulletin, Vol. 61 (1977), p. 1837. The part of Block K-5 that was not
relinquished is in part covered by the JDZ.
38. William R. Scheidecker, "Petroleum Developments in Far East in 1975: Republic
of Korea," AAPG Bulletin, Vol. 60 (1976), p. 1912; G.L. Fletcher, "Oil and Gas Developments in Far East in 1981: South Korea," AAPG Bulletin, Vol. 67 (1983), pp. 1897-98.

SEABED BouNDARY DELIMITATION

4.

31

Joint Development with Japan

Frustrated by its experience with the U.S. oil companies that
were vulnerable to political pressure, the ROK became enthusiastic
about joint development with Japan in the area claimed by both
countries. Negotiation with Japan began in late 1972 and was consummated, despite protests from China (the PRC and the ROC) 39
and North Korea, 40 in January 1974, with the signing of two agreements. The first dealt with delimitation of the continental shelf
boundary in the Korea Strait. 41 The other was the Japan-ROK Joint
Development Agreement under which the JDZ was established and
the seabed dispute was shelved. 42 While the ROK parliament
quickly approved the treaty in December 1974, it took the Japanese
Diet more than three years to do the same, mainly due to domestic
political infighting. 43 The PRC protested again, 44 accusing Japan
and the ROK of infringing upon China's sovereignty. Seoul and Tokyo exchanged instruments of ratification in June 1978.45 Despite its
expected third protest, 46 the PRC took no retaliatory action against
Japan nor linked the issue with the pending friendship treaty. 47
The JDZ, located entirely on the Japanese side of the JapanROK hypothetical median line (Map 1), was divided fm1her, under
39. Peking Review, February 8, 1974, p. 3. The ROC also made it clear on February
14, 1974 that it reserved all its rights in the continental shelf of the East China Sea.
"Continental Shelf Rights Reserved," Free China Weekly, February 17, 1984, p. I. For a
discussion, see infra Chapter 3.
40. Korean Central News Agency (Pyongyang), February 3, 1974.
41. Agreement between Japan and the Republic of Korea Concerning the Boundary
in the Northern Part of the Continental Shelf Adjacent to the Two Countries, February
5, 1974, NDLOS, Vol. 4 (1975), p. 113; "Continental Shelf Boundary and Joint Development Zone: Japan-Republic of Korea," Limits in the Seas, No. 75, September 2, 1977,
pp. 1-3.
42. Agreement between Japan and the Republic of Korea Concerning Joint Development of the Southern Part of the Continental Shelf Adjacent to the Two Countries,
February 5, 1974, NDLOS Vol. 4 (1975), pp. 117-33; Limits in the Seas, No. 75, September 2, 1977, pp. 12-33.
43. For the pros and cons in Japan, see Susumu Awanohara, "Oil Pact Delay Upsets
Seoul," Far Eastern Economic Review, May 13, 1977, p. 25; Sarn-O Kim, "The Resentful
Land of the (Not So) Morning Calm," ibid., June 4, 1977, pp. 55-56.
44. The PRC first warned, on May 27, 1977, the Japanese not to ratify the agreement,
Peking Review, June 3, 1977, p. 7, and then lodged a "serious protest" with Tokyo after
the agreement was ratified, declaring the agreement "entirely illegal and null and void",
ibid., June 17, 1977, pp. 16-17.
45. Junnosuke Ofusa, "Japan-South Korea Oil Treaty Ratified," New York Times,
June 15, 1978, p. Dll.
46. Peking Review, June 30, 1978, p. 25.
47. Junnosuke Ofusa, supra note 45.
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the agreement, into nine subzones along the boundaries of existing
Korean and Japanese concession blocks (Map 6). 48 Subzones 5, 6, 7,
8, and 9 overlap with areas claimed by the ROC and the PRC. The
Western oil firms which left reluctantly in 1976 or earlier came back,
applying anew for mining rights in the JDZ. 49 So did Japanese firms
which had concessions there. 50 Thus far, the exploration right to
Subzone 7, the largest, has been awarded to Koam on behalf of the
ROK whereas exploitation rights, upon commercial discovery, will
be exercised by Nippon Oil, representing Japan. 51 The Japan-ROK
Joint Commission, an overseeing body set up under the agreement,
has worked out similar arrangements in Subzones 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6
(Map 6). 52 These opposite combinations of oil companies representing the interests of the ROK and Japan are intended to balance conflicting national interests in an intergovernmental joint venture.
Regardless of these arrangements, all natural resources extracted
and all costs incurred are to be equally divided. 53 Full-scale exploration was begun in September 1979. 54 By mid-1983, two exploratory wells had been spudded in Subzone 7, again over the PRC's
protest. 5 5
B.

Japan

Japan was the first in East Asia to appreciate the potential of
seabed oit.5 6 The Ryukyu Islands' return to Japan by the U.S. in
1972 was reportedly accelerated under Japanese pressure due in part
to the islands' strategic location. 57 The hitherto little known Tiao48. See Article III and the Appendix of the Agreement, supra note 42.
49. Junnosuke Ofusa, supra note 45. The Western majors in fact pushed the conclusion of the agreement so that they could go ahead with drilling.
50. Ibid.
51. Ron Richardson, "South Korea Poised to Drill," Far Eastern Economic Review,
September 14, 1979, p. 63.
52. Art. XXIV of the Agreement.
53. Art. IX.
54. Ron Richardson, supra note 51.
55. Petroleum Economist, August 1980, p. 357; G.L. Fletcher, supra note 38, p. 2373;
G.L. Fletcher, "Oil and Gas Developments in Far East in 1982: South Korea," AAPG
Bulletin, Vol. 67 ( 1983 ), pp. 1897-98. The PRC's protest appeared in Beijing Review, May
19, 1980, pp. 6-7.
56. The Japanese conducted preliminary drilling near the Tiao-yu-t'ais and almost
found gas during World War II. Harrison, supra Chapter I, note 39, p. 174.
57. See Tao Cheng, "The Sino-Japanese Dispute over the Tiao-yu-t'ai (Senkaku)
Islands and the Law of Territorial Acquisition," Virginia Journal of International Law,
Vol. 14 (1974), pp. 221, 242 note 67 [hereinafter cited as Cheng (1974)]. Japan was vested
with so-called "residual sovereignty" over the Ryukyu Islands. For details of the back-
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yu-t'ais, sitting atop the oil-rich shelf, became the focus of a bitter
territorial dispute between Japan and China (the ROC and the
PRC). Japan also found itself unable to accept the ROK's extensive
offshore claims. The year 1972 witnessed certain significant changes.
Japan and the ROK began negotiating a joint development program
in the disputed area. Meanwhile, Tokyo's establishment of diplomatic ties with Peking in September 1972 not only shelved the explosive territorial issue but also paved the way for oil imports from the
PRC. 58 It was thereafter politically undesirable and economically
unnecessary for Japan to continue an ambitious oil hunt in the troubled East China Sea.

1.

Claims and Concession Areas

Japan thus far has made no official seabed claim to the East
China Sea. The Japanese Government, however, has asserted or defended its de facto claims and concessions in a variety of ways. For
instance, in a diplomatic note to the ROC on July 18, 1970, 59 ten
days before Gulf signed the oil exploration contract with CPC, 60 Japan stated that the ROC's concession zones located between Japan
(including the Tiao-yu-t'ais, according to the Japanese) and Taiwan
were unilateral and invalid under international law. The position
was made public in August of that year by Japanese Foreign Minister Aichi in the Diet. 61 In October, talks were held between the
ROC's acting Foreign Minister and the Japanese Ambassador. 62
The latter reportedly defended Japanese concessions in the disputed
area63 and proposed a transitional arrangement pending formal neground, see generally Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Okinawa Reversion
Treaty: Hearing on Exec. J 92-1 (The Agreement between the United Stales of America
and Japan Concerning the Ryukyu Islands and the Dailo Island), 92nd Cong., 1st Session,
1971.
58. Japan began importing crude oil from the PRC in May 1973. A long-term trade
agreement concluded in 1978 called for importation of 47.1 million tons (344 million
barrels) of oil during 1978-85, New York Times, February 17, 1978, p. 8. The agreement
was later extended to 1990.
59. See Hungdah Chiu, "Tiao-yu-t'ai Lieh-yu Wen-t'i Yen-chiu'· (A Study of the
Tiao-yu-t'ai Islands Problem], Cheng-la Fa-hsueh P'ing-lun, (Chengchi Law Review),
Vol. 6 (1972), pp. I, 3 [hereinafter cited as Chiu (1972)]. This article was the definitive
work on the Tiao-yu-t'ais dispute at the time. The source of this particular information
was identified as "reliable sources", ibid, p. 3, n.l8.
60. Infra text accompanying notes 112.
61. Chung-yang Jih-pao, August II, 1970, p. I.
62. Chiu (1972), supra note 59, pp. 4, 21-22.
63. See Park (1972), supra Chapter I, note 18, p. 13.
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gotiation. 64 Japan reiterated this flexible stand later in December
1971.65 As if to show that flexibility did not mean weakness. Japan
was firm in preventing Gulfs planned survey near the Tiao-yu-t'ais
in mid-1972. 66 Japan's reactions to the ROK's claims ran along similar lines, 67 except for the added complication of a territorial dispute
with the ROC and the PRC. By concluding the Joint Development
Agreement, Japan and the ROK did not fail to stress that their respective sovereign rights in the JDZ remained unaffected. 68
West Japan Oil, a Shell/Mitsubishi joint venture, filed the first
concession application in 1967 (J-4 in Maps 4, 7, and 8). 69 The block
was only marginally relevant here (Map 4). West Japan obtained
more concessions in the Okinawa Trough (J-3c in Maps 7 and 8) and
beyond, the bulk of which were assigned in 1977 to New West Japan
oil (Map 8), a joint venture of Mitsubishi, Shell, and the government-owned Japan Petroleum Development Corporation (JPDC,
renamed Japan National Oil Corporation (JNOC) in June 1978). 70
Part of the West Japan blocks (J-4 and J-3c) was later included in
the JDZ (Subzones 1 and 9 in Map 6). The second concession application was made by Nippon Oil in 1968 for a block (J-3 in Maps 4, 7,
and 8) of 50,312 sq. km. immediately south of the West Japan
block. 71 The bulk of the Nippon block later became Subzones 4, 5,
and 7 of the JDZ (Map 6).
In 1969, Teikoku Oil applied for a concession block (J-2 in
Maps 4, 7, and 8) south of the Nippon zone (Map 7). 72 Subsequently, Teikoku, joined by Gulf, applied for vast areas along the
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Chiu (1972), supra note 59, pp. 25-26.
Ibid.

Harrison, supra Chapter I, note 39, pp. 178-79.
Park (1972), supra Chapter I, note 18, p. 20.
Japan-ROK Joint Development Agreement, supra note 42, Art. XXVIII.
Howard W. Dalton, "Petroleum Developments in Far East in 1967: Japan,''
AAPG Bulletin, Vol. 52 (1968), pp. 1585, 1587.
70. New West Japan Petroleum Development Company was formed to accommodate financing by the Japanese Government through JPDC. Japan Petroleum Consultants, Ltd., Japan Petroleum and Energy Yearbook 1978, (Tokyo, 1978), pp. T-Ill, T-112
[hereinafter cited as Japan Petroleum Yearbook (1978)). For the renaming of JPDC to
JNOC, see the Japanese National Committee of the World Petroleum Congress, The
Petroleum Industry in Japan 1978, (Tokyo, 1979), p. 2.
71. Howard D. Dalton, "Petroleum Development in the Far East in 1968: Japan,''
AAPG Bulletin, Vol. 53 (1969), p. 1801. But Nippon Oil claimed that it first applied for a
permit as early as 1958. Japan Petroleum Yearbook, supra note 70, p. T -107. The acreage figures in these sources (and within the same source) are also slightly different. Here
the figure in the September 1972 issue of AAPG Bulletin is adopted.
72. Wilson Humphrey, "Petroleum Development in Far East [in 1969): Japan,"
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Okinawa Trough and around the Ryukyus. Teikoku's block J-3 was
later covered by the JDZ. Among Japanese firms, Teikoku has the
largest concession area in the East China Sea. Also in 1969, JPDC
approached the Ryukyu authorities, then under U.S. administration,
for leasing 25,000 sq. km. of seabed (J-1 in Map 4) 180 miles west of
the Ryukyus and 108 miles from Taiwan (Map 4). 73 The JPDC zone
was later enlarged and divided among Uruma (J-1a), Japan Petroleum Exploration Company (Japex, J-lb), and Alaska (J-1c) (Maps
7 and 8).
The status of some of these concession blocks remains unclear. 74
For the purpose of this study, they are treated as representing the de
facto Japanese claim to the East China Sea.
2.

Principles

of International Law Employed

Despite the absence of an official seabed claim to the East
China Sea, Japan nevertheless made public its positions on continental shelf issues in general. In 1973, Japan submitted to the U.N.
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Seabed and the Ocean Floor
beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction (hereinafter the Seabed
Committee) a preliminary proposal on "Principles on the Delimitation of the Coastal Seabed Area." 75 Revised Draft Articles on the
same subject were proposed during the second session of UNCLOS
III at Caracas. The Draft Articles, in which Japan's adherence to the
equidistance principle was obvious, provided, inter alia:
2. The outer limit of the continental shelf (the coastal seabed area) shall not exceed a maximum distance of 200 nautical miles from the baseline for measuring the breadth of
the territorial sea as set out in . . .
3. (a) Where the coasts of two or more States are adjaAAPG Bulletin, Vol. 54 (1970), p. 1561; Wilson Humphrey, "Petroleum Development in
Far East in 1970: Japan," AAPG Bulletin, Vol. 55 (1971), pp. 1647, 1648.
73. Wilson Humphrey, "Petroleum Developments in Far East [in 1969]: Japan,"
supra note 72, p. 1561.
74. Before 1972, all the concessions had been regarded as "under application" Park
(1972), supra Chapter I, note 18, p. 13; J.J. Tanner and W.E. Kennett, "Petroleum Developments in Far East in 1971: Japan," AAPG Bulletin, Vol. 56 (1972), pp. 1828, 1843
(Table 5). But as late as 1977, the Japex sector, for instance, was referred to as "provisional" whereas the Teikoku and Uruma blocks were marked "letter of intent area" in
Map 8. This author's inquiries to JNOC (Washington office) and the Japanese embassy
in Washington in late 1979 got nowhere. The information black-out was obviously
prompted by the sensitivity of the matter.
75. Japan: Principles on the delimitation of the coastal sea-bed area, UN Doc. A/
AC.l38/SC.II/L.56 (1973), Seabed Committee Report, Vol. 3 (1973), p. Ill.
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cent or opposite to each other, the delimitation of the
boundary of the continental shelf (the coastal seabed area)
appertaining to such States shall be determined by agreement between them, taking into account the principle of
equidistance.
(b) Failing such agreement, no State is entitled to extend its sovereign rights over the continental she!f (the coastal
seabed area) beyond the median line, every point of which is
equidistant from the nearest points of the baselines, continental or insular, from which the breadth of the territorial
sea of each State is measured. (emphasis added). 76
Another important element in seabed delimitation is the selection of basepoints. It is not uncommon for two opposite states adhering to the same equidistance principle to disagree considerably on
the basepoints from which the equidistance line is to be drawn. 77
Tiny islands situated midway or on the "wrong" side of the hypothetical median line are one of the best examples. The regime of
islands (i.e., definition and status) was debated at length in the Caracas session of UNCLOS III, where Japan declared that it favored,
in principle, an equal treatment of islands, islets, and continents regarding their entitlement to seabed rights. 78 Article 3(b) of the Draft
Articles quoted above indicated the same position of Japan.
Delimitation of the West Japan blocks in the Korea Strait (J-4)
and Okinawa Trough (J-3c) clearly relied, in relation to Korea and
China, on the equidistance principle. All the islands (Tsushima,
Osumi, Tokara, Amami, etc) were used as basepoints. The Nippon
block (J-3a) seems to have followed the same principle vis-a-vis Korea and China, using as basepoints not only the Japanese continental
territory (Kyushu), and nearby islands (Goto Retto), but also tiny
76. Japan: Revised draft articles on the continental shelf, UN Doc. A/CONF.62/
C.2/L.3/Rev.l (1974), UNCLOS III, Official Records, Vol. 3 (1975), p. 211.
77. For instance, judging from their claims and concessions, both Greece and Turkey
seemed to adhere to the equidistance principle. Yet the Greeks would use the Greek
Aegean Islands as basepoints for measuring the median line, including those only a few
miles from the Turkish coast. This would leave the Turks with nothing but a narrow belt
of continental shelf not much different from its territorial sea. On the contrary, the Turks
would disregard the Greek islands in drawing the median line between the mainland
coasts of the two countries so that Turkey would get a substantial share of the Aegean
continental shelf. The Aegean Sea shelf dispute underscores the significance of basepoint
selection. See Ying-jeou Ma el a/., supra note 13. This is also true in the Anglo-French
arbitration, supra note 31.
78. Statement of Mr. Ogiso (Japan), UNCLOS III, Official Records, Vol. 2 (1975), p.
148.

SEABED BouNDARY DELIMITATION

37

islets (Tokara Gunto) and barren rocks (Tori Shima and Danjo
Gunto). Delineation of the Teikoku blocks also entailed the equidistance principle. As two of the blocks (J-2 and J-3b) stretch over 200
miles, the basepoints employed vary. Kyushu, Tokara Gunto, and
Amami Gunto may all have been used as basepoints for Block J-3b
and the eastern part of Block J-2 whereas the southern part of Block
J-2 must have engaged the disputed Tiao-yu-t'ais as basepoints.
Questions concerning tiny, uninhabited islets would arise. Moreover, all basepoints selected (except the Tiao-yu-t'ais) are in areas
geomorphologically unrelated to the continental shelf on which the
concession blocks sit, due to the presence of the intervening Okinawa
Trough. Much the same can be said of the concession blocks of
Japex, Uruma, and Alaska which used the Tiao-yu-t'ais as the sole
basepoints. Analyses of the legal status of tiny islands and undersea
trough in relation to continental shelf delimitation are reserved for
Chapters 4 and 5.
To summarize, despite the unclear status of some concession
blocks, Japan has consistently followed the equidistance principle in
delimiting its continental shelf, with islands being accorded the same
seabed rights as is continental territory, regardless of their size and
economic value.

3.

O.ffshore Exploration

As noted earlier, Japanese geologist Niino coauthored, with
Emery, two important geological studies in 1961 and 1967 on the
East China Sea and participated in the 1968 CCOP survey. Niino
was so fascinated by the oil potential that he personally organized,
with substantial support from the Japanese Government and universities, three geophysical surveys in 1968, 1969, and 1970 in areas
around the Tiao-yu-t'ais. 79 The first two produced inconclusive findings;80 the result of the third, said to be more encouraging, led to
79. For an account of these surveys, see Daisuke Takaoka, "Senkaku Retto Shuhen
Kaiiki no Gakujyutsu Chosa ni Sanka Shite" (I participated in the Academic Surveys in
Offshore Areas Surrounding the Senkaku Islands), Okinawa (in Japanese), No. 56
(March, 1971), pp. 42-65, cited in Yang-chih Huang et al, "Jih-jen Wei Mou-tuo wuo
Tiao-yu-t'ai Cho-lt-hsieh Sht-mo Shou-chiao?" [What Tricks Have the Japanese Played
in Attempting to Plunder Our Tiao-yu-t'ais?], Ming-pao Yueh-k'an, Vol. 7 (October
1972), pp. 6, 7, 20 note 16 [hereinafter cited as Huang et al (1972)]; Harrison, supra
Chapter I, note 39, p. 175. For the result of the second survey, see UNECAFE/CCOP
Technical Advisory Group, "Marine Geologic Investigations of the Offshore Area
around the Senkaku Islands, Southern Ryukyu Islands," Report of the Seventh Session
ofCCOP (Agenda Item 4(b)), UN Doc. E/CN.ll/L.278 (1970), pp. 99, 111.
80. Harrison, supra chapter l, note 39, p. 175.
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Japan's planning of a "five-year crash program" to search for oil in
that area. 81 Troubled by the boundary dispute, however, Japanese
companies except West Japan did minimal exploration before September 1972. 82 Since then, the Japanese Government has undertaken cautiously a few surveys in the East China Sea where private
companies were not permitted to do so. All these surveys and one
drilling (by Gulf) took place in the Okinawa Trough or east of the
R yukyus, outside the disputed area. 83
4.

Joint Development with the ROK

The background ofthe Japan-ROKjoint development program
has been noted earlier. Japanese concession blocks included in the
JDZ are those of Nippon (J-3a), Teikoku (J-3b), and West Japan (J3c & J -4) (Map 6).
C. The Republic of China
In terms of population and territory under effective control, the
ROC is the smallest coastal state in the East China Sea. 84 Otherwise
resource-poor, the island of Taiwan has had a century-long history
81. Ibid But see Huang et al (1972), supra note 79, p. 9.
82. In 1969, both West Japan and Nippon conducted magnetometer and seismic
surveys in their respective concession areas. Wilson Humphrey, supra note 73, p. 1562.
No survey was ever conducted by either Teikoku or Japex in 1970. Wilson Humphrey,
"Petroleum Developments in Far East in 1970: Japan," supra note 72, pp. 1647-49.
83. See W.E. Kennett, "Petroleum Developments in Far East in 1972: Japan," AAPG
Bulletin, Vol. 57 (1973), pp. 2090, 2091 (Table 2); Harrison, supra Chapter I, note 39, pp.
172-73; William R. Scheidecker, "Petroleum Developments in Far East in 1976: Japan,"
AAPG Bulletin, Vol. 61 (1977), pp. 1837, 1843 (Table 3), 1870 (Fig. 9); G.L. Fletcher,
"Petroleum Developments in Far East in 1977: Japan," ibid, Vol. 62, (1978), pp. 1985,
2005 (Table 5); G.L. Fletcher, "Petroleum Developments in Far East in 1978: Japan,"
ibid, Vol. 63 (1979), pp. 1822-23, 1864 (Fig. 13), 1865 (Fig. 14); G.L. Fletcher, "Petroleum Developmentsin Far East, 1979: Japan," ibid, Vol. 64 (1980), pp. 1888, 1940 (Fig.
15), 1941 (Fig. 16); G.L. Fletcher, "World Energy Developments, 1980-Foreign Oil and
Gas Developments, Far East: Japan,'' ibid, Vol. 65 (1981), pp. 2168, 2193 (Fig. 19), 2194
(Fig. 20); and G.L. Fletcher, "Oil and Gas Developments in Far East in 1981: Japan,"
ibid, Vol. 66 (1982), pp. 2367, 2394 (Fig. 19), 2395 (Fig. 20). G.L. Fletcher, "Oil and Gas
Developments in Far East in 1982: Japan," AAPG Bulletin, Vol. 67 (1983), pp. 1893-94.
In late May 1979, Tokyo sent two research vessels to the Tiao-yu-t'ai waters for a ten-day
multipurpose survey. A day earlier, a heliport was completed on the main island of the
group. Hua-chiao Jih-pao, May 28, 1979, p. I. For details, see Introduction, note IS and
accompanying text.
84. Population and land area as of December 3 I, I 982 are as follows:
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of onshore oil and gas development dating back to 1877. 85 Offshore
oil operation did not begin, however, until the late 1960s. Like the
ROK, the ROC was quick to capitalize on the Emery Report; unlike
the ROK, the ROC has, since 1946, had a relatively sophisticated
state oil enterprise-the China Petroleum Corporation (CPC). CPC
has engaged not only in such "downstream" operations as transportation, refining, marketing, and petrochemicals, but also in such "upstream" operations as geological survey and oil prospecting. 86
During 1969-1970, the ROC systematically made seabed claims, enacted relevant legislation, delineated offshore zones, and engaged six
U.S. oil companies for offshore oil development. All this occurred
amid the simmering political atmosphere among coastal states in the
East China Sea, the offshore claims of which hopelessly overlapped
with one and other. To becloud matters further, the U.S. quietly
reversed its China policy in 1970, culminating in President Nixon's
visit to the PRC in February 1972. To the oil companies associated
with CPC, Washington's voltej'ace eroded their confidence in the
ROC's future. Moreover, State Department interventions against
operations by U.S.-fiag vessels in sensitive waters made offshore operations even more difficult. Eventually, two firms gave up; the
other four decided to wait and see.

I.

Claims and Concession Areas

"Continental shelf' as a legal concept was alien to the ROC
prior to the 1958 UNCLOS I, except to a few U.N.-related legal experts. After the ROC signed the Shelf Convention, neither the ROC
Government nor the academic community paid much attention to
the new regime or the Convention's ratification by the ROC until the
Emery Report brought the issue into the limelight. 87 The ROC GovChina
Population
(millions)
Land area

Japan
118

ROK
40
(est.)

PRC
1,004

ROC
18

(est.)

('000 Jun2)
378
99
9,561
36
The World Almanac and Book of Facts 1983, New York: Newspaper Enterprise Association, 1983, pp. 509, 511, 535, 537.
85. Chinese Petroleum Corporation, A Petroleum History of China, Vol. 2, Taipei:
Chinese Petroleum Corporation, 1976, pp. 905-09 [hereinafter cited as Petroleum History
of China].
86. ibid, Vol. 2, p. 1521 et seq. See also Chinese Petroleum Corporation, (A Brief
Introduction], Taipei, 1979.
87. Kang Huang, "Chung-hua-min-kuo Yu Ta-lu-chiao-ch'en Chih-tu (The Repub-
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ernment, urged by its Economic Affairs Ministry (CPC's parent ministry), declared on July 17, 1969:
The Republic of China is a State signatory to the Convention on the Continental Shelf which was adopted by the
U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea in 1958. For the
purposes of exploring and exploiting natural resources and
in accordance with the principles embodied in the said
Convention, the Government of the Republic of China declares that it may exercise its sovereign rights over all the
natural resources of the seabed and subsoil adjacent to its
coast outside its territorial sea. 88
To strengthen the declaration's legal basis, the ROC ratified the
Shelf Convention on August 21, 197089 with two reservations made
to Article 6 of the Convention:
(1) that the boundary of the continental shelf appertaining to two or more States whose coasts are adjacent to and/
or opposite each other shall be determined in accordance
with the principle of the natural prolongation of their land
territories; and
(2) that in determining the boundary of the continental
shelf of the Republic of China, exposed rocks and islets shall
lie of China and the Regime of the Continental Shelf)," Jen Yu She-hui (Man and Society], Vol. l, No. 3, (August l, 1973), p. 50.
88. Chung-yang Jih-pao, July 18, 1969, p. I; Free China Weekly, July 20, 1969, p. 4.
This declaration was simply a restatement of Article 2, Paragraph I and part of Article I
of the Shelf Convention. Can the ROC, merely a signatory but not a party to the Convention, nevertheless invoke its provisions to claim shelf rights? International law requires a state "to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a
treaty" when that state has signed the treaty subject to ratification unless and until that
state "shall have made its intention clear not to become a party to the treaty.'' Article 18,
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. United Nations Conferences on the Law of
Treaties, Official Records, 1970, p. 289, UN Doc. A/CONF.39/ll/ Add. 2; American
Journal of International Law, Vol. 63 ( 1969), p. 875. The ROC's exercise of rights under
Article 2 certainly would not defeat the object and purpose of the Convention since
neither Japan nor the ROK was a party to the Convention. Further, a coastal state's
shelf rights have been so established by state practice since 1945 that it has become customary international law. The Convention is no longer needed to justify such a claim.
Thirdly, the fact that the Convention had already entered into force for five years when
the ROC made the declaration also militates against possible illegality, if any, of the
ROC's action.
89. Li-fo-yuan Kung-pao (Gazette of the Legislative Yuan], No. 64, (August 22,
1970), pp. 2, 14.
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not be taken into account. 90 (emphasis added)
The ROC thus became the forty-third party to the Shelf Convention
when the instrument of ratification was deposited with the U.N. Secretariat on October 14, 1970.91
The next step was to get offshore operation going. Though competent onshore, CPC needed the technology to "go offshore." From
mid-1970 to mid-1972, CPC entered into joint ventures with seven
North American oil companies (later reduced to six) 92 to develop a
total of 194,000 sq. km. of seabed in the Taiwan Strait and the East
China Sea. To regulate offshore activities, a Statute for Exploration
and Exploitation of Petroleum in Offshore Areas was belatedly
promulgated in September 197093 after three of CPC's joint venture
contracts had been signed. 94 The Enforcement Rules issued in July
1974 further spelled out details of implementation. 95 To give substance to the 1969 continental shelf declaration, the ROC announced
on October 15, 1970 the delineation of five "Reserved Offshore Petroleum Zones" 96 (hereinafter the Offshore Zones) stretching from
the Taiwan Strait (22°N latitude) to the East China Sea (30°N latitude) (Map 9). The zones are separated from one another by latitudinal lines, using the mainland Chinese coasts invariably as their
western limits and the west coast of Taiwan (for Zone 1), the mid90. Ibid., p. 14; For the English translation, see International Legal Materials, Vol. 10
(1971), p. 452.
91. International Legal Materials, Vol. 10 (1971), p. 452. Nine years later, by extending the breadth of its territorial sea from 3 miles to 12 miles and by declaring a 200mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ) on September 6, 1979, the ROC did not forget to
stress in the declaration that
[t]he sovereign rights enjoyed by the Republic of China over the continental
shelf contiguous to its coast as recognized by the Convention on the Continental Shelf of 1958 and the general principles of international law shall not be
prejudiced in any manner by the proclamation of the present exclusive economic zone or the establishment of such zones by any other state.
See supra Introduction, note 20.
92. They were: Amoco (Standard Oil of Indiana), Gulf, Oceanic, Clinton, Conoco,
Texfel, and Viking. Viking's relationship with CPC was too brief to deserve attention
here. See A Petroleum History of China, Vol. 2, supra note 85, pp. 1177-83 and Table 7 in
the Appendix of this study.
93. English text of the statute appears in Investment Laws ofthe World, Vol. 8 (1974),
p. 201.
94. The haste with which the new law was acted upon belied its alleged three-year
preparation and one-year drafting. Petroleum History of China, Vol. 2, supra note 85, p.
1172.
95. Chinese and English texts of the Statute and the Enforcement Rules also appear
in a pamphlet published by CPC in July 1976.
96. Chung-yang Jih-pao, October 16, 1970, p. I.
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channel line of the Okinawa Trough (for Zone II, III and IV), and
the outer edge of East China Sea continental shelf (for Zone V) as
their eastern limits. 97 The ROC did not fail to stress the preliminary
nature of these offshore zones, envisaging that more zones would be
announced in the future.
Steps taken. by the ROC were the most specific and systematic
among those of the coastal states in the East China Sea. However
extravagant and, perhaps, unrealistic in words, the ROC has been
prudent and realistic in deeds. Concessions granted to CPC to be
shared with the U.S. oil companies occupy only one half of the five
Offshore Zones (Map 9). All the concession areas lie in the eastern
half of the Offshore Zones, leaving unallocated the western half adjacent to the Chinese mainland coast. Moreover, the eastern limit of
concession areas actually granted follows the 200-meter isobath instead ofthe mid-channel line of the Okinawa Trough as stated in the
ROC's official announcement (Map 7). The former is farther than
the latter from the Japanese coast.

2.

Principles of International Law Employed

Unlike the ROK and Japan, the ROC has declared the principles of international law on which it based its seabed claims. Zone I
in the Taiwan Strait requires no international delimitation since the
ROC and the PRC are not foreign states inter se. There is presumably no room for applying international law. Despite the ROC's
nominal claim, the western limit of its concession blocks in Zone I
largely centers around a de facto median line, 98 zigzag in shape,
leaving open the area west of that line. Were international law to
govern, the result would probably be the same, given the flat and
continuous shelf shared by the mainland and Taiwan.
Zones II, III, and IV extend from the Chinese mainland coast
all the way to the middle of the Okinawa Trough. The ROC's claim,
as the 1970 announcement indicated, does not stop at the 200-meter
isobath-the conventional limit of the continental shelf; rather, it
continues through the slope and the rise until it reaches the deep
bottom of the Okinawa Trough. This sweeping claim, using the
coasts of the Chinese mainland and Taiwan as basepoints, could not
have been based on anything other than the natural prolongation
97. Ibid
98. All the blocks allegedly lie within the ROC's naval patrol lines which largely
coincide with or parallel to the median line in the Taiwan Strait. Interview with a CPC
official in Taipei (July 29, 1978). This official preferred to remain anonymous.
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principle. The explicit designation of the median line of the Okinawa Trough as these zones' eastern limit also suggests that the
thalweg principle might have had some role to play. As in the case
of the ROK's Block K-7, there exists a number oflegal questions to
be analyzed in Chapter 5. Zone V, the northernmost zone, is 290 to
415 miles from Taiwan (See Table 7). Under the 1970 announcement, the zone's eastern limit coincides with the edge of the continental shelf, namely, the 200-meter isobath. Applying the same
analysis for Zones II to IV, one finds that the natural prolongation
principle has been employed again. It is unclear, however, why
Zones II, III and IV have the mid-trough line as the outer limit
whereas Zone V has the shelf edge as its limit. In effect, the depression, which the 400-fathom (724-meter) isobath encircles near Kyushu, is still part of the Okinawa Trough. This means that the ROC
could have designated the mid-trough line as the outer limit of Zone
Vas well.
Another significant feature is the selection of basepoints. Except for Zone I and part of Zone III, the ROC must have used the
mainland Chinese coast as basepoints to claim such far-off shelves in
the East China Sea hundreds of miles from Taiwan. The ROC's
designation of the mainland Chinese coast as the outer limit of its
five Offshore Zones attests to this observation. By so doing, the
ROC has apparently intended to speak for all China, including the
mainland. 99 Realistic or not, this position further complicates the
East China Sea oil controversy.

3. O.ifshore Exploration
CPC's first offshore seismic survey took place in 1965 in the Taiwan Strait off the onshore producing wells in northern Taiwan. 100
The year 1968 saw three airborne geomagnetic surveys in the Taiwan Strait and the East China Sea: one by CCOP, the other two by
a U.S. firm associated with Amoco. 101 The results indicated seaward
99. This position has been upheld by the ROC Government since its retreat from the
mainland to Taiwan. Taipei has made no change of its position regarding the offshore
zones as delineated in the October 15, 1970 announcement. CPC officials vigorously
demanded correction by editors of O..lfshore magazine in 1975 when a map in its October
1974 issue showed overlapping claims made by Japan, the ROK and the ROC in the East
China Sea. O..lfshore, March 1975, p. 19. In September 1979 when the ROC proclaimed
a 12-mile territorial sea and a 200-mile exclusive economic zone, it did not fail to emphasize that its previous continental shelf claims were not thereby affected. Chung-yang Jihpao, September 7, 1979, p. 1.
100. Petroleum History of China, Vol. 2, supra note 85, pp. 1037-61.
101. Ibid., p. 1169.
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extension of an onshore anti-clinal structure into the Taiwan Strait
and the thick sedimentary strata of the Neogene Age. 102 The
shipborne CCOP survey that produced the optimistic Emery Report
also took place later in that year. Short of needed offshore technology, CPC engaged six U.S. oil companies whose explorations in
Zone I to Zone V are related below.
(a)

Amoco 103

Amoco (Standard Oil oflndiana) approached CPC in 1967 and
conducted an aeromagnetic survey for CPC in 1968. A firm joint
venture contract was finally signed in July 1970 and approved in
September by the ROC Government. Amoco's 8,200-sq. km. concession lies in the northern part of Zone I in the Taiwan Strait (Map
9). From 1970 to 1973, Amoco shot 1,500 miles of seismic lines and
drilled one dry hole. Having done nothing in its blocks since 1974,
Amoco withdrew temporarily in early 1977. When the contract expired in September 1978, Amoco relinquished all its concession
blocks to CPC which struck oil there only a year later. 104
(b)

Conoco 105

Continental Oil Company (Conoco), a large "independent"
based in Stamford, Connecticut, obtained a joint venture contract
with CPC in July 1971. Conoco had four blocks in Zone I totaling
20,000 sq. km. (Map 9). In May 1973 Conoco farmed out 50 percent
interest to Amoco to fully utilize Amoco's establishment in Taiwan.
Conoco carried out, from 1972 to 1975, 4,500 miles of seismic
surveys. One of the drillings done by Amoco as operator for the
partnership struck natural gas in June 1974, 60 miles off southern
102. Ibid
103. Information

about Amoco is based, unless otherwise indicated, on the following
sources: Petroleum History of China, Vol. 2, supra note 85, pp. 1179, 1188; Wilson
Humphrey, "Petroleum Developments in Far East [in 1970]: China (Taiwan)," AAPG
Bulletin, Vol. 55 (1971), pp. 1635, 1641; Standard Oil Company (Indiana), Annual Report
(1971), p. 121; ibid, (1972), p. 8; ibid, (1974), p. 10; Shih-Yu T'ung-hsun [CPC Monthly),
No. 307 (March I, 1977), p. 40. Shih-Yu T'ung-hsun is a monthly newsletter published by
CPC.
104. "Hai-yu Tan-yu Chih Shu-kuang (The Dawn of [Taiwan's) Offshore Oil Exploration)," Shih-yu T'ung-hsun, No. 339 (November I, 1979), p. 5.
105. Information about Conoco is based, unless otherwise indicated, on the following
sources: Petroleum History of China, Vol. 2, supra note 85, pp. 1188-89. 1197;
Continental Oil Company, Annual Report, (1974) p. 24.
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Taiwan. 106 The estimated probable reserve was large enough
(300,000 million cubic feet per day (MMCFD) 107 to sustain Taiwan's
then natural gas supply for more than four years. 108 But both companies consider this find still too small to justify further investment
in view of price re§ulation of natural gas in Taiwan and the ROC's
uncertain future. 10 Conoco's confidence was further eroded when
the U.S. Government reportedly refused to insure its investment in
Taiwan and strenuously intervened to thwart its planned drilling in
early 1976 by a U.S.-flag rig. 110 Like Amoco, Conoco completely
disengaged in September 1978. 111
(c)

Gulf112

Though the smallest among the "Seven Sisters", Gulf is CPC's
largest foreign partner. It has had a quarter-century relationship of
crude sale, financing, and investment with CPC. Its joint venture
contract with CPC entered into force in September 1970. Gulfs 11
concession blocks in Zone II (Map 9) also had the largest acreage55,000 sq. km. Gulf shot 7,500 miles of seismic lines and drilled four
unsuccessful wells, one of which was less than 40 miles from the disputed Tiao-yu-t'ais. Gulf relinquished 73 percent of its original
acreage before 1976. This was intended in part to minimize conflict
with Japan where Gulf had a larger stake, including a joint venture
with Teikoku whose block slightly overlapped with Gulfs (Map 7).
106. Continental Oil Company, Annual Report ( 1974), p. 24; 01/ & Gas Journal, September 2, 1974, p. 28.
107. Harrison, supra Chapter 1, note 39, p. 98. Amoco and Conoco stated a daily flow
of 25 MMCFD of gas and 250 barrels of condensate. Standard Oil Company (Indiana)
Annual Report (1974), p. 10; Continental Oil Company, Annual Report (1974), p. 24; Oil
& Gas Journal, September 2, 1974, p. 28. AAPG Bulletin reported 24 MMCFD of gas.
R.D. Caldwell, "Petroleum Developments in Far East in 1974: Taiwan," AAPG Bulletin,
Vol. 59 (1975), pp. 1983, 1984.
108. Taiwan's daily production of natural gas was put at 201,210 MMCFD by Liu Keshu, Chairman of CPC. Shih-yu T'ung-hsun, No. 286 (June l, 1975), p. 14.
109. Harrison, supra chapter I, note 39, p. 98.
110. Ibid., p. 99; Jeffrey Segal, "Taiwan: Reality Intrudes into Oil Plans," Petroleum
Economist, May 1979, p. 185.
Ill. Actions of Amoco and Conoco were concerted since each held 37.5 percent interest in their joint venture with CPC.
112. Information about Gulf is based, unless otherwise indicated, on the following
sources: Petroleum History of China, Vol. l, supra note 85, p. 394; ibid., Vol. 2, pp. 1181,
1190, 1198, 1264, 1356-57; Harrison, supra Chapter l, note 39, pp. 95-97; Gulf Oil
Corporation, Annual Report, (1970), p. 22; ibid., (1972), p. 5; ibid., (1973), p. 6; ibid.,
(1974), p. 12; ibid., (1975), p. 9; G.L. Fletcher, "Petroleum Developments in Far East in
1982: Taiwan,'' AAPG Bulletin, Vol. 67 (1983), p. 1898.
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Earlier, Gulf extended the exploration period under the contract
with CPC to March 1980 but has suspended operation since the mid1970s under the force majeure clause of the contract; it was said to
have dropped all its holdings in 1982. 113
(d)

Oceanic 114

Oceanic Exploration Company was a small but active independent based in Denver, Colorado. It came to Taiwan in 1968
and concluded a joint venture contract with CPC in September 1970.
Oceanic lost Zone II to Gulf but won Zone III over Clinton. Its
concession area, 110 miles from Taiwan at the closest point (Map 9;
Table 7), had 40,000 sq. km. in eight blocks. From 1970 to 1974,
Oceanic shot 5,500 miles of seismic lines and found five promising
structures before relinquishing to CPC 62.5 percent of its original
acreage. Despite CPC's constant prodding and extension of drilling
deadline, Oceanic failed to drill, due primarily to State Department
intervention 115 and the departure of its drilling partner. Oceanic
113. There were intensive debates in 1975 among ROC officials on whether to let the
foreign concessionaires extend the exploration deadline by invoking the force majeure
clause. Opponents alleged that invoking that clause would delay the companies' operations indefinitely while CPC could not take the block back because the foreign companies would remain the operator under the contract. This would vitiate the policy reason
for inviting foreign operators, namely, to accelerate the offshore oil hunt. Proponents
argued, on the other hand, that the only alternative for CPC to invoking the force
majeure clause would be to terminate the joint venture contract on the ground of nonperformance. But CPC may be unable to find a substitute operator to do the exploration.
Should CPC be momentarily unable to take over the exploration itself, Peking might
take advantage of this vacuum. Moreover, the contract would remain intact with the
force majeure clause being invoked. Interview with an official in the ROC's Ministry of
Economic Affairs in Taipei (November 21, 1978). The official preferred to remain anonymous.
What actually came out of the debates seemed to be a combination of the two views:
extension of the exploration deadline was first granted; when performance still could not
be secured, then came the force majeure clause. Ibid See also Jeffrey Segal, supra note
110, p. 185.
114. Information about Oceanic is based, unless otherwise indicated, on the following
sources: Petroleum History of China, Vol. 2, pp. 1179-80, 1191, 1194, 1198; Harrison,
supra Chapter I, note 39, p. 110; Jeffrey Segal, supra note 110; Oceanic Exploration
Company, Annual Report (1973), p. II; ibid, (1974), pp. 7, 8; Interim Report (1974);
Annual Report (1975), p. 5; ibid, (1976), p. 9; ibid, (1979), p. 7.
115. Harrison, supra chapter I, note 39, p. 113. The State Department's warning was
allegedly prompted in part by the Mayaguez incident earlier that year where a U.S.
container ship was seized by Khmer Rouge forces for violating Khmer territorial waters.
Interview (November 21, 1978) supra note 113.
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since then has invoked the force majeure clause to excuse its nonperformance of contractual obligations owed CPC.
(e)

Clinton 116

Clinton International Corporation, the overseas arm of Energy
Reserve Group, a Wichita, Kansas company, concluded a joint venture contract with CPC in September 1970. The Clinton sector, 250
miles from Taiwan, had seven blocks with a total area of 35,000 sq.
km. (Map 9; Table 7). Clinton shot only 1,700 miles of seismic lines
and relinquished four blocks in March 1972. Promising prospects
shown in the surveys helped induce Superior Oil of Houston to join
Clinton in 1974 as a drilling operator. The State Department vigorously blocked Superior's planned drilling in early 1975 (Map 9),
however. Superior subsequently pulled out of the partnership with
Clinton which in tum suspended all operations under the force
majeure clause in the contract with CPC. In July 1979, Clinton acquired a 10 percent interest from CPC in an ex-Gulf block, with
CPC as operator. 117 Though the well drilled was dry, the move
demonstrated Clinton's desire to operate in safer areas closer to
Taiwan.
(f)

TexfeP 18

Texfel Pacific Corporation is the exploration outfit of Texfel Petroleum Company, a small independent based in Los Angeles. Signing a joint venture contract with CPC in June 1972, Texfel was only
able to obtain a 28,000-sq. km. triangular-shaped block in Zone V,
the farthest from Taiwan (more than 300 miles) (Map 9; Table 7).
Texfel has done nothing whatsoever in its concession zone because
of the zone's conspicuously sensitive location. Like Clinton, Texfel
has been looking for safer blocks closer to the island. 119 No new
agreement with CPC has materialized so far.
116. Information about Clinton is based, unless otherwise indicated, on the following
sources: Petroleum History of China, Vol. 2, supra note 85, pp. 1181, 1198; Harrison,
supra Chapter 1, note 39, pp. 105-09; Oil & Gas Journal, May 13, 1974, p. 34. Annual
reports of Clinton in the 1970's had no information in this respect.
117. Lien-ho Pao, July 27, 1979, p. I.
118. Information about Texfel is based, unless otherwise indicated, on the following
sources: Petroleum History of China, Vol. 2, supra note 85, p. 1198; Harrison, supra
Chapter I, note 39, pp. 115-17.
119. Perhaps to show their goodwill, two senior executives of Texfel came to Taipei
four days after President Carter announced in December 1978 his sudden decision to
recognize Peking. Shih-Yu T'ung·hsun, No. 330 (February I, 1979), p. 34.
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(g)

CPC'2o

CPC's explorations had concentrated in close-in areas offshore
Taiwan (Map 10). In Zone I, CPC had shot, as of December 1975,
7,860 miles of seismic lines, more than those of its foreign partners
combined. In Zone II (ex-Gulf blocks), CPC's seismic work (6,500
miles) was about half of what Gulf, Oceanic, and Clinton combined
did before 1976. The seven wells spudded by CPC in Zone I before
1976 were all unsuccessful. In view of the U.S. companies vulnerability to political pressure from Washington, CPC decided in 1975 to
carry out, on its own, explorations in all the unallocated and relinquished areas (Map 10). A seven-year intensive program, with a
capital outlay of $1.8 billion, was begun in July 1976. More than a
hundred wells were projected for that period. From 1976 to 1984, 60
wells had been drilled, in contrast to 16 wells (seven by CPC alone)
before 1976. CPC made a modest discovery in October 1979, 11
miles off northern Taiwan in an ex-Amoco block. 121 The four wells
yielded altogether, during testing, 3,300 barrels of petroleum per day
(BOPD) and 1,519 MMCFD of natural gas, with a 20,000 BOPD
potential estimated by CPC. 122 The oil strike did more to boost
CPC's morale than to reduce the ROC's dependence on foreign oil
since the estimated output amounted to only six percent of the
ROC's daily oil imports. Only when a second commercial gas discovery was made in September 1984 in the same area did CPC decide to develop this so-called CBK structure. 123

D.

The People's Republic of China

The PRC has been active since the 1960s in such dispute-free
waters as the Pohai Bay, the Pearl River estuary near Hong Kong,
and close-in areas in the South China Sea. However, in the Yellow
Sea, the East China Sea, and the Taiwan Strait, the PRC had, since
the Emery Report, only made strong but vague claims and done vir120. Information about CPC is based, unless otherwise indicated, on the following
sources: Petroleum History of China, Vol. 2, supra note 85, pp. 1191-97; Chinese
Petroleum Corporation, Annual Report ( 1976), p. 4; ibid, ( 1977), p. 4; ibid, ( 1978), p. 4;
ibid ' ( 1979), p. 4; ibid ' ( 1980), p. 4; ibid ' (1981 ), p. 4; ibid' ( 1982), p. 4; ibid, ( 1983 ). p. 4.
Asia Letter, December 16, 1975, pp. 3-41;Asia Research Bulletin, January 31, 1976, pp.
156-66 cited in Harrison, supra chapter I, note 39, pp. 118, 290 n.41; Lien-ho Pao,
November II, 1980, p. I; September 15, 1984, p. I.
121. Lien-ho Pao, October 27, 1979, p. I.
122. Jung-hua Hsu, "Chung-yu Tzuan-t'an Ch'i-nien Hai-yu T'an-yu Ch'en Kung
(After Seven Years of Offshore Drilling and Exploration, CPC Strikes Oil)," ibid
123. Lien-ho Pao, September 30, 1984.
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tually no exploration before 1979. In the wake of Peki~g's '_'grand
opening" to the West beginning in 1978, it has forsaken 1ts ~1therto
sacred "self-reliance" doctrine in the petroleum industry, whtch was
formerly a national "self-reliance" model. 124 Foreign, especially
American, offshore technology was vigorously sought since Sino-foreign joint ventures began. From late 1978 to July, 1979, the PRC
engaged as operators large American, British, French, Italian, and
Japanese oil companies to conduct geophysical surveys to be completed in one year in the Pohai Bay, the Yellow Sea, and the South
China Sea (Map 11). 125 The surveys covered 448,000 sq. km. of seabed and eventually 46 international oil firms from 13 nations, including all the Seven Sisters except Gulf, participated in the bidding
during 1982. 126 As of this writing in August 1984, among the 33
companies which have completed bidding for 43 blocks that cover
150,000 sq. km. of seabed, twenty-three joint venture contracts have
been signed with Peking's China National Offshore Oil Corporation
(CNOOC) to explore the Pearl River estuary and the Yellow Sea. 127
124. "In Industry, Learn from Taching" has been a national campaign slogan for
many years until 1980. Taching oil field in northeastern China has been the PRC's
number one oil field since the early 1960s. Stephanie Green, "Taching/Pohai Journal,"
China Business Review, November-December 1978, p. 10. The ·•self-reliance" rigidity
slackened during 1977-78 when Hong Kong businessman made joint venture deals with
PRC enterprises in Canton. China Business Review, March-April, 1979, pp. 15, 16. The
new trend culminated on July 8, 1979 when the PRC made public its Sino-Foreign Joint
Venture Law. New York Times, July 9, 1979, p. AI. The new law's official English
translation appears in China Business Review, July-August, 1979, pp. 46-47.
125. New York Times, August 24, 1979, p. I; China Business Review, July-August 1979,
p. 62 (with map); United States-China Economic Relations: A Reappraisal, supra Chapter
I, note 42, p. 87 (Geophysical Surveys Map) and p. 92 (Offshore China Exploration
Activity Map). Both maps are reproduced as Map II in the Appendix of this book.
126. The first round of bidding is in two stages. Stage one, covering an area of
150,000 sq. km. in the north Yellow Sea and Pearl River basin in the South China Sea,
began February 16, 1982. The second stage, which covers 42,700 sq. km. in the south
Yellow Sea and the Tokin Gulf, started March 15, 1982. Hong Kong Standard, February
18, 1982, p. I; Asian Wall Street Journal, March 18, 1982, p. 3.
127. See, e.g., Amanda Bennett, "BP Signs Accord for Oil Rights Offshore China,'·
Asian Wall Street Journal, May II, 1983, p. I; "U.S. Company Gets Rights to Search for
Oil Off China," New York Times, August 7, 1983, p. I; Dinah Lee, "Exxon, China Expected to Reach Oil Accord," International Herald Tribune, August 17, 1983, p. 9; Teresa
Ma, "Foreigners Too Would Like Some Offshoot Business;· Far Eastern Economic Review, August 25, 1983, pp. 61-63; Amanda Bennett, "China Awards Two More Contracts
for Drilling in the South China Sea," Asian Wall Street Journal, September 6, 1983, p. I;
"Foreign Oil Companies Sign China Contracts," ibid., November 16, 1983, p. 7; Vigor
Keung Fung, "China Limits Foreign Role in Oil Support," ibid, November 23, 1983, p.
I; Jing Wei, "Oil Exploitation in the South China Sea;· (1)-(3), Beijing Review, April 9,
1984, p. 19; Aprillo, 1984, p. 25; April23, 1984, p. 22; Nancy Langston, "Wells ofUncer-
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Conspicuously missing from the long chain of survey sectors are
those in the East China Sea and the Taiwan Strait where the ROC
has laid extensive claims.

1.

Claims and Concession Areas

Neither the PRC's official statement nor academic literature has
ever mentioned "continental shelf' as a legal concept prior to the
1970s. 128 The Emery Report and its aftermath certainly did not escape the attention of the PRC, however. 129 The PRC's first reaction
was to denounce the establishment in November 1970 of a non-governmental ROC-ROK-Japan Liaison Committee by businessmen
from the three countries for research and development of resources
of the East China Sea. The Committee proposed that the three governments involved freeze the seabed disputes and let their private
enterprises proceed with oil exploration. 130 The PRC's denunciation
appeared in the official People's Daily in an article by a "commentator" (a pen name reserved for high officials) instead of a formal governmental statement. The article attacked the committee proposal as
representing the real intentions of the respective governments, but
stopped short of stating the PRC's own claim. The term "continental
shelf' was absent, however.
The Liaison Committee decided in late December 1970 to take
more concrete actions. Infuriated, Peking attacked again on December 29 through the People's Daily's commentator. 131 The article containing Peking's first continental shelf claim is worth quoting at
length:
Taiwan Province and the islands appertaining thereto intainty: The Hunt for China's Offshore Oil is not all plain sailing," Far Eastern Economic
Review, June 28, 1984, p. 50.
128. Hungdah Chiu, Chinese Attitude Toward Continental She!f and Its Implication on
IJelimiting Seabed in Southeast Asia, No. I, Baltimore, University of Maryland Law
School: Occasional Papers/Reprints Series in Contemporary Asian Studies. 1977, p. 16
[hereinafter cited as Chiu (1977)).
129. Mention was made of exploration and other developments in East Asia in Peking's December 4, 1970 statement. Peking Review, December II, 1970, pp. 15-16; Washington Post, December 5, 1970, p. A I.
130. Park (1972), supra Chapter I, note 18, p. 21. But see Chung-yang Jih-pao, March
6, 1971, p. I; Ibid, April 9, 1971, p. I. The ROC's chief delegate to the conference, Mr.
C.K. Ku, flatly denied any attempt by the conference to even touch the issue of sovereignty over seabed resources. Minutes of the two sessions of the conference appeared in
ibid
131. Jen-min Jih-pao, December 29, 1970, p. I; English translation in Peking Review.
January I, 1971, p. 22.
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eluding the Tiaoyu, Huangwei, Chihwei, Nanhsiao, Peihsiao and other islands, are China's sacred territories. The
resources of the sea-bed and subsoil of the seas around these
islands and of the shallow seas adjacent to other parts of
China all belong to China, their owner, and we will never
permit others to lay their hands on them. The People's Republic of China has the right to explore and exploit the resources of the sea-bed and subsoil of these areas ... All
agreements and contracts concerning the exploration and
exploitation of China's sea-bed and subsoil resources
[which] the Chiang Kai-shek gang concluded with any
country, any international organization or any foreign public or private enterprise under the signboard of joint development' or anything else are illegal and null and void
(emphasis added). 132
The PRC's position was reaffirmed in a communique issued on
March 1, 1970 by the annual, unofficial PRC-Japan Memorandum
Trade Talks:
The newly established Japan-Chiang-Park 'liaison committee' has gone so far as to decide on the 'joint exploration' of
the resources of the shallow seas adjacent to China's coasts.
This is a flagrant encroachment of China's sovereignty. The
Chinese people will not tolerate this. 133 (emphasis added)
This was the first time that the PRC asserted its "sovereignty" over
the "shallow seas adjacent to China's coasts." This formulation was
employed repeatedly later in 1974 and 1977 in the PRC's protests
against the Japan-ROK Joint Development Agreement and in 1980
against their exploratory drilling in the JDZ. 134
In February 1981 and April 1982, respectively, Peking's Minis132. Ibid. The PRC learned about the ROC's offshore gas strike in late 1974. (Gas
was found in June but news was not broken until October.) Peking made a critical comment through a People's Liberation Army radio in Fukien facing Taiwan across the Taiwan Strait. It accused the CPC of being "an unfilial son who stole the family fortune by
colluding with outsiders," referring to CPC's joint ventures, and of "selling out the natuof the motherland in the name of China." The broadcast, relying
ral resources
allegedly on a UPI dispatch, erroneously reported that the CPC was a "joint organization
of six U.S. petroleum companies." The accusation was based on this information. Yang
Ping, "Such is the Chinese Petroleum Corporation," Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report, November 4, 1974, p.Cl.
133. Communique on Talks between Representatives of China-Japan Memorandum
Trade Office of China and Japan-China Memorandum Trade Office Of Japan, Peking
Review. March 12, 1971, pp. 24, 25.
134. See notes 39, 44, 46, 55 and accompanying text supra.
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try of Geology drilled two exploratory wells, Longjing-1 and Longjing-11 (Longjing means "dragon well"), and China National
Offshore Oil Corporation drilled the third, Dongtai-I, all in the
northern East China Sea right in the ROC's Zone V and very close
to the Japan-ROK JDZ. 135 As the southwestern edge of the JDZ
coincides with the southwestern edge of the ROK's Block K-7 (Maps
5 and 6) which in turn is the extension of the hypothetical median
line suggested by Seoul between the ROK and the PRC in the Yellow Sea, the two wells are located on the west (Chinese) side of the
hypothetical median line. This by no means indicates Peking's tacit
acceptance of that line, however. Quite to the contrary, these symbolic moves obviously serve as a reminder to other claimants of Peking's claim to the East China Sea, regardless of the allegedly
favorable but unconfirmed test results of the drillings. Meanwhile,
Peking promulgated, in February 1982, the Regulation of the People's Republic of China on the Exploitation of Offshore Petroleum
Resources in Cooperation with Foreign Enterprises, 136laying down
for the first time rules for international joint ventures and offshore
operations. This new law presumably covers the East China Sea,
should any concession be granted in that area. As of this writing
(August 1984), though, no concession has been granted either in the
East China Sea or in the Taiwan Strait.
2.

Principles

of International Law Employed

Since the PRC has neither specified its seabed claims nor
granted exploration or development concessions in the East China
Sea, it is difficult to infer any international legal principle from the
vague statements made thus far. Peking did, however, make known
its positions on law of the sea issues in general. In July 1973, the
PRC submitted a working paper to Subcommittee II of the Seabed
Committee. 137 On the seaward extent of a coastal state's continental
shelf jurisdiction, it provided:
( l) By virtue of the principle that the continental shelf is
the naturalprolongation ofthe continental territory, a coastal
State may reasonably define, according to its specific geo135. Supra Chapter I, note 42.
136. Jen-min Jih-pao, February II, 1982, p. 4. English text appears in Beijing Re~iew,
February 22, 1982, p. 14.
137. Working paper submitted by the Chinese Delegation: Sea area within the limits
of national jurisdiction, UN Doc. A/ AC.l38/SC.II/L.34 ( 1973 ), Seabed Committee Report, Vol. 3 (1973), supra note 75, p. 71, reprinted in International Legal Materials, Vol. 12
(1973), p. 1231.
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graphical conditions, the limits of the continental shelf
under its exclusive jurisdiction beyond its territorial sea or
economic zone. The maximum limits of such continental
shelf may be determined among states through consultations . 138 (emphasis added)
On the method of boundary delimitation, it continued:
(5) States adjacent or opposite to each other, the continental shelf of which connects together, shall jointly determine the delimitation of the limits of jurisdiction of the
continental shelf through consultation on an equal footing. 139 (emphasis added)
The working paper did not directly address the question of islands' seabed rights. But the language seemed to imply that only
continental territory was entitled to a legal continental shelf. 140 It is
also worth noting that on the seaward delimitation of the EEZ, the
working paper specified four considerations, one of which was the
geological conditions of the coastal state. 141 As an EEZ embraces
the water surface and column as well as the seabed and the subsoil, 142 geological conditions which no other state has mentioned in
connection with EEZ delimitation, are relevant nevertheless. The
PRC's inclusion of the geological factor in EEZ delimitation could
be intended for the Okinawa Trough. Implications of this provision
are discussed in Chapter 5.
In substantive sessions of UNCLOS III since 1974, Peking indicated in only a few occasions its position on the delimitation of the
continental shelf and the EEZ. At the Resumed Ninth Session (July
28-August 29, 1980), the PRC took the position that delimitation
questions should be determined through negotiations between the
parties concerned on the basis of equity, taking into account all fac138. Seabed Commillee Report, Vol. 3 (1973), supra note 75, p. 74; International Legal
Materials, Vol. 12 (1973), p. 1233.
139. Seabed Committee Report, Vol. 3 (1913),supra note 75, p. 14;/nternational Legal
Materials, Vol. 12 (1973), p. 1233.
140. According to the PRC Working Paper, islands are entitled to a territorial sea
regardless of their sizes. Seabed Committee Report, Vol. 3 (1973), supra note 75, p. 72;
International Legal Materials, Vol. 12 (1973), p. 1232. The key term "continental territory" was later replaced by "land territory", thereby eliminating previous discrimination
against islands. See, e.g., the PRC's protest against exploratory drilling in the JapanROK JDZ, supra note 55.
141. Seabed Committee Report, Vol. 3 (1973),supra note 75, p. 13;/nternational Legal
Materials, Vol. 12 (1973), p. 1232.
142. Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 56, para. l(a).
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tors concerned; the median line approach is acceptable only when in
accordance with equitable principles. 143 In late 1981, Peking again
submitted its opposition, together with a group of developing and
East European states, to the Conference president's giving special
consideration to the employment of the equidistance line in continental shelf or exclusive economic zone (EEZ) delimitations through
negotiations under equitable principles. 144
To summarize, the PRC, like the ROC, adheres to the natural
prolongation principle in seaward delimitation of the continental
shelf. Islands are accorded a territorial sea. Beyond that, it is less
clear. While implicitly limiting continental shelf jurisdiction to a
coastal state's continental territory, the PRC has claimed the "shallow seas" around disputed, mid-ocean islets in the East China Sea
and the South China Sea. On seabed boundary delimitation, the
PRC prefers multistate consultation to third-party process. In the
East China Sea, the political reality has prevented any multistate
consultation from taking place. 145
3.

0./fthore Exploration

Before the recent mass engagement of foreign oil companies, the
PRC had done little prospecting in the East China Sea other than
rudimentary bottom sedimentation studies, according to published
sources. 146 Since September 1980, a West German team has been
143. Statement of PRC delegate Shen Wei-liang at the plenary meeting held on August 25, 1980, UN Press Release (Geneva) SEA/128 (1980), p. 4.
144. UN Press Release SEA/425 (1981), p. 24.
145. When the oil controversy first arose, seven governments were involved: Japan,
the ROK, the DPRK, the PRC, the ROC, the Ryukyus, and the U.S. (as administrative
authority of the Ryukyus). Since the return ofthe Ryukyus to Japan in 1972, the number
of contenders has been reduced to four: Japan, the ROK, the ROC, and the PRC. (The
DPRK is excluded here since it has no coastal front in the East China Sea.) The number
of governments involved poses less of a problem than do the relationships of these governments inter se. Both China and Korea are divided; while the PRC and the DPRK are
"socialist brother states", the ROC and the ROK are no less friendly. Mutual non-recognition between rival regimes within the same state naturally extends to the ally of its
rival. Any official contact by one government with the ally of its rival regime could be
interpreted as de facto recognition thereof and would seriously offend the ally. This is
why Peking remained cool towards the ROK's overtures made in March 1973 to negotiate a settlement with the PRC on the seabed issue, even at the expense of Seoul-Taipei
ties. Peking understood well that any positive reaction would alienate Pyongyang and
only benefit Moscow which had been seeking to expand its influence in the Korean Peninsula. For the ROK's overtures, see Harrison, supra, Chapter I, note 39, pp. 130, 137.
146. E.g., M.B. Klenova, supra Chapter I, note 13; Shih-ching Fang and Yun-shan
Ch'in, "Chung-kuo Tung-hai Ho Huang-hai Nan-pu Ti-chih Ti Ch'u-pu Yen-chiu (A
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conducting geochemical and geophysical surveys in the western part
of the W enchou basin off the coast of Chekiang Province, using a
Communist Chinese vessel. 147 No drilling had been done until the
sinking of Longjing-1 and Longjing II in February 1981 and April
1982, respectively and Tongtai-1 in 1982 (Map 10). Given the sensitivity of the East China Sea, large-scale exploration probably will
not commence until production begins in other dispute-free areas of
the China seas, which will be in the late 1980s. 148

Preliminary Study of Submarine Geology of China's East China Sea and Southern Yellow Sea)." Hai-yang Yu Hu-chao [Oceanologia et Limnologia Sinica], Vol. 2 (1959), p.
82; Yun-shan Ch'in, "Tung-hai Ta-lu-chia Ti Ch'i-fu Ho Ti-chih Ch'en-Chi-wu Ti Ch'upu Yen-chiu (An Initial Study of the Relief and Botton Sediment of the Continental
Shelf of the East China Sea)," ibid, Vol. 5 (1963), p. 35.
147. Jeffrey Segal, "Need for More Oil Exploration," Petroleum Economist, November, 1981, p. 498.
148. Kevin Fountain, "The Development of China's Offshore Oil: Prospects for the
80s," China Business Review, January-February 1980, p. 23.

CHAPTER 3 CONFLICTS OF CLAIMS AND
CONCESSION AREAS
This chapter examines conflicts resulting from the coastal states'
unilateral claims and overlapping concession areas and defines the
issues to be pursued further in Part II. Table 11 illustrat~s the ma~
nitude of these conflicts. Apart from political consideratiOns, application by the East China Sea's coastal states of seminal and unc~ear
rules of international law then prevailing to the complex geophysical
environment also accounts for the conflicts. Legal implications of
these geophysical features vary depending on the interpreting coastal
states. Based on discussions in Chapter 2, Table 2 summarizes the
respective positions of the coastal governments on relevant law of
the sea issues.
In the East China Sea, claims of all the coastal states (but not
necessarily their concession areas) conflict with one another. While
their claims may be extravagant, they are more prudent in granting
concessions. In fact, certain concession blocks were granted clear of
overlaps. 2 This is because claims exclusively involve governments
but concessions concern oil companies as well. Unrealistic claims
may be good for domestic consumption or as a bargaining position
for future negotiations. Unreasonably high political/jurisdictional
risks 3 associated with legally untenable concessions, however, only
scare away potential concessionaires. Analyzed below are conflicts
between pairs of disputants.
I. In the Chart, to preserve the numbering system for Japanese concessions used in
Map 4, the former "J-1" is broken down to "J-la", "J-Ib", and "J-lc", representing three
smaller blocks shared by Japex (Block J-l's original holder), Uruma, and Alaska. By the
same token, the former "J-3" is re-numbered "J-3a", "J-3b", and "J-3c" In fact, blocks
like J-2 and J-3b are merely a part of the vast Teikoku concession area. The division is,
of course, artificial. In both the J-1 and J-3 cases, the newly-numbered blocks put together have a larger area than the original J-1 or J-3 blocks. The numbering system is
unofficial and used simply for the convenience of discussion.
2. For instance, Texfel Pacific's block in the ROC's Zone V, text accompanying
note 12 infra.
3. This author has defined "jurisdiction risk" as the risk or probability of occurrence of adverse political and/or legal events arising from a potential jurisdictional dispute that will affect the profit prospect or operation of a given foreign direct investment.
For an elaborate discussion of jurisdictional risk and foreign oil investment in the East
Asian context, see Ying-jeou Ma, "Foreign Investment in the Troubled Waters of the
East China Sea," Chinese Yearbook of lnlemational Law and Affairs, Vol. I (1981), pp.
35-73.
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The ROK and Japan

As Table 1 shows, all of the eight concession blocks of Japan
and the ROK that overlapped each other before 1974 are now either
re-delineated through boundary delimitation (Blocks J-4 and K-6 in
the Korea Strait) or included in the Japan-ROK JDZ (the rest of the
blocks in the East China Sea). 4 The Joint Development Agreement
left unsettled the seabed dispute, 5 yet it has defused the controversy
by shelving the sovereignty question indefinitely and replacing confrontation with cooperation. Advocated by commentators6 and the
ICJ/ the idea of joint development of offshore oil in disputed waters
between claimants has found only modest support in state practice. 8
4. Supra Chapter 2, text accompanying notes 41, 42.
5. Article XXVIII of the Agreement provides:
Nothing in this Agreement shall be regarded as determining the question of
sovereign rights over all or any portion of the Joint Development Zone or as
prejudicing the positions of the respective Parties with respect to the delimitation of the continental shelf.
For a competent and comprehensive analysis of the legal issues of the ROK-Japan seabed dispute, see Park (1972), supra Chapter I, note 18, pp. 29-36.
6. E.g., Note, "The 'Distance plus Joint Development Zone,' Formula: A Proposal
for the Speedy and Practical Resolution of the East China and Yellow Seas Continental
Shelf Oil Controversy," Cornell International Law Journal, Vol. 7 (1973), pp. 49, 63-70
[hereinafter cited as Cornell Note (1973)].
7. The North Sea Continental Shelf Case, l.C.J. Reports 1969, p. 52.
8. Supplementary Agreement to the Ems-Dollart Treaty, the Netherlands-Federal
Republic of Germany, AprilS, 1960 UNTS, Vol. 509, p. 140; Agreement Relating to the
Partition of the Neutral Zone, Kuwait-Saudi Arabia, July 7, 1965, UNLS/15, p. 760;
International Legal Materials, Vol. 4 ( 1965), p. 1134; American Journal of International
Law, Vol. 40 ( 1966), p. 744; Agreement on Settlement of Maritime Boundary Lines and
Sovereign Rights over Islands Between Qatar and Abu Dhabi, March 20, 1969, UNLS/
16, p. 403; Limits in the Seas, No. 18, May 29, 1970; and Agreement Between Sudan and
Saudi Arabia Relating to the Joint Exploration of the Natural Resources of the Seabed
and Subsoil of the Red Sea in the Common Zone, May 16, 1974, UNLS/18, p. 452.
Joint development of oil in disputed seabeds is not to be confused with joint exploitation of common oil or gas deposits between states across their borders (sometimes
referred to as "unitization" arrangements). The former has several distinctive features:
First, a boundary dispute must exist; second, the hydrocarbon deposit has not been previously discovered; and third, the sovereignty issue is either unresolved but shelved or the
sovereignty itself is equally shared by the parties. On the other hand, a unitization arrangement is usually dictated by the geological conditions of a previously discovered oil
or gas field. Normally no dispute exists over the boundary across which the deposit lies.
Hence no sovereignty issue. The only feature shared by both is the existence of a consultation or joint management body. In state practice, unitization arrangements are quite
common whereas joint development mechanisms are rare. In fact, a number of seabed
boundary agreements contain unitization clauses. For a good discussion, see Rainer
Lagoni, "Oil and Gas Deposits Across National Frontiers," American Journal of International Law, Vol. 73 (1979), p. 215 [hereinafter cited as Lagoni (1979)].
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Issues of joint management and distribution of petroleum l?r~du~ed,
just to name a few, are no easier than seabed boundary dehrrutatwn.
Although these problems are well handled by the Japan-ROK Joint
Development Agreement, it remains to be seen how effectively this
pioneer arrangement will work, 9 since exploration has just gotten
under way. Furthermore, other claimants to the same seabed have
not stayed idle. The agreement was signed, ratified, and implemented over vigorous protests from the PRC and the DPRK. The
sinking by Peking of three exploratory wells (Longjing I and II and
Dongtai-1) in the East China Sea only a few miles from the JDZ
(Map 10) highlights the intensity of the conflict. Further complications could emerge upon commercial discovery of petroleum.
B. The ROK and China (the ROC and the PRC)
The ROC and the PRC assert identical claims to the East China
Sea's shelf but have been exploring in different parts of China's marginal seas. Their relationships with the ROK vary accordingly.
1.

The ROK and the ROC

The ROC granted no concession block in the Yellow Sea where
the ROK's four blocks are located, but the ROC's Zone V overlaps
with the ROK's Blocks K-4, K-5, and K-7. The ROK had in fact
asserted claims to what is now the ROC's Zone V ten months before
the ROC did; yet the ROK has made no protest, at least in public, to
the ROC when the ROC announced its five Offshore Zones in October 1970. When the ROK and Japan signed the Joint Development
Agreement in early 1974, however, the ROC issued a statement to
reserve its rights:
In connection with certain statements recently made
by some States concerning the development of submarine
resources in the East China Sea and the illegal claims made
by the Chinese Communist regime, the Government of the
Republic of China reserves all her rights over the continental shelf extending from her coast including the right to ex9. The Japan-ROK Joint Development Agreement is unprecedented in terms of the
size of the JDZ, the national economic interests at stake, and the often abrasive relations
between Tokyo and Seoul. In fact, the ROK officials took pride in the agreement for
being a pioneer work. Conversation with Mr. Sang-Myon Rhee, S.J.D. candidate at
Harvard Law School, Cambridge, Massachusetts (December 27, 1979). Mr. Rhee
worked for the ROK Foreign Ministry at the time the agreement was negotiated and
signed. Mr. Rhee got his S.J.D. and returned to Korea to teach law.
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plore the continental shelf and to exploit its natural
resources.
The continental shelf in question is adjacent to, and is a
natural prolongation of, the territory of the Republic of
China ...
. . . The activities for the exploration and exploitation in
these areas have begun for several years and are going on
extensively. 10 (emphasis added)
The tone was mild; Japan and the ROK were not even mentioned by name. The allegation of extensive exploration seems to
refer to the ROC's concession areas other than Zone V, since no reported exploration has been conducted there by either Texfel, 11 the
concessionaire, or CPC. In fact, the eastern half of Zone V that
overlaps extensively with the ROK's blocks was left unallocated
when Texfel obtained the western half12 (Compare Maps 7 and 9).
All in all, the ROC-ROK conflict in claims in the East China Sea
seems minor at best. On the other hand, no overlap exists in concession blocks actually granted. This means that there is no mining
rights conflict between companies working for the ROC and those
exploring in the JDZ. This is likely to continue given cordial ties
between Taipei and Seoul.

2.

The ROK and the PRC

Seabeds in the East China Sea covered by the PRC's vague
claims overlap with those of the ROK, as evidenced by the PRC's
protests and hostility since 1970 against the ROK (and Japan). 13 But
the extent of the conflict has never been clear. By 1979, five out of
seven of the ROK's concession blocks had been relinquished and
open for bidding again (Map 5). Only part of Block K-4 was regranted to Zapata Oil Company in 1981. The sensitive location coupled with their former operator's experiences seem unattractive to
potential operators. Block K -6 in the Korea Strait does not really
enter the picture here (Map 5). Nor does the part of Block K-5 still
held by Caltex since it entails no international delimitation (Map 5).
In terms of real conflict between the PRC's claim and the ROK's
concession blocks, therefore, the only relevant area is the JDZ.
10.
11.
12.
Taipei
13.

Free China Weekly, February 17, 1974, p. 1.
Supra Chapter 2, text accompanying notes 118-19.
It is, of course, not unlikely that certain tacit understanding was reached between
and Seoul to avoid overlapping of concession blocks.
Supra Chapter 2, text accompanying notes 36, 39, 40, 44, and 46.
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The PRC's protests over the JDZ from 1974 to 1980 seemed to
have been addressed more to the mode by which it was established
rather than to the alleged infringement of the PRC's sovereignty, despite the PRC's phrasing to the contrary. 14 The drilling of the
Longjing and Dongtai wells seems to have engendered similar protests. In other words, Japan's failure to consult the PRC in advance
was what really mattered. But Japan could not possibly have done
so without first consulting the ROK, the other party to the agreement, which the PRC simply refuses to deal with in the first place. 15
On the other hand, the PRC's response, in a People's Daily article, to
the Japanese argument that the JDZ lay entirely within the Japanese
side of the hypothetical Sino-Japanese median line was substantiated
by the following arguments:
It is well known that "mid-line" is not a recognized principle under international law for demarcating the waters between the littoral states. On the contrary, international law
requires that such demarcation, including temporary measures prior to reaching a formal agreement, must be made
through consultation and agreement between the countries
concerned. Moreover, the "mid-line" referred to by the
Japanese side is defined unilaterally and not based on any
law whatsoever. The argument used by the Japanese Government cannot cover up the essence of its infringement on
China's sovereignty. 16
The response, understandably not addressed to the ROK, affected
14. The recurring theme in the PRC's 1974, 1977, and 1978 official protests was that:
(A)ccording to the principle that the continental shelf is the natural extension of
the continent, the People's Republic of China has inviolable sovereignty over
the continental shelf in the East China Sea, and that the division ofthose parts of
this continental shelf which involve other countries ought to be decided on through
consultations by China and the countries concerned The unilateral marking off
of a so-called Japan-ROK ·~oint development zone" on the continental shelf in
the East China Sea by the Japanese Government and the south Korean authorities through signing behind China's back the "Japan-ROK Agreement on Joint
Development of the Continental Shelf' is an infringement on China's sovereignty
to which China will never agree. (emphasis added)
Peking Review, June 30, 1978, p. 25.
Peking's May 7, 1980 protest largely repeated the above except that the first half of
the first sentence was rephrased "according to the principle that the continental shelf is
the natural prolongation of the land territory . . " (emphasis added). The two words
"extention" and "continent" were replaced by "prolongation" and "land" respectively.
Beijing Review, May 19, 1980, p. 6.
15. See supra Chapter 2, note 143.
16. Jen-min Jih-pao, June 14, 1977, p. I [commentator's article); English translation in
Peking Review, June 17, 1977, p. 17.
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the ROKas well. Both Tokyo and Seoul have reserved their previous positions vis-a-vis each other in establishing the JDZ. The
ROK's positions regarding Block K-7, which later became the main
body of the JDZ, are the natural prolongation principle vis-a-vis Japan and the equidistance principle in relation to the PRC. 17 Japan,
on the other hand, relied on the equidistance principle alone vis-avis China and the ROK in granting concessions to Nippon, Teikoku,
and West Japan (later New West Japan), part of whose concession
areas later came within the JDZ 18 (Map 6). This was why reservation of previous positions was necessary for Japan and the ROK in
the Joint Development Agreement. Now, with regard to boundary
delimitation with the PRC, the only part of the JDZ to be involved is
its southwestern edge, formerly the edge of the ROK's Block K-7.
The ROK's equidistance position vis-a-vis the PRC naturally becomes the common position of Japan and the ROK in relation to the
PRC. The PRC's outright rejection of the equidistance solution obviously was not addressed to Japan alone.
The present conflict between the PRC and the ROK has become
and will remain a tripartite legal controversy as a result of the advent
of the JDZ. In purely legal terms, a boundary delimitation between
the PRC on the one hand and the JDZ on the other is manageable
(to be shown in Chapter 5 infra). 19 The real obstacle arises from
politics, not law, however.
C.

Japan and China (the ROC and the PRC)

As in the Japan-ROK case, Japan and China (at least the ROC)
hold diametrically opposite views on almost every key issue (Table
2). As a result, their claims and concession areas overlap substantially (Table 1). Unlike the Japan-ROK case, attempts by the ROC,
Japan, and the ROK to work out a regional development program
were nipped in the bud by the PRC. 20 Meanwhile, the Tiao-yu-t'ai
territorial dispute made any separate, bilateral cooperation between
Taipei and Tokyo politically impossible. 21 When Tokyo switched
17. Supra Chapter 2, text accompanying notes 26-30.
18. Supra Chapter 2, text accompanying notes 75-78.
19. Such a delimitation involves neither mid-ocean islets nor deep trough, unlike lhe
Sino-Japanese situation. However, the "lying off' situation in the East China Sea between the PRC and the JDZ poses the same difficulty as it does to Sino-Korean delimitation, supra Chapter 2, notes 31, 32, and accompanying text.
20. Supra Chapter 2, text accompanying notes 29-35.
21. The ROC then was under strong pressure from Chinese communities all over the
world not to discuss with Japan any joint development program before the territorial
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recognition from Taipei to Peking in 1972, the ROC lost its status as
China's spokesman in all future dealings with Japan. Issues the
PRC inherited from the ROC against Japan were nonetheless the
same; yet Peking made a political decision to shelve them all.
Claiming to represent China, the PRC and the ROC hold identical
views on some of the sea law issues (Table 2). Yet they differ in
granting survey licenses and exploration concessions: the ROC in
the East China Sea and the PRC in the Pohai Bay, the Yellow Sea,
and the South China Sea. Their respective overlaps with Japan vary
accordingly.

1.

Japan and the ROC

The unilateral claims and counterclaims of Japan and the ROC
were noted in Chapter 2 supra. Here the focus is on concession
blocks. Table 1 shows that five Japanese blocks and four ROC
blocks produce nine overlaps. The conflict is indeed substantial.
One dimension of the conflict is the selection of basepoints. The
ROC used the coasts of mainland China and Taiwan exclusively as
basepoints for delineating its Offshore Zones. 22 Neither of them relied on the Tiao-yu-t'ais' mid-ocean location. 23 Quite to the contrary, Japan relied heavily on these islets as basepoints for
delineating the concession areas of Teikoku (J-2), Uruma (J-la),
Alaska (J-lb), and Japex (J-lc).24 This demonstrates how the territorial dispute became entangled hopelessly with the seabed issue and
has prompted writers to recognize the inseparable nexus between
them. 25 Under the then prevailing rules of international law, islands,
regardless of their "merits" (size, population, and economic value),
issue was satisfactorily resolved. The "Defending Tiao-yu-t'ai" Movement, first begun
by Chinese students in the U.S. in late 1970, spread rapidly to Taiwan, Hong Kong,
Japan, Europe, and Australia. The movement has had profound impact on Chinese intelligentsia at the time. See generally Hearings on Okinawa Reversion Treaty, supra
Chapter 2, note 57, at 152-53; March, May, June, and August 1971 issues of Ming-Pao
Yue-K'an; and The Fourth Department of the Kuomintang Central Committee, Tiao-YuT'ai Lien- Yu Wen-T'i Tzu-Liao Hui-Pien [A Collection of Materials on the Tiao-yu-t'ais
Question] (Taipei, 1972) [hereinafter cited as Collection of Tiao-yu-t'ais Materials).
22. Supra Chapter 2, text accompanying notes 97-99.
23. Relying on the natural prolongation principle, the ROC did not need these islets
for claiming the continental shelf of the East China Sea. Besides, the ROC was estopped
to use them as basepoints in continental shelf delimitation by its reservations to Article 6
of the Shelf Convention.
24. Supra Chapter 2.
25. See infra Chapter 4, note 4.

64

CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES

generated as much seabed rights as continental territories did. 26 The
Tokara-Amami-Ryukyu islands chain also benefitted from this rule
in giving Japan a large chunk of the East China Sea's shelf. The
disparate views of Taipei and Tokyo on insular seabed rights dictate
the emergence of the conflict.
As in the ROK-Japan case, another source of conflict is the Okinawa Trough. The ROC has made a strong case under the natural
prolongation principle against Japan in treating the Trough as a natural boundary of Chinese and Japanese seabed jurisdictions. Japan's insistence on the equidistance principle for seabed
delimitation, which ignores the Trough, however, receives some support from the recent trend of expanded maritime jurisdictions. Since
the Chinese mainland (and Taiwan) and the Ryukyus are less than
400 miles apart, if the Trough did not exist, a median line seems to
be an equitable solution when each side has a minimum 200-mile
shelf jurisdiction. The legal status of the Okinawa Trough, which in
turn depends on its geological structure (oceanic or continental), and
the legal regime of islands, are key issues to be dealt with in Chapters 4 and 5 infra.

2.

Japan and the PRC

From reading the PRC's vague statements since 1970, one concludes that the PRC does lay claims to the continental shelf of the
East China Sea under the natural prolongation principle and to sovereignty over the Tiao-yu-t'ais on historical grounds. Other than
these vague claims and drillings of the Longjing and Dongtai wells,
the PRC has not specifically challenged Japanese concession areas in
the East China Sea. Nor has it granted any of its own in the same
area. Therefore, while the question of overlapping concessions does
not arise, there is a serious conflict of claims between the PRC and
Japan, whose claim is implicit as well. But the gravity of the conflict
has been deliberately played down by both sides. The provocative
fishing-boat incident in 1978 only momentarily revived the territorial
issue, not the seabed dispute. 27 However, the PRC has decided to
redouble its efforts to go offshore because its onshore prime reserve
could run out in two decades. 28 It could not afford to leave unallo26. This is what Article I, Paragraph b of the Shelf Convention literally means. The
article, along with Articles 2 and 3, was declared by the ICJ as a part of customary
international law. I.C.J. Reports 1969, p. 39.
27. See supra Introduction.
28. Central Intelligence Agency, China: Oil Produclion Prospecls, supra Chapter I,
note 47, p. 22. The CIA predicted that if the PRC crude oil output expanded at 10% to
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cated forever the East China Sea-the most promising among
China's four marginal seas. 29 Overtures on joint development with
Japan are just one indication; 30 the sinking of the Longjin~ and
Dongtai wells is another. In the long run, as energy demand.s mtensify, the seabed and territorial issues are likely to surface agam. The
Law of the Sea Convention, which both the PRC and Japan have
signed, will certainly influence the ultimate solution.
D. The ROC and the PRC
As seabed rights derive ultimately from a state's sovereignty
over its land territory, the conflict of seabed claims (as opposed to
concession conflicts) between the ROC and the PRC expresses itself
more as an extension of the existing rivalry in speaking for China
than as a legal clash between two separate states. Both of their seabed claims, identical in substance, reach all the marginal seas of
China, the only difference being that the ROC's appear more specific
than the PRC's. The real issue, therefore, is not who claims how
much seabed, but who represents the state of China, which, under
international law, is entitled to exercise sovereign rights over its adjacent continental shelf. Though not a purely legal question, this
issue nevertheless has legal consequences that bear upon the oil dispute in the East China Sea, particularly when third states are involved. This dimension is treated at length in Chapter 6 infra.
A more pertinent question seems to be the potential overlaps of
concession areas ofthe ROC and the PRC. 31 As if to avoid just such
a possibility, the PRC did not engage any foreign oil company to
survey areas where the ROC's concessionaires have been operating
for years. However, a closer look at the PRC's survey areas (Map
11) reveals that such a possibility still exists. The most likely overlap
20% annually, then the prime reserves in the north and northeastern regions of China
from which 80% of the PRC's output has come, would be exhausted in ten to fifteen
years.
29. See supra Chapter l.
30. Supra Introduction, text accompanying notes 16-17.
31. As of this writing in August 1984, the PRC has granted no exploration or production concessions in the East China Sea. But it has since 1978 engaged dozens of Western
and Japanese oil firms to conduct geophysical surveys in the rest of China's marginal
seas; some of these firms have already obtained exploration concessions in the past two
years, as related in Chapter 2 supra. Although none of these concessions granted by the
PRC overlaps with the ROC's offshore concessions blocks in the East China Sea, the
assumption here is that the PRC would sooner or later grant some of these survey sectors
that are potentially overlapping with the ROC's concession blocks to foreign oil
companies.
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exists in the Taiwan Strait where the ROC's Zone I is located, and
possibly the area offshore Shanghai where the ROC's Zone V lies
(Map 10). If the ROC's official claims, namely, the five Offshore
Zones (Map 10), are taken seriously, then the sectors of Phillips,
Chevron/Texaco, and even Exxon (Esso) (Map 11) fall, in part,
within the ROC's Zone I, the southern edge of which extends from
Taiwan all the way to Macao. The overlap would be substantial indeed. However, as stated earlier, the western half of these overlapping zones has remained unallocated. A more relevant inquiry,
therefore, should focus on concession areas actually or potentially
granted instead of nominal claims. The Phillips sector (Map II),
reportedly only 80 miles from Taiwan at its closest poine 2 where the
ROC's Zone I (Map 10) (now held by CPC) protrudes I20 miles into
the Taiwan Strait, is then the most likely candidate. If Map II is any
guide, the overlapped area could range from a few hundred square
miles to a few thousand, depending on the exact location of the present Phillips sector near the border between the South China Sea and
Taiwan Strait.
A second possible area is offshore Shanghai near the Yangtze
River estuary. The ROC's nominal Zone V (Map 10) might overlap
with the British Petroleum (BP) sector (Map 11). But the triangularshaped block actualry granted to CPC and Texfel, I 50 miles off the
mainland shore, is unlikely to overlap with the BP sector (Map lO
and 11 ). Chances of one lying adjacent to the other are good,
however.
On the other hand, the drilling by Peking of the Longjing and
Dongtai wells right in the ROC's Zone V suggests that the PRC
might, instead of granting that area to foreign interests, explore and
develop the area itself. If the ROC reacts strongly, the resulting direct confrontation between them would be serious indeed. It is submitted, however, that any such move would not come about unless
the two sides are ready for a larger political/military showdown.
Given the prevailing situation in East Asia and the PRC's recent
conciliatory attitude toward the ROC, this scenario seems unlikely.
In view of the above, the first overlap seems more important
than the second. Texfel has not explored its concession area in Zone
V and probably will not do so in the foreseeable future. The regional geology, heretofore little known, will remain so until a few
years after the PRC's exploration in other areas is completed. On
32. New York Times, August 4, 1979, p. I; Far Eastern Economic Review, September
28, 1979, p. 19.
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the other hand, the ROC's Zone I (Map 9), particularly its southern
part, has been well explored by Cono_co and Am_oc~ (with _a gas
strike in 1974) and by CPC. The potential overlap hes m a sedimentary basin known as the Leichou Basin, 33 extending from southwe~t
ern Taiwan to Hong Kong, Macao, and on to the Gulf of Tonkm
(called Beibuwan by Peking). The shallow-water, thick-sediment
character bespeaks its hydrocarbon potential and economic feasibility.34 Unlike those far-off areas north of Taiwan, this may be one of
the priority areas CPC will concentrate its efforts on in the next decade. Clashes with Phillips or whomever is granted the sector in this
area are not unlikely.
Concession overlappings give rise to a host of legal questions:
Who infringes on whose sovereign rights or mining rights? Who has
title to the oil produced from the overlaps? If oil is exported to a
third state by the PRC's operator (or CPC), can Taipei (or Peking)
claim it? If that state has switched recognition from Taipei to Peking, could the ROC claim the oil at all? Does international law in
this regard, if any, apply to the ROC and the PRC? These questions
are discussed at length in Chapter 6.
E.

Summary
A decade and a half after the present oil controversy first arose,
one development has brought about profound changes. The conclusion of the Japan-ROK Joint Development Agreement has defused
the Japan-ROK seabed dispute which, though not formally settled,
probably will lie dormant for fifty years, if the Agreement's term is
any guide. Meanwhile, the Agreement literally reduced the size of
the multilateral controversy as a whole. For instance, the number of
overlapping concession blocks decreased from seventeen to nine (Table I). It was pointed out in 197235 that the present controversy,
though involving five governments, was effectively one between Japan on the one hand, and China (the PRC and the ROC) and Korea
on the other, because geophysical similarities in the latter states'
coastal areas dictated their similar legal positions vis-a-vis Japan.
Now that the ROK has concluded a "separate peace" with Japan in
the oil war, the controversy becomes, essentially, a Sino-Japanese
dispute. This by no means suggests that the Sino-Korean dispute is
33. K.O. Emery and Zvi ben-Aviaham, "Structure and Stratigraphy of the China
Basin," UNECAFE/CCOP Technical Bul/erin, Vol. 6, (1972) p. 136, ciled in Harrison,
supra Chapter I, note 39, p. 287 n.l6.
34. Harrison, supra Chapter I, note 39, pp. 54, 99.
35. Park (1972), supra Chapter I, note 18, p. 20.
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readily solvable. While legally it may be so, the dispute has been so
politicized that what really matters is which of the two Chinese governments one is dealing with. The net results are, of course, diametrically opposite. The ROK's claims and concession blocks overlap
with areas under the ROC's nominal claims, but not the ROC's concession zones actually granted. In real terms, the conflict is marginal
at most. On the other hand, the ROK-PRC conflict is deprived of a
settlement exclusively for political reasons, although the legal issues
involved are manageable.
The Sino-Japanese seabed and territorial disputes seem to be
the only real conflict left in the East China Sea. Whereas the PRC
has refrained from pressing its claim against Japan for political reasons, the ROC's concession blocks have overlapped substantially
with Japanese ones, half of which have used the disputed Tiao-yut'ai Islands as basepoints. Economic reality is changing this picture.
The PRC's stagnant domestic oil production no longer can afford the
strategy of playing patience to its neighbors' impatience. Sooner or
later the parties involved will be serious about seeking a settlement
of these disputes to clear the way for oil development. The Law of
the Sea Convention would obviously to play a role. Apart from the
international dimension, the two Chinese governments also have
overlapping concession areas. Obviously, the ultimate settlement
must await political forces at work; but the legal aspects or consequences in particular contexts are nevertheless worth probing.
What was summarized above defines the scope of inquiry in
Part II: first, the Sino-Japanese seabed disputes; second, the legal
aspect of the Peking-Taipei rivalry in the undersea oil context. A
preliminary analysis of the relevance of the Tiao-yu-t'ai territorial
dispute to the seabed issue will clarify their interrelationship. References are made occasionally to the rest of the disputing states, but
the focus will remain on China (the ROC and the PRC) and Japan.

PART II THE MARITIME JURISDICTIONAL DISPUTE:
WHO MAY OWN THE UNDERSEA OIL?
CHAPTER 4 RELEVANCE OF THE TIAO-YU-T'AI
(SENKAKU) ISLANDS TERRITORIAL DISPUTE
This Chapter does not purport to deal with the territorial dispute over the Taio-yu-t'ai Islands as such, but instead analyzes the
relevance of this dispute to the larger East Asian seabed jurisdictional issue. In the past decade, an extensive body of literature on
the sovereignty question has been published in Chinese, Japanese,
and English. 1 Unless new historical evidence of significance is uncovered or the international law of territorial acquisition is clarified,
it is unlikely that either China (the ROC and the PRC) or Japan can
l. For the Chinese sources, see Co/lee/ion qf Tiao-yu-r'ai Maleria/s, supra Chapter 3,
note 21. This is the most comprehensive collection of news reports, editorials, and scholarly commentaries of ROC origin. See also Yang Chung-Kwei, Chung-kuo, Liu-ch'iu,
Tiao-yu-r'ai (China, Ryukyu, and Tiao-yu-t'ai) Hong Kong: Union Research Institute,
1972 (hereinafter cited as Yang (1972)); Chiu (1972), supra Chapter 2, note 59.
For the Japanese sources, see Okinawa (A Japanese quarterly devoted to the problem of Okinawa and Bonin Islands), No. 56 (Senkaku Islands Special Issue), March
1971. See also Toshio Okuhara, "Senkaku Rettt'l no ryt'lyilken kizoku montai" (The
Problem of the Right of Sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands),Asahi Asian Review, Vol.
3, No.2 (1972), pp. 18-25, cited in Cheng (1974), supra Chapter 2, note 57, p. 221, p. 244,
note 77 (hereinafter cited as Cheng (1974)); Kiyoshi Inoue, "Tiao-yu Shoto ("Senkaku
Rettt'l" nado) no rekishi to sono ryt'lyilken (sairon)" (The History and Sovereignty of the
T'iao-yu-t'ai Islands - A Re-assessment), Chukoku Kenkyu Geppo (Chinese Studies
Monthly), No. 292 (June 1972), p. 36, cited in Cheng (1974), supra p. 248, note 88 (Professor Kiyoshi Inoue, a Japanese historian, supported the Chinese position); Kiyoshi Inoue, Tiao-yu-l'ai Lieh-yu: Li-shih Yu Ling-r'u Chu-ch'uan Te Pou-hsi (An Analysis of the
History and Territorial Sovereignty of the Tiao-yu-t'ai Islets) translated by Chi-nan
Chen, Taipei: Mei-chuan Hsiao Chiu, 1973.
For the English sources, see Toshio Okuhara, "The Territorial Sovereignty over the
Senkaku Islands and Problems on the Surrounding Continental Shelf," Japanese Annual
of lnrernalional Law, Vol. 15 (1971), p. 97; Park (1972), supra Chapter I, note 18, pp. 3748; Choon-ho Park, "Oil Under Troubled Waters: The Northeast Asia Sea-Bed Controversy," Harvard lnlernalional Law Journal, Vol. 4 (1973), p. 212 (hereinafter cited as
Park (1973)) (this is a slightly revised version of his 1972 paper); Note, "International
Law and the Sino-Japanese Controversy over Territorial Sovereignty of the Senkaku
Islands," Boslon Universiry Law Review, Vol. 52 (1972), p. 763; Note, "The East China
Sea: The Role of International Law in the Settlement of Dispute," Duke Law Journal
(1973), p. 823, pp. 846-54; Cheng (1974), supra; Jerome A. Cohen and Hungdah Chiu,
People's China and lnlernaliona/ Law, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1974,
pp. 346-53; Victor H. Li, "China and Offshore Oil: The Tiao-yu-t'ai Dispute," Sranford
Journal qf lnlernalional Srudies, Vol. 10 (1975), p. 143.
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advance any new argument determinative of the sovereignty issue. 2
Moreover, even if questions of fact and law are settled, there is no
guarantee that the contestants would have the dispute adjudicated
by a third party pursuant to international law principles. The more
likely scenario is, like other territorial disputes, a settlement through
diplomatic negotiations. Chinese and Japanese attitudes toward the
dispute have, since its emergence, attested to this observation. The
PRC's decision to shelve the issue in 1972 and revive it in 1978 simply to serve a particular political purpose vividly illustrates the extent to which the dispute has been politicized. The same can
probably be said of Japan. A reexamination of a territorial issue
which both contestants 3 have deliberately kept dormant makes little
sense, particularly when prospects for breaking new ground are
poor.
On the other hand, the seabed issue has received much less attention. International law in this regard was embryonic and confusing. Accordingly, most writers as well as the disputing states
considered the settlement of the territorial issue as a conditio sine qua
non to the seabed dispute. 4 The 1958 Shelf Convention, the only
2. For a comprehensive and balanced discussion, see Cheng (1974), supra Chapter
2, note 57. On the basis of the arguments and evidences presented by Japan and China
(the PRC and the ROC), Professor Cheng concluded that China had a stronger claim.
Ibid, pp. 239-41, 266. The unclear aspect of the international law of territorial acquisition is the doctrine of intertemporallaw as interpreted by Judge Huber in the Is/anti of
Pa/mas Case (United States v. The Netherlands). United Nations Report of International
Arbitral Awards, Vol. 2 ( 1949), p. 829; American Journal of International Law, Vol. 22
(1928), p. 867. For a famous critique of that case, see Philip Jessup, "The Palmas Island
Arbitration,'' American Journal of International Law, Vol. 22 (1928), pp. 735, 740. See
also Robert Yewdall Jennings, The Acquisition of Territory in International Law,
Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1963, pp. 28-31.
3. Japan derecognized the ROC and established diplomatic relations with the PRC
in 1972. Accordingly, the relations between Taipei and Tokyo since then have been unofficial. Even if the ROC wished to reopen the territorial issue, Japan could not possibly
negotiate with a government which it officially has derecognized as representing China.
4. For writers who explicitly or implicitly took this view, see Park (1972), supra
Chapter 1, note 18, p. 49; Note [Duke Law Journal], supra note I, p. 846; Cheng ( 1974),
supra note I, p. 264; Li, supra note l, p. 146; Barry Buzan, A Sea of Troubles? Sources of
Dispute in the New Ocean Regime, Adelphi Papers No. 143, London: The International
Institute for Strategic Studies, 1978, p. 38; Derek W. Bowett, The Legal Regime of Is/antis
in International Law, Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana Publications, Inc., 1979, p. 307 (hereinafter cited as Bowett (1979)]; Jeanette Greenfield, China anti the Law of the Sea, Air, anti
Environment, Alphan aan den Rijn, The Netherlands: Sijithotf & Noordhotf, 1979. p.
129; Choon-ho Park, "Les Jurisdictions Maritimes dans Ia Mer de Chine: Les Pratiqucs
etatiques actuelles,'' Revue Gimera/e De Droit International Public, Vol. 84 (1980), pp.
328, 338; Choon-ho Park, "Offshore Oil Development in the China Seas: Some Legal
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positive law as of this writing, also unequivocally recognizes, in Article l(b), the seabed rights of islands regardless ofth_eir "merits." The
International Court of Justice in 1969 declared m the North Sea
Cases that Articles l to 3 of the Shelf Convention had acquired the
status of customary international law applicable to parties and n<:>nparties to the ShelfConvention. 5 This in tum stiffened the re~pectl~e
positions of China (the ROC and the PRC) and Japan and mtenstfied the territorial dispute, since the whole seabed issue hinged upon
its outcome.
The following decade witnessed a revolution in the regime of
the oceans, especially in the areas of expanded national jurisdictions
and the legal status of islands regarding seabed rights. The new international consensus is that small islands may, in some cases, be
denied continental shelf rights. If the Tiao-yu-t'ais are to have no
continental shelf of their own beyond the territorial sea, the seabed
issue can then be detached entirely from the territorial dispute. The
key question, of course, is whether the Tiao-yu-t'ais should be so
treated. The analysis below responds to this question.
A. The Tiao-yu-t'ai Islets: Geographical Context6
The Tiao-yu-t'ais consist of five uninhabited islets and three
barren rocks (Map 12). The whole group is 102 miles from Keelung
in northern Taiwan and 230 miles from Naha, the capital of Japan's
Okinawa Prefecture (Map 1). However, the distance between the
group and the nearest Chinese and Japanese territories, including
small offshore islets, is approximately 90 miles respectively. Scattered between 25°40'N and 26°N latitude and 123°E and 124°34'E
longitude in the East China Sea, the Tiao-yu-t'ais have three separate clusters. Tiao-yu, the largest in the group (4.5 sq. km.), along
and Territorial Issues" in Ocean Yearbook 2 ed. by Elisabeth Mann Borgese and Norton
Ginsburg, Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1980, p. 315.
5. See text accompanying note 21 infra.
6. This section is based primarily on the following sources: Sha Hsueh-chun,
"Tiao-yu-t'ai Shu Chung-kuo Pu-shu Liu-ch'iu Chih Shih-ti Ken-chit" (The HistoricalGeographical Evidence of the Chinese and Not the Ryukyuan Sovereignty Over the
Tiao-yu-t'ai Islands], Hsueh Ts'ui [Sinological Studies], Vol. 14, No.2 (February 1972),
p. 4, reprinted in Sha Hsueh-chun, Ti-/i-hsUeh Lun-wen-chi (Collected Geographical
Papers] p. 483, 1972; Yang (1972),supra note l, pp. 131-35; and Tiao-yu-t'ai Lieh-yu Ti-tu
[A Map of the Tiao-yu-t'ai Islands], made by Professor H. Sha (scale 1:10,000; size: 37"
X 51"; color: five colors) (Taipei 1972). Professor Sha was the president of the Chinese
Geographic Society and Professor of Geography Emeritus at the National Taiwan
Normal University. The map is allegedly the only large-scale map of the Tiao-yu-t'ais in
the world. It is partially reproduced as Map 12.
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with Nan-hsiao (the third largest), Pei-hsiao (the fourth), and three
barren rocks (Ch'ung-pei-yen, Ch'ung-nan-yen, and Fei-lai) form
the eastern cluster. Huang-wei, the second largest in the group (1.08
sq. km.), is 14 miles northeast of Tiao-yu. Ch'ih-wei (also known as
Raleigh Rock to Westerners), the fifth largest (0.154 sq. km.), lies 48
miles west of Huang-wei.
Geologically, the Tiao-yu-t'ais are volcanic formations of the
Neocene age. Like islets off the northern Taiwan shore (Hua-p'ing
Mien-hua, and P'eng-chia Islets) (Map 1), they are rocky outcroppings of undersea extensions of coastal mountains in northern Taiwan. Small but disproportionately high peaks (383 meters on Tiaoyu) and steep cliffs are common to all islets. They have served as
excellent navigational aids in past centuries. All the islets sit atop
the edge of the East China Sea continental shelf, separated from the
R yukyus by the deepest part of the Okinawa Trough (over 2,000
meters).
B.

The Regime of Islands in International Law Regarding Seabed
Rights

All states on earth, if not landlocked, have insular territories.
When the territorial sea concept first emerged in the late 1500s
among European maritime powers, islands were treated in the same
way as other mainland territories since many of the states' metropolitan and colonial territories were insular. 7 The security-oriented rationale underlying the territorial sea regime called for no
differentiation. As regards entitlements of tiny islets and rocks to far
more extensive jurisdictions such as continental shelf and 200-mile
zones developed during the last three decades, questions of inequity
arose. One problem concerns the seaward delimitation of these
zones for islands, namely, whether all islands were capable of generating a continental shelf or an EEZ. The apparent inequity lay in
the extreme case where an uninhibited mid-ocean reef of one square
mile commanded a 200-mile zone of more than 140,000 square
miles. 8 The other problem resulting from expanded national juris7. See generally H.S.K. Kent, "The Historical Origins of the Three-mile Limit."
American Journal of International Law, Vol. 48 (1954), p. 537.
8. The reef is assumed to be circular in shape with approximately a one-mile diameter. However, in order for an island to have a land area comparable to that of its 200nautical mile zone around it, such an island must have a diameter of 965 nautical miles if
it is circular in shape. In that case, the area of the island's landmass and the 200-mile
zone would be 967,850 sq. mi. each. It would be larger than Greenland (840,000 sq. mi.,
the largest island in the world) and simply does not exist on earth.
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dictions related to the effect of islands' presence on shelf and EEZ
boundaries between neighboring states: that is, whether islands
should be taken into account in boundary delimitations. These two
problems are separate but interrelated. Certain categories of islands
that were not allowed to generate their own shelf or EEZ, were irrelevant to shelf or EEZ boundary delimitations. However, it was conceivable that in certain cases an island may generate its own
maritime zone but may not equitably be granted full effect (or any
effect) in drawing a boundary. The inequity seemed acute when islands, situated closer to the state other than their home state, were
used as basepoints in drawing an equidistant boundary. 9 The following survey of various sources of international law on this subject
focuses on the continental shelf alone.

1.

International Legislation

An island's seaward delimitation is determined by the legal defi-

nition of continental shelf, an erstwhile purely geological term. It
was first dealt with by the United Nations International Law Commission (ILC) in the early 1950s. 10 The ILC's first draft articles on
the continental shelf, completed in 1951, made it clear that the term
"continental shelf" "may apply also to islands to which such submarine areas are contiguous." 11 On the other hand, neither the text
(Article 7) nor the commentary referred to the effect of islands' presence on boundary delimitation. Indiscriminate treatment of islands
and mainlands seemed to have been assumed without challenge in
previous and subsequent ILC discussions. The ILC's second draft
articles made no change in the islands' seabed entitlement. 12 In this
draft the ILC also considered the effect of islands on seabed boundary delimitation between opposite and adjacent states. In the comments on Article 7, "presence of islands" was cited as one of the
"special circumstances" justifying a departure from the equidistance
line drawn from the mainland coasts Qf the neighboring states. 13
The ILC adopted the same formulation in its third draft, couched in
9. A good example would be the Channel Islands in the English Channel (Map 14).
10. YBILC (1949), pp. 235, 237.
11. ILC Report to the General Assembly, UNGAOR, Vol. 6, Supplement (no. 9),
UN Doc. A/1858 (1951) p. 17, reprinted in YBILC (1951), Vol. 2, p. 141, UN Doc. A/
CN.4/SER.A/1951/ Add. I.
12. ILC Report to the General Assembly, UNGAOR, Vol. 8, Supplement (no. 9),
UN Doc. A/2456 (1953), p. 12, reprinted in YBILC (1953), Vol. 2, pp. 200, 212-14, UN
Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1953/Add.l.
13. Ibid., p. 216.
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Articles 67 to 73 of the draft convention on the law of the sea. 14 This
draft became the basis of negotiation at Geneva in the first United
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS I) in 1958.
During the Conference, a Filipino proposal 15 added to draft Article 67, which omitted islands in the text, a second paragraph explicitly providing islands with whatever rights a continent may have.
The Conference adopted draft Article 67 as amended by the proposal.16 Meanwhile, intensive debate took place in the Fourth Committee (dealing with continental shelf) on the effect of islands on
shelf boundaries (draft Article 72). 17 Two proposals by Italy and
Iran, which would have had the effect of ignoring all islands as basepoints if they were situated in a continental shelf continuous from
the mainland coast, were rejected. 18 Draft Articles 67 and 72 later
became Articles 1 and 6, respectively, of the Shelf Convention, the
relevant parts of which are as follows:
Article 1
For the purpose of these articles, the term "continental
shelf" is used as referring (a) to the seabed and subsoil of
the submarine areas adjacent to the coast but outside the
area of territorial sea, to a depth of 200 meters or, beyond
that limit, to where the depth of the superjacent water admits of the exploitation of the natural resources of the said
areas; (b) to the seabed and subsot1 of similar submarine areas adjacent to the coasts of islands.
Article 6
1. Where the same continental shelf is adjacent to the territories of two or more States whose coasts are opposite
14. ILC Report to the General Assembly, UNGAOR, Vol. II, Supplement (no. 9),
pp. 11-12, 40-45, UN Doc. A/3159 (1956), reprinted in YBILC, (1956), Vol. 2, pp. 253,
264, 296-301, UN Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1956/Add.l.
15. Philippines: Proposal (Article 67), UN Doc. A/CONF.l3/C.4/U.26, UNCLOS
I, Official Records, Vol. 6, 4th Committee (Continental Shelf), UN Doc.A/CONF.l3/42,
1958, p. 133.
The Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, UNTS, Vol. 516, p.
207, also adopted by the 1958 UNCLOS I at Geneva, defines an island in Article 10,
Paragraph I:
An island is a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is
above water at high tide.
The second paragraph recognizes that an island may have a territorial sea of its own.
16. UNCLOS I, Official Records, Vol. 6, supra note 15, p. 47.
17. Ibid., pp. 91-98.
18. Italy: Proposal, UN Doc. A/CONF.l3/C.4/L.25/Rev.l, ibid., p. 133; Iran: Proposal, UN Doc. A/CONF.l3/C.4/L.60, ibid., p. 142. The voting rejecting both proposals
appears in ibid., p. 98.
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each other, the boundary ofthe continental shelf appertaining to such States shall be determined by agreement between them. In the absence of agreement, and unless
another boundary line is justified by special circumstances,
the boundary is the median line, every point of which is
equidistant from the nearest points of the baselines from
which the breadth of the territorial sea of each State is
measured.
2. Where the same continental shelf is adjacent to the territories of two adjacent States, the boundary of the continental shelf shall be determined by agreement between
them. In the absence of agreement, and unless another
boundary line is justified by special circumstances, the
boundary shall be determined by application of the principle
of equidistance from the nearest points of the baselines
from which the breadth of the territorial sea of each State is
measured . . . . 19 (emphasis added)
The Shelf Convention went into effect in 1964 with ratifications
by 22 states; by the time the ICJ decided the North Sea Cases, 39
states had become parties. 20 The ICJ declared, in dictum, that Articles 1 to 3 of the Convention "were then regarded [by UNCLOS I] as
reflecting, or as crystalizing, received or at least emerging rules of
customary international law relative to the continental shelf." 21 The
Court did not address islands which were not at issue in that case.
Nor did it intend to alter the effect of the presence of islands, as (or
not as) a special circumstance under Article 6, on seabed boundary
delimitation. The legislative history of Article 6 clearly shows that,
absent an agreement between opposite or adjacent states, the general
rule is the equidistance principle, whereas a departure from that
principle justified by the presence of islands is an exception. 22 In
other words, despite Article l(b) of the Convention, an island's presence should be ignored as a general rule unless it is so exceptional as
to justify a deviation. The Shelf Convention appears to retract partially in Article 6 what it generously grants to islands in Article 1(b).
The ICJ, recognizing Article 1 to 3 as reflecting customary international law but denying Article 6 the same status, nevertheless did not
19. UNTS, Vol. 450, p. 311.
20. United Nations Secretariat, Multilateral Treaties in Respect of Which the Secretary-General Performs Depository Functions, List of Signatures, Ratifications, Accessions,
etc. as at 31 December 1978, UN Doc. ST/LEG/SER.D/12 (1978), p. 566.
21. I.C.J. Reports 1969, p. 39.
22. Supra note 12, p. 216.
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approve the notion that presence of islands may be invoked as a
"special circumstance" in all cases. Rather, their presence may be
merely one of the "relevant circumstances" to be taken into account
by the delimiting states under the rubric of "equitable principles." 23
The troublesome character of islands' shelf entitlement began to
gain wider recognition in the international community as offshore
technology made more and more seabed accessible to human beings
and more and more mid-ocean insular states declared independence.
Difficult questions of classifying islands according to varying criteria
were discussed in the early 1970s in the Seabed Committee, 24 which
was established by the United Nations General Assembly in 1968,
and were debated intensively in the Caracas session of UNCLOS III
in 1974.25 A compromise was reached in the third session at Geneva
23. I.C.J. Reports 1969, pp. 53, 54.
24. There were a number of proposals submitted to Sub-Committee II on the regime
of islands in general and islands' effect on shelf and other maritime boundaries in particular. See e.g., Greece: Draft article under item 19, Regime of Islands, UN Doc. A/
AC.l38/SC.II/L.29 and Corr. 1, Seabed Committee Report, Vol. 3 (1973), p. 70; Algeria,
Cameroon, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Mauritius, Senegal, Sierra
Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Tunisia, and United Republic of Tanzania: Draft articles on
exclusive economic zone, UN Doc. A/AC.l38/SC.Il/L.40 and Corr. 1-3 (Article XII),
ibid., p. 87 and p. 89; Cameroon, Kenya, Madagascar, Tunisia and Turkey: Draft article
under article 19, Regime of Islands, UN Doc. A/ AC.l38/SC.Il/L.43, ibid., p. 98 (same
as Art. XII above); Turkey: Proposal for a study on islands, UN Doc. A/ AC.l38/SC.II/
L.49, ibid., p. 105; Romania: Working paper on certain specific aspects of the regime of
islands in the context of delimitation of marine spaces between neighboring states, UN
Doc. A/AC.l38/SC.II/L.53, ibid., p. 106.
By and large, Greece advocated equal treatment of islands and mainland territories
of a state whereas the rest of the proposals favored a differentiated treatment.
25. The regime of islands, as agenda item 19, was debated in the 38th, 39th, and 40th
meetings of the Caracas session. UNCLOS III, 0./ficia/ Records, Vol. 2 (1974), pp. 27889. There were nine draft articles relating to islands submitted to the Second Committee
(dealing with traditional law of the sea issues); Romania: Draft articles on delimitation
of marine and ocean space between adjacent and opposite neighboring States and various aspects involved (Article 2), UN Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/L. 18, UNCLOS III, Official
Records, Vol. 3 (1974), p. 195; Fiji, New Zealand, Tonga and Western Samoa: Draft
articles on islands and on territories under foreign domination or control, UN Doc. A/
CONF.62/C.2/L.30, ibid., p. 210; Ireland: Draft article on delimitation of areas of continental shelf between neighboring states, UN Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/L.43, ibid., p. 220;
Greece: Draft articles on the regime of islands and other related matters, UN Doc. AI
CONF.62/C.2/L.50, ibid., p. 227; Romania: Draft articles on definition of and regime
applicable to islets and islands similar to islets, UN Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/L.53, ibid., p.
228; Turkey: Draft articles on the regime of islands, UN Doc. A/CONF.62./C.2/L.55,
ibid., p. 230; Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Libyan Arab Republic, Mexico, Morocco, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay: Draft article on islands and
other territories under colonial domination or foreign occupation, UN Doc. AI
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in 1975, as reflected in Article 132 of the Informal Single Negotiating
Text26 (hereinafter ISNT) which provided:
1. An island is a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide.
2. Except as provided for in paragraph 3, the territorial
sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and
the continental shelf of an island are determined in accordance with the provisions of the present Convention applicable to other land territory.
3. Rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall have no exclusive economic
zone or continental shelf. 27 (emphasis added)
This formulation combines the definition of island under Article
10 of the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous
Zone and Article l(b) of the Shelf Convention. Paragraph 3, however, imposes an important but elusive restriction on an island's entitlement to the continental shelf and the EEZ. Compared to the Shelf
Convention, the new regime on islands made a significant changenot all islands may have shelf rights, even in an isolated location
where no boundary delimitation is involved. The merits of an island
thus became crucial considerations for its seabed rights. But it is still
unclear from the language of paragraph 3 just how the dividing line
is to be drawn between a qualified and an unqualified rock. On the
other hand, islands' effects on shelf boundaries become, under Article 7028 of ISNT, one of the "relevant circumstances" to be considered in effecting an equitable delimitation employing, where
CONF.62/C.2/L.58, ibid., p. 232; Algeria, Dahomey, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Liberia,
Madgascar, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Tunisia, Upper Volta and
Zambia: Draft articles on the regime of islands, UN Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/L.62/Rev.
l,ibid., p. 232; Uruguay: Draft article on the regime of islands, UN Doc. A/CONF.62/
C.2/L.75, ibid., p. 238.
Except for the draft article of Argentina et al, (L.58) supra which did not address
the question of islands' maritime rights, the draft articles of Fiji el al (L.3), Greece (L.50)
and Uruguay (L.75), supra supported an equal treatment of islands and mainland territories whereas those of Ireland (L.43), Romania (L.53), Turkey (L.55), and Algeria el al
(L.62/Rev .l ), supra, advocated a differentiated treatment. A French draft article referred to islands but did not specify its position on islancs' entitlement to shelf. France:
Draft article on the delimitation of the continental shelf or of the economic zone, UN
Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/L.74, ibid., p. 237.
26. UN Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.8, UNCLOS III, Official Records, Vol. 4 (1975), p.
137.
27. Ibid., pp. 170-171.
28. Ibid., p. 163.
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appropriate, the equidistance principle. The change from Article 6
of the Shelf Convention is, at least in form, 29 obvious, as is the heavy
influence of the North Sea Cases.
The formulation of ISNT's Article 132 survived all the subsequent sessions of UNCLOS III that produced the Revised Single
Negotiating Text (RSNT) (Article 128) in 1976, the Informal Composite Negotiating Text (ICNT) (Article 121) in 1977 and its three
subsequent revisions30 in 1979 and 1980 (ICNT/Rev. I, ICNT/Rev.
2, and Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea (Informal Text), Article 121 respectively), the Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea31
(Article 121) in 1981, and finally, the LOS Convention (Article 121)
in 1982.32
2.

Other Sources of International Law

Questions of islands' shelf entitlement did not arise until the international community's general acceptance of 200-mile maritime
zones. On the other hand, islands' effects on shelf boundaries have
long been a subject of controversy among states since 1958. To date,
a solid body of state practice has accumulated and international
tribunals have adjudicated three continental shelf boundary disputes. A brief account of these developments is presented below.
(a)

State Practice

Following the lead of the United States in making unilateral
claims to adjacent continental shelf, a great number of states, continental or insular, have asserted seabed rights of islands. 33 The uniformity and frequency of these claims and the absence of protests
29. The Court in the Anglo-French Arbitration stated that in substance Article 6 and
corresponding provisions under discussion at UNCLOS III (including, of course, the
ISNT Article 70) made little difference as applied to the case before the Court. The
Anglo-French Award, Chapter 2, note 31 supra, para. 96.
30. The three revisions of ICNT were: the Informal Composite Negotiating Text/
Revision l, UN Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.l0/Rev.l, 28 April 1979, the Informal Composite
Negotiating Text/Revision 2, UN Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.l0/Rev.2, ll April 1980, and
the Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea (Informal Text), UN Doc. A/CONF.62/
WP.l0/Rev.3, 27 August 1980. All three documents have not been reprinted in official
records of UNCLOS Ill.
31. UN Doc. A/CONF.62/L.78, 28 August 1981.
32. UN Doc. A/CONF.62/l22, 7 October 1982.
33. E.g., Chile (1947), UNLS/1, p. 6, Costa Rica (1948), ibid., p. 9; Philippines
(1949), ibid, p. 19; Iran (1955), UNLS/15, p. 366; India (1959), ibid., p. 364; Denmark
(1963), ibid., p. 344; New Zealand (1964), ibid., p. 389; Iceland (1969), ibid., p. 354; Malaysia (1969), UNLS/16, p. 154; Fiji (1970), ibid., p. 141.
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from other states combined to vindicate the existence of an international custom to that effect. Codification of this custom by Article
l(b) of the Shelf Convention and subsequent endorsement by the
ICJ in the North Sea Cases as such further strengthen its status.
On the other hand, state practice in boundary delimitation consists primarily of boundary agreements. As a rule, not all states disclose the legal principles underlying their agreement on a particular
boundary. 34 Shelf boundary maps provide useful clues, but they
sometimes admit of more than one interpretation. 35 Nevertheless,
there is substantial agreement among commentators36 who have surveyed scores of these boundary agreements and summarized their
treatments of islands. A number of these conduct patterns emerge
from these agreements.
34. E.g., the Norway-U.K. shelf boundary agreement stated that the boundary was
an equidistance line. Agreement Relating to the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf,
Norway-U.K., March 10, 1965, UNTS, Vol. 551, p. 214; UNLS/15, p. 775; "Continental
Shelf Boundary: North Sea," Limits in the Seas, No. 10 (revised), June 14, 1974, p. 2.
But the Netherlands-U.K. agreement only specifies the geographical coordinates without
stating the delimitation principle. Agreement Relating to the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf Under the North Sea, Netherlands-U.K., October 6, 1965, UNTS, Vol. 595,
p. 113; UNLS/ 15, p. 779; "Continental Shelf Boundary: North Sea," Limits in the Seas,
No. 10, supra, p. II.
35. E.g., Agreement Concerning the Delimitation of Continental Shelf, Sweden-Norway, July 24, 1968, UNLS/16, p. 413; "Continental Shelf Boundary: Norway-Sweden,"
Limits in the Seas, No. 2, January 22, 1970.
Northcutt Ely, a Washington lawyer, pointed out that "[s]ome small Swedish islets
or exposed rocks were ignored, i.e., were not used as basepoints" (emphasis added).
Northcutt Ely, "Seabed Boundaries between Coastal States: The Effect to be Given Islets
as Special Circumstances." International Lawyer, Vol. 6 (1972), p. 227 [hereinafter cited
as Ely (1972)]. However, Robert D. Hodgson, the late geographer of the State Department, considered that "Norway and Sweden have granted full f!ffect to their respective
islands ... " (emphasis added). Robert D. Hodgson, Islands: Normal and Special Circumstances, Research Study RGE-3, Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, 1973, p. 55 [hereinafter cited as Hodgson (1973)]. The
difference of interpretation comes not as a surprise since both states have identical or
similar insular geography. Granting their respective islands full effect or no effect produces nearly the same result since the effects are equalized anyway.
36. See e.g., Ely (1972), supra note 35; L.F.E. Goldie, "The International Court of
Justice's Natural Prolongation and the Continental Shelf Problems of Islands." Netherlands Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 4 (1973), p. 237 [hereinafter cited as Goldie
(1973)]. Hodgson (1973), supra note 35; Donald E. Karl, "Islands and the Delimitation
of Continental Shelf: A Framework for Analysis." American Journal of International
Law, Vo. 71 (1977), pp. 642, 651-65 [hereinafter cited as Karl (1977)]; Bowett (1979),
supra note 4, pp. 156-83; CliveR. Symmons, The Maritime Zones of Islands in International Law, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1979, pp. 189-204 [hereinafter
cited as Symmons (1979)].
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As between opposite states, which is the concern here, islands in
general are accorded full effect, partial effect, or no effect in shelf
boundary delimitations, depending on their location, size, status of
title, and macrogeography. In terms of location (in the order of ascending distance from the island's home state coast): (1) Islands located within the territorial sea of the mainland of their home state
are usually granted full effect in generating their own shelves; 37
(2) islands located close to but outside the territorial sea of their
home state's mainland coast are accorded partial effect; 38 (3) islands
located on or near the median line (constructed in disregard of their
very presence) between their home state and the opposite state, are
given full effect, 39 partial effect, 40 or no effect,41 depending on other
considerations; and, (4) islands located close to the mainland coast of
the opposite state are accorded partial effect or no effect. 42
37. E.g., Agreement on the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf, Denmark-Norway, December 8, 1965, UNTS, Vol. 634, p. 71; UNLS/15, p. 780; "Continental Shelf
Boundary: North Sea," Limits in the Seas, No. lO (revised), June 14, 1974, p. 6; "Continental Shelf Boundary: Italy-Yugoslavia," ibid., No.9, February 20, 1970; International
Legal Materials, Vol. 7 (1968), p. 547. Agreement Relating to the Delimitation of the
Continental Shelf between Greenland and Canada, Canada-Denmark, December 17,
1973, UNLS/18, p. 447; International Legal Materials, Vol. 13 (1974), p. 506. In the
above delimitations, coastal islands within the outer limits of the territorial sea were used
as basepoints.
38. E.g., Agreement Concerning the Islands Al-'Arabiyah and Farsi and the Delimitation of Submarine Areas, Saudi Arabia-Iran, October 24, 1968, UNTS, Vol. 696, p.
189; UNLS/18, p. 433; "Continental Shelf Boundary: Iran-Saudi Arabia," Limits in the
Seas, No. 24 (n.d.); "Continental Shelf Boundary: Italy-Yugoslavia," supra note 37.
In the former agreement, the Iranian island of Kharg, 17 miles offshore (Iran claims
a 12-mile territorial sea), was given half effect in delimiting the median line between
Iranian and Saudi mainland coasts. In the latter agreement, the Yugoslav islands of
Jabuka and Andrija were granted partial effects in influencing the median line drawn
between the mainland coasts of the two states.
39. See e.g., the Norway-U.K. agreement, supra note 34; "Continental Shelf Boundary and Joint Development Zone: Japan-Republic of Korea,'" Limits in the Seas, No. 75,
September 2, 1977, pp. 1-3. For an elaborate discussion, see text accompanying notes
111-12 infra.
40. See e.g., the Italy-Yugoslavia agreement, supra note 37; "Continental Shelf
Boundary: Italy-Tunisia," Limits in the Seas, No. 89, January 7, 1980. The two boundaries are discussed in text accompanying notes 113-20 infra.
41. See e.g., Bahrain-Saudi Arabia Boundary Agreement, February 22, 1958,
UNLS/16, p. 409; "Continental Shelf Boundary: Bahrain-Saudi Arabia," Limits in the
Seas, No. 12, March 10, 1970; Iran-Saudi Arabia agreement, supra note 38. These two
boundary delimitations are also discussed in text accompanying notes 121-27 infra.
42. See e.g., the Italy-Tunisia agreement, supra note 40. But compare "Continental
Shelf Boundary: India-Indonesia," Limits in the Seas, No. 62, August 25, 1975 (the Indian islands of Nicobar (740 sq. mi; population: 14,563), which are 900 miles from the
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In terms of size, small islets or rocks are usually ignored or
given limited effect in continental shelf delimitation. 43 Since th~se
tiny land masses are too small to support a permanent populatiOn
living on them, they are often uninhabited (except by caretakers)
and have little or no economic value. In terms of status of title, an
island the sovereignty of which is in dispute is often accorded no
effect in shelf delimitation. 44 This pattern is largely independent of
other factors. In terms of macrogeography, islands of various locations and sizes belonging to two states are granted identical treatment, be it full effect, partial effect, or no effect, if the insular
geography of the delimiting states warrants reciprocal concessions
on each side. 45 The application of this pattern is not limited to islands inter se; it is applicable to islands vis-a-vis other geographical
features. 46
These patterns of state practice are, of course, somewhat
overgeneralized. In practice, the actual delimitation is affected by a
combination of these factors and possibly even more. The relative
weight of each factor is a function of the particular context and is
difficult, if not impossible, to generalize about.
(b)

International Adjudication

Since the 1945 Truman Proclamation, there have been only
three adjudicated cases relating to international seabed delimitation:47 the 1969 North Sea Cases, the 1977 Anglo-French Arbitration
Indian mainland, were granted full effect in drawing the median line between the islands
and Indonesia's Sumatra Island).
43. See e.g., the Norway-Sweden agreement, supra note 35; the Italy-Tunisia agreement (treatment of the island of Lampione), supra note 40; Bahrain-Saudi Arabia agreement, supra note 41. See text accompanying notes 119, 121 infra.
44. See e.g., "Continental Shelf Boundary: Iran-United Arab Emirates (Dubai),"
Limits in the Seas, No. 63, September 30, 1975 (the island of Abu Musa was in dispute
and thus ignored); "Historical Water Boundary: India-Sri Lanka," ibid., No. 66, December 12, 1975 (the disputed Kachchativu Islet was denied even a territorial sea of 12
miles). See text accompanying notes 123-27 infra.
45. See e.g., the Norway-Sweden agreement, supra note 35 (islands were given reciprocal treatment, be it full or no effect); the Iran-Saudi Arabia agreement, supra note 38
(the reciprocal treatment of the islands of Al-'Arabiyah and Farsi); the Iran-U.A.E.
agreement, supra note 44 (two islets each of which belonged to one state were used in
drawing a boundary line); Japan-ROK agreement, supra note 31 (all islands were given
full effect).
46. See e.g., the Norway-U.K. agreement, supra note 34 (the ignorance of the Norwegian Trough as a limiting factor and the full effect granted to the Shetland Islands may
have been part of a bargain).
47. There have been a number of international and municipal adjudications relating
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and the Case Concerning the Continental She!( (Tunisia/Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya) of 1982 (hereinafter the Tunisian-Libyan Case). 48 The
first case dealt with an adjacent-state situation involving no islands,
the second case specifically focused on islands' entitlement to continental shelf, and the third case discussed a half-adjacent, half-opposite coast with some coastal islands. The way islands were treated is
outlined below.
The North Sea Cases are relevant to the regime of islands only
marginally. The ICJ stated in dictum, as noted earlier, that for opposite states to effect an equitable delimitation of their common geological shelf the "presence of islets, rocks . . ." should be ignored to
eliminate their "disproportionately distorting effect" in constructing
a median line between the two mainland coasts.
The Anglo-French case, on the other hand, largely hinged on the
effect given to islands between opposite states. The seabed of the
English Channel was, the Court of Arbitration pointed out, a common prolongation of the territories of the U.K. and France, despite a
to the maritime boundaries of islands prior to and after the 1945 Truman Proclamation.
For instance, The Anna, 5 C. Rob. 373; 165 Eng. Rep. 815 (1805) (an uninhibated American island was held to have a territorial sea of three miles), The Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case, l.C.J. Reports, 1951, p. 115 (the Norwegian skjaergaard, or rock rampart, was
recognized by the Court as legitimate basepoints for measuring the breadth of territorial
sea), and the Anglo-Icelandic Fisheries Jurisdiction Case, l.C.J. Reports, 1974, p. 3 (the
50-mile fishing zone of Iceland, an insular state, was held not opposable to the United
Kingdom). None of these cases, however, deal with the seabed rights of islands.
On the other hand, there have been a number of unresolved cases relating to the
continental shelf: the territorial dispute, which has seabed implications, between Chile
and Argentina over the Beagle Channel (an arbitral tribunal granted an award in 1977 in
favor of Chile, which has remained unimplemented due to Argentina's rejection of it).
See F. V., "The Beagle Channel Affair," American Journal of International Law, Vol. 71
(1977), p. 733; the Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case concerning the Greece-Turkey seabed boundary (the dispute was submitted to ICJ which found itself lacking jurisdiction to
decide the merits), I.C.J. Reports 1978, p. 3; and the U.S.-Canadian maritime dispute
regarding the delimitation of the Gulf of Maine (now being submitted to the International Court of Justice), Delimitation of Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine, I.C.J.
Reports 1982, p. 3 (Constitution ofChambre Order of January 20, 1982). For a study of
the parties' arguments and a proposed solution, see Sang-Myon Rhee, "Equitable Solutions to the Maritime Boundary Dispute Between the United States and Canada in the
Gulf of Maine,'' American Journal of International Law, Vol. 75 (1981), p. 590. A decision is expected in August 1984. See John Vinocur, "U.S.-Canada Case is Given to
Judges,'' New York Times, May 13, 1984, p. 11.
48. I.C.J. Reports 1982, p. 18. For discussions, see Mark B. Feldman, "The TunisiaLibya Continental Shelf Case: Geographic Justice or Judicial Compromise?" American
Journal ofInternational Law, Vol. 77 (1983), p. 219 and E. D. Brown, "The Tunisia-Libya
Continental Shelf Case: A Missed Opportunity," Marine Policy, Vol. 7 (1983), p. 142.
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minor geological depression. 49 (Map 14) ~oth.states agreed~ principle that the boundary should be a median line, but they differed
significantly as to how the line should be drawn. 5° France argued,
inter alia, that the proximity (6 to 16 miles) of the Channel Islands 51
(belonging to the U.K. but maintaining automony) to the French
coast and their presence in a concave bay surrounded by French
coast dictated, under equitable principles, a median line drawn between the two states' mainland coasts, thus denying the Channel Islands their own shelf.5 2 The U.K. replied that since the Channel
Islands had substantial land area (195 sq. km.) and population
( 130,000) and were of economic and political importance, they
should generate their own continental shelf. 53
After considering the geographical location, political status, and
economic importance of the Channel Islands, the existing regimes in
the region 54 (the 12-mile territorial sea and fishing zones of France
and the U.K., respectively), and the parties' navigation and defense
interests in the area, 55 the Court concluded:
The presence of these British Islands close to the French
coast, if they are given full effect in delimiting the continental shelf, will manifestly result in a substantial diminution
of the area of continental shelf which would otherwise accrue to the French Republic. The fact by itself appears to
the Court to be, prima facie, a circumstance creative of inequity and calling for a method of delimitation that in
some measure redresses the inequity. 56
Short of accepting the French position, the Court decided that a
primary boundary should be a mid-Channel equidistance line drawn
between mainland coasts of France and the U.K. (Map 14). 57 A second boundary in effect was a line 12 miles from the Channel Islands
in their north and west, leaving France a belt of continental shelf,
between the mid-Channel line and the Channel Islands, continuous
with the rest of the French shelves elsewhere (Map 14). 58 Thus, an
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Anglo-French Arbitration, supra note 29, para. 107.
Ibid., para. 146.
Ibid., para. 6.
Ibid., paras. 156-67.
Ibid., paras. 168-79.
Ibid., para. 187.
Ibid., para. 188.
Ibid., para. 196.
Ibid., para. 201.
Ibid., para. 202.
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enclave was created for the Channel Islands surrounded by French
shelves.
A second dispute related to the Atlantic area west of the English
Channel, where some British islands (the Scillies) extended roughly
twice as far from the British mainland coast (21 miles) as the French
islands (Ushant) did from the French mainland coast (10 miles). 59
France favored a delimitation on the basis of a bisector of an angle
drawn between lines constructed along the general direction of the
Channel coasts of the U.K. and France whereas the U.K. proposed a
normal median line between the two coasts. 60
The Court first identified the geographical character of the area
as constituting a "special circumstance" under Article 6 of the Shelf
Convention, 61 thus rejecting the U.K. position. The Court also
found itself unable to accept the French approach since it would
have detached the delimitation from the coast and thus run afoul of
the fundamental principle of continental shelf-natural prolongation of land territories. 62 In view of the Scillies' distorting effect, the
Court finally decided to accord them half effect in drawing the median line between French and British mainland coasts in the Atlantic
area (Map 14). 63
The results of the Anglo-French case fit nicely into the patterns
of state practice noted above. The enclave treatment of the Channel
Islands is compatible with pattern four, namely, no effect or partial
effect accorded to islands located close to the mainland coast of the
opposite state, whereas granting partial effect to the Scillies finds
support from pattern two, namely, partial effect accorded to islands
located close to but outside the territorial sea of their home state.
More importantly, these results were reached by the Court in the
belief that Article 6 of the Shelf Convention, customary rules of international law, state practice, and even the consensus reached at
UNCLOS III were simply different expressions of a single conceptequitable principles. 64 The Court's emphasis on taking into account
all the relevant circumstances65 supports not only the North Sea ruling but also the boundary delimitation provisions of the RSNT (Articles 62 and 71) (Articles 74 and 83 in all the subsequent versions of
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Ibid.,

paras. 4, 10, 235, 251.
paras. 208, 212.
para. 245.
para. 246.
para. 251.
para. 96.
para. 97.
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the negotiating text and the LOS Convention). The inherent and
unanswered question, of course, is what circumstances are relevant
and who should decide whether relevance exists. Disagreement between disputing states could lie precisely there.
The Tunisian-Libyan Case involves, unlike the North Sea Cases
and the Anglo-French Arbitration, coasts that are both adjacent to
and opposite each other. The area in dispute lies in the Pelagian
Sea, a marginal sea of the Mediterranean Sea (Map 15). The coastlines of Tunisia and Libya facing the Pelagian Sea are such that they
are adjacent in the area near the common land boundary but become opposite in the area farther out to sea. 66 In both areas there
are islands on the Tunisia side, namely, Jerba and the Kerkennahs,
but not on the Libyan side. The seabed of the Pelagian Sea, known
as the Pelagian Block to geologists, is the common continental shelf
shared by both Tunisia and Libya; there is no distinct geological feature that may serve as a natural boundary. 67
Both parties have made unilateral continental shelf claims that
were rejected by the ICJ68 (Map 16). They themselves also rejected
the applicability of the equidistance method as the boundary delimitation principle. 69 The Court, having appreciated the hybrid nature
of the parties' coastline, decided to divide the disputed area into two
sectors applying different delimitation principles. 70 In the area near
the common land boundary (the first sector), the seabed boundary
largely follows the extension of the land boundary which bears an
angle of 26° to the meridian, roughly perpendicular to the coastline
at Ras Ajdir, the land boundary's terminal poinf 1 (Map 17). The
Court has chosen this line because it had been followed by the parties as a de facto boundary in granting concessions for offshore oilexploration during the period 1964-76. 72 In this sector the island of
J erba was disregarded by the Court in assessing the direction of the
coastline, for it was "at more than a comparatively short distance
from" Ras Ajdir. 73
66. This hybrid relationship is not unusual in cases where two neighboring states
share a common bay or bight, such as those between Norway and Sweden in the Skagerrak, Italy and Yugoslavia in the Adriatic Sea, France and Spain in the Bay of Biscay, and
China and Korea (North) in the Yellow Sea.
67. l.C.J. Reports 1982, para. 67, p. 58.
68. Ibid., para. 113, p. 80.
69. Ibid., para. 110, p. 79.
70. Ibid., para. 114, p. 82.
71. Ibid., para. 121, p. 85.
72. Ibid., para. 21, p. 35 and paras. 117-18, pp. 83-84.
73. Ibid., para. 120, p. 85.
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In the second sector where the parties' coasts were considered
opposite each other, the Kerkennah Islands were given half effect in
drawing the boundary based on the equidistance principle (Map
17).74 The ICJ reasoned that to take account of these islands' seaward coastline as baseline for delimiting the boundary would, "in
the circumstance of the case, amount to giving excessive weight to
the Kerkennahs." 75
The ICJ's disregard of the island of Jerba should not be disturbing since its presence is, after all, much less relevant, as the equidistance method is not employed here. 76 But the Court's treatment
of the Kerkennah Islands deserves attention. Large (about 65 square
miles) and populous (more than 15,000), these islands lie only 11
miles offshore at their closest point and 22 miles at their farthest. 77
(Tunisia has claimed a 12-mile territorial sea since 1973). 78 In state
practice outlined earlier, islands of this size and location are normally granted full effect or partial effect. Here the Court, which saw
equitable principles basically as a result-oriented concept/ 9 apparently considered that granting no effect or full effect to the Kerkennah Islands would result in inequities; hence the adoption of a
middle ground. Despite the apparent impression of arbitniriness,
the result of the Tunisian-Libyan Continental She!f Case does not depart appreciably from state practice in treatment of islands in seabed
boundary delimitations.
C. The Tiao-t'ais Dispute: Is It Relevant to the East Asian
Seabed Controversy?
The Tiao-yu-t'ai dispute was triggered in part80 by the Sino74. Ibid., para. 128, p. 88.
75. Ibid.
76. Employment of the equidistance principle in lateral boundary delimitation between two adjacent states has a greater chance of creating inequity in cases where islands
or other prominent geographical features are present by magnifying the protruding effect
of these features.
77. Columbia Lippincoll Gaze/leer of the World ( 1962), p. 931 [hereinafter cited as
Columbia Gazeteer].
78. Law 73-49, August 2, 1973, "National Claims to Maritime Jurisdictions," Limits
in the Seas, No. 36, 4th revision, May I, 1981, p. 157.
79. I.C.J. Reports 1982, para. 70, p. 59.
80. It is, however, important to note that this territorial dispute had existed, without
much attention being paid by the Chinese and Japanese governments, long before the
publication of the Emery Report in 1969. Although neither state had openly contested
the other's claim prior to 1968, each had assumed that the islets were part of its territory.
Visits to and uses of them for various purposes by their respective nationals, text accompanying note 102 infra, have been taken for granted and never challenged by the other
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Japanese seabed dispute. In the past decade, that disput~ has effectively delayed seabed delimitation and consequently ml development in that area. As the legal regime of islands is about to tum a
new page, it is high time to examine whether the Tiao-yu-t'ais are
eligible at all, under emerging customary and conventional inter':lational law, for seabed rights. If so, how much? If they are demed
any effect, then the seabed issue could be dealt with separately
before the territorial dispute is finally resolved. If they are only denied full effect, then it is necessary to ascertain how much effect they
should exert on the shelf boundary. Once that is determined, the
territorial issue can still be detached from the seabed issue. In both
cases, the Tiao-yu-t'ai territorial dispute would be irrelevant.

1.

Under Existing and Emerging Conventional
International Law
(a) Existing Conventional Law

No existing conventional international law applies to the present dispute because Japan, the ROK, and the PRC are not parties to
the Shelf Convention, although the ROC is a party, and no bilateral
shelf boundary agreement exists between Japan and the two Chinese
governments.
(b)

Emerging Conventional Law

On the other hand, the new Law of the Sea Convention, which
was signed by 117 states at Jamaica in December, 1982 but has not
come into effect, 81 will be the governing conventional law for Japan
and the PRC, but not necessarily for the ROC. The ROC has been
precluded from all United Nations activities, including UNCLOS
Ill, since October 1971 when the PRC took over the ROC's seat at
the U.N. Security Council and the General Assembly under General
Assembly Resolution 2758 (XXVI). 82 Should the ROC, as a nonside. (Presumably Chinese and Japanese visitors rarely came across each other.) After
all, the magnitude and economic value of this tiny landmass would hardly have warranted any government's attention before the prospects for undersea oil were publicized.
It is thus fair to say that the coastal states' oil hunt merely activated an erstwhile dormant
territorial dispute but did not create it. For the history of the dispute, see the references
cited in note 1 supra.
81. "Sea Law Signed by 117 Nations; U.S. Opposes It; 46 Other Countries Also Refuse to Back Treaty," New York Times, December 11, 1982, p. l. As of January 1984,
133 countries have signed the convention and nine have ratified. U.N. Chronicle, Vol. 21,
No. 2 (February 1984), p. 96.
82. UN Doc. A/RES/2758 (XXIV) (A/L.630 and Corr. 1), UN Monthly Chronicle,
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party, be bound by the LOS Convention even though it will never be
able to accede thereto?
(1)

Should the ROC be Bound by the LOS
Convention?

To respond, one has first to determine whether the LOS Convention, nearly a universal treaty, declares or creates customary international law. The preamble of the LOS Convention explicitly
illustrates its norm-declaring and norm-creating character:
Believing that the cod!fication and progressive development
of the law of the sea achieved in this Convention will contribute to the strengthening of peace, security, co-operation
and friendly relations among all nations. . . . 83 (emphasis
added)
The next question is to ascertain to which category a particular
provision of the LOS Convention relevant to the present study belongs. Article 77, dealing with rights of the coastal state over the
continental shelf, seems to be a prima facie norm-declaring case.
This was illustrated by its adoption by the ICJ in the North Sea
judgment which, as a source of customary law, 84 was subsequently
endorsed by the Anglo-French Court of Arbitration. 85 To use the
late Judge Baxter's words, "the decision maker, legal advisor, or
scholar must give to the treaty the same weight that would be accorded to [117] 86 simultaneous, contemporary and identical declarations by those [117] states of their understanding of customary
law." 87
However, one is less sure about Article 121 (dealing with the
regime of islands), particularly paragraph 3, which denies shelf and
EEZ entitlements to certain rocks. That paragraph presumably is
intended to replace the customary law as contained in Article 1(b) of
Vol. 8, No. 10 (November 1971), p. 61. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 65 (1971), p.
556. The PRC delegate at the U.N. specifically proposed that the ROC not be invited to
UNCLOS III. "Recommendation for Holding U.N. Conference on Law of the Sea,"
Hsinhua Weekly [New China Weekly], November 5, 1973, p. 22. Hsinhua Weekly is one
of the PRC's official weekly publications.
83. LOS Convention, Preamble, UN Doc. A/CONF.62/122, 7 October 1982, p. I.
84. I.C.J. Reports 1969, p. 46.
85. See note 64 supra and accompanying text.
86. This is the assumed number of states that will become parties to the Law of the
Sea Convention.
87. Richard R. Baxter, "Treaty and Custom,'' Hague Academy, Recuei/ IJes Cours,
Vol. 129, Sec. I (1970), p. 25 and p. 55.
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the Shelf Convention. Therefore, whereas Article 77 may apply to
the ROC, a non-party to the LOS Convention, qua customary l~~·
Article 121(3) may not apply until sometime in the future when 1t IS
declared "through juridical decision or other authoritative pronouncement that the treaty provision has passed into customary
law." 88
As a practical matter, the ROC probably will not oppose Article
121(3) to the extent it coincides with its reservation to Article 6 of the
Shelf Convention that "exposed rocks and islets shall not be taken
into account" in continental shelf boundary delimitation. 89 Since
the ROC made this reservation with the Tiao-yu-t'ais in mind, 90 it
seems reasonable to assume that the ROC will accept Article 121(3)
as applied to the Tiao-yu-t'ais. 91
(2)

Article 121 of the LOS Convention: An
Analysis

In this context, Article 121, which has been adopted by successive negotiating texts without change, demands attention. Paragraph
3, requoted below, is particularly relevant to the Tiao-yu-t'ais:
Rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic
life of their own shall have no exclusive economic zone or
continental shelf.
Nowhere in the LOS Convention is "rock" defined. The fact
that mathematical criteria suggested by commentators92 and partici88. Ibid., pp. 73-74.
89. Supra Chapter 2, text accompanying note 90.
90. Li-Ja-yuan Kung-pao, supra Chapter 2, note 89, p. 3; Ch'ang Shen-chun, "Chiaoch'en Kung-yueh Yu 'Pao-liu T'iao-k'uan' [The Shelf Convention and the "Reservations"] Chung-kuo Shih-pao [China Times], August 16, 1970, reprinted in Collection of
Tiao-yu-t'ai Materials,supra Chapter 3, note 21, p. 50; Chiu (1972), supra Chapter 2, note
59, p. 10 (The China Times is an independent Chinese-language daily based in Taipei).
91. As a developing and, insofar as territory under effective control is concerned, an
insular state, the ROC is not expected to find any obvious disadvantag~ in abiding by the
rules of the LOS Convention. In effect, by declaring a 200-mile EEZ on September 6,
1979, the ROC seemed to show its receptiveness to developments at UNCLOS III. For
the declaration, see Introduction, note 20 supra.
92. See e.g., Hodgson (1973), supra note 35, pp. 17-18; Hodgson classified islands
into four categories: (I) rocks (less than 0.001 sq. mi. in area); (2) islets (0.001-1 sq. mi.);
(3) isles (1-1,000 sq. mi.); and (4) islands (over 1,000 sq. mi. in area). This proposal was
repeated in Hodgson and Smith, "The Informal Single Negotiation Text (Committee II):
A Geographical Perspective;· Ocean Development and International Law Journal, Vol. 3
(1976), p. 225, pp. 230-31 [hereinafter cited as Hodgson and Smith (1976)].
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pating states93 were not adopted by drafters at UNCLOS III bespeaks the difficulties in reaching agreement. Without a precise,
objective definition, one is forced to place more emphasis on the
qualitative criteria of a rock's ability to "sustain human habitation or
econmic life of [its] own." 94
A logical interpretation of this provision is that rocks that fail
either test would be disqualified from having a continental shelf
whereas, to qualify itself, the rock in question must conform to both
criteria simultaneously. 95 A number of questions arise. Does the
first test mean "uninhabitability" or "uninhabitedness"? Interpreted
by the ordinary meaning of the words, 96 "uninhabitability" seems to
have been intended. 97 The drafters thus envisage a rare but possible
situation where an inhabitable rock able to sustain its own economic
life is nevertheless left uninhabited for other reasons. But it is still
unclear how long the rock in ~uestion should sustain human habitation in order to qualify itself? 8 Weeks? Months? Years?
The answer seems to depend on how much resources the rock
has. This inquiry leads to the second test: the rock's ability to sustain its own economic life. In determining that ability, one has first
to ask: should the rock's economic life originate from resources of
93. Romania, in its draft articles on islands (L.53), supra note 25, differentiated between an islet (less than I sq. km.) and an island similar to an islet (larger than I sq. km.
but smaller than x sq. km.) on the one hand, and islands (over x sq. km.) on the other.
The draft articles of Algeria et al (L.62/Rev.1), ibid., classified into islands, islets, rocks,
and low-tide elevations without using any mathematical criterion. Nor did the Irish
(L.43) and Turkish (L.55) draft articles, ibid.
94. This shift of emphasis should not give "rock" an excessively broad definition so
as to include fairly substantial islands. In fact, islands that fail the qualitative criteria are
rarely substantial in size.
95. But compare: Hodgson and Smith ( 1976), supra note 92, p. 231 (it was stated that
"[l]ogically, to qualify, the rock must meet one of the two implicit criteria") (emphasis
added).
96. See Article 31 (general rule of interpretation) of the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, which provides, inter alia,
I. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of
its object and purpose . . . .
United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties, Official Records, Documents of the
Conference, UN Doc. A/CONF.39/ll/Add.2, 1970, p. 289;American Journal of International Law, Vol. 63 (1969), p. 875.
97. Another indication is that the Romanian draft articles (L.53), supra note 25, suggested both meanings but the ISNT only adopted the former.
98. Both the draft articles of Romania (L.53) and Algeria et al (L.62/Rev.l) favored
a requirement of permanent habitation or settlement, supra note 25. This requirement
was not adopted by ISNT, subsequent negotiating texts and the LOS Convention.
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the rock proper (the landmass) alone, or those in nearby waters as
well? Inclusion of nearby resources as part of a rock's "own economic life" seems to beg the question since what needs to be determined is precisely whether the marine resources in the continental
shelf and the EEZ of that rock should belong to it. On the other
hand, whether to include the resources within the rock's 12-mile territorial sea, which it is undeniably entitled to, poses a harder question. A rich fishing ground within the rock's territorial sea could
sustain a viable economic life, thereby enabling it to claim the petroleum lying beneath its continental shelf further seaward. The issue,
then, is whether the resources in the territorial sea may be used as a
"stepping stone" to bypass the second test.
Technically, given sufficient investment, virtually any rock in
the world could be made economically viable, with or without the
resources in its territorial sea. A not-too-remote possibility would be
building an offshore casino on a rock. The "human habitation" and
"own economic life" tests would be met effortlessly. This again
leads to the third question: should "economic life of their own" exclude a situation in which massive outside resources pour in to tum
an erstwhile barren rock into a valuable piece of real estate? If potential resources in the rock's continental shelf or EEZ are rich
enough, its home state would lack no incentive to do so. In this case,
the equity of granting extensive maritime jurisdiction to a semi-artificial island is in serious doubt. 99
The fourth question is whether an inhabitable rock can claim an
economic life of its own if it has limited indigenous resources in the
landmass but they are economically unfeasible to develop? What
standards should be used in determining economic feasibility?
Neither the LOS Convention nor its travaux preparatoires provides obvious answers to the last three questions. But the apparent
object or purpose of Article 121(3) sheds some light on a proper interpretation.100 Since paragraph 3 of that article serves as an exception to paragraph 2 and clearly is intended to exclude certain types
of rocks from shelf and EEZ entitlements, 101 a more strict construe99. It has been settled that an artificial island or any offshore structure shall have no
maritime zone other than a 500-meter safety zone around them. LOS Convention, arts.
60, 80.
100. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31(1), supra note 96.
101. At UNCLOS III, the number of states that supports the restrictions on the continental shelf and EEZ entitlements of certain islands far exceeds that of the other side.
This can be seen from the draft articles proposed and the debates on the regime of islands held at the Caracas session, supra note 25.
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tion should then be given to it to keep the exception from becoming
meaningless. Under this assumption, to qualify itself, a rock not
only has to be inhabitable for an extended period of time, but its
own economic life should be supported by the resources on the rock
proper alone, not including those in its territorial sea or brought
from outside. Moreover, the development of the rock's indigenous
resources must be economically feasible according to local standards
at the time the question arises.
(3)

Applying Article 121 to the Tiao-yu-t'ais

A few more words about the Tiao-yu-t'ais are needed before
applying the above criteria to them. 102 In Table 3, the islets and
rocks are listed in the order of their sizes. Tiao-yu (No. 1), Nanhsiao (No. 3), Pei-hsiao (No. 4), Ch'ung-pei-yen (No. 6), Ch'ungnan-yen (No. 7) and Fei-lai (No. 8) should be, as noted earlier, considered together because of their proximity (4 miles apart) which
would make their shelf entitlements, if any, largely identical. Since
Huang-wei (No.2) is not far (10 miles) from Ch'ung-pei-yen (No.6),
it is discussed together with the Tiao-yu cluster. We shall begin with
Ch'ih-wei (No. 5), to be followed by the rest.
Ch'ih-wei is a volcanic rock without vegetation. The rocky surface and steep cliffs make it virtually useless except as a navigational
aid in ancient times and for target practice in modern times. From
all available evidence, Ch'ih-wei has not and prabably cannot sustain human habitation and economic life of its own.
Tiao-yu and Huang-wei, about 30 and 7 times, respectively, the
size of Ch'ih-wei, are also of volcanic origin. They and Nan-hsiao
are the only ones that have vegetation on them. In addition to palm
trees and tropical bushes, Tiao-yu and Huang-wei are abundant in
Hai-:fujung or Shih-ts'ungjung (Statice arbuscula), a precious Chinese medicinal herb good for curing high blood pressure and rheumatism. Whereas Huang-wei has no potable water, Tiao-yu is said
I02. In addition to the literature cited in supra note 6, this section is based, unless
otherwise indicated, on the following sources: Ch'i Tung-hsin, "T'iao-yu-t'ai Ch'un-tao
Chien-chieh" (A Brief Note on the T'iao-yu-t'ai Islands], Chung-yang Jih-pao, August 18,
1970, reprinted in Collection of T'iao-Yu-T'ai Materials, supra Chapter 3, note 21, p. 51;
Yao Chuo-jan, Ch'ing-t'ing Yu-min-men Te Hu-sheng: "Tiao-yu-t'ai Shih Wo-men-te!"
[Please listen to the Fishermen: "The Tiao-yu-t'ais are Ours!"), Chung-kuo Shih-pao,
August 28, 1970, reprinted in Collection of Tiao- Yu- Tai Materials, supra Chapter 3, note
21, p. 73; Liu Pen-yen, "Tiao-yu-t'ai Chiu-ching Shih-She-mo Yang-tzu?" [What Are
the Tiao-yu-t'ais like after all?), Chung-yang Jih-pao, August 24, 1970, reprinted in Collection of Tiao-yu-t'ai Materials, supra Chapter 3, note 21, p. 59; Okuhara (1971), supra
note I.
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to have a spring big enough to accomoda!e 200 people .. N~arby ~a
ters are rich in bonito. A strait between Ttao-yu and Fet-lat provtdes
a good gale shelter for fishing vessels in the region.
In the past six centuries, Chinese imperial envoys of Ming and
Ch'ing Dynasties first used the Tiao-yu-t'ais as navigational aids on
their way to the Ryukyu Kingdom, then a tributary of China, to officiate at investiture ceremonies. 103 In the nineteenth century came
the Chinese fishermen and pharmacists. Around the turn of this century, an enterprising Japanese named Koga brought in scores of seasonal workers, food, and supplies each year to develop Tiao-yu,
Huang-wei, and Nan-hsiao. Houses, reservoirs, docks, warehouses
and sewers were built and experimental planting was conducted.
Koga was engaged in the business of collecting guano and albatross
feathers, bonito canning, and bird stuffing. His business was discontinued in 1915 because of high cost. After his death in 1918, his son
continued his fish canning and bird stuffing businesses until the early
1940s, when all operations were terminated and enterprises abandoned. After the war, the Tiao-yu-t'ais were placed, along with the
Ryukyus, under U.S. administration} 04 No other use was made of
them except for naval target practice on Huang-wei and Ch'ih-wei.
In the 1950s and 1960s a Taiwan-based salvage company used
Huang-wei as a work site, having built a 200-meter railroad and an
iron pier which were later destroyed by naval bombing. Coming
from Taiwan, Chinese fishermen still regularly, and pharmacists occasionally, visited the islets or nearby waters until the Sino-Japanese
territorial dispute erupted and Japanese patrol boats began to chase
them away. Currently the Tiao-yu-t'ais are under Japanese physical
control. Ever since Koga and company left, the islets have been
uninhabited for four decades. How will these islets fare, in light of
the above descriptions, under Article 121(3) ofthe LOS Convention?
As to the "inhabitability" test, one could argue that at least the
103. Cheng (1974), supra Chapter 2, note 57, pp. 254-56, especially p. 256 note 108.
See generally Ta-tuan Ch'en, "Investiture of Liu-ch'iu Kings in the Ch'ing Period," in
The Chinese World Order, edited by John K. Fairbank, Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1968, p. 135.
104. The Ryukyus were under the physical control of the U.S. forces when Japan
surrendered in 1945. The 1951 peace treaty with Japan, UST, Vol. 3, p. 3169; TIAS, No.
2490; UNTS, Vol. 130, p. 45, placed the Ryukyus under U.S. administration, to be included in the U.N. trusteeship system (which never happened). In 1953, the U.S. Civil
Administration of the Ryukyus issued Proclamation No. 27 which embraced the Tiaoyu-t'ais within the scope of the U.S. civil administration, Hearing on Okinawa Reversion
Treaty, supra C~apter 2, n?te 5~, p. 149. For a denial of the alleged legal effect of the
above proclamation on China wtth respect to the Tiao-yu-t'ais, see ibid., p. 152.
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Tiao-yu Island can sustain human habitation, given its potable water
and tillable soil. After all, it has been done in the past for a fairly
long period of time. On the other hand, opponents can point out
that to sustain human habitation Koga and company had not only to
bring in food and supplies but also constantly replace the seasonal
inhabitants. Additionally, they can argue that the attempt to settle
on the islets was unsuccessful. It is true that the Kogas' experience
admits of conflicting interpretations. But if "inhabitability" is not
intended to mean "permanent settlement," 105 then Tiao-yu and
Huang-wei seem qualified to be inhabitable under that test.
Next is the "own economic life" test. Proponents can argue that
the collection of guano, feathers and herb and production of stuffed
birds and canned fish enable the islets to sustain an economic life of
their own. However, arguments can also be advanced to the effect
that the absence of the collecting of guano, which is exhaustible, in
the post-war decades attests to its unfeasibility; that the drastic reduction of birds, according to a Japanese study, 106 also makes
feather collecting or bird stuffing difficult, if not impossible; and that
the herb, according to a Chinese pharmacist in Taiwan who has occasionally extracted herbs on the Tiao-yu-t'ais, can sustain largescale exploitation for only five years. 107 Opponents may conclude
that the ultimate failure of Koga's family business and the absence
of its restoration thereafter bespeaks the unfeasibility of establishing
an indigenous economic life on the islets. As for fish canning, it has
been assumed that the living resources in nearby waters of a rock are
excluded from its "own economic life". So is the use of these islets
as temporary work sites.
Unlike the "inhabitability" notion susceptible of more objective
criteria, the "own economic life" test has various interpretations.
"Economic life" itself is vague enough to literally include everthing
of economic value. But with the word "own" strictly construed to
denote only indigenous resources from the rock proper, the case disqualifying Tiao-yu and Huang-wei seems to be stronger than the
case qualifying them.
The above analysis relies on a few assumptions intended to give
Article 121(3) a strict reading according to the purpose and object of
105. Supra note 98.
106. The study said that there were around 850,000 birds in the area in 1963. By 1970,
the number went down to about 110,000. This study, done by the Japanese in 1970, was
cited in Yang (1972), supra note I, p. 134.
107. This was estimated by Mr. Shen Ch'eng-nan, a Chinese herbal pharmacist who
was familiar with the Tiao-yu-t'ais. See Liu, supra note 102, p. 61.

SEABED BOUNDARY DELIMITATION

95

the article as a whole. Applying that paragraph under these assuJ?~
tions, Tiao-yu and Huang-wei can sustain human habitation but It IS
doubtful that these islets can sustain an economic life of their own
without bringing in substantial resources from outside.

2.

Under Customary International Law
(a) State Practice

The state practice in this regard discussed above may not have
become so general as to evidence an international custom or constiute an opinio juris, as required by the Statute of the International
Court of Justice 108 (Article 38) and the North Sea Cases . 109 But a
few patterns summarized earlier may be in the process of becoming
one, if more states whose interests are specially affected follow those
patterns. In the following analysis, factors that influence islands' effect on shelf boundaries such as location, size, status of title, and
macrogeography are considered together with location as the connecting factor.
In addition to their small size and disputed status, the Tiao-yut'ais have another characteristic. They (except Ch'ih-wei) are located exactly on or very close to the hypothetical median line drawn
from the coasts of China (including Taiwan) and Japan (including
the Ryukyus) in disregard of the presence of the Tiao-yu-t'ais (Map
1). Islands in the following shelf boundary agreements selected from
state practice have at least one of the three characteristics. The midway location is used as the connecting factor.
(1)

Full Effect to Midway Islands

There have been two relevant full-effect cases: 1 10 the Shetland
108. Article 38 provides, inter alia:
I. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law
such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply:
a. international conventions, . . . ;
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
109. I.C.J. Reports 1969, p. 44. This requirement was criticized as too rigid by dissenting Judges Tanaka and Lachs, ibid., p. 175, and p. 231.
110. Another two cases of interest are the treatment of the Indonesian islands of
Natuna (815 sq. mi.) and Anambas (260 sq. mi.) in the South China Sea and the treatment of the Venezuelan Aves Isle in the Carribbean Sea. In the first case, the two groups
of islands, situated approximately midway from Borneo and the Malay Peninsula, were
granted full effect in the Indonesian-Malaysian shelf boundary delimitation. However,
apart from the islands' substantial size which would have justified full-effect treatment
anyway, they were in fact included within Indonesia's straight baseline system. There-
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Islands in the North Sea between the United Kingdom and Norway
and the Tsushima Island in the Korea Strait between the ROK and
Japan. In the former case, a 1965 shelf boundary agreement between London and Oslo 111 gave full effect to the Shetland Islands in
drawing a median-line boundary (Map 13). (The Shetlands lie
outside the British straight baseline system and are 96 and 173 miles
from the nearest British and Norwegian mainland coasts respectively. The distance between the two coasts in that part of the North
Sea is about 270 miles.) In the latter case, points on the coast of
Tsushima Island, situated 37 and 53 miles respectively from Korean
and Japanese coasts in the 95-mile-wide Korea Strait, were used as
basepoints in drawing an equidistance shelf boundary under the
1974 Japan-ROK agreement (Map 1). 112
A closer look at the geographies of the two cases reveals that
their full shelf entitlements may have little to do with their midway
or near-midway location. First, in both cases the islands involved
are fairly large (Shetlands: 552 sq. mi.; Tsushima: 271 sq. mi.), populous (Shetlands: 17,298; Tsushima: 58,672) and important. There
is little reason to deny them a continental shelf. Second, considerations of reciprocal concessions may have heavily influenced the
boundaries. For instance, in the Norway-U.K. case, the Norwegian
Trough lying only a few miles off Norway could have caused Norfore their use as basepoints had nothing to do with their midway location. See Agreement on the Delimitation of the Continental Shelves, Malaysia-Indonesia, October 12,
1969, UNLS/16, p. 417; "Continental Shelf Boundary: Indonesia-Malaysia," Limits in
the Seas, No. I, January 21, 1970. But see Hodgson (1973), supra note 35, p. 63 (the
effects these islands received were said to range from half to 86 percent rather than full
effect).
In the second case, Venezuela's tiny Aves Isle (0.02 sq. mi.) was also granted full
effect. The Islet is located in the east Caribbean Sea 300 miles from Venezuelan mainland coast and 191 miles from Puerto Rico, a self-governing commonwealth of the U.S.
The islet, which is actually a sand bar covered by purslane and inhabited by birds and
turtles, is occasionally used as garrison by the Venezuelan military authorities. Under
the Maritime Boundary Treaty between the United States of America and the Republic
of Venezuela concluded on March 18, 1978, TIAS No. 9890, the U.S. agreed to grant it
full effect primarily because of political considerations. For the boundary and the Aves
Isle, see "Maritime Boundary: United States-Venezuela," Limits in the Seas, No. 91,
December 16, 1980. For the Venezuelan perspective, see Kaldone G. Nweihed, "EZ
(Uneasy) Delimitation in the Semi-Enclosed Caribbean Sea: Recent Agreements between Venezuela and Her Neighbors," Ocean Development and International Law Jour·
nal, Vol. 8 (1980), pp. 5 (map), 20-21. For the U.S. perspective, see Mark B. Feldman
and David Colson, "The Maritime Boundaries of the United States," American Journal of
International Law, Vol. 75 (1981), p. 747.
Ill. Supra note 39.
112. Supra note 39.
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way difficulties in claiming the shelf west of the Trough had the
United Kingdom stressed the discontinuity of the Norwegian shelf.
However, the median-line boundary was drawn in total disregard of
the Trough's presence as a potential limiting factor. To what extent
this concession of the United Kingdom was linked to granting full
effect to the Shetlands is a matter of conjecture. But such a possibility obviously exists. In the Japan-ROK case, a similar situation appears. The ROK's Cheju Island in the mouth of the Korea Strait is
48 miles offshore. Like Tsushima, it was used as a basepoint in constructing the southern portion of the Japan-ROK median line in the
Korea Strait. lfTsushima had been granted no effect (other than the
territorial sea), there would have been little reason to treat Cheju
differently. Using these islands in question in both cases as basepoints admittedly displaced the median lines to varying degrees
(more so in the wider North Sea than in the narrower Korea Strait),
but the resulting distorting effects were reduced or eliminated by reciprocal concessions from macrogeographical perspectives. The two
cases shed little light on the Tiao-yu-t'ais' shelf entitlement, however,
because of the disparity in size and importance between them.
(2)

Partial Effect to Midway Islands

The two most noted partial-effect cases involve Italy. In a 1968
agreement between Italy and Yugoslavia, 113 Pelagrus and Kajola,
two tiny Yugoslav islets 114 midway in the Adriatic Sea, were only
accorded a 12-mile zone which created a bulge in the otherwise
smooth median line between the Italian and Yugoslav mainland
coasts. Since Yugoslavia did not claim a 12-mile territorial sea until
1978, 115 the two-mile continental shelf beyond its then 10-mile territorial sea reflected recognition of the partial effect of these islands at
the time. After Yugoslavia's extension of territorial sea to 12 miles,
these islands' effects on the median-line boundary were eliminated
entirely.
Another instance was the 1971 shelf boundary agreement between Italy and Tunisia 116 that went into effect in 1978. One island
(Pentelleria, 32 sq. mi.), 117 two islets 118 (Lampedusa and Linosa, 3
I 13. Supra note 37.
114. Information about the size and economic life of these two islets is not available.
115. "National Claims to Maritime Jurisdictions," supra note 78, p. 175.
116. Supra note 40.
117. See Webster's New Geographical Dictionary (1972), p. 920. Pantelleria's 1961
population was 9,267. See also Hodgson (1973), supra note 35, p. 62, note 43.
118. The Columbia Gazetteer, supra note 77, p. 1015 and p. 1060. Lampedusa's 1971
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sq. mi and 2 sq. mi respectively) and one uninhabited rock 119 (Lampione, less than 1 sq. mi.) are situated either on the median line
drawn without regard to their presence or on the Tunisian side of
that line (Map 15). Under the agreement four semicircles of different radius were drawn around these islands as their entitlements to
continental shelf. Except for Lampione, which was accorded a 12mile zone, the rest got a 13-mile zone. All the semicircles intersect
with the median line or with each other so that no enclave was created. Since Italy claimed a 6-mile territorial sea in 1971 and extended it to 12 miles in 1974, 120 all the islands' effects on shelf
boundary may be categorized as "partial" before 1974. Thereafter,
the effect of Lampione became nil. In fact, Italy might have deliberately used a 12-mile limit in anticipation of its prevalence in the future as the width of territorial sea.
These two cases have important implications for the Tiao-yut'ais in view of their great resemblance in size, location, and
macrogeography. None of these islets was granted full effect; the
partial effects they received were limited or even symbolic. Particularly noteworthy is that an island of the magnitude of Pantelleria
(population over 9,000) was accorded only slight effect in shelf
delimitation.
(3)

No Effect to Midway Islands

Where islands are granted no effect, the result may be the mere
existence of a territorial sea (including, of course, the seabed) or even
a reduced territorial sea if the area to be delimited is very small. In
addition to the Lampione instance discussed above, there have been
a number of cases where small, midway, and/or disputed islets are
ignored in shelf boundary delimitation.
In 1958, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia delimited a shelf boundary121 where small islands between their coasts were either ignored
or used as turning points on the equidistance line (which is another
way of denying maritime zones, including territorial sea, to midway
population was 4,387. John Paxton, The Statesman's Yearbook World Gaze/leer, London
and Basingstoke: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1979, p. 299. Linosa's population in the 1950s
was 336. It is noteworthy that Linosa's small size and precisely midway location are
extremely similar to those of Tiao-yu Islet in the Tiao-yu-t'ai Islands.
119. Information about Lampione is limited; it has no entry (or separate entry) in the
above-cited geographical references. Its land area is estimated at less than 0.2 sq. mi.,
approximately the size of Nan-hsiao Islet of the Tiao-yu-t'ais.
120. "National Claims to Maritime Jurisdictions," supra note 78, p. 90.
121. Supra note 41.
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islands). In the Iran-Saudi Arabia shelf boundary agreemen.t of
1968 122 there were two tiny islets, Farsi (Iran) and Al-'Arab1yah
(Saudi Arabia), sitting very close to the median line (but on the
Saudi side) drawn between the mainland coasts of the two states.
These islets were allowed to have only a 12-mile territorial sea, thus
having no effect on the shelf boundary. A "local" median line delimited the territorial sea boundary between them.
In 1974, India and Sri Lanka signed an agreement 123 to delimit
their "historical waters" in the island-riddled, 45-mile-wide Palk
Strait. It is of interest to note that Kachchativu, 124 a tiny landmass
located 1.2 miles from the median line drawn without regard to its
presence, was denied even a 12-mile territorial sea, which Sri Lanka
claims. The islet's sovereignty was previously in dispute between India and Sri Lanka. The agreement allocated the islet to the latter but
guaranteed the citizens of the former free access to it for fishing and
religious purposes. 125 Also in 1974, Iran and the United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.) signed an agreement 126 delimiting their shelf boundary
in the Persian Gulf near the Strait of Hormuz. The mid-gulf island
of Abu Musa, 127 claimed by both Iran and Sharjah Emirate (a part
of the U.A.E.), was ignored in drawing the boundary, which was not
a median line.
(4)

Observations

The cases of Shetland and Tsushima Islands apparently exemplify that midway location alone may not determine shelf entitlement. Size does matter; so do macrogeographical considerations. If
the midway islands are small, as the Italian-Yugoslav and ItalianTunisian shelf boundaries show, they are given partial effects ranging from two to seven miles beyond the territorial sea of the state to
which the islands belong. In yet another series of shelf or other maritime boundaries in the Persian Gulf and the Palk Bay, small islets
situated near the median lines drawn in disregard to their presence
were either completely ignored or were permitted to maintain a terri122. Supra note 38.
123. Supra note 44.
124. The land area is estimated by the author at about 0.1 sq. mi., roughly the size of
Pei-hsiao in the Tiao-yu-t'ai.
125. See India-Sri Lanka Historical Waters Boundary Agreement, Article 5, supra
note 44.
126. Supra note 44.
127. The land area is estimated at about 4 sq. mi. The treatment of this island was
also referred to in Ely (1972), supra note 35, p. 230.
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torial sea only. If the particular islet's sovereignty is in dispute, ignoring its presence in boundary delimitation seems to be the rule, as
the treatments of Kachchativu (Sri Lanka) and Abu Musa (U.A.E.)
demonstrate. 128 The above observations are in general accord with
proposals on treatment of islands by commentators. 129
(b)

The North Sea Cases, the Anglo-French
Arbitration, and the Tunisian-Libyan
Case
(1)

The North Sea Cases

The North Sea Cases are relevant here only in general terms
because the ICJ did not address, except in passing, the question of
islands not at issue in that case. 130 The Court nevertheless expressly
favored disregard of the presence of "islets, rocks and minor coastal
128. That a disputed island should be given no effect in the delimitation of continental
shelf or EEZ is a convenient proposition. But it must be subject to the caveat that it may
be abused by a state by creating a dispute over an erstwhile undisputed island near its
coast but belonging to another state. Hodgson (1973), supra note 35, pp. 57-58. This is
not the case with respect to the Tiao-yu-t'ai territorial dispute. For details, see supra note
80.
129. See e.g., S. Whittemore Boggs, "Delimitation of Seaward Areas under National
Jurisdiction," American Journal of International Law, Vol. 45 (1951), pp. 240, 258-59
(hereinafter cited as Boggs (1951)]; David J. Padwa, "Submarine Boundaries," International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 9 ( 1960), pp. 628, 647-50 [hereinfter cited as
Padwa (1960)]; Louis Henkin, Law for the Sea's Mineral Resources, New York: Columbia University Press, 1968; Shigeru Oda, "Boundary of the Continental Shelf," Japanese
Annual of International Law, Vol. 12 (1968), pp. 264, 281-83; Juraj Andrassy, International Law and the Resources of the Sea, New York: Columbia University Press, 1970,
pp. 103-05; Edward D. Brown, The Legal Regime of Hydrospace, London: Stevens and
Sons, 1971, p. 64 [hereinafter cited as Brown (1971)]; Hodgson (1973), supra note 35, pp.
55-59 and pp. 62-63; Goldie (1973), supra note 36, pp. 258-59; Karl (1977), supra note 36,
pp. 655-59; Symmons (1979), supra note 36, p. 206; Kiyofumi Nakauchi, "Problems of
Delimitation in the East China Sea and the Sea of Japan," Ocean Development and International Law Journal, Vol. 6 (1979), pp. 312-16; Jon M. Van Dyke and Robert A. Brooks,
"Uninhabited Islands: Their Impact on the Ownership of the Ocean's Resources," Ocean
Development and International Law Journal, Vol. 12 (1983), p. 288.
130. There are fringes of islands along the North Sea coasts of the Netherlands, Germany, and Denmark: notably the West, East, and North Frisian Islands (Map 13). All
closely related to the coasts geographically, these islands should be regarded as part of
the coast for purposes of continental shelf delimitation. The only island that stands out is
Helgoland, 27 miles off the German coast. Previously heavily fortified and famous but
now deserted, Helgoland is located on or near the line that bisects the approximate right
angle formed by the concave coastlines of Germany. More seaward than any other islands in the area, Helgoland is, however, still too landward to significantly influence the
courses of boundaries between the three states inter se even if geometrically median lines
are drawn from the respective coasts. This probably explains why Helgoland did not
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projections" in a delimitation between opposite states. 131 Given the
generality of the opinion, the Court seemed to regard th~ pr~sence of
these minor geographical features as inherently distort1ve m opposite-coast delimitations.
(2)

The Anglo-French Arbitration

The Anglo-French case, particularly the part relating to the
Channel Islands, has some bearing here. In macrogeography, the
two cases share a few similarities. Both involve an insular state
(U.K., Japan) and a continental state (France, China), and both have
opposite-coast situations (which seem inevitable between insular and
continental states). The two cases, however, have more geophysical
differences. The seabed of the English Channel is, as the Court of
Arbitration and the parties all agreed, a continental shelf continuous
from the United Kingdom to France. Such geological integrity of
continental shelf is presumably lacking in the East China Sea, given
the presence of the deep Okinawa Trough. Second, whereas the
Channel Islands are large (195 sq. km.) and densely populated (667
persons per sq. km.), the Tiao-yu-t'ais are tiny (total area: 6.5 sq.
km.) and uninhabited. Third, the Channel Islands are situated much
closer to the French coast than to the English coast, whereas the
Tiao-yu-t'ais are just about equidistant to the nearest territories of
China and Japan. Finally, having agreed that their coasts were opposite and the shelf in between was continuous from their coasts, the
United Kingdom and France agreed to apply the equidistance principle. The only difference between them was how the median line
was to be drawn. Here, China (the PRC and the ROC) and Japan
differ profoundly on the delimitation principle: the former advocates the natural prolongation principle while the latter insists on the
equidistance principle.
Despite the dissimilarities, the Anglo-French award contains
principles of general application relating to islands. The Court of
Arbitration's determination on an island's effect in shelf delimitation
depends on whether full effect, if granted, would create inequity,
given the broad equality of the coastlines of the two opposite states.
Thus, like the North Sea Cases, the Anglo-French decision is also
predicated on the a priori equality of the macrogeography of a particular case to determine whether a balance is disturbed by the presbecome an issue either in the North Sea Cases or the subsequent bilateral negotiations by
the three states in accordance with the North Sea judgment.
131. I.C.J. Reports 1969, p. 36.
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ence of islands. In the East China Sea, one doubts that the
macrogeography of Japan and China- island chains (the Ryukyus
et al ) separated by a deep trough and a vast shelf from a continent
(China) -can be characterized as "broadly equal", since the geophysical setting. here is two-dimensional as opposed to the one-dimensional seabed of the English Channel. If one takes into account
the regional geology, then the natural prolongation principle, which
the Anglo-French Court also endorsed, 132 would boost the Chinese
claim all the way to the middle of the Okinawa Trough. In that case,
the question of islands' effect (or inequity-creating potential) becomes moot because the shelf entitlements of the Chinese mainland
and the Tiao-yu-t'ais would merge. On the other hand, if the geological factor is ignored and the coastline of the R yukyus et al is
considered as broadly equal to that of China's mainland and Taiwan, then a median line would supposedly effect an equitable delimitation. The Tiao-yu-t'ais, if granted full effect, would certainly
command an enormous piece of seabed around them owing to their
isolated location (Map 1) and thus "manifestly result in a substantial
diminution of the area of continental shelf which would otherwise
accrue to" the country eventually not owning them. Thus ignoring
their presence seems to be required under the Anglo-French rule.
In sum, the Anglo-French case applies here only to the extent
geophysical similarities permit. But it at least establishes that islands
of the Channel Islands' magnitude can be discounted in the name of
equity. Other things being equal, the tiny Tiao-yu-t'ais ought to be
disregarded in the Sino-Japanese seabed delimitation a fortiori.
(3)

The Tunisian-Libyan Case

The role of islands in the Tunisian-Libyan case in determining
the final seabed boundary was, as discussed earlier, limited. The
Kerkennah Islands, the only islands involved in that case that have
affected delimitation, bear virtually no similarity to the Tiao-yu-t'ai
Islands here. (Maps 12 and 15)
Geologically, the Kerkennahs are sitting on the natural prolongation of Tunisia's land territory, which, according to the ICJ, is also
the natural prolongation of Libya's land territory. Such continuity
of continental shelf simply does not exist in the situation of the Tiaoyu-t'ais in the East China Sea where they are geologically separated
from Japan's Ryukyu Islands by the deep Okinawa Trough. The
macrogeographies of these two island groups also differ greatly. The
132. Anglo-French Award, supra note 29, para. 246.
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Kerkennahs, comparatively large (65 sq. mi.) and yopulous (more
than 15,000), are situated very close to shore (11 mlles) whereas the
Tiao-yu-t'ais are tiny (2.5 sq. mi.), uninhabited, and l~~ated h~lfway
(90 miles) between Taiwan and the Ryukyus. In addttwn, whtle the
Tunisian-Libyan coasts are both adjacent and opposite, the China
(Taiwan)-Japan (Ryukyu) coasts are only opposite each other. Finally, the Kerkennahs are undisputably Tunisian territory whereas
the territorial sovereignty of the Tiao-yu-t'ais are still contested between China (the ROC and the PRC) and Japan.
Given the above-stated dissimilarities, the Tunisia-Libyan Case
is of little specific applicability to the Tiao-yu-t'ais situation. However, like the Anglo-French Arbitration, the Tunisian-Libyan judgement also contains principles of general application relating to
islands. The judgment (particularly the part relating to the second
sector) was also predicated, as in the Anglo-French Arbitration, on
the a priori equality of the macrogeography of a given case to determine whether the balance is disturbed by the presence of islands.
This was why the Kerkennahs were given neither full effect nor no
effect, but rather were given half effect. Leaving aside the question
of regional geology which also differs fundamentally in the two cases
under discussion, the conclusion one gets from analyzing the Tunisian-Libyan Case is that if islands of the Kerkennahs' magnitude
may be denied full effect in the name of equity, it is all the more
logical to ignore the presence of the tiny Tiao-yu-t'ais in continental
shelf delimitation in the East China Sea between China (the ROC
and the PRC) and Japan.
D.

Concluding Remarks

Under the new LOS Convention, which reflects current international consensus, the Tiao-yu-t'ais seem to lie in the gray area. Yet
denying their. shelf entitlement seems to be a stronger case than
granting one. The state practice in shelf delimitation between opposite states seems to favor a no-effect treatment for the Tiao-yu-t'ais as
well, or alternatively, some effect such as a few miles beyond the
islets' territorial sea. But the Tiao-yu-t'ais' disputed status, an independent factor, dictates the denial of effect. The North Sea Cases
endorses, in general, the disregard of the presence of islets in opposite-coast situations. The Anglo-French Arbitration and the TunisianLibyan Case, though not squarely applicable here, at least establish
the likelihood of denying the shelf entitlement to islands much larger
and more important than the Tiao-yu-t'ais in an opposite-state
delimitation.
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The combined effect of the above summary suggested a rather
strong case for denying the Tiao-yu-t'ais any continental shelf beyond its territorial sea of 12 miles. The territorial dispute can then
be wholly detached from the continental shelf issue. However the
territorial issue is eventually resolved and whoever ultimately acquires the sovereignty of the Tiao-yu-t'ais, the disputing states would
be unable to take advantage of the islets' strategic location in claiming any portion of the seabed of the East China Sea beyond their
territorial sea.
At first glance, the conclusion reached here seems to differ insignificantly from the "enclave" solution proposed by some writers 133 in
the early 1970s. A closer look reveals two important distinctions,
however. First, the approach leads to the conclusion. Previous writers relied primarily on a few scattered shelf boundary agreements 134
alone which at the time hardly provided any evidence of a general
practice of states capable of creating an international custom. The
approach here, on the other hand, derives its authority from a variety of emerging conventional and customary sources of international
law, including not only more extensive, and thus more conclusive,
state practice, but also adjudicated cases and crystallized international consensus on the subject to date. It seems obvious that the
133. See e.g. , Park (1972), supra Chapter I, note 18, p. 31 (although the reference there
was made to Danjo Gunto and Tori Shima and not directly to the Tiao-yu-t'ais); Donald
R. Allen and Patrick H. Mitchell, "The Legal Status of the Continental Shelf of East
China Sea," Oregon Law Review, Vol. 51 ( 1972), pp. 80 1-10; Note, "The Distance Plus
Joint Development Zone Formula: A Proposal for the Speedy and Practical Resolution
of the East China and Yellow Seas Continental Shelf Oil Controversy," Cornell International Law Journal, Vol. 7 (1973), pp. 59-60.
134. See e.g., The Bahrain-Saudi Arabia agreement, supra note 41; the Iran-Saudi
Arabia agreement, supra note 38; the Italy-Yugoslavia agreement, supra note 37; Agreement Concerning the Boundary Line Dividing the Continental Shelf, Iran-Qatar, September 20, 1969, UNTS, Vol. 787, p. 165; UNLS/16, p. 416, Limits in the Seas, No. 25,
July 9, 1970. (This agreement was not discussed in the text above because its indiscriminate disregard of all islands in the Persian Gulf, presumably out of practical convenience, makes it largely irrelevant here. However, two writers did discuss it and
interpreted its significance differently. Karl ( 1977), supra note 36, p. 657; Bowell ( 1979),
supra note 4, pp. 172-73); and the Abu Dhabi-Qatar agreement, "Continental Shelf
Boundary: Abu Dhabi-Qatar," Limits in the Seas, No. 18, May 29, 1970. (A small Abu
Dhabi (now the United Arab Emirates) island, Dayyinah, situated near the equidistance
line but on Qatar's side was given a 3-mile seaward zone coextensive with the breadth of
Abu Khabi's territorial sea. The island, whose ownership was also determined by the
agreement, thus creates a bulge on the equidistance line in favor of Abu Dhabi. Despite
similarities between this island and the Tiao-yu-t'ais in terms of size and location, the
agreement was not discussed in the text above because Abu Dhabi and Qatar are adjacent states and thus do not fit into the discussion exclusively on opposite-state situations.)
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conclusion reached here has a solid legal foundation rather than
merely an arbitrary sense of equity.
The second distinction lies in the inference drawn from the conclusion reached. A few writers, though proposing the "enclave" solution, still considered settlement of the Tiao-yu-t'ai territorial
dispute precedent to that of the East Asian seabed issue. 135 Hence
the complication of the whole East China Sea oil controversy. The
inference drawn here, which seems logically imperative, is that the
Tiao-yu-t'ai territorial dispute, given its irrelevance to the East
Asian seabed issue, can be, and should be, taken completely out of
the picture.

135. See e.g., Park (1972), supra Chapter I, note 18, p. 49.

CHAPTER 5 THE SINO-JAPANESE SEABED DISPUTE: A
FRESH LOOK
A. Introduction: A Framework for Analysis
It has been suggested that the continental shelf dispute in the
East China Sea is, for all practical purposes, a Sino-Japanese dispute. Like the shelf delimitation problems involving the Channel
Islands (France versus Britain) and the Aegean Sea Islands (Greece
versus Turkey), the East China Sea problem is among the cases generally recognized as intractable. Unlike the above two cases which
are physically one-dimensional (geography), the Sino-Japanese dispute involves two dimensions, geography and geology, which result
from the presence of the Ryukyu Islands chain and the Okinawa
Trough. The detachment of the Tiao-yu-t'ai dispute from the seabed
controversy, as analyzed in the preceding chapter, at least makes the
geographical dimension of the present dispute more manageable, if
not any easier. This chapter will deal with the rest of the legal issues
arising from the two dimensions and other relevant circumstances.
Given the complexity of the issues involved, a legal framework
for identifying and analyzing them is clearly needed. In establishing
such a framework, the first issue encountered is the applicable law
governing the present dispute.
The LOS Convention, adopted by UNCLOS III in 1982, will
enter into force 12 months after it has been ratified or acceded to by
60 states. Article 83 of the Convention, which deals with shelf delimitation, provides:
Article 83
Delimitation of the continental shelf between States with
opposite or adjacent coasts
1. The delimitation of the continental shelf between
States with opposite or adjacent coasts shall be effected by
agreement on the basis of international law, as referred to
in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of
Justice, in order to achieve an equitable solution.
2. If no agreement can be reached within a reasonable period of time, the States concerned shall resort to the
procedures provided for in Part XV.
3. Pending agreement as provided for in paragraph
1, the States concerned, in a spirit of understanding and cooperation, shall make every effort to enter into provisional
(107)
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arrangements of a practical nature and, during this transitional period, not to jeopardize or hamper the reaching of
the final agreement. Such arrangements shall be without
prejudice to the final delimitation.
4. Where there is an agreement in force between the
States concerned, questions relating to the delimitation of
the continental shelf shall be determined in accordance
with the provisions of that agreement. 1
Among the disputants to the present controversy, Article 83 will
become the positive law for the PRC and Japan, both of which have
signed2 and will probably ratify the Convention, to settle their differences regarding the East China Sea continental shelf. On the other
hand, the ROC, unable to participate in UNCLOS III in the past
and unlikely to accede to the Convention in the future because of the
PRC's vigorous obstruction, 3 has shown considerable receptiveness
toward developments at UNCLOS III by, for instance, extending its
territorial sea to 12 miles and declaring a 200-mile EEZ in 1979. 4
With regard to EEZ delimitation, the 1979 declaration states:
(2) Where the exclusive economic zone of the Republic of
China extends over any part of the exclusive economic
zone as proclaimed by other states, the boundaries shall be
determined by agreement between the states concerned or in
accordance with generally acceptedprinciples ofinternational
law on delimitation .5 (emphasis added)
This position of the ROC is in essential accord with Article 74
of the LOS Convention, which is identical to Article 83 except that
the term "continental shelf' is replaced by "exclusive economic
zone." Therefore, barring any unexpected turn of events in the future, one can probably assume that Article 83, particularly paragraph 1, will be the applicable law governing the shelf delimitation
between China (the PRC and the ROC) and Japan.
Other than requiring that the solution be equitable, Article 83
offers little guidance in terms of specific criteria for shelf boundary
delimitation in order to achieve such an equitable solution. The
UNCLOS III's acceptance of this masterpiece of ambiguity, proposed by Conference President Tommy T.B. Koh of Singapore at
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

UN Doc. A/CONF.62/122, 7 October 1982, p. 36.
See supra Introduction, note 21.
See supra Chapter 4, note 82 and accompanying text.
See supra Introduction note 20.
Ibid.
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the Resumed Tenth Session in August 1981 at Geneva, was intended
to resolve a hopeless, prolonged deadlock in negotiations between
two groups of states belonging respectively to the "equidistance" and
"equitable principles" schools regarding shelf delimitation. 6 The
reference to Article 38 of the Statute of the ICJ, which includes treaties, custom, general principles of law, and judicial decisions and authoritative scholarly teachings as sources of international law, has in
effect passed the law-making burden from the Conference to the
evolution of customary international law. A brief analysis of customary law on shelf delimitation thus is necessary.
A general trend, if not already a general rule, of customary intemationallaw regarding the delimitation of continental shelf, as reflected by the 1958 Shelf Convention, the 1969 North Sea Continental
She!fCases, the 1977 Anglo-French Continental She!fArbitration, the
1982 Tunisian-Libyan Continental She!f Case and the deliberations at
the UNCLOS III, which have crystallized pre-existing or emerging
rules of customary law, seems to have taken shape. Simply put, it is
that a shelf boundary should be effected by agreement between the
delimiting states in accordance with equitable principles, taking into
account all the relevant circumstances, and that, failing to reach an
agreement, the parties should have the dispute adjudicated by a
third-party process entailing a binding decision. This formulation
serves as a convenient point of departure for the analysis in this
chapter. It consists of three obligations on the part of the delimiting
states: the obligation to conduct "meaningful" negotiations (or
good-faith bargaining7 ); the obligation to consider all the relevant
circumstances in applying equitable principles to reach agreement
on an equitable delimitation; and, the obligation to resort to international adjudication in the absence of an agreement. The first and the
last obligations are procedural in character. The second obligation
addresses the substance of shelf delimitation and thus deserves attention and elaboration.
While the notion of equity may be vague and abstract, a few
6. UN Press Release, SEA/445 (1981), p. I. For a criticism on the hasty manner in
which the new text was adopted and the extent to which it deviates from the jurisprudence on the subject, see Bernard H. Oxman, "The Third United Nations Conference on
the Law of the Sea: The Tenth Session (1981)," American Journal of International Law,
Vol. 76 (1982), pp. 14-15.
7. The term is borrowed from American labor law. For a discussion, see L.F.E.
Goldie, "The North Sea Continental Shelf Cases-A Ray of Hope for the International
Court?" New York Law Forum, Vol. 16 (1970), pp. 325, 359-66; L.F.E. Goldie, "The
North Sea Continental Shelf Cases: A Postscript," New York Law Forum, Vol. 18 ( 1972),
pp. 411, 414-15.
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substantive "equitable principles" of continental shelf delimitation,
such as the principles of natural prolongation8 and equidistance, 9
which have grown out of state practice and international adjudications and have in effect become legal principles, are fairly concrete
and comprehensible. Even more concrete are the "circumstances" in
which these principles are to operate. An ideal delimitation process,
usually via negotiations by the delimiting states, would involve a
close interplay of these three elements. The equity of a substantive
equitable principle still depends very much upon the relevant circumstances to which that principle is to apply. Thus, the equidistance principle-the most frequently employed principle in state
practice-may not be applicable or may have to undergo substantial
modification in a particular geographical setting simply because its
strict application would produce inequitable results. The North Sea
Cases is an instructive example. The Court in that case held that
application of the equidistance principle, as urged by Denmark and
the Netherlands, in delimiting the lateral boundaries between the
two states on the one hand and Germany on the other in the North
Sea would have a disproportionately distorting (and thus inequitable) effect on the shelf boundaries because of the concave coastline
of Germany. 10 On the other hand, in determining the relevance of
and, particularly, the weight to be assigned to a given circumstance,
be it geographical, geological or otherwise, one may have, at times,
to tum to the notion of equity. Thus, in the Anglo-French Arbitration
the Court acknowledged the relevance of the presence of the Channel Islands but denied them any weight in effecting the mid-Channel
shelf boundary between France and the United Kingdom in order to
"correct" the disproportionate influence they would otherwise have
8. The ICJ considered the natural prolongation principle as the most fundamental
principle of the continental shelf doctrine in seaward delimitation and an equitable principle in inter-state delimitation. I.C.J. Reports 1969, pp. 3, 22, 47. This position was
somewhat toned down in the Tunisian-Libyan Case, l.C.J. Reports 1982, p. 46.
9. Whittemore Boggs in 1951 suggested that the median line method "would provide the 'equitable principles' for accord between the United States and a neighbor state
which are referred to in" the 1945 Truman Proclamation. Boggs ( 1951 ), supra Chapter 4,
note 116, p. 262, note 34. Since the adoption by the Shelf Convention, the equidistance
principle has been used extensively in state practice of shelf delimitation. See Table 4 in
the Appendix. Despite the North Sea Cases the Anglo-French Court of Arbitration did
consider that principle as an equitable principle and part of customary international law.
Anglo-French Award, supra Chapter 2, note 31, paras. 70, 75. For an excellent discussion, see M.D. Blecher, "Equitable Delimitation of Continental Shelf," American Journal
of International Law, Vol. 73 ( 1979), pp. 60, 68-73 [hereinafter cited as Blecher ( 1979)).
10. I.C.J. Reports 1969, p. 49.
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were they granted full effect. 11 The same can be said of the Tun~s~a~
Libyan Case, where the ICJ granted only half effect to Tums1a s
Kerkennah Islands, despite their large size and proximity to shore,
because, according to the ICJ, giving them full effect would be "excessive."12 The complexity of a given situation may call for the application of more than one principle to satisfactorily solve a
delimitation problem, since both the means and ends of a shelf delimitation must be equitable with the means being subordinate to the
ends. 13 Questions as to whether one principle should override the
other(s) will naturally arise; the answer probably has to be sought
again in the notion of equity in light of the relevant circumstances.
That the prevailing trend of shelf delimitation derives its ultimate authority from equity should not, in theory, obscure the fact
that in neither the North Sea Cases, the Anglo-French Arbitration nor
the Tunisian-Libyan Case were the courts deciding the disputes ex
aequo et bono. 14 Both courts insisted that they applied exclusively
legal principles in adjudicating the disputes before them. 15 As a
matter of procedure, they could not have decided the cases ex aequo
et bono without the consent of the parties. 16 Despite the courts' disclaimer, however, the results of the three cases, which are generally
regarded as reasonable, could well have been reached the same way
even if the courts were in fact instructed to make the decisions ex
aequo et bono. The ICJ singled out, on the one hand, the concavity
of the German coastline as a natural feature creative of inequity and
needing to be redressed. The Court refused, on the other hand, to
"completely refashion" nature by redressing all inequities created by
nature. Such reasoning leaves one largely in the dark as to just how
far one should go in correcting natural "inequities", even if they are
at all readily identifiable under well-defined criteria. The same can
be said of the Anglo-French court, particularly regarding its giving
half effect to the British Scilly Islands but granting full effect to the
French island of Ushant in the Atlantic region west of the English
Channel. The ICJ's treatment of the Kerkennah Islands in the Tunisian-Libyan Case, as noted earlier, is another example. The Courts'
II. Anglo-French Award, para. 196.
12. l.C.J. Reports 1982, p. 89.
13. I.C.J. Reports 1969, p. 50; I.C.J. Reports 1982, p. 59.
14. I.C.J. Reports 1969, p. 48; Anglo-French Award, para. 245; I.C.J. Reports 1982,
p. 60.
15. Ibid.
16. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38, para. 2. In the case of arbitration, the arbitral tribunal's competence is derived from the parties' consent as well.
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intuition of equity or proportionality appears very evident. It is
therefore not unreasonable to characterize the two courts, as the late
Professor Friedmann did with respect to the ICJ in the North Sea
Cases, as "[applying] a kind of distributive justice while denying that
[they were] doing so" and "in effect, giving [decisions] ex aequo et
bono under the guise of interpretation." 17 Apparently, the judges'
subjective sense of equity and justice has played a significant part in
deciding these cases, whether the reasoning process or guiding principle is labeled ex aequo et bono, absolute equity, equity praeter
legem, or equity secundum legem. 18
What has been discussed above is in actuality a recurring phenomenon in the operation of law in human society, municipal or
international. Legal principles grow out of notions of equity, justice,
and fairness, which themselves are a part of the law. These legal
principles may become, over time, too rigid to produce just results
under certain circumstances, which then call for correction in accordance with equity. As a matter of approach, the following analysis on the seabed issue of the East China Sea will begin by
identifying all the "relevant circumstances" of that area as such. Recourse is had, in the process, to various sources of international law
for guidance. This approach has in fact been employed in the preceding chapter to establish the irrelevance of the Tiao-yu-t'ai territorial dispute. Once the relevance question, which is a comparatively
easier one, is settled, the next question is to determine, according to
equitable principles, the relative weight of relevant circumstances in
influencing the ultimate shelf boundary. Finally, the focus will be
shifted to the selection of substantive equitable principles of shelf
delimitation, with all the weighed circumstances considered. The
result may be one principle or a combination of several principles.
Admittedly, the exercise cannot but have a measure of subjectivity since there are few hard and fast rules to draw upon. Therefore, a few alternatives based on different but comparable weights
assigned to each relevant circumstance are suggested. These suggestions are intended to indicate the range of equitable solutions. They
could also serve as a basis for the parties, reportedly already engaged
intermittently in negotiations for joint development of the resources
17. Wolfgang Friedman, "The North Sea Continental Shelf Cases: A Critique,"
American Journal of lnlemational Law, Vol. 64 (1970), pp. 229, 236. Similar criticism
was voiced in E.D. Brown, "The Tunisia-Libya Continental Shelf Case," Marine Policy,
Vol. 7 ( 1983), p. 149.
18. Bin Cheng, "Justice and Equity in International Law," Current Legal Problems,
Vol. 8 ( 1955), pp. 185, 202-11.
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near the Tiao-yu-t'ais, 19 to tackle the larger issue of shelf delimitation elsewhere in the East China Sea.
B. The "Relevant Circumstances" and International Law of
Seabed Delimitation
In view of the open-ended character of the requirement that all
the relevant circumstances be taken into consideration in reaching
agreement on shelf boundaries, a review of the existing conventional
and customary rules of international law may offer some guidelines
for identifying the relevant circumstances in the East China Sea.
1.

The 1958 She!( Convention

Article 6 of the Shelf Convention provides, with similar language in paragraphs 1 and 2, that a shelf boundary between opposite
and adjacent states shall be determined by agreement; and failing
that, "and unless another boundary line is justified by special circumstances," the boundary shall be the equidistance line. The concept of "special circumstances" which is functionally parallel to, but
far less extensive as, that of the "relevant circumstances," is not defined in the Convention itself. But a glance at its travaux
preparatoires, including deliberations ofthe International Law Commission of the United Nations during 1950-1956 and of the Geneva
Conference in 1958, reveals in part what was in the drafters' minds
with respect to that concept. The references may be grouped into
two categories: unusual geographical features and legitimate uses of
the sea.
(a)

Unusual Geographical Features

In the ILC's Comments on draft article 7 (similar to Article 6 of
the Shelf Convention) of its 1953 Report to the General Assembly, it
was stated that:
[M]oreover, while in the case of both kinds of boundaries
the rule of equidistance is the general rule, it is subject to
modifications in cases in which another boundary line is
justified by special circumstances. As in the case of boundaries of coastal waters, provision must be made for departures necessitated by any exceptional configurations of the
coast, as well as the presence ofislands or of navigable channels. To that extent the rule adopted partakes of some elas19. See supra Introduction, text accompanying notes 15-17.

114

CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES

ticity. 20 (emphasis added)
Nearly identical words appeared in the ILC's 1956 draft article 7221
which later was adopted by the Geneva Conference as Article 6 of
the Shelf Convention. During the Conference, a number of delegates also made references to these unusual features as constituting
special circumstances justifying a boundary other than the equidistant line. 22 Given the great variety of complex geographical situations, the Conference could not have, and did not, set any criteria for
this purpose.
(b)

Other Legitimate Uses of the Sea

Considerations in this regard include navigation, fishing, and
exploitation of the seabed. References were made to "navigable
channels" in both the ILC's 1953 and 1956 draft articles quoted
above and during the Geneva Conference. Since the legal continental shelf does not include the superjacent water column, which is still
part of the high seas, these concerns were satisfactorily addressed by
Articles 3 and 5 of the Shelf Convention. 23 The same can be said of
fishing of the free-swimming species which is carried out also in the
water column above the continental shelf. Article 5 of the Shelf
Convention offers at least de jure protection to the fishing rights as
against unjustifiable interference resulting from exploitation of the
continental shelf. Finally, the question of existing exploitation
rights, though referred to in the Conference as a special circumstance, 24 received little attention.
It is evident that the relatively narrow concept of "special circumstances," as the drafters of the Shelf Convention saw it, is basically geographically oriented. It is of special interest to note that
20. YBILC (1953), Vol. 2, supra Chapter 4, note 13, p. 216.
21. YBILC (1956), Vol. 2, supra Chapter 4, note 15, p. 300.
22. E.g., Statements of the Venezuelan delegate, UNCLOS I, Official Record, Vol. 2
supra Chapter 4, note 16, p. 92, and of the United States delegate, ibid. p. 95.
23. Article 3 provides:
The rights of the coastal State over the continental shelf do not affect the legal
status of the superjacent waters as the high seas, or that of the air space above
those waters.
Article 5, Paragraph 1 provides:
The exploration of the continental shelf and the exploitation of its natural resources must not result in any unjustifiable interference with navigation, fishing
or the conservation of the living resources of the sea, nor result in any interference with fundamental oceanographic or other scientific research carried out
with the intention of open publication.
24. The reference was made by Commander Kennedy, representing the United
Kingdom. UNCLOS I, Official Records, Vol. 6, supra Chapter 4 note 16, p. 93.
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geological consideration did not figure prominently in_ the t~a~aux
preparatoires of the Shelf Convention despite the geological ongm of
the continental shelf doctrine.
2.

State Practice

It was noted earlier that state practice in continental shelf delimitation is found in boundary agreements, excluding, of course,
unilateral delimitations protested by neighboring states. Delimitation principles employed are sometimes provided for in the agreements, but provisions for consideration of certain special
circumstances are rarely seen. As the analysis in the preceding chapter of state practice on islands shows, one may be able to infer from
boundary maps that certain geographical or geomorphological features (such as the presence of islands or troughs) were taken into
account or ignored, but very little can one learn about the influence
of other factors such as the regional geology or the ratio of the length
of coastlines to shelf entitlements. Information about these factors
either does not show on a map or has to be gathered through precise
mathematical calculations.
Despite the difficulties, some general observations nevertheless
can be made. Conceivably, geographical considerations play the
most important part in shelf delimitation between neighboring
states, particularly where the equidistance principle is employed.
Examples can readily be found in shelf boundaries in the North Sea,
the Mediterranean Sea, and the Persian Gulf (Table 4). As most of
the areas covered by boundary agreements concluded so far lie in
relatively shallow and smooth parts of the geological shelf, geological and geomorphological considerations at most remain in the background. In a few localities where distinctive geological or
geomorphological features exist, such as the Georges Bank (CanadaUnited States), 25 the Rockall Bank (Ireland-United Kingdom), 26 and
25. The Georges Bank, located in the Gulf of Maine off the U.S. and Canada, is rich
in lobsters and oil. The decade-old dispute over the maritime jurisdiction over the area
became explosive when both the U.S. and Canada declared a 200-mile fishing zone. After lengthy negotiations filled with turns and twists, they finally agreed to submit the
dispute to the ICJ. For the history of the dispute and the parties' contentions, see SangMyon Rhee, "Equitable Solutions to the Maritime Boundary Dispute between the
United States and Canada in the Gulf of Maine", American Journal ofInternational Law,
Vol. 75 (1981), p. 590. The ICJ has constituted a special chamber of the Court to adjudicate the dispute. Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area
(U.S. v. Canada), I.C.J. Reports 1982, p. 3 (Constitution of Chamber Order of January
20). At this writing of August 20, 1984, the Court has not yet rendered the decision on
the merits.

116

CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES

the East China Sea (China-Japan-Korea), disputes rather than
agreements become the rule, with the notable exceptions of the Norwegian Trough (Norway-United Kingdom, Denmark-Norway) and
the Timor Trough (Australia-Indonesia) to be discussed infra .27
Considerations of unity of deposits (of minerals), 28 the presence of
offshore structui:es,29 and existing navigation channels30 have, in a
few isolated occasions, influenced parts of the course of the shelf
boundaries, but the main courses are still dominated by geographical
factors. Existing legal regimes of the sea, such as straight baselines 31
and territorial sea boundaries, 32 have also played limited roles in
measuring the shelf boundaries.
The brief survey above of state practice regarding the influence
of "special" or "relevant" circumstances seems to confirm the prevailing view that they have been and should be taken into account in
shelf boundary delimitation. However, given the great variety of
physical circumstances, state practice so far has not produced any
specific pattern of conduct regarding the treatment of special or relevant circumstances uniform enough to evidence an international
custom.
3.

The North Sea Cases

After rejecting the principle of equidistance as a mandatory rule
26. The most comprehensive study thus far on the Rockall problem is contained in a
lengthy, two-part article by Professor E.D. Brown of the University of Wales, England.
E.D. Brown, "Rockall and the Limits of National Jurisdiction of the UK," Marine Policy, Vol. 2 (1978), pp. 181 (Part 1), 275 (Part 2) [hereinafter cited as Brown (1978)].
27. See infra text accompanying notes 186-204.
28. Eg., The Iran-Saudi Arabia shelf boundary, supra Chapter 4, note 38. The
northern sector of the boundary, zigzag in shape, was said to have been delimited in
consideration of the undersea oil deposits. For an analysis, see Richard Young, "Equitable Solutions for Offshore Boundaries: the 1968 Saudi Arabia-Iran Agreement," American Journal of International Law, Vol. 64 (1970), pp. 152, 154, 156.
29. Eg., the Iran-United Arab Emirates shelf boundary, which is not a median line,
was drawn to avoid an offshore anchorage platform near the second turning point. For a
brief reference, see Bowett (1979), supra Chapter 4, note 4, p. 174.
30. Eg., The Argentina-Uruguay boundary. "Continental Shelf Boundary: Argentina-Uruguay," Limits in the Seas, No. 64 October 24, 1975. The boundary (between two
adjacent coasts) follows the navigation channel instead of the equidistant line. Ibid. p.
14.
31. Eg., the Indonesia-Malaysia shelf boundary, supra Chapter 4, note 110. See also
infra text accompanying note 144.
32. Eg., The Norway-Sweden shelf boundary, supra Chapter 4, note 35. The shelf
boundary begins where the territorial sea boundary, which was delimited according to
previous treaties and the award of the famous Grisbadarna Arbitration, ends.
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of international law regarding continental shelf delimitation among
Denmark, the Netherlands and Germany, the ICJ went on to elaborate the elements of equity, itself a rule of law, in reference to the
legal regime of the continental shelf. These elements include, inter
alia, the obligation on the part of the parties to take into account all
the relevant circumstances in applying equitable principles. Conceding that "there is no legal limit to the considerations which States
may take account of for the purpose of making sure that they apply
equitable procedures," 33 the Court nevertheless listed three "factors
to be taken into account:"
(I) the general configuration of the coasts of the Parties,
as well as the presence of any special or unusual features;
(2) so far as known or readily ascertainable, the physical
and geological structure, and natural resources, of the continental shelf areas involved;
(3) the element of a reasonable degree of proportionality,
which a delimitation carried out in accordance with equitable principles ought to bring about between the extent of
the continental shelf areas appertaining to the coastal State
and the length of its coast measured in the general direction
of the coastline, account being taken for this purpose of the
effects, actual or prospective, of any other continental shelf
delimitations between adjacent States in the same region. 34
Intended to be illustrative but not exhaustive, these "relevant
circumstances" are far more extensive than the "special circumstances" as conceived by the drafters of the Shelf Convention.
Given the format of a general rule, they seem to be intended for
general application elsewhere as well. The ICJ thus in fact granted
carte blanche to the delimiting states insofar as factors affecting a
shelf boundary delimitation are concerned.
4.

The Anglo-French Arbitration

The geography of the British and French territories in the English Channel (Map 14) and the treaty relations between the two
states gave the Anglo-French Court of Arbitration a unique opportunity to interpret and apply both conventional and customary internationallaw relating to "special" and "relevant" circumstances in shelf
33. I.C.J. Reports 1969, p. 50.
34. Ibid., p. 54. Since the Court was not asked to actually delimit the boundary
between the parties' coasts, it did not relate these factors to the geography or geology of
the North Sea.
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delimitation. Both the United Kingdom and France are parties to
the Shelf Convention. But since France had made reservations, 35 to
which the United Kingdom later objected, 36 to Article 6 to exclude a
number of areas characterized as special circumstances from the application of the equidistance principle, the Court declared that Article 6 was inapplicable to the parties to the extent of the French
reservations. 37 That is to say, delimitation in the Bay of Granville
(Channel Islands area), one of the areas being excluded, was not
governed by Article 6 but by customary international law, namely,
the rules stated in the North Sea Cases .38 But the Court added that
the two sets of rules made no difference in substance as far as the
case at bar was concerned. 39 On the other hand, Article 6 still applied to the Atlantic region which was not referred to in the French
reservations.
In actually delimiting, instead of merely expounding the legal
principles governing, the Anglo-French boundary in the Channel Islands area, 40 the Court took into account the following factors:
-regional geology (particularly some geomorphological
depressions, that is, the Hurd Deep, in the middle of the
English Channel);41
-macrogeography (the broad equality existing between
the British and French coasts in the English Channel42
and the notion of proportionality); 43
-size of the Channel Islands ( 195 sq. miles), population
(130,000), economy (agriculture and commerce), and
political and legal status (direct dependency of the British Crown maintaining substantial autonomy except in
the area of defense and foreign affairs );44
-existing maritime regimes in the area45 (France's 12-mile
territorial sea and the United Kingdom's 12-mile fishing
zone); and
-navigational, defense, and security interests of the parties
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

UN Multilateral Treaties, mpra Chapter 2, note 10, p. 568.
Ibid., p. 570.
The Anglo-French Award, para. 61.
Ibid., para. 62.
Ibid., para. 65.
Art. 2 of the Anglo-French Arbitration Agreement. Ibid., p. 4.
Ibid., paras. 9, 12, 104-108.
Ibid., paras. 181-83. See also infra text accompanying notes 179-84.
Anglo-French Award, paras. 98-101.
Ibid., para. 184.
Ibid., para. 179.
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in the disputed area. 46
These factors were all considered as relevant to, but were assigned quite different weights in, determining the primary (midchannel) and the second (around the Channel Islands) shelf boundaries in the Channel Islands area. The regional geology in general,
namely, continuity of the continental shelf in the English Channel,
constitutes one of the foundations of the Court's decision. 47 But the
significance of the Hurd Deep was dismissed summarily. 48 The
macrogeography of the area (broad equality between French and
English coasts) is the other cornerstone underlying the Court's
choice of the median line as the primary shelf boundary. 49 Considerations of size, population, economy, and political and legal status
prevented the Channel Islands from being totally ignored; and the
existing juridical regimes provided some guidance to the effect to be
accorded them. The relevance of these factors seems to be largely
confined to the second shelf boundary, however. 50 The influence of
the navigational, defense, and security interests of the parties was
expressly regarded by the Court as not "decisive" and their weight
"diminished," despite their being said to support the French
position. 51
In the Atlantic region, the Court seems to consider only the
macrogeographical factor: the fact that the Scilly Islands extend
roughly twice as far from the United Kingdom mainland as does
Ushant Island from the French mainland. 52 By invoking this geographical fact as a special circumstance within the meaning of Article 6 of the Shelf Convention, the Court justified the departure from
the equidistance boundary which would have otherwise obtained in
that area. 53 The geological factor again remained in the
background.
5.

The Tunisian-Libyan Case

The Tunisian-Libyan dispute was submitted on December 1,
1978 to the ICJ by Special Agreement between the parties with the
following question put to the Court:
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Ibid., para. 188.
Ibid., paras. 9, 12, 104-09. See also infra text accompanying notes 285-90.
Ibid.
See infra text accompanying notes 179-84.
Ibid., para. 202.
Ibid., para. 188.
Ibid., paras. 249-51.
Ibid., para. 250.
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What are the principles and rules of international law
which may be applied for the delimitation of the area of the
continental shelf appertaining to the Socialist People's Republic of Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and to the area of the
continental shelf appertaining to the Republic of Tunisia,
and the Court shall take its decision according to equitable
principles, and the relevant circumstances which characterize
the area, as well as the new accepted trends in the Third
Conference on the Law of the Sea. 54 (emphasis added)
Reasoning that "[i]t is clear that what is reasonable and equitable in any given case must depend on its particular circumstances," 55
the Court went on to identify the following relevant circumstances:
-geography (the area to be delimited, configuration of the
parties' coasts, and the presence of islands and low-tide elevations)56 (Map 15);
-geomorphology (particularly the Tripolitanian
Furrow); 57
--existence and interests of other states in the area; 58
-the Tunisian-Libyan land boundary (particularly its terminus, Ras Ajdir, at which the land boundary intersects
with the coastline) 59 (Map 15);
-the parties' alleged maritime limits (i.e., ( 1) Tunisia's ZV
(Zenith Vertical) 45° line, (2) Libya's 1955 petroleum exploration line, (3) the perpendicular modus vivendi line, and
(4) the 26° northeast line) 60 (Map 16);
-Tunisia's historical rights (straight baselines and sedentary fishery); 61 and
--economic considerations (Tunisia's relative poverty and
lack of natural resources; presence of oil wells in the delimitation area). 62
All these circumstances were considered and weighed in determining the ultimate shelf boundary. The geographical circum54. Special Agreement between the Republic of Tunisia and the Socialist People's
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, signed June 10, 1977, quoted in I.C.J. Repons 1982, p. 21.
55. Ibid., p. 60.
56. Ibid., pp. 61-64.
57. Ibid., p. 64.
58. Ibid.
59. Ibid., pp. 64-65.
60. Ibid., pp. 66-71, 83-85.
61. Ibid., pp. 71-77.
62. Ibid., pp. 77-78.
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stances exerted substantial influence on the course of the boundary
in the second, more seaward sector north of the 34°10'30" north latitude. While the turning point from which the boundary in the second sector (Map 17) begins was determined by reference to the
westernmost point of the Gulf of Gabes where the abrupt change of
the general direction of the Gulf coast occurs, the angle of the
boundary to the meridian in the second sector was calculated by giving the Kerkennah Islands half effect. 63 The island of Jerba was ignored because of its close proximity to shore. 64
The geomorphological circumstances were generally discounted
since the Court considered the seabed in the delimitation area as the
common, continuous shelf of both Tunisia and Libya. It thus is not
surprising that although the Tripolitanian Furrow, a submarine valley running roughly parallel to the Libyan coast, received some consideration, it was subsequently dismissed. 65
The existence and interests of other states in the areas, namely,
those of Italy and Malta, were not, according to the Court,
prejudiced by the present delimitation. 66 Italy delimited a modified
equidistance boundary with Tunisia in 1971 which entered force in
1978 67 (Map 15). Malta has not delimited its seabed boundary with
either Tunisia or Libya; it has sought but failed to intervene in the
present case. 68 Because of this uncertain boundary situation in the
northeastern part of the delimitation area, the end of the boundary
in the second sector was left open (the arrow in Map 17). On the
other hand, in calculating the areal ratios of the parties' shelves
under the proportionality principle, shelf areas potentially belonging
to Malta were included for comparison purposes. 69
The terminus of the Tunisian-Libyan land boundary, Ras Ajdir,
is relevant here primarily for constructing the 26° line as the boundary in the first sector (Map 17). As to the alleged maritime limits, the
63. Ibid., pp. 87-89.
64. Ibid., p. 85.
65. Ibid., p. 64.
66. Ibid., p. 91.
67. "Continental Shelf Boundary: Italy-Tunisia", Limits in the Seas, No. 89, January
7, 1980.
68. Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), Application to Intervene,
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1981, p. 3, referred to in I.C.J. Reports 1982, p. 24. A special
agreement between Malta and Libya to submit the question of shelf boundary delimitation to the ICJ was notified to the Court on July 26, 1982. The Court has set April 26,
1983 as the time limit for the filing of memorials. International Legal Materials, Vol. 21
( 1982), p. 971.
69. I.C.J. Reports 1982, p. 91.
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first two were disregarded summarily as unilateral claims not opposable to the other party. 70 The third line, the tacit modus vivendi line
perpendicular to the coastline at Ras Ajdir, was held not precise
enough and discounted. 71 But it was actually very close to the fourth
line-the 26° northeast line which was ultimately used as the first
sector boundary. 72
Tunisia's historical rights of sedentary fishery were considered
irrelevant to the delimitation. 73 The seabed of its territorial sea and
areas landward of its straight baselines also were held to be included
in calculating the degree of proportionality between area of the shelf
and length of the coastline, despite the fact that these areas are not
continental shelf in the legal sense. 74 On the other hand, the economic considerations advanced by Tunisia were all rejected as irrelevant.75 But the Court also stated that oil wells located in the
delimitation area may be taken into account in achieving an equitable result. 76
6.

The LOS Convention

During the nine years before the present LOS Convention was
finally adopted by UNCLOS III in December 1982, it had had five
versions of negotiating texts and two versions of draft conventions.
They are (with shelf delimitation articles):
-Informal Single Negotiating Text (ISNT) (1975), 77 Article 70;
-Revised Single Negotiating Text (RSNT) (1976), 78 Article 71;
70. Ibid., p. 68.
71. Ibid., p. 69.
72. Ibid., pp. 70-71, 83-85.
73. Ibid., pp. 71-77.
74. Article 1 of the Shelf Convention, which has become part of customary international law, provides that the continental shelf is "outside the territorial sea". UNTS, Vol.
449, p. 311. But the Court argued that calculations of the ratio of proportionality are
based on the lengths of coasts, not the straight baselines around the coasts. I.C.J. Reprts
1982, p. 76.
75. I.C.J. Reports 1982, p. 77.
76. Ibid., p. 78.
77. Informal Single Negotiating Text, UN Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.8, 7 May 1975,
UNCLOS III, Official Records, Vol. 4 (1975), p. 137.
78. Revised Single Negotiating Text, UN Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.8/Rev. I, 6 May
1976, UNCLOS III, Official Records, Vol. 5 (1976), p. 125.
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-Informal Composite Negotiating Text (ICNT) (1977)/ 9
Article 83;
-Informal Composite Negotiating Text/Revision 1
(ICNT/Rev.1) (1979), 80 Article 83;
-Informal Composite Negotiating Text/Revision 2
(ICNT/Rev. 2) (1980), 81 Article 83;
-Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea (Informal Text)
( 1980), 82 Article 83; and
-Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea (1981), 83 Article
83.
The substantive delimitation principles contained in these documents have undergone several changes, but up to the Draft Convention (Informal Text) of 1980, the basic formula had remained largely
the same. That is, regardless of whether the delimiting states' coasts
are opposite or adjacent to each other, the delimitation is to be effected by agreement in accordance with equitable principles (and/or
in conformity with international law), employing, where appropriate, the median or equidistance line, and taking into account all the
relevant circumstances (or all the relevant circumstances prevailing
in the area concerned). However, in order to break the impasse of
negotiation created by the irreconcilable confrontation between the
"equidistance" and the "equitable principles" schools, the Conference finally decided to remove all the references to equitable principles, equidistance median or line, and relevant circumstances, as
noted earlier. 84 The compromise solution as contained in Article 83
of the 1981 Draft Convention later became Article 83 of the present
LOS Convention.
The changes notwithstanding, customary international law in
this regard remains the same, as analyzed in the beginning of this
chapter. However, neither customary international law nor the 1980
Draft Convention (Informal Text) and previous negotiating texts defines "relevant circumstances." As far as the latter are concerned,
79. Informal Composite Negotiating Text, UN Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.IO, 15 July
1977, UNCLOS III, Official Records, Vol. 8 (1977), p. 1.
80. Informal Composite Negotiating Text/Revision I, UN Doc. A/CONF.62/
WP.IO/Rev.l, 28 April 1979.
81. Informal Composite Negotiating Text/Revision 2, UN Doc. A/CONF.62/
WP.IO/Rev.2, II Aprill980.
82. Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea (Informal Text), UN Doc. A/
CONF.62/WP.IO/Rev.3, 27 August 1980.
83. Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea, UN Doc. A/CONF.62/L.78, 28 August
1981.
84. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
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recourse has to be had to the LOS Convention's travaux
preparatoires: the proceedings of the UNCLOS III since 1974 and
those of the Seabed Committee prior to that. Since Article 83 and
Article 74 (dealing with EEZ delimitation), are nearly identical, and
since within 200 miles from the shore of a coastal state its continental
shelf is part of its EEZ, references will be made to the EEZ as well.
However, because of the fundamental differences between these two
concepts on the one hand and that of the territorial sea on the other,
factors which states considered relevant to the delimitation of the
latter will not be discussed.
Negotiations at the UNCLOS III show that states which favored the adoption of equitable principles as the rule of delimitation
of the continental shelf and EEZ outnumbered those adhering to the
equidistance/special circumstance rule under Article 6 of the Shelf
Convention. 85 However, not all of the states in the former group
have spelled out what specific "relevant circumstances" they had in
mind. Presented below are specific illustrations which some of these
states have given in the draft articles and debates.
Apparently having the Greek Aegean Islands in mind, Turkey
was the only state in the Seabed Committee that specified the term
"special circumstances" which includes:
fljnter alia, . . . the general configuration of the respective
coasts, the existence of islands or islets of another state and
the physical and geological structure of the marine area involved including the seabed and subsoil thereof. 86 (emphasis added)
During the 1974 Caracas session of the UNCLOS III where major debates and proposals were made, Romania proposed that delimitation of marine spaces be effected by agreements between
neighboring states in accordance with equitable principles, "taking
into account all the circumstances affecting the marine or ocean area
concerned and all relevant geographical, geological or other factors."87 (emphasis added)
85. The former group had 29 states while the latter 22. Reports the Committees and
Negotiating Groups on Negotiations at the Seventh Session [and the Resumed Seventh
Session] Contained in A Single Document both for the Purposes of Records and for the
Convenience of Delegations. UN Docs. A/CONF.62/RCNG/l and 2. UNCLOS III,
Ojjicial Records, Vol. 10 (1978), pp. 13, 124, 126, 170. But since UNCLOS II adopts the
consensus method to conduct negotiations, no vote has ever been taken on this hotly
contested issue.
86. Seabed Committee Report, Vol. 3 (1973), pp. 22-23.
87. Romania: Draft articles on delimitation of marine and ocean space between ad-
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Turkey again proposed:
In the course of negotiations, the States shall take into account all the relevant factors, including, inter alia, the geomorphological and geological structure of the shelf up to the
outer limits of the continental margin, and special circumstances such as the general configuration of the respective
coasts, the existence of islands, islets or rocks of one State
on the continental shelf of the other. 88 (emphasis added)
A similar list of factors relating to delimitation of the EEZ was also
proposed by Turkey later. 89
Meanwhile, the delegate of the Libya Arab Republic, Mr. Unis,
stated in the 16th meeting of the Second Committee:
In order to delineate the limits of area allocated to each of
the adjacent or opposite States, any one of a combination
of delimitation methods appropriate for arriving at an equitable subdivision of the economic zone might be applied,
taking into consideration the historical and geographical
conditions and special circumstances. 90 (emphasis added)
The Draft Article on the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf
or the Exclusive Economic Zone, submitted by Kenya and Tunisia
to the Second Committee, provided, inter alia:
For [the purpose of delimitation], special account should be
taken of geological and geomorphological criteria, as well as
all the special circumstances, including the existence of islands or islets in the area to be delimited. 91 (emphasis
added)
In their draft articles on the delimitation of the continental shelf
and the economic zone, Ireland92 and France93 proposed slightly difjacent and opposite neighboring States and various aspects involved, art. 1, UN Doc. A/
CONF.62/C.2/L.l8, UNCLOS lll, Official Records, Vol. 3 (1975), p. 195.
88. Turkey: Draft articles on delimitation between States: Varous aspects involved,
art. 2, UN Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/L.23, ibid., p. 201.
89. Turkey: Draft articles on delineation between adjacent and opposite States, UN
Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/L.34, ibid., p. 213.
90. UNCLOS lll, Official Records, Vol. 2 (1975), p. 145 (16th mtg, 2nd Comm.).
91. Kenya and Tunisia: Draft article on the delimitation of the continental shelf or
the exclusive economic zone, art. 2, UN Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/L.28, UNCLOS lll, Official Records, Vol. 3 (1975), p. 195.
92. Ireland: Draft articles on delimitation of areas of continental shelf between
neighboring States, UN Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/L.43, ibid., p. 220.
93. France: Draft article on the delimitation of the continental shelf or of the economic zone, UN Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/L.74, ibid., p. 237.
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ferent rules. Yet both states specifically singled out the presence of
islands and islets as a special circumstances deserving ad hoc consideration. It is apparent that Ireland had the British Rockall Rock in
mind whereas France was worried about the Channel Islands.
Last, in the draft articles on the EEZ submitted by eighteen African states, it was proposed that, inter alia:
For this purpose [of delimitation of the exclusive economic
zone], special account shall be taken of geological and geomorphological factors as well as other special circumstances
which prevail. 94 (emphasis added)
To sum up, the common denominator of circumstances regarded as "relevant" by the participating states of the Seabed Committee and the UNCLOS III who have addressed the question seems
to include the following:
-regional geography, such as the general configuration of
the coast and presence of islands; and
-regional geology and geomorphology.
None of these factors was unknown previously. They seem to reflect
the influence of the North Sea Cases in this area.
A question arises as to whether these proposals or statements
constitute a source of international law. The ICJ correctly pointed
out, in the 1974 Fisheries Jurisdiction Case 95 between Iceland and the
United Kingdom, that they are merely "manifestations of the views
and opinions of individual States as vehicles of their aspirations
rather than as expressing principles of existing law." 96 But when the
Convention enters into force, these proposals will be firsthand
sources of travaux preparatoires for interpreting the new convention
because of the direct contribution of their adoption, rejection, or revision to the final text of the convention. Hence, the significance of
these proposals and debates.
C.

Identifying the "Relevant Circumstances" in the East China
Sea Other Than Its Geography, Geology, and
Geomorphology
The above review provides certain guidelines as to where to

94. Gambia, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Arab Republic,
Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Tunisia, United
Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania and Zaire: Draft articles on the
exclusive economic zone, UN Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/L.82, ibid., p. 240.
95. I.C.J. Reports 1974, p. 3.
96. Ibid., p. 23.
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look for the "relevant circumstances" in the East China Sea for the
purpose of Sino-Japanese seabed delimitation. The circumstances
worth considering are grouped into four categories: irrelevant, partially relevant, potentially relevant, and relevant circumstances.
What follows is a discussion of the relevance of the former three
types of circumstances chosen according to the above guidelines.
The fourth type, i e., the geographical, geological, and geomorphological circumstances are reserved for the next two sections.
1.

Irrelevant Circumstances
(a) Defense and Security Interests

A state's sovereignty over its adjacent continental shelf is, at
least theoretically, resources-oriented and does not reach the superjacent water where surface and submarine navigation takes place.
The defense and security interests, if any, of a coastal state with respect to the continental shelf largely consist of the freedom of maneuver of its submarines. In the Anglo-French Arbitration France
did stress the need for its navy to control activities on the continental
shelf around the Channel Islands. 97 If the French continental shelf
was cut into two separate parts in consequence of granting full effect
to the Channel Islands, France argued, "serous inconveniences and
risks for French submarines stationed at Cherbourg" 98 would result
(Map 14). These considerations, held to be relevant but not decisive
in that case, 99 seem to be absent in the East China Sea. Despite its
semi-enclosed configuration, the East China Sea is much larger and
far more open than the English Channel. Moreover, neither of the
boundaries based on the claims of China (the ROC and the PRC) or
Japan (Map 1) would result in the severance of either state's continental shelf into two separate zones. The freedom of maneuver of
either state's submarines would hardly be affected. Hence the irrelevance of defense and security considerations.
(b) Navigation
This is a concern that existed only in the early stages of the
evolution of the continental shelf doctrine when the juridical status
of that novel notion was unclear and the high seas freedoms were
feared threatened. Since 1958, the rule that the legal status of the
waters superjacent to the continental shelf remains as high seas has
97. Anglo-French Award, para. 161.
98. Ibid.
99. Ibid., para. 188.
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become part of customary international law. Consideration of navigation thus becomes irrelevant.
(c)

Historical Title

The historical title to a maritime area is a legitimate consideration for delimitation of territorial sea between neighboring states,
given the proximity of that jurisdiction to shore and the long history
of human activities in coastal waters. Both customary international
law and the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous
Zone recognize historical bays and other historical titles to coastal
waters. 100 It is doubtful, however, whether such rights exist in connection with the seabed and subsoil outside the territorial sea. There
are nevertheless a few possibilities: existing rights to sedentary fisheries101 and exploitation of seabed resources. The East China Sea is
not noted for sedentary species of living organisms. Even if it were,
that consideration would still be irrelevant since the possible site of
the Sino-Japanese shelf boundary, based on either the Japanese or
the Chinese claim, would lie in waters ranging from 100 to 2,000
meters in depth where sedentary fishery is unlikely.
Historical title based on exploitation of undersea oil is also
questionable, insofar as the East China Sea is concerned. Aside
from the lack of a solid legal foundation of such a title, 102 as conceded by Judge Jessup in his separate opinion of the North Sea
Cases, 103 there have not been much exploitation activities by the
PRC, the ROC, or Japan in the disputed area. As noted in Chapter
2, all the wells drilled by CPC and its foreign partners lie on the
Chinese side of the hypothetical median line; so do the three wells,
Longjing I and II and Dongtai-1, drilled by the PRC (Map 10). Japanese drillings have also been confined to areas east of the Okinawa
Trough even farther from the potential boundary line. Even if largescale exploitation had been conducted by either state in the disputed
area on the continental shelf, the vigorous protests by the other state,
100. Art. 7(6), 12.
101. The "natural resources" as defined by Article 2 of the Shelf Convention include
only one kind of living resources, i.e., sedentary species.
102. Under Article 2 of the Shelf Convention, a coastal state's right to the continental
shelf is inherent and exclusive, not depending on occupation, effective or notional. Other
states may not obtain such rights without the express consent of the coastal state. There
is, accordingly, little basis to claim historical title based on occupation, prior use, or prescription. This point was discussed by the ICJ in the Tunisian-Libyan Case in connection
with Tunisia's historical rights in the disputed area. l.C.J. Reports 1982, p. 74.
103. I.C.J. Reports 1969, p. 80. But see infra text accompanying note 276.

SEABED BouNDARY DELIMITATION

129

which would have been made before any drilling took place, would
have prevented the creation of any title based on prescription or
other legal doctrines.
(d)

Unity of Deposits

The ICJ prescribed, in the North Sea Cases, the unity of deposits of natural resources, "so far as known or readily ascertainable," 104 as a relevant circumstance. It has been suggested in
Chapters I and 2 that despite the bright prospects for hydrocarbons
in the East China Sea, very little is known about the bulk of its seabed simply because jurisdictional disputes effectively have delayed
oil exploration. Since knowledge about a deposit will not be obtained before the boundary disputes are settled and large-scale exploration begins, the "unity of deposits" question logically will be
irrelevant to boundary delimitations in the East China Sea.
(e)

Fishing and the EEZ

As in the case of navigation, fishing of free-swimming species,
one of the high seas freedoms, 105 was thought to be threatened upon
the advent of the continental shelf doctrine. Article 5 of the 1958
Shelf Convention, which prohibits "any unjustifiable interference
with fishing or the conservation of the living resources" by exploration and exploitation of the continental shelf, eliminates such fear
only on an ipso jure basis. In fact, competition between the fishing
and ocean mining industries becomes increasingly acute in areas
where rich fishing grounds and mineral deposits lie side by side. The
North Sea, 106 the Atlantic Ocean off New England coast (Georges
Bank), 107 and the East China Sea off the coast of Kyushu, 108 just to
name a few, are illustrative examples.
Another dimension of the relationship between fishing and the
continental shelf relates to their jurisdictional limits. Despite their
juridically distinguishable character, the seaward limit of one may,
for administrative purposes, coincide with that of the other. In fact,
104. l.C.J. Reports 1969, p. 54.
105. Convention on the High Seas, art. 2, UST, Vol. 13, p. 2312; TIAS, No. 5200;
UNTS, Vol. 450, p. 82. That article is generally recognized as having codified customary
internationa1law.
106. See generally John P. Grant, "The Conflict between the Fishing and the Oil Industries in the North Sea: A Case Study," Ocean Management, Vol. 4 (1978), p. 137.
107. "Oil Drilling Foes Drop Court Suit," Boston Globe, December 22, 1980, p. I.
108. Ron Richardson, "South Korea Posed to Drill," Far Eastern Economic Review,
September 14, 1979, p. 63.
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the evolution of the concept of the exclusive economic zone, which
comprises the water column, the seabed, and the subsoil, can be conceived as a step further toward the marriage of the concepts of the
continental shelf and the exclusive fishery zone. Moreover, in the
Anglo-French Arbitration, the 12-mile fishery zone of the Channel
Islands was taken into account by the Court in determining the extent of their continental shelf. 109 The boundary finally delimited was
in fact a 12-mile zone to the north and west of the Channel Islands
(Map 13).
In the East China Sea, a fishing ground from time immemorial,
fishing has been regulated in the past three decades by treaties and
non-governmental arrangements among the three coastal states. 110
As between Japan and the PRC, lack of diplomatic ties during the
pre-1972 period necessitated a series of unofficial arrangements
which were later superseded by formal treaties. 111 The latest was
one signed in 1975 and renewed in 1977. 112 Fishing zones established thereunder are located closer to the Chinese mainland than to
Japan. They consist of an irregular belt of the sea with an average
width of 100 miles beyond the PRC's straight baselines. The most
seaward part of their outer limit extends 140 miles into the East
China Sea. Within these zones, fishing vessels from both states are
subject to various restrictions for conservation purposes.
The outer limits of the fishing zones seem to provide little guidance as to how the continental shelf boundary between China and
Japan should be delimited. 113 The fishing boundary is much closer
to the Chinese mainland coast than the median line proposed by Japan. Since the PRC, like the ROC, adheres to the natural prolongation principle and has raised objections to a median line solution, it
would a fortiori reject the fishing limits as a shelf boundary which is
109. See text accompanying note 50 supra.
110. See generally Choon-ho Park, "Fishing Under Troubled Waters: The Northeast
Asia Fishery Controversy," Ocean Development and International Law Journal, Vol. 2
(1974), p. 96.
Ill. See generally Tao Cheng, "Communist China and the Law of the Sea,'' American
Journal of International Law, Vol. 63 (1969), p. 47; Song Yook Hong, The Sino-Japanese
Fisheries Agreement of 1975: A Comparision with Other North Pac(jic Fisheries Agreements, No.6, Hungdah Chiu ed., University of Maryland Law School: Occasional Papers/Reprints Series in Contemporary Asian Studies, 1977, and the references cited
therein.
112. For the text of the 1975 agreement and the chart showing the fishing zones, see
"Fisheries Agreement China-Japan," Limits in the Seas, No. 70, April 6, 1976. The
agreement was renewed in 1977.
113. In accord is Bowett (1979), supra Chapter 4, note 4, p. 305.
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even more unfavorable to it. Besides, there seems to be little legal or
practical justification whatsoever in taking into accoun~ the fishing
zone in seabed delimitation in the East China Sea. Fmally, these
fishing zones are by no means permanent and may be overtaken
shortly by a new boundary based on the 200-mile EEZ. As of 1984,
at least Japan and the ROC have asserted a 200-mile fishing zone or
an EEZ.
At this juncture, a question arises regarding the interrelationship between boundaries of the EEZ and the continental shelf.
Without going into detailed discussion of the EEZ as a legal regime,
one should ask: should the shelf and the EEZ boundaries necessarily coincide if the PRC and Japan also proclaim their respective
EEZs?
Conceptually, the EEZ, as defined in the LOS Convention's Articles 56 and 57, 114 incorporates the continental shelf up to a maximum distance of 200 miles from shore. Functionally, the major
resource-related concern, or the only concern in the foreseeable future in the EEZ, is fishing, since other exotic uses of the water column 115 will not be technically or economically feasible soon. In
contrast, the interest in the continental shelf almost exclusively consists in the underlying petroleum. With respect to the question of
interstate boundary, the distance- (or geographically) oriented regime of the EEZ clearly is more amenable to such a distance-oriented delimitation principle as the equidistance principle than to the
geologically-oriented regime of the continental shelf, which cannot
escape considerations of geology and geomorphology. Therefore,
separate EEZ and continental shelf boundaries, though difficult to
administer, are not incompatible with the fundamental rationale underlying these two regimes. 116 The following discussion therefore is
114. Article 56 provides:
I. In the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State has: (a) sovereign rights
for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving, and managing the natural resources, whether living or non-living, of the waters superjacent to the
seabed and subsoil and of the seabed and its subsoil . .
Article 57 provides:
The exclusive economic zone shall not extend beyond 200 nautical miles from
the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured.
115. E.g. Ocean thermal energy conversion (OTEC). See generally Michael Mulcahy, "OTEC-from $85,000 to $35 Million in Six Years," Sea Technology, Vol. 18 (August, 1977), p. 16.
116. For a discussion in support of this view, see Bowett (1979), .supra Chapter 4, note
4, pp. 188-89. But see J.C. Phillips, "'The Exclusive Economic Zone as a Concept in
International Law," International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 26 (1977), pp.
585, 613-15.
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based on this premise.
2.

Partially Relevant Circumstances

It was noted earlier that in deciding whether the Channel Islands would be allowed to generate their own continental shelf, the
Anglo-French Court of Arbitration took account of the size, population, economy, and political and legal status of the Channel Islands.
These considerations eventually proved to have only marginal effects
on the primary (mid-channel) boundary between France and the
United Kingdom but were important to the secondary boundary to
the north and west of the Channel Islands. Hence the characterization "partially relevant" circumstances. In the East China Sea, both
China (PRC and ROC) and Japan have substantial insular territories that may be relevant to seabed delimitation, s¥ch as the coastal
islands of mainland China, Taiwan (including offshore islands),
Kyushu (including offshore islands), arrd the Ryukyu Islands. A
brief review of their "merits" seems warranted. The coastal islands
of mainland China, which mostly are included in the PRC's straight
baseline system, will be the subject of a later discussion. Meanwhile,
since Kyushu (16,215 sq. miles) and Taiwan (13,885 sq. miles) have
substantial landmass (the 31st and 36th largest islands on earth, respectively)117 and constitute the major portion of the territory of Japan and the ROC, they will be treated as mainlands. The review
below therefore is confined to the Ryukyu Islands only.
The Ryukyu Islands 118 comprise three major island groups
(gunto in Japanese): The Amami Gunto (north), the Okinawa
Gunto (central), and the Sakishima Gunto (south) (Map 1). The
R yukyu Islands from a northeast-southwest trending arc extending
650 miles from the southern tip of Kyushu all the way down to the
vicinity of Taiwan. The islands are fairly large (total area: 1,338 sq.
miles) and populous (around one million). Fishing and agriculture
are the major economic activities with a less significant light industrial sector. The Amami Gunto was "returned" to Japan by the
United States in 1953 and the rest ofthe Ryukyu Isla~ds in 1972.
Administratively, the Amami Gunto belongs to the Kogashima Prefecture with its seat in Kyushu, whereas the Okinawa Prefecture includes the Okinawa Gunto and the Sakishima Gunto.
117. Hodgson (1973), supra Chapter 4, note 35, p. 4.
118. The physical and political geographies of the Ryukyu Islands are based on Co·
/umbia Gazetteer, supra Chapter 4, note 77, p. 1618; Encyclopedia Americana, Vol. 24
(1974), p. 62; Statistics Bureau, The Prime Minister's Office, Japan Statistical Yearbook,
Vol. I (1979).
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The above review seems to suggest that the R yukyu Islands are
capable of generating their own continental shelf under any cr~teria.
Given their location in a semi-enclosed sea (at least on one s1de of
these islands) less than 400 miles in width, however, there is no guarantee that they actually would obtain full entitlement in a shelf
boundary delimitation. In other words, the circumstances of size,
population, etc., merely provide the necessary conditions enabling
the Ryukyu Islands to receive full consideration in the process of
balancing the equities. They are not sujficient conditions, however.
3.

Potentially Relevant Circumstances

A few legal and physical circumstances in the East China Sea
appear to be prima facie potentially relevant to the seabed delimitation. But the ex~ent of their relevance depends not so much on their
own merits as on certain extrinsic variables. These circumstances
include two existing legal regimes, namely, the Japan-ROK Joint
Development Zone (JDZ) and the PRC's straight baselines, and the
presence of coastal islands off K yushu and Taiwan.
However, these potentially relevant circumstances are not to be
confused with the partially relevant circumstances discussed above.
While relevance of the former is uncertain, depending on future
events, tpe latter's relevance is definite, but the weight assigned it
may be only marginal.
(a) The Japan-ROK Joint Development Zone
It was noted in Chapters 2 and 3 that the JDZ, not being a de
jure shelf boundary as such, will nevertheless commit Japan and the
ROK for at least 50 years, unless the resources in the JDZ become
economically unexploitable sooner. 119 But since the legal continental shelf is precisely a resource-oriented concept, if the joint efforts of
Japan and the ROK eventually deplete the undersea hydrocarbons
in the JDZ, there simply would exist no reason for the other claimants to assert sovereignty over the then sterile seabed of the JDZ. 120
In this sense, the JDZ functions as a de facto shelf boundary zone,
despite the parties' disclaimer to the contrary.
The potential relevance of the JDZ as a de facto shelf boundary
expresses itself in two ways. First of all, part of the JDZ's western
119. The Japan-ROK Joint Development Agreement, arts. XXVIII, XXXI, supra
Chapter 2, note 42.
120. S"ee Choon-ho Park, "China and Maritime Jurisdiction: Some Boundary Issues",
German Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 22 (1979), p. 119.
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edge coincides with the Sino-Korean and Sino-Japanese hypothetical median lines (Map 1). This overlapping segment naturally includes the trijunction point of the Sino-ROK and Japan-ROK
hypothetical median lines. Should the application of the equidistance principle in this region be considered equitable by the parties,
then this segment as a reference line would be potentially significant.
Second, it was pointed out in Chapter 2 that the JDZ lies entirely on the Japanese side of the Japan-ROK hypothetical median
line. Japan thus is thought to be willing to tolerate the ROK's shelf
claim based on the natural prolongation principle at the expense of
its own claim based on the equidistance principle. Although the
JDZ is not a shelf boundary as such, Japan's apparent concession
could adversely affect its legal position vis-a-vis China (PRC and
ROC) in the southern part of the East China Sea where the geophysical situations are similar to those of the north but the petroleum
geology may be much more favorable.
To conclude, since Japan and the ROK can always defend, ipso
jure, that the JDZ is not a shelf boundary, it is considered here only
as a potentially relevant circumstance.
(b)

The PRC's Straight Baselines (Map 1)

One of the important dimensions of continental shelf delimitation is the determination of baselines (or basepoints) from which the
territorial sea is measured. The whole question of islands' entitlement to continental shelf in substance can be conceived of as a question of whether islands may be used as basepoints in seaward or
lateral delimitations. Two methods for determining baselines are
most widely used in state practice and recognized in international
treaties. The first method, known as the low-water baseline or normal baseline, calls for a line following the low-water marks of a
coastal state's seashore. 121 The other method, known as the straight
baseline, consists of a series of straight lines connecting salient points
of a coastline irrespective of the low-water marks. 122 While most
states employ the normal baseline method, states with irregular
coasts have applied the straight baseline method to the whole or a
part of their coasts for practical, economic, security, and other reasons. In the 1951 Fisheries Case between Norway and the United
Kingdom, Norway's time-honored employment of the straight base121. Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, art. 3, UST, Vol. 15, p.
1606; TIAS No. 5639; UNTS, Vol. 516, p. 205.
122. Ibid., article 4.
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line method to its exceptionally indented coasts was sanctioned by
the ICJ as "not contrary to international law." 123 Since then,
through state practice, codification efforts of the U.N. International
Law Commission, 124 and the adoption by the Geneva Conference,
the straight baseline method has acquired the status of customary
international law. As of today (1984), out of the world's 140 or so
coastal states, more than sixty have passed domestic legislation permitting the use of straight baseline or have actually drawn it along
their coasts. 125
(1) The 1958 Declaration
The PRC was one of the fifteen harbinger states that had declared a straight baseline system prior to 1960. 126 In its "Declaration
on China's Territorial Sea" on September 4, 1958, the PRC stated:
1. The breadth of the territorial sea of the People's Republic of China shall be twelve nautical miles. This provision applies to all territories of the People's Republic of
China, including the Chinese mainland and its coastal islands, as well as Taiwan and its surrounding islands, the
Penghu [Pescadore] Islands, . ..
2. China's territorial sea along the mainland and its
coastal islands takes as its baseline the line composed of the
straight lines connecting basepoints on the mainland coast
and on the outermost of the coastal islands;. . . The water
areas inside the baseline, including Pohai Bay and the
Chiungchow Strait, are Chinese inland waters.
4. The principles provided in paragraphs 2 and 3 likewise
apply to Taiwan and its surrounding islands, the Penghu
Islands. . . and all other islands belonging to China. 127
(emphasis added)
The PRC has never made public how its straight baseline system would be drawn on the Chinese coast of 11,900 km. (6,432
miles). (The system does not, of course, cover Taiwan and the Pes123. I.C.J. Reports 1951, pp. 115, 143.
124. YBILC (1956), Vol. 2, supra Chapter 4, note 15, p. 257.
125. The figures are derived from the author's calculations based on "National Claims
to Maritime Jurisdictions," Limits in the Seas, No. 36, 4th rev., May I, 1981.
126. The others were Albania, Cuba, Egypt, Ethiopia, Finland, Guatemala, Iceland,
Iran, Norway, Panama, Saudi Arabia, Soviet Union, Sri Lanka, Sweden, and
Yugoslavia.
127. Peking Review, September 9, 1958, p. 21.
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cadores which are under the ROC's control.) This move would have
been required if the PRC joined the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone. 128 The Geographer of the United
States Department of State in 1972 drew hypothetical straight baselines to the Chinese coasts on a naval chart. 129 In the accompanying
comments, he concluded:
Basically, Peking appears to have taken a realistic and
non-expansive attitude in drafting its straight
baselines. . . .
. . .With the exception of the Spratly Islands, the
straight baselines shown on the attached charts would
probably be quite consistent with international state
· . . . . do
practices
(2)

Challenges and Protests

Shortly thereafter, two American commentators 131 challenged
the legality of the PRC's straight baselines in the East China Sea on
the grounds that some of the outlying islands supposedly used as
basepoints are excessively distant from the mainland coast (the
greatest distance being 69 miles) and that the straight lines connecting these islands do not follow the general direction of the Chinese
coastline, 132 as required by customary international law reflected in
the ruling of the Fisheries Case.
In practice, however, other than the United States 133 and the
128. Supra note 122.
129. See "Straight Baselines: People's Republic of China," Limits in the Seas, No. 43,
July I, 1972.
130. Ibid., pp. 3, 6.
131. Allen & Mitchell (1972), supra Chapter 2, note 28.
132. Ibid., pp. 796-800. Art. 4, paras. I and 2 of the Convention on the Territorial Sea
and Contiguous Zone provide:
I. In localities where the coastline is deeply indented and cut into, or if there
is a fringe of islands along the coast in its immediate vicinity, the method of
straight baselines joining appropriate points may be employed in drawing the
baseline from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured.
2. The drawing of such baselines must not depart to any appreciable extent
from the general direction of the coast, and the sea areas lying within the line
must be sufficiently closely linked to the land domain to be subject to the regime of internal waters.
UNTS, Vol. 516, p. 208.
133. Department of State, "The Legal Considerations Affecting the Status of Taiwan
and the Offshore Islands," American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1958, pp. 1189,
1198.
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United Kingdom, 134 no state has ever raised any obj~ctions. Sin~e
the United Kingdom itself adopted the straight baseline method m
1964, 135 its objection seems to be weakened, if still valid. Meanwhile, the ROK promulgated a system of straight baselines on September 20, 1978. 136 Inasmuch as the East China Sea is concerned,
the PRC's straight baselines have met with no objection from Japan.
The ROC also has been silent so far. 137
(3) Opposability to Japan
If Japan presumably has acquiesced since 1958 to the PRC's
straight baselines for measuring China's territorial sea, is it thereby
estopped from objecting to such method when the same baselines are
used for measuring China's continental shelf? The interests of Japan
in the seabed of the East China Sea were not aroused until the late
1960s. But it took part in the negotiations at the 1958 Geneva Conference. Although Japan did not sign nor later accede to the Shelf
Convention, it ought to be aware that the continental shelf of a
coastal state begins outside the territorial sea but is measured from
the same baseline from which the breadth of the territorial sea is
measured. 138 It thus is arguably, at least, that the PRC's straight
baseline system is opposable to Japan on the same ground on which
the ICJ decided the Fisheries Case in favor of Norway:
The notoriety of the fact, the general toleration of the international community, Great Britain's position in the North
Sea, her own interest in the question, and her prolonged
abstention would in any case warrant Norway's enforcement of her system against the United Kingdom. 139
It seems necessary at this juncture to discuss the ICJ's treatment
of Tunisia's straight baselines in relation to shelf delimitation in the
134. U.S. Consulate General in Hong Kong, Survey of China Mainland Press [SCMP],
No. 1871 (October 9, 1958), p. 89.
135. Territorial Waters Order in Council of 25 September 1964, article 3, UNLS/15,
pp. 129, 130. For an analysis with charts, see "Straight Baselines: United Kingdom,"
Limits in the Seas, No. 23, June 26, 1970.
136. "Straight Baselines: Republic of Korea," Limits in the Seas, No. 82, January 22,
1979, p. I; UNLS/19, p. 98.
137. The ROC was said to have seriously considered the use of the straight baseline in
the past. Hungdah Chiu, "China and the Question of Territorial Sea," International
Trade Law Journal, Vol. l (1975), pp. 29, 49-50.
138. Although Article I of the Shelf Convention (definition of the continental shelf)
does not so prescribe, Article 6 (delimitation between states) should make this point quite
clear.
139. I.C.J. Reports 1951, p. 139.
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Tunisian-Libyan Case . 140 The question there was whether Tunisia's
internal waters and territorial sea should be included in calculating
the degree of proportionality between the shelf areas appertaining to
each of the parties and the lengths of their respective coasts. Tunisia
argued that by definition the legal continental shelf begins where the
territorial sea ends; the seabed of its territorial sea and internal waters landward of the straight baselines therefore should be excluded
from shelf delimitation. On the other hand, Libya contended that
the whole seabed of the delimitation area must be taken into account
in making these calculations. The Court, disclaiming passing any
judgment on the legality of or opposability to Libya of the Tunisian
straight baselines, stated that it was not convinced by Tunisia's contention. It concluded:
It should be reaffirmed that the continental shelf, in the
legal sense, does not include the sea-bed areas below territorial and internal waters; but the question is not one of definition, but ofproportionality as a function ofequity. The fact
that a given area is territorial sea or internal waters does
not mean that the coastal State does not enjoy "sovereign
rights for the purpose of exploring it and exploiting its natural resources". . . . Furthermore, the element ofproportionality is related to lengths of the coasts of the States
concerned, not to striaght baselines drawn round those
coasts. . . . [S]ince it is a question of proportionality, the
only absolute requirement of equity is that one should compare like with like . 141 (emphasis added)
The real rationale, however, underlying the ICJ's deviation
from the fundamental legal concept of the continental shelf in the
name of equity is, it seems, that the inclusion or exclusion of the
Tunisian internal and territorial waters would make "a very marked
difference in the ratios resulting from any foreseeable delimitation
line." 142 As is clearly shown in Map 16, the areas landward of Tunisia's territorial sea limits amount to nearly one third of the whole
delimitation area lying off the coasts of Tunisia up to Ras Kaboudia
and of Libya up to Ras Tajoura. If these areas had been excluded,
Tunisia would have gained an enormous advantage vis-a-vis Libya
in dividing the remaining two-thirds of the delimitation area. Furthermore, Tunisia's straight baselines were declared in 1973, five
140. I.C.J. Reports 1982, pp. 71-76.
141. Ibid., p. 76.
142. Ibid., p. 71.
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years after the critical date when the present di~p~te aros~. ~ The
1973 law has substantially changed the pre-eXIstmg Tums1an law
which did not constitute the waters in question as internal or territorial. Therefore, the above considerations must have combined to
convince the Court that equity requires the inclusion of Tunisian territorial and internal waters in applying the proportionality test.
Despite the smokescreen of the Court's disclaimer on the legality of Tunisia's system of straight baselines, it seemed to disapprove
of the way they were drawn to include so large an area in Tunisia's
exclusive domain. But to admit such disapproval on the record
would, of course, have unnecessarily complicated the already sticky
question at issue.
Now the question is: should the Tunisian-Libyan rule apply
here in the Sino-Japanese shelf delimitation in the context of the
East China Sea? It seems that the Sino-Japanese case is distinguishable from the Tunisian-Libyan Case in two respects. First, the delimitation area here is the whole of the East China Sea (Map 1), which
is much larger both in absolute terms than the delimitation area in
the Tunisian-Libyan Case (Map 15) and in relation to the PRC's internal and territorial waters measured from its straight baselines. Inclusion or exclusion of these areas therefore would not make a
marked difference in calculating the proportionality ratios as in the
Tunisian-Libyan Case. Second, the PRC's straight baselines were
declared in 1958, as noted above, long bifore any shelf dispute in the
East China Sea arose. In fact, the declaration was the PRC's first
legislation on the subject, not amending any pre-existing law.
Therefore, even if Japan cites the Tunisian-Libyan rule in support of
its own claim in future shelf delimitations with China (PRC and
ROC), the rule's applicability to a wholly dissimilar East China Sea
is only open to question.
Another aspect of the opposability of the PRC's straight baselines to Japan concerns their relationship to boundary delimitation
principles. The straight baseline, by nature, extends more seward
than does the normal baseline and consequently would affect any
shelf boundary based on distance-oriented criteria, such as the equidistance principle, in favor of the state that adopts the straight baseline. The Indonesia-Malaysia continental shelf boundary is a case in
point. Precisely to counteract such an effect resulting from Indone143. Continental Shelf, Separate Opinion of Jimenez de Arechaga, I.C.J. Reports
1982, p. 139.
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sia's extensive straight baselines, Malaysia declared its own 144
shortly before the two states agreed upon their shelf boundaries in
1969. By the same token, should the equidistance principle apply to
either the Yellow Sea or the East China Sea, Japan may, instead of
objecting to the PRC's system, simply declare its own. However, if
other principles based on depth of water or the natural prolongation
of the coast apply, the effect of the straight baseline on the shelf
boundary becomes nil since the boundary is drawn independent of
the coastal configuration as well as the distance from the coast.
(4)

Conclusion

In conclusion, the relevance of the PRC's straight baselines to
the continental shelf delimitation in the East China Sea depends on
the delimitation principle and the proportionality test to be employed. The delimitation principle should, in turn, be determined by
the larger context of geography, geology, and geomorphology of the
East China Sea as a whole.
(c)

The Coastal Islands of Kyushu and Taiwan
( 1) The Coastal Islands of K yushu 145

There are two groups of islands off the northwestern shore of
Kyushu, namely, Goto Retto and, further south, Danjo Gunto and
Tori Shima (Map 1). (The Osumi Gunto southeast of Kyushu are
largely irrelevant due to their far-east location.) The Goto Retto,
comprising seven main islands, are relatively large (240 sq. miles)
and populous (150,000). They are situated about 25 miles west of
K yushu, separated therefrom by waters dotted with islets and rocks.
Two islands in the Goto Retto were used six times as basepoints in
constructing the southern portion of the Japanese-ROK shelf boundary in the Korea Strait. 146 Given their proximity to Kyushu, the
Goto Retto perhaps might be enclosed in a straight baseline system
as part of Kyushu should Japan decide to adopt one. However, the
144. Emergency (Essential Powers) Ordinance, No. 7, 1969, as amended in 1969, an.
3, UNLS/16, pp. 14, 15.
145. Unless otherwise indicated, descriptions of the physical geography of Goto Retto,
Danjo Gunto, and Tori Shima are based on Columbia Gazetteer, supra Chapter 4, note
77, pp. 649, 701, Allen & Mitchell (1972), supra Chapter 2, note 28, pp. 803-04, and Park
(1972), supra Chapter l, note 18, pp. 30-32.
146. They were Sagono Shima and Shiro-Se, each of which was used three times.
"Continental Shelf Boundary and Joint Development Zone: Japan-Republic of Korea,"
Limits in the Seas, No. 75, September 2, 1977, (Table 1).
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Goto Retto are so located that they are relevant only to delimitation
between Japan and Korea and not between Japan and China.
More troublesome to the Sino-Japanese delimitation are the
Danjo Gunto and Tori Shima. The former consists of several small
islets with a total area of less than four square miles. They lie 34
miles south of Fukue Shima, the largest and the southernmost island
of the Gotto Retto. Tori Shima comprises two small islets lying 32
miles southwest of Goto Retto and 18 miles northwest of Danjo
Gunto. With no intervening islands between them and Goto Retto,
Danjo Gunto and Tori Shima cannot be connected with Gotto Retto
by their territorial seas. Other than the existence of caretakers of a
light house and a radio signal tower in Danjo Gunto, the two groups
are also uninhabited. To complicate matters further, Danjo Gunto
and Tori Shima are sitting on the geological continental shelf continuous from Korea but separated from Gotto Retto by the northernmost end of the Okinawa Trough. The ROK maintained, at least
prior to 1974, that these islets were too small to generate their own
continental shelf and that in any case, under the natural prolongation principle, Japan's continental shelf would terminate on the eastem rim of the Okinawa Trough near Goto Retto. 147
When the 1974 Japan-ROK shelf boundary in the Korea Strait
was delimited, the ROK seemed to have retreated from its previous
position by allowing Japan to use Tori Shima as a basepoint 148 in
determining the southernmost terminal point of that boundary.
Danjo Gunto, unlike Goto Retto, are also likely to be used as basepoints by Japan in future Sino-Japanese delimitation because they
are among the few Japanese territories north of 26°N latitude that
are close to the Chinese mainland coast (Map 1).
(2)

The Coastal Islands of Taiwan 149

Three volcanic outcroppings, P'eng-chia, Mien-hua, and Hua147. See supra Chapter 2.
148. According to Limits in the Seas, supra note 143, the name of the islet was Torino
Shima and not Tori Shima. However, on the naval chart attached to the book, only the
latter appears. Moreover, Tori Shima's distance from the terminal point, actually measured by this author, is almost identical to the distance between the terminal point and
the nearest Korean territory, Cheju. This finding is in accord with the distance figures in
Table I of the same book. Therefore, the name "Torino Shima" is taken either as a
typographical error or as another name of the same islet.
.149. f!nless otherwise indi,cated, descriptions of the physical geography of the P'engchta, Mten-hua, and Hua-p mg Islets are based on Jui-nan Chou, "P'eng-chia Yu:
Taiwan Ch'ih Tsui-pei-tien" (P'eng-Chia Islet: Taiwan's Northernmost Point), Shih-yu
t'ung-hsun, supra Chapter 2, note 103, No. 281, p. 33 (Jan. I, 1975). Chou identified his
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p'ing Islets, lie 30, 23, and 17 miles, respectively, from the northern
coast of Taiwan in the East China Sea (Map 1). All of them sit on
the geological shelf continuous from Taiwan but separated from the
Sakishima Gun to of the R yukyu Islands by the Okinawa Trough.
The total area of the group is less than one square mile. Otherwise
uninhabited, there is a light house on P'eng-chia staffed with a few
caretakers and weathermen.
The ROC's newly declared 12-mile territorial sea, applicable
under international law even to the most tiny little landmass insofar
as it is naturally formed and above high tide at all times, 150 connects
the three islets with Taiwan by a continuous belt of territorial sea.
However, the ROC's renunciation in its reservations to the Shelf
Convention of the use of "exposed rocks and islets" as basepoints on
shelf delimitation 151 could deprive them of any shelf entitlements.
The PRC's straight baseline system, which was intended to apply to
"Taiwan and its surrounding islands" as well, probably would give
rise to protests from other states if it is applied to these islets. The
straight lines connecting these islets and Taiwan obviously will depart appreciably from the general direction of the northern coast of
Taiwan, even if the islets could be characterized as situated in the
"immediate vicinity" of the Taiwan coast. 152
(3)

Relevance of the Coastal Islands of Kyuhsu and
Taiwan

The geographic locations and physical dimension of these two
groups of islets are largely comparable to those of the Tiao-yu-t'ai
Islands. Some of the arguments that support the disregard of the
Taio-yu-t'ais' presence in the Sino-Japanese seabed delimitation apparently are applicable here. Even if, however, the Tiao-yu-t'ais are
differentiated by reference to their disputed status, the relevance of
Danjo Gunto eta/. still depends on two variables: first, whether the
treatment accorded them is reciprocal; and second, whether the equidistance principle is used.
Despite the ROC's expressed disregard of "exposed rocks and
islets" in shelf delimitation in its reservations to the Shelf Convention, this disclaimer does not seem to be unconditional. The ROC
would be unlikely to adhere to that reservation unilaterally if the
source as Keelung City Government, Statistical Yearbook of the City o/ Kee/ung. No
publication date was indicated. Ibid., p. 34.
150. Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, art. 10(1).
151. See supra Chapter 2, text accompanying note 90.
152. See supra note 94.

SEABED BOUNDARY DELIMITATION

143

other side refused to go along. In other words, reciprocity in t~eat
ment, which appears evident in the language of the reservatwns,
would be crucial. Furthermore, the PRC has never disclaimed the
use of islets as basepoints.
Assuming that all these islets would be used as basepoints, their
relevance still would depend on what delimitation principle is to
govern. As in the case of the PRC's straight baselines, the islets' use
or non-use makes a difference only if a distance-oriented delimitation principle, e.g., equidistance, applies. Thus, once again the conclusion is that the ultimate answer to the relevance question depends
on the larger physical context of the East China Sea.
D. Geography as a Relevant Circumstance
Each independent sovereign state occupies a defined piece of
the globe's dry surface as its territory. Boundaries between states on
land, in rivers and lakes, or in the seas unavoidably involve the geography of that region. Distinctive geographical features, such as rivers and mountain ridges are often directly used, for practical
purposes, as boundaries. Ever since the advent of the legal concept
of the continental shelf, geographical considerations also have
played a prominent role in shelf boundary delimitation, as evidenced
by treaties, international judicial decisions, and state practice.
Geographical circumstances usually relate to suiface features
only, whereas submarine features fall into the ambit of regional geomorphology and geology. Specifically, two geographical features
have generated the greatest influence in shelf delimitation: the overall coastal configuration and, to a lesser extent, the presence of islands. The former may be referred to as the "macrogeography,"
whereas the latter may be termed the "microgeography". In Chapter
4 the legal significance of small, isolated islands was examined. Here
we shall deal with the macrogeography of the East China Sea. Since
the choice of the equidistance principle in state practice to date (Table 4) is largely dictated by the coastal configuration of the delimiting states, it is adequate to treat the applicability of that principle
together with the discussion of geography.

1.

The Macrogeography

of the East China Sea

The detailed physical geography of the East China Sea was
noted in Chapter 1. Here we will only pinpoint a few legally significant features as a frame of reference. First, there exists no common
land boundary between China and Japan, between Japan and the

144

CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES

ROK, or between China and the ROK. 153 The geographical relationships of the three states inter se, are, accordingly, opposite-coast
situations (Map 1). Second, for the Japan-ROK and China-ROK
pairs, the juxtaposition of the two "opposite" relationships exists
only in the northern part of the East China Sea, roughly north of the
30°N parallel. 154 South of that latitude the opposite relationship
finds itself only between Japan and China (ROC and PRC). For the
purpose of this study, the former area is referred to as the North
Region while the latter area is referred to as the South Region.
Third, and more specifically, the Chinese coasts in the North Region
include the Yangtze River estuary and the island-spattered
Hangchou Bay. The Japanese coasts comprise those of Kyushu and
its offshore islands. In the South Region, the Chinese coasts begin
with the southern headland of the Hanchou Bay to the Hai-t'an Island in Fukien Province and include that of Taiwan whereas the
Japanese coasts consist only of those of the Ryukyu Islands. In the
North Region, which is a trijunction area, the future Sino-Japanese
shelf boundary likely would be influenced by the future Sino-ROK
and Japan-ROK boundaries and possibly by the Japan-ROK JDZ.
As suggested earlier, politics rather than law would be more determinative of the outcome. We therefore shall focus more on the South
Region, which is exclusively a Sino-Japanese sphere.
Between states having opposite coasts facing each other, the inevitable question relating to seabed delimitation is: should the equidistance principle apply? Japan's response is positive while the
responses of China (and the ROK) are in the negative. It is therefore
necessary to examine the applicability of that principle to the East
China Sea in light of its macrogeography and precedents in international practice.
153. The PRC and the DPRK (North Korea) do share a common land boundary, i.e.,
the Yalu River which is not, however, near the East China Sea.
154. The choice of the 30°N latitude as the demarcation line between two macrogeographically distinct regions is an intermediary position. The geographical trijunction
point of the three median lines drawn between the coasts of Japan and Korea, Korea and
China, and China and Japan has geographical coordinates of 30°46.2 N Latitude and
125° 55.5 E Longitude. That point, of course, is north of the 30°N parallel. On the other
hand, the ROK's concession block K-7 extends to 28°36'N Latitude, which is south of
the 30°N parallel, indicating the ROK's perception of the southern limit of the SinoKorean, and Japanese-Korean opposite relationships. Controversial as the location of
that demarcation line is, a sensible choice must be a convenient, intermediary one. Since
the 30°N parallel roughly coincides with the geographical boundary between Kyushu
(including the Osumi Gunto) and the Ryukyu Islands (including the Tokara Gunto)
(Map I) and the northern limit of the 1,000 meter isobath of the Okinawa Trough (Map
Ia), it is accordingly chosen.
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The Equidistance Principle: Should It Apply?

The equidistance principle is the rule, the ap~lica~ion o~ ~hich
calls for the drawing of a line every point of whtch 1s eqmdtstant
from the nearest points of the baseline from which the breadth of the
territorial sea is measured. 155 An equidistant line so drawn between
opposite coasts is referred to as a "median" line, whereas the line
between two adjacent coasts is a "lateral" line. This principle, sometimes with variations, has been used extensively in the state practice
of maritime boundary delimitation for over one hundred years. 156 It
also has been adopted by a number of bilateral and multilateral treaties. Its evolution as an important rule of international boundary
delimitation and its legal and technical applications have been
treated elaborately by the U.N. International Law Commission, 157
the ICJ, 158 and many commentators. 159
Before we proceed to address the East China Sea problem, one
important assumption has to be made. The presence of the Okinawa
Trough, which makes the seabed issue two-dimensional, fundamentally disturbs the geological continuity on which the appliability of
the equidistance principle in many cases is premised. Therefore, for
the purpose of the following analysis, the Okinawa Trough is re155. The technique of drawing a strict median line was said to be developed by a
Colonel Lawrence Martin in connection with the Michigan-Wisconsin boundary in the
Great Lakes. It was later used by the U.S. Supreme Court in Wisconsin v. Michigan, 297
U.S. 547 (1963), and theorized by S. Whittemore Boggs, a geographer advising the State
Department, in his article entitled "Problems of Water Boundary Definition," Geographical Review, Vol. 27 (1937), p. 445. See Boggs (1951), supra Chapter 4, note 129, p. 258
note 30. But the use of median or equidistant line as water boundary began much earlier. See Padwa ( 1960), supra Chapter 4, note 129, p. 631. For the technical construction
of an equidistant line, see Aaron L. Shalowitz, Shore and Sea Boundaries, Vol. 1, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Commerce, Coast and Goedetic Survey, 1962, pp. 23235.
156. Sang-Myon Rhee, "Sea Boundary Delimitation between States before World
War II," American Journal o.f International Law, Vol. 76 (1982), p. 555. Some water
boundaries, which in fact coincided with the equidistant line in whole or in larger part,
did not refer to that principle as such but only enumerated geographical coordinates.
This practice still prevails today. See the treaties listed in Table 4.
157. For a terse summary of the ILC's deliberations, see Etienne Grisel, "The Lateral
Boundaries of the Continental Shelf and the Judgment of the International Court of
Justice in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases," American Journal o.f International
Law, Vol. 64 (1970), pp. 562, 570-73 [hereinafter cited as Grise! (1970)].
158. The North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, I.C.J. Reports 1969, p. 3, particularly the
dissenting opinions.
159. Eg., Padwa (1960), supra Chapter 4, note 129, pp. 631-47; Grisel (1970), supra
note 157, pp. 570-79; Brown (1971), supra Chapter 4, note 129, pp. 57-62; Collins &
Rogoff (1982), supra Introduction, note 23, p. 14 and pp. 24-29.
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garded as non-existent and the geological shelf is assumed to extend
from the Chinese mainland coast all the way to the R yukyu Islands.
We now begin the survey of state practice to see under what circumstances the equidistance principl~ is applied or rejected.
(a)

State Practice

One of the direct consequences of expanded national maritime
zones in the last two decades is the increasing overlapping jurisdictions and hence the urgent need to delimit boundaries between
neighboring states. According to Dr. R. Hodgson, 160 the late geographer of the Department of State and a recognized authority on the
geographical aspects of the law of the sea, as of mid-1976,
[t]here are approximately 300 potential territorial sea or
continental shelf boundaries at the present state of time and
geography. Of these, 156 boundaries divide opposite states
while 144 divide adjacent states. The figures are, surprisingly, nearly equal. Of the 156 "opposite" boundaries five
are limited to the territorial sea, while eight of the adjacent
boundaries fall in that category. Thus, there are 151 "opposite" territorial sea or continental shelf boundaries and
136 "adjacent" limits. 161
Hodgson also indicated that only 21 per cent or (63) of the 300 potential boundaries have been negotiated by them, but he did not give
separate numbers for each of the group of "adjacent" and "opposite"
boundaries. By 1981, out of a total of 331 maritime boundaries, approximately 100 had been negotiated. 162
A survey by this author, on the basis of a variety of sources to
date concerning "opposite" shelf boundaries published under the
auspices of the United Nations, 163 the United States Department of
State, 164 and private publicists, 165 indicated 45 delimitations of "op160. Robert D. Hodgson and Robert W. Smith, "Boundaries of the Economic Zone,"
in Edward L. Miles and John King Gamble, ed., Law of the Sea: Conference Outcomes
and Problems of Implementation, Proceedings of the Law of the Sea Institute, Tenth Annual Conference, June 22-25, 1976, Cambridge, Mass: Ballinger Publishing Company,
1977, p. 183 [hereinafter cited as Hodgson & Smith (1977)].
161. Ibid., pp. 189-190.
162. See Robert D. Hodgson and Robert W. Smith, "Boundary Issues Created by
Extended National Marine Jurisdictional", The Geographical Review, Vol. 69 (1979), p.
426 and Robert W. Smith, "The Maritime Boundaries of the United States", ibid., Vol.
71 (1981), p. 397.
163. le., UNLS/15, UNLS/16, UNLS/18, and UNLS/19.
164. le., the Limits in the Seas series (97 issues as of August 1984).
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posite" shelf boundaries (including the Anglo-French boundary)~ as
shown in Table 4. (The Tunisian-Libyan shelf has not been delimited since the ICJ judgment.) The geographical distribution of these
boundaries is as follows: Europe (14), Asia (16), the Americas (12),
and the Oceans (3). With two exceptions, all the boundaries were
delimited on or after 1965. This survey plainly shows the high frequency of the use of the equidistance principle. The list may well be
incomplete, given the possibility of unpublished treaties. It nevertheless includes the vast majority of "opposite" shelf boundaries delimited to date and provides a reasonable basis for analysis.
Table 4 is intended to examine the correlations between the
choice of the equidistance principle and the macrogeography of the
opposite coasts. The concept of a "broad equality of coasts," as used
by the Anglo-French Court of Arbitration to describe the macrogeography of the English Channel, 166 is employed here as a measuring
rod. The coasts compared here involve only those that are relevant
to the particular boundary delimitation, and thus do not include the
same delimiting states' other coasts situated outside the delimitation
area. For instance, the overall coasts of Norway and Denmark
clearly are unequal; yet the parts of their coasts which actually were
used as basepoints-those in the Skagerrak-in delimiting the Danish-Norwegian shelf boundary, are broadly equal in configuration
and length.
It is submitted that in view of the great variety of coastal geographies, the labelling of two opposite coasts as being "broadly equal"
inherently involves a measure of subjectivity. Some allowances for
arguably different characterizations therefore are provided for. The
brief remarks in Table 4 on salient geographical features also should
shed some light on the labelling process. In some cases, the straight
baselines may equalize otherwise broadly unequal coastlines.
The notions of "true" or "simplified" or "selective" equidistant
lines are borrowed from Dr. Hodgson's usage 167 with certain modifications. Theoretically, in a "true" equidistant line, every point along
the line must be equidistant from at least one basepoint on each
coast; the turning points must be equidistant from three basepoints:
one on one coast and the rest on the other. In practice, states follow
that principle strictly in situations where their coasts are practically
165. !e., the multi-volume New Directions in the Law of the Sea (II volumes as of
August 1984). Other private sources have also been consulted, see Index to Sources Consulted in Table 4.
166. Supra note 42.
167. Hodgson & Smith (1977), supra note 160, pp. 188-92.
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equal, but simplify, for administrative purposes, the boundary in
certain localities by eliminating certain turning points, or by minor
exchanges of areas. The former line thus is called a "true" median
line while the latter is a "simplified" one. Both fall in the same category for being the closest to the geometrical median line. The "selective" equidistant line is one which is equidistant from the two
baselines only at selected points of the boundary. As used here, this
concept also includes boundaries, one or more segments of which are
delimited under other principles or considerations. For instance,
about 45 percent of the length of the Italy-Yugoslavia boundary was
a true equidistant line; the rest was influenced heavily by equitable
considerations necessitated by the presence of Yugoslav islands. 168
Similar situations appear in the Italy-Tunisia, 169 Iran-Saudi Arabia, 170 Australia-Indonesia, 171 and Canada-Denmark 172 boundaries.
Boundaries under the caption "other" refer to those delimited
entirely under equitable or other considerations. It is unfortunate
that the charts on which about ten percent of these 45 boundaries
appear are unavailable; hence the impossibility of understanding the
particular delimitation principle employed there. The principles actually applied may vary greatly. Where the boundary charts are
published and studied, there is a strong consistency between the
equidistant lines drawn on the charts and the references to the equidistance principle in the boundary agreements. Therefore, in some
cases where charts are unavailable, the labelling of "true/simplified
equidistance" is based on the references in treaty provisions, 173 subject, of course, to future studies on actual delimitations.
Despite some irregularities as stated above, a tentative general168. Supra Chapter 4, note 37.
169. Italy-Tunisia shelf boundary, ibid., note 40.
170. Iran-Saudi Arabia shelf boundary, ibid., note 38.
171. Agreement Establishing Certain Seabed Boundaries, Australia-Indonesia, May
18, 1971, UNLS/18, p. 433; Agreement Establishing Certain Seabed Boundaries in the
Area of the Timor and Arufura Seas Supplementary to the Agreement of 18 May 1971,
Australia-Indonesia, 9 October 1972, ibid., p. 441. Both agreements, hereinafter referred
to as the Australia-Indonesia shelf boundary agreement, are analyzed in "Territorial Sea
and Continental Shelf Boundaries: Australia and Papua New Guinea-Indonesia," Limits
in the Seas, No. 87, August 20, 1979. For further discussion, see infra text accompanying
notes 270-80.
172. Supra Chapter 4, note 37.
173. E.g., the Columbia-Dominican Republic agreement, NDLOS, Vol. 8 (1980), p.
78. But in certain cases the designation in treaty text makes little sense. For instance, in
Article I of the boundary agreement between Cuba and Haiti, it is stated that the EEZ
shall be delimited "on the basis of the principle of equidistance or equity" (emphasis
added). NDLOS, Vol. 8 (1980), p. 69.
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ization seems possible on the basis of Table 4. While there are cases
where the broad equality of opposite coasts was present but the parties resorted to principles other than the equidistance rule, there has
been no instance where the coasts are not broadly equal but the parties nevertheless apply the equidistance principle. Logically, the
existence of broadly equal coasts seems to constitute a conditio sine
qua non to the application of the equidistance principle. A statistically positive correlation between these two variables thus can be
established. This observation is supported by over 90 percent of the
boundaries surveyed, with the delimitation principle of only three
boundaries entirely unknown. Among the latter three, what is
known is that all of them are located between two broadly equal
coasts. Thus, even if all of them had been delimited under principles
other than the equidistance rule, the above observation logically still
would stand. This is so because the presence of broadly equal coasts
is here established as a necessary condition, but not as a sufticient
condition, to the application of the equidistance principle in its true,
simplified, or selective versions.
(b)

The North Sea Cases

The ICJ in this case reviewed at length the rationale, origin, and
the legal status of the equidistance principle. It rejected the "fundamentalist aspect" for the contentions of Denmark and the Netherlands, namely the proposition that the equidistance rule was an a
priori accompaniment of the continental shelf doctrine based upon
the notion of proximity. 174 Meanwhile, the Court stressed that the
natural prolongation principle, which conferred ipso jure title in respect of the continental shelf to the coastal state, was more fundamental to the continental shelf doctrine than the notion of proximity,
which provided only per se title to land territory. 175 After reviewing
the travaux preparatoires of Article 6 of the Shelf Convention, the
Convention's provisions relating to reservations, and the state practice since 1958, the Court also dismissed the Danish and Dutch contentions that the equidistance rules either embodied or created
customary rules of intemationallaw. 176
It seems obvious that the Court was not addressing merely the
equidistance principle as applied to an adjacent-coast situation,
which was the subject of the North Seas Cases, but was examining
174. I.C.J. Reports 1969, pp. 28-31.
175. Ibid., pp. 31-32.
176. Ibid., pp. 32-46.
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that principle in general. However, one is still inclined to view the
geography of the three North Sea states (a concave German coast
adjacent to two convex Danish and Dutch coasts (Map 13)) as the
single most important factor underlying the Court's rejection of the
equidistance rule since its application would obviously produce
grossly inequitable results. An inevitable question immediately
arises: would the Court's opinion hold true in an opposite-coast
situations?
The Court in fact did address that question, albeit in a more
casual way. 177 There are only two passages in the Court's opinion
addressing the opposite situation and are thus worth quoting in full:
57. Before going further it will be convenient to deal
briefly with two subsidiary matters. Most of the difficulties
felt in the International Law Commission related, as here,
to the case of the lateral boundary between adjacent States.
Less difficulty was felt over that of the median line boundary between opposite States, although it too is an equidistance line. For this there seems to the Court to be good
reason. The continental shelf area off, and dividing, opposite States, can be claimed by each of them to be a natural
prolongation of its territory. These prolongations meet and
overlap, and can therefore only be delimited by means of a
median line; and ignoring the presence of islets, rocks and
minor coastal projections, the disproportionally distorting
effect of which can be eliminated by other means, such a
line must effect an equal division of the particular area involved. If there is a third State on one of the coasts concerned, the area of mutual natural prolongation with that
of the same or another opposite State will be a separate and
distinct one, to be treated in the same way. This type of
case is therefore different from that of laterally adjacent
States on the same coast with no immediately opposite
coast in front of it, and does not give rise to the same kind
of problem-a conclusion which also finds some confirmation in the differences of language to be observed in the two
paragraphs of Article 6 of the Geneva Convention (reproduced in paragraph 26 above) as respects recource in the
one case to median lines and in the other to lateral equidistance lines, in the event of absence of agreement.
58. If on the other hand, contrary to the view ex177. Ibid., pp. 36-37.
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pressed in the preceding paragraph, it were correct to ~ay
that there is no essential difference in the process of delimiting the continental shelf areas between opposite States
and that of delimitations between adjacent States, then the
results ought in principle to be the same or at least comparable. But in fact, whereas a median line divides equally
between the two opposite countries areas that can be regarded as being the natural prolongation of the territory of
each of them, a lateral equidistance line often leaves to one
of the States concerned areas that are a natural prolongation of the territory of the other. 178
These passages present a more balanced picture of the equidistance principle. They should, of course, be read in their context.
The Court then was comparing the equities between applying the
equidistance rule in an opposite situation and applying it in an adjacent one. In the former, it is less likely to produce inequitable results
if certain "disproportionately distorting" features are ignored. One
difficulty with the dictum is that the geographical and geological
contexts the Court had in mind are not entirely clear. Given the
generality of its formation, the Court was presumably referring to
the most common situation, i.e., two broadly equal or comparable
coasts. Moreover, a geologically continuous continental shelf, which
constitutes the natural prolongation of each state's territory, seems
also to have been assumed. One is, accordingly, unable to predict
what the Court's view would be if the assumed geographical and/or
geological contexts were lacking. In any event, this dictum suggests
nothing that supports an automatic and unconditional application of
the equidistance principle in any opposite-coast situation and therefore should not derogate from the Court's general ruling that a delimitation should be effected by agreement in accordance with
equitable principles.
(c) The Anglo-French Arbitration
Two geographical and legal factors that distinguish the AngloFrench case from the North Sea Cases render the former more relevant to the present question of the East China Sea. First, the Court
of Arbitration was requested to actually delimit the course of the
shelf boundary between France and the United Kingdom. 179 It thus
had ample opportunity to weigh the specific geographical circum178. Ibid.
179. Supra note 40.
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stances of the area in question. Second, the macrogeography involved in the Anglo-French case (Map 14), like that in the East
China Sea and unlike that in the North Sea Cases, was an oppositecoast situation. The equidistance principle was more pertinent and
its application accordingly had been closely examined.
In deciding the course of the boundary in the Channel Islands
region, the Court began by identifying the "features and considerations" relevant to that region. The Court opined:
. . . The region forms an integral part of the English
Channel. .. ; and for the purpose of delimiting its continental shelf the region has clearly, in the opinion of the
Court, to be viewed in its context as part of that whole maritime area. . . . Along the whole 300 miles of the south
coast of the Channel runs the mainland coast of the French
Republic; along the whole 300 miles of the north coast of
the Channel runs the mainland coast of the United Kingdom. Each country has some promontories on its coast and
the general result is that the coastlines of their mainlandsface
each other across the channel in a relation of approximate
equality.
Between opposite States, . . . a median line boundary
will in normal circumstances leave broadly equal areas of
continental shelf to each State and constitute a delimitation
in accordance with equitable principles. It follows that
where the coastlines of the two opposite states are themselves
approximately equal in their relations to the continental shelf
not only should the boundary in normal circumstances be the
median line but the areas of shelf left to each Party on either
side of the median line should be broadly equal or at least
broadly comparable. 180
The Court then considered the presence of the Channel Islands and
concluded that:
Inevitably, the presence of these islands in the English
Channel in that particular situation disturbs the balance of
the geographical circumstances which would otherwise exist between the Parties in the region as a result of the broad
equality of the coastlines of their mainlands. 181 (emphasis
added)
180. The Anglo-French Award, paras. 181-82.
181. Ibid., para. 183.
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It seems quite clear that for the equidistance principle to apply,
the presence of an opposite-coast situation alone does not suffice. A
more important geographical factor has to be present, namely, the
coastlines of the two opposite states must be "approximately equal"
in the sense that their respective length and irregular projections are
broadly equal or comparable.
The geographical situation of the Atlantic region is distinguishable from that of the Channel Islands in that the areas of continental
shelf to be delimited in the former lay "off' rather than "between"
the coasts of France and the United Kingdom. This situation is similar to that of the continental shelf between China and Korea, and
between Japan and Korea, in the East China Sea, but not between
China and Japan (Map 1). The relevance of the Court's opinion in
relation to the present case accordingly diminishes. However, the
Court's reasoning in general still deserves attention. Relying on the
"fact that in other respects the two States abut on the same continental shelf with coast not remarkedly different in extent and broadly similar in their relations to that she!f'' 182 (emphasis added), the Court
declared that the further seaward protrusion of the British Scilly
Isles distorted the boundary delimited by reference to them, resulting
in a "gain" of 4,000 square miles of shelf areas to the United Kingdom and a corresponding "loss" of the same magnitude to France. 183
A special circumstance in the sense of Article 6 of the Shelf Convention was, according to the Court, present and another boundary thus
was justified to redress the inequity created. 184
(d)

The Tunisian-Libyan Case

The equidistance principle played a minor role in the decision
of the ICJ in the Tunisian-Libyan Case primarily for two reasons.
First, the Court, in recalling its 1969 judgment in the North Sea
Cases, which also involved an adjacent-coast situation, reiterated
that the equidistance method was not prescribed by a mandatory
rule of international law; nor did it have any privileged status in
relation to other methods in shelf delimitation. 185 Although that
method had been employed frequently in state practice since 1969,
the Court noted that states also deviated from it whenever equitable
considerations dictated. 186 Second, the fact that both Tunisia and
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Ibid.,
l.C.J.
Ibid.

para. 244.
para. 243.
para. 245.
Reports 1982, p. 79.
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Libya were opposed to the use of the equidistance line, which they
firmly believed would result in inequity in the present case, greatly
impressed the Court. 18 7
As the Court was requested under the parties' special agreement
to clarify the delimitation method in the specific situation of the
present case, it decided to adopt a two-sector-two-method approach,
namely, applying two delimitation methods, respectively, in two sectors of the delimitation area. 188 In the first sector, which is immediately off the parties' territorial sea, the Court considered four
possible lines before finally choosing the 26 o northeast line as the
shelfboundary 189 (Map 17). But, since the line is approximately perpendicular to the coast at Ras Ajdir, it becomes less appropriate as it
extends farther out to the sea. Two factors required its change of
course in the second sector: the abrupt tum of the coast of the Gulf
of Gabes and the ~resence of the Kerkennah Islands and nearby
low-tide elevations 90 (Map 15). As a perpendicular, the 26° line
was unable to take account of these changed circumstances to which
the Court attached great importance. A line based on other methods, which would veer in a more easterly direction than the 26° line,
so as to reflect the geographical changes, therefore was called for.
In this connection the Court thought it proper to weigh the relevance of the equidistance line, which Tunisia once advocated in 1976
but dropped in its present memorial. 191 The Court first noted that it
is the virtue as well as the weakness of the equidistance method to
take full account of almost all the geographical variations of the
coastline. 192 It then recalled its opinion in the North Sea Cases that
the equidistance method would encounter much less difficulty in an
opposite-coast situation than in an adjacent one. Then the Court
concluded:
The major change in direction undergone by the coast of
Tunisia seems to the Court to go some way, though not the
whole way, towards transforming the relationship of Libya
and Tunisia from that of adjacent States to that of opposite
States, and thus to produce a situation in which the position
of an eqwdistance line becomes a factor to be given more
weight in the balancing of equitable considerations than
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

Ibid.
Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Ibid.,

pp. 82-83.
pp. 85.
pp. 86-89.
p. 87.
p. 88.
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would otherwise be the case. 193 (emphasis added)
Since the final boundary delimited by the Court in the second
sector was not an equidistance line, the equidistance principle thus
only played a "reminder" role in pointing to the need for a line that
takes full account of the relevant geographical circumstances in order to reach an equitable delimitation. The perspective in which the
court elaced the equidistance principle, which has given rise to criticism, 1 4 may be summarized below by quoting the Court's own
words:
Treaty practice, as well as the history of Article 83 of the
draft convention on the Law of the Sea, leads to the conclusion that equidistance may be applied !fit leads to an equitable solution; !f not, other methods should be employed.
Nor does the Court consider that it is in the present case
required, as a first step, to examine the effects of a delimitation by application of the equidistance method, and to reject that method in favour of some other only if it considers
the results of an equidistance line to be inequitable. A finding by the Court in favour of a delimitation by an equidistance line could only be based on considerations derivedfrom
an evaluation and balancing up of all relevant circumstances . ... 195 (emphasis added)
Given the limited role the equidistance principle played in the
Tunisian-Libyan Case, the Court did not take the trouble to elaborate under what circumstances, other than the presence of certain
geographical features, the application of the equidistance principle
will lead to an equitable solution. Thus the Tunisian-Libyan Case,
unlike the Anglo-French Arbitration, shed little light on whether the
equidistance principle should apply to the Sino-Japanese shelf delimitation in the East China Sea.
The above analysis of the three cases confirms the conclusion
that the applicability of the equidistance principle is a function or
reflection of the geographical circumstances of a particular case.
Specifically, the application of the equidistance principle seems to
require a broadly equal or comparable geography of the coasts facing
each other in an opposite-coast situation.
193. Ibid.
194. E.g., E.D. Brown, "The Tunisia-Libya Continental Shelf Case: A Missed Opportunity," Marine Policy, Vol. 7 (1983), pp. 154-56.
195. I.C.J. Reports 1982, p. 79.
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(e)

The Equidistance Principle and the Sino-Japanese
Seabed Delimitation

The above survey of international judicial cases suggests that
while the North Sea and Tunisian-Libyan Cases did not specifically
address the geographical circumstances under which the equidistance principle should apply, the Anglo-French Court did exactly
that. The latter's ruling that the approximate equality of the coastlines of two opposite states makes equitable the application of the
equidistance principle finds overwhelming support from state practices to date. The inevitable question therefore is: are the coastlines
of China and Japan in the East China Sea broadly equal in their
relations to the continental shelf?
( 1) The North Region
If the Okinawa Trough did not exist, the equidistance principle
would probably apply among the three states in the North Region
inter se. For broad equality of coasts seems to be present prima facie
between China and Korea, Korea and Japan, and China and Japan
in that area (Map 1). Such broad equality exists initially in the Yellow Sea between the Chinese mainland coast and the west coast of
Korea and in the Korea Strait between the southern Korean coast
and Japan. Such broadly equal relationships continue southerly into
the East China Sea, crossing the artificial boundaries between the
Yellow Sea and the East China Sea, and between the East China Sea
and the Korea Strait. The southerly extensions of the hypothetical
Sino-Korean median line in the Yellow Sea and the existing JapanROK median line in the Korea Strait would divide approximately
equally the continental shelf areas appertaining to each state. The
two median lines would converge at a point with the geographical
coordinates of30°46.2'N latitude and l25°55.5'E longitude, which is
now the westernmost point on the western limit of the Japan-ROK
JDZ (Maps 6 and 1). Presumably, a Sino-Japanese median line
would start at that point and extend in a southerly, then southwesterly, direction for about 90 miles, intersecting the 30°N parallel.
The course of this median line would change if Danjo Gunto and
Tori Shima were not used as basepoints and were not given full effect in the delimitation. Given the broadly comparable macrogeographies of the states' coasts, an equidistance line seems to be a
good start for shelf delimitation in the North Region, subject to the
proportionality test, to be discussed infra.
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(2) The South Region
South of the 30°N parallel, with the Korean Peninsula, the
Chejo Do, and Japan proper (Kyushu) out of the picture, the
macrogeography of the East China Sea changes markedly (Map 1).
In the west there still lie the coasts of the Chinese mainland and
Taiwan; in the east, however, only those of the scattered Ryukyu
Islands exist. Broad equality of coasts no longer presents itselfprima
facie. Moreover, the relationship of mainland (plus large islands)
versus island chain is not unequal per se. The crucial tests, as suggested by the North Sea and Anglo-French cases involve the coastal
configuration and the length of coastline. Does broad equality exist
under each test between China (ROC and PRC) and Japan in the
South Region?
Chapter 1 noted that the two seaward arcs formed by the Chinese mainland coast and the R yukyu Islands chain largely are parallel. The addition of Taiwan's coastline to that of the Chinese
mainland does not alter substantially this parallel relationship.
Since the intervening water gaps between each island in the R yukyu
chain, the total length of which exceeds the total length of the landmass, hardly can be regarded as part of the islands' general configuration, then broad equality seems to be lacking.
As for the question of the length of coastline there is no obvious
answer, however. A preliminary question is: how should the coastline be measured? Following all the sinuosities of the coast? Or its
"general direction" and "coastal front" as suggested by the ICJ in
the North Sea and Tunisian-Ltbyan Cases? 196 How should the length
of islands be measured? Since the whole idea of measuring the
length of coastline is intended for comparison, it matters little as
long as the method is simple and equally applied. 197 Therefore, the
"general direction" as well as the "coastal front" approaches to the
mainland coast seem acceptable. Under the same rationale, an island's coast may be measured by its maximum length instead of following its sinuosities. 198 Under this formula, China (ROC and
PRC) has, in the East China Sea, approximately 748 miles of coastline (365 miles in the South Region) for its mainland and Taiwan,
whereas Japan has 415 miles for Kyushu, Osumi Gunto and the en196. I.C.J. Reports 1969, p. 52; I.C.J. Reports 1982, p. 91.
197. The Tunisian-Libyan judgment is in accord, I.C.J. Reports 1982, pp. 75-76.
198. The "maximum length" idea owes its origin to Donald E. Karl who developed it
in Karl (1977), supra Chapter 4, note 36, p. 633, note 85 and accompanying text.
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tire Ryukyu Islands (205 miles in the South Region). 199 For present
purposes, the PRC's straight baselines are disregarded.
The above exercise indicates that broad equality does not seem
to exist in the South Region between Chinese and Japanese territories in terms of coastal configuration and length. If the landmass of
the R yukyu Islands were as continuous as that of the four main islands of Japan proper, such a relationship probably would exist.
Given the R yukyus' broken-chain configuration with many intervening water gaps (the greatest distance being 120 miles between the
Okinawa and Sakishima Guntos), it is only natural that their general
configuration and length of coastline are not comparable to China's.
In conclusion, the appliability of the equidistance principle to the
South Region seems, absent broad equality of coastal geography,
questionable, if not altogether impermissible.
3. The Equitability Test: Proportionality
The objection against the equidistance principle as applied to
the South Region is directed primarily at its strict application, which
is likely to result in disproportionate distortions of the boundary in
view of the markedly incomparable configuration and length of
coastlines of the two states in that region. This rationale brings into
play the notion of proportionality in continental shelf delimitation.
In fact, where the application of the equidistance principle is regarded as equitable, one element of such equity lies precisely in the
broadly proportionate division it effects. 200 This element is quite visible in the opinions of the North Sea Cases, the Anglo-French Arbitration, and the Tunisian-Libyan Case quoted earlier. If, as
suggested above, the landmass of the R yukyus extended, like that of
Japan proper, in a nearly uninterrupted fashion, the applicability of
the equidistance principle probably would be assured, given the
comparable configuration and coastal length and the resulting proportionate division of the assumed continuous continental shelf. It is
therefore necessary to ascertain the legal status of the proportionality
concept.
199. For details about the calculations, see Table 5.
200. This point was well made by M.D. Blecher in Blecher (1979), supra note 9, pp.
73-77.
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Proportionality and the North Sea Cases, the AngloFrench Arbitration, and the Tunisian-Libyan
Case

The proper role of the proportionality concept is not devoid of
controversy. In the North Sea Cases, the Court specifically rejected
the German contentions, "at least in the particular form they have
taken," that each of the three North Sea states should get a "just and
equitable share of the available continental shelf in proportion to the
length of its coastline or sea-frontage." 201 The Court first distinguished delimitation from apportionment:
Delimitation is a process which involves establishing the
boundaries of an area already, in principle, appertaining to
the coastal state and not the determination de novo of such
an area. Delimitation in an equitable manner is one thing,
but not the same thing as awarding a just and equitable
share of a previously undelimited area, even though in a
number of cases the results may be comparable or even identical.202 (emphasis added)
It then dismissed the whole concept of "just and equitable share:"
More important is the fact that the doctrine of the just and
equitable share appears to be wholly at variance with . . .
the most fundamental of all the rules of law relating to the
continental shelf . . . namely that the rights of the coastal
State in respect of the area of continental shelf that constitutes the sea exist ipso facto and ab initio, by virtue of its
sovereignty over the land . . . In short, there is here an
inherent right.
The delimitation itself must indeed be equitably effected, but it cannot have as its object the awarding of an
equitable share, or indeed of a share, as such, at all,-for
the fundamental concept involved does not admit of there
being anything undivided to share out. 203
Despite the strong language of these quotations, three inferences
can be drawn. First, the Court did not reject the concept of proportionality as a factor in shelf delimitation, but it only discounted an
extreme application of that concept. Second, the Court's objections
are more theoretical than practical since the Court itself admitted
201. I.C.J. Reports 1969, p. 21.
202. Ibid., pp. 21-22.
203. Ibid., p. 22.
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that "in a number of cases the result may be comparable or even
identical." Third, and most importantly, the Court's reference in its
final judgment to the concept of proportionality demands attention.
A final factor to be taken account is the element of a reasonable degree of proportionality which a delimitation effected according to equitable principles ought to bring
about between the extent of the continental shelf appertaining to the States concerned and the lengths of their respective coastlines,-these being measured according to their
general direction in order to establish the necessary balance
between States with straight and those with markedly concave or convex coasts, or to reduce very irregular coastlines
to their truer proportions. The choice and application of the
appropriate technical methods would be a matter for the
parties. One method discussed in the course of the proceedings, under the name of the principle of the coastal
front, consists in drawing a straight baseline between the
extreme points at either end of the coast concerned, or in
some cases a series of such lines. Where the parties wish to
employ in particular the equidistance principle method of
delimitation, the establishment of one or more baselines of
this kind can play a useful part in eliminating or diminishing the distortions that might result from the use of that
method. 204 (emphasis added)
Now the Court itself seemed to advocate the idea of proportionality, albeit in a less offensive fashion. This position in effect substantially modified its earlier rejection of the German contentions.
(One may argue alternatively that the Court did not reject this part
of the German contentions in the first place.) The message, somewhat confusing, seems to be that while the apportionment of the continental shelf into "just and equitable shares" is repugnant as a goal,
it would be acceptable if it is brought about acctdentally by delimitation under equitable principles. This distinction, even if discernible
in theory, makes little sense in practice. Even the theoretical distinction cannot escape criticism. 205
In the Anglo-French Arbitration, the Court's view is in accord
with the ICJ's distinction between delimitation and apportionment.206 But it specifically limited the effects of the latter's formula204. I.C.J. Reports 1969, p. 52.
205. Grise! (1970), supra note 157.
206. Anglo-French Award, para. 78.
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tion on the proportionality between the "coastal fro~t" and the
continental shelf entitlement to the particular geographical facts of
the North Sea Cases? 01 It declared:
In the present case, the role of proportionality in the delimitation of the continental shelf is, in the view of this Court,
a broader one, not linked to any specific geographical feature. It is a factor to be taken into account in appreciating
the effects of geographical features on the equitable or inequitable character of a delimitation, and in particular of a
delimitation by application of the equidistance method. 208
The role of proportionality thus is redefined as a "criterion or
factor," and not a "general principle" providing an independent
source of rights to areas of continental shelf/09 and it is to be invoked only to check the presence of distortion. 210 Thus, both Courts
define the role of proportionality as a factor; yet the ICJ would use it
more positively while the Anglo-French Court would employ it only
negatively.
In the Tunisian-Libyan Case, both parties stressed that the element of proportionality must be taken into account. 211 Finding itself
in full agreement with the parties, the ICJ characterized that element
as "a function [or aspect] of equity" and reiterated the relationship
between it and the lengths of the coasts of states concemed.2 12 In
demonstrating the practical methods of delimitation in the present
case, the Court, after having designated as shelf boundary the 26°
line in the first sector to be connected by the 52° line in the second
sector, used the element of proportionality as a test to evaluate the
equitability of the shelf areas appertaining to each of the parties as a
result of the delimitation by this boundary. 213 The Court first determined the area to be compared: the parallel of latitude passing
through Ras Kaboudia and the meridian of longitude passing
through Ras Tajoura. 214 The shelf boundary as delimited by the
Court divided the seabed of the above area into two parts with an
areal ratio of 60:40 between Tunisia and Libya. 215 The Court re207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.

Ibid.,
Ibid.
Ibid.,
Ibid.
I.C.J.
Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Ibid.
Ibid.

para. 99.
para. 101.
Reports 1982, p. 43 and p. 75.
p. 76.
p. 91.
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garded the ratio as comparable to the ratio of 69:31 in coastal lengths
measured in the general direction of the two states' coasts and the
ratio of 66:34 in coastal front measured by straight lines between the
two states. 216 In conclusion,the Court stated that, "This result, taking into account all the relevant circumstances, seems to the Court to
meet the requirements of the test of proportionality as an aspect of
equity. " 217
Thus, the Tunisian-Libyan Case clearly confirms earlier decisions, particularly that of the Anglo-French Arbitration, that the element of proportionality is employed to test the equitability of a given
boundary rather than to be used as an independent principle of continental shelf delimitation.
In sum, the notion of proportionality has been used in such a
way that logically presupposes a general proportionality of the continental shelf entitlements between the parties in the delimitation area
as the basis on which any distortion-a potential source of inequity-can be assessed accordingly. In the North Sea Cases, and the
Tunisian-Libyan Case, the respective lengths of the coast of the three
states serve as this basis of assessment, whereas in the Anglo-French
Arbitration it was the broadly equal or comparable coastal geographies (including length and configuration) of the coasts of France
and the United Kingdom.
(b)

Proportionality and the Length of Coastline

Despite the slightly different forms of recognition accorded it,
the proportionality concept in general seems to have been well recognized by international tribunals as well as by commentators. 218
The linkage between the coastal length and the continental shelf
entitlement also finds su~port in the fundamental concept that the
"land dominates the sea" 19 declared by the ICJ. The coast of a state
is where the land meets the sea under which the continental shelf lies
and prolongs. Its length seems to be the single most objective criterion in measuring the continental shelf entitlement of a state. The
216. Ibid.
217. Ibid.
218. Myres S. McDougal and William T. Burke, Public Order of the Oceans: A Con·
temporary International Law of the Sea, New Heaven and London: Yale University
Press, 1962, p. 725; Shigeru Oda, "Proposals for Revising the Convention on the Conti·
nental Shelf," Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, Vol. 7 (1979), pp. I, 27; Karl
(1977), supra Chapter 4, note 36, pp. 665-72; Blecher (1979), supra note 200; Collins &
Rogoff (1982), supra Introduction, note 23, p. 14.
219. I.C.J. Reports 1969, p. 50.
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same has been true for the delimitation of other regimes of the seas
for centuries. It would be unthinkable if a coastal state's maritime
jurisdiction were determined by anything other than its coast. In its
oft-cited quotation, which theAnglo-French Court endorsed, the ICJ
opined:
Equity does not necessarily imply equality. There can
never be any question of completely refashioning nature,
and equity does not require that a State without access to
the sea should be allotted an area of continental shelf, any
more than there could be a question ofrendering the situation
of a Stale with an extensive coastline similar to that of a
State with a restricted coastline.220 (emphasis added).
There are, however, objections to this "coastal length" approach
to continental shelf delimitation. Opponents point out that it is vulnerable to manipulation by states in order to reach desired results. 221
Like any formula based on arithmetic calculations, potential manipulation of the factual input does exist; but this problem is not insurmountable. For instance, if the coastal length of a mainland is
measured in the general direction of the coastline and islands by
their maximum lengths, as was done earlier, rather than by following
their sinuosities, the possibility of manipulation can be reduced substantially. The potential disagreement on the definition and equity
of the "general direction" and the "maximum length" approaches is
also possible, but it is certainly more manageable than requiring the
parties to agree on the length of their coasts following all their sinuosities. Further, the coastal-length method does not requier a mathematically precise ratio of the length of coastline to the continental
shelf entitlements, but rather requires a "reasonable proportionality," as the ICJ suggested. The percentage figures arrived at from
the calculations only would serve as an indicator of the range of proportions for the parties. This clearly is demonstrated by the ICJ's
computations in the Tunisian-Libyan Case discussed above. Finally,
proportionality would and should operate always together with other
delimitation principles since that notionper se semantically suggests
no limits or boundaries. The chances of abuse thus further diminish.
(c)

Proportionality and the Sino-Japanese Delimitation
in the South Region

If the proportionality test as emodied by the coastal length ap220. Ibid., p. 49.
221. Allen & Mitchell, supra Chapter 2, note 28, p. 812.
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proach were applied to the South Region of the East China Sea, the
resulting proportions of Chinese and Japanese continental shelves
would look like those shown in Table 5.2 22 The measurement of the
length of the Chinese mainland coast in its general direction, ignoring the presence of minor protrusions and coastal islets, encounters
little problem. But the shape of Taiwan poses a challenge to the
equity of the "maximum length" approach to the coastal length of
islands. Technically, Taiwan borders the East China Sea only at its
northern and northeastern coasts with the rest of its coasts surrounded by the Taiwan Strait (west), the South China Sea (south),
and the Philippine Sea (east) (Map 1). The "maximum length" approach, if strictly applied, would give Taiwan a coastal length of approximately 202 miles, a figure grossly incompatible with its actual
length (81 miles) bordering the East China Sea, measured in the general direction of that part of its coast. Therefore, the "general direction" approach, which seems to fit better islands like Taiwan with
sizes comparable to those of the mainland in some cases, is applied
to Taiwan's northern and northeastern coasts as well as to the coast
of K yushu facing the East China Sea. On the other hand, the "maximum length" approach applies perfectly to the R yukyus where the
majority of the main islands are relatively small as compared to Taiwan, but long in shape. Their lengthy shape, unlike that of Taiwan,
does not create problems, since they are mostly parallel to the general configuration of the East China Sea (Map 1).
The percentage figures in Table 5, 64 (or 65) percent for China
and 36 (or 35) percent for Japan, are not intended to be mechanically applied in a way that divides up the whole South Region in
precise shares. Rather, it is to be used to evaluate the inequities that
might result from the strict application of a particular delimitation
principle, or to serve as a guideline to the range of proportions an
equitable delimitation ought to bring about.
4.

Conclusion

The geographical factor has been, and will continue to be, one
of the most important circumstances affecting the delimitation of
continental shelf between neighboring states. A macroanalysis of the
geography of the East China Sea, under the assumption that the Oki222. Calculations of the coastal lengths in Table 5 are based on U.S. Army Map Service, The World, Series 1106, Sheet 8, Topographic Map: Southeastern Asia (scale
1:5,000,000). This map may be obtained from the Defense Mapping Agency in Washington, D.C.
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nawa Trough is non-existent, leads to the imaginary division of the
area into two regions separated by the 30°N parallel. The division is
justified by the distinctive macrogeographies of the two regions. In
the North Region, all three states have coastal fronts with relatively
heavy concentration of their territories. The broad equality of opposite coasts that exists in the Yellow Sea between China and Korea
and in the Korea Strait between Korea and Japan continues southerly into the North Region. Consequently, the application of the
equidistance principle, subject to the proportionality test, to the
North Region seems to be broadly equitable and in general accord
with international judicial decisions and state practice. On the other
hand, the macrogeography of the South Region, where the Korea
Peninsula and Japan proper largely cease to have any influence in
boundary delimitation, calls for a markedly different treatment. The
sharply incomparable coastal lengths of the Chinese mainland and
Taiwan and the scattered Ryukyu Islands render a strict median-line
solution prima facie inequitable. Although it may still be used as a
reference line, it must again be subject to the proportionality test
based on the length of the coast. The resulting ratio (China: 64 percent; Japan: 36 percent) provides a general range of proportions
which an equitable delimitation ought to bring about. Actual delimitation of the boundary, however, has to await the review below of
the regional geology and geomorphology in the East China Sea.
E.

Geology and Geomorphology as Relevant Circumstances

In the preceding section, the geological and geomorphological
aspects deliberately were disregarded in order to concentrate on the
geographical circumstances of the East China Sea. Here we shall
largely ignore the geographical aspects and exclusively examine the
legal significance of the regional geology and geomorphology. In
relation to the law on continental shelf, the geology and geomorphology of the seabed have two aspects: one concerns the seaward
delimitation of the continental shelf; the other relates to inter-state
delimitation. We shall deal with each aspect in the context of the
East China Sea before assessing their implications for the Sino-Japanese seabed controversy.
1.

Geology, Geomorphology, and the Natural Prolongation
Principle

The definition (or seaward delimitation) of the continental shelf
as adopted in Article 1 of the 1958 Shelf Convention contains two
tests: depth (200 meters) and exploitability (wherever the superja-
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cent water admits of exploitation). Designed to accommodate the
interests of both the narrow-margin and broad-margin states, this
definition fails to reflect truly the geological reality of the seabed,
however. The juxtaposition of two criteria plus the vague words
"adjacent to the coasts" have given rise to much confusion and controversy ever since 1958.223 As if to becloud the already puzzling
picture further, the ICJ in 1969 injected in the North Sea Cases a
new element-natural prolongation of land territories-into the definition of the legal continental shelf. The Court formulated this
"most fundamental" doctrine of the continental shelf in these words
(in addition to those quoted on p. 161 supra):
What confers the ipso jure title which international law attributes to the coastal State in respect of its continental
shelf, is the fact that the submarine areas concerned may be
deemed to be actually part of the territory over which the
coastal State already has dominion,-in the sense that, although covered with water, they are a prolongation or continuation of that territory, an extension of it under the
sea.224
And the geological or geomorphological underpinnings of that doctrine are also evident as the Court further noted:
The continental shelf is, by definition, an area physically
extending the territory of most coastal States into a species
ofplatform ... The appurtenance of the shelf to the countries in front of whose coastlines it lies, is therefore a fact,
and it can be useful to consider the geology of that shelf in
order to find out whether the direction taken by certain
configurational features should influence delimitation because, in certain localities, they point-up the whole notion
of appurtenance of the continental shelf to the State whose
territory it does in fact prolong. 225
223. The question of the continental shelfs outer limit has been treated extensively by
commentators. See, e.g., Louis Henkin, "International Law and the Interest: The Law
of the Seabed," American Journal of International Law, Vol. 63 (1969), p. 504; Luke W.
Finlay, "The Outer Limit of the Continental Shelf: A Rejoinder to Professor Louis Henkin," American Journal of International Law, Vol. 64 (1970), p. 42; Louis Henkin, "A
Reply to Mr. Finlay," American Journal of International Law, Vol. 64 (1970), p. 62;
L.F.E. Goldie, "A Lexicographical Controversy-the Word 'Adjacent' in Article I of the
Continental Shelf Convention," American Journal ofInternational Law, Vol. 66 (1972), p.
829, and the references cited there.
224. I.C.J. Reports 1969, p. 31.
225. Ibid., p. 51.
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It is worth noting that, thirteen years later, that "most fundamental" doctrine of the continental shelf was downplayed by the ICJ
in the 1982 Tunisian-Libyan Case, primarily because ofthe geophysical circumstances involved. In that case both Tunisia and Libya
were in agreement as to the degree of importance they attributed to
this concept. 226 They also regarded it as a major criterion for shelf
delimitation, but they differed substantially in the definition and application of that principle to the present case. 227 At one point, Libya
even went so far as to suggest that the natural prolongation was determinable as a matter of scientific fact by the application of geological criteria; equitable principles should therefore play no role in
identifying the appurtenant continental shelf based upon the juridical concept of natural prolongation. 228
Alarmed by the parties' excessive reliance on the literal interpretation of the 1969 North Sea Cases and the confusion and misunderstanding that case may have created as a result of
overemphasizing the natural prolongation principle, the Court decided to place that principle in proper perspective by trimming its
sweeping effect:
The satisfaction of equitable principle is, in the delimitation process, of cardinal importance,. . ., and identification
of natural prolongation may, where the geographical circumstances are appropriate, have an important role to play, in
defining an equitable delimitation, in view of its significance as the justification of continental shelf rights in some
cases; but the two considerations-the satisfying of equitable principle and the identification of the natural prolongation-are not to be placed on a plane of equality. 229
(emphasis added).
As to the application of the natural prolongation principle to the
present case, the Court stated that
the area relevant for the delimitation constitutes a single
continental shelf as the natural prolongation of the land
territory of both Parites, so that in the present case, no criterion for delimitation of shelf areas can be derived from
the principle of natural prolongation as such; 230
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.

I.C.J.
Ibid.
Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Ibid.,

Reports 1982, p. 43.
p. 44.
p. 47.
p. 92.
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Thus, by attributing the irrelevance of the natural prolongation
principle to the particular geophysical facts of the present case, the
Court seemed to imply that if the relevant delimitation area does not
constitute a single shelf, then certain criteria for delimitation may be
derived from the principle of natural prolongation. The Court went
further to point out that the geomorphological features present in the
delimitation area were not sufficiently distinct to disrupt the geological continuity of the shelf, although it still may be considered as one
of the relevant circumstances in delimiting an equitable boundary. 231
The Tripolitanian Furrow, a minor submarine valley but the most
distinct geomorphological feature in the area, on the presence of
which Tunisia relied as the "natural submarine frontier" of Libya's
natural prolongation, was thus taken by the Court into account as a
geomorphologically relevant circumstance but was given no weight
in influencing the ultimate boundary.2 32
While the ICJ and commentators233 were struggling with the exact meaning of the "natural prolongation" principle as it relates to
the geology and geomorphology of the seabed, its impact was already deeply felt in a hitherto little noticed area-the East China
Sea. The advent of that principle could not have been more timely
for the ROK and ROC which, amid the euphoria brought about by
the Emery Report, were eager to stake out their claims as far as possible into the East China Sea. The deep Okinawa Trough, which is
situated closer to Japan than to the ROK or the ROC territories, was
regarded by the latter two states as marking the outer limits of the
continental shelf of the East China Sea under the natural prolongation principle. Both of them argued that the Japanese shelf as generated by K yushu and the R yukyus would prolong for a short distance
and terminate in the vicinity of the Trough, whereas both Chinese
and Korean shelves also would reach the Trough and the logical
boundary would be a mid-channel line (Map 1). As discussed in
Chapter 2 supra, the eastern limits of the ROC's claims (Map 9) and
the ROK's concession area (Map 5), which largely follow the midchannel line, clearly demonstrate the two states' reliance on the natural prolongation principle.
The way that principle was invoked seems to imply two possible
231. Ibid., p. 58.
232. Ibid., pp. 55-58.
233. Robert Y. Jennings, "The Limits of Continental Shelf Jurisdiction: Some Possible Implications of the North Sea Case Judgment," International & Comparative Law
Quarterly, Vol. 18 (1969), p. 819; Brown (1971), supra Chapter 4, note 129, pp. 32-35;
Wolfgang Friedman, The Future of the Oceans, New York: G. Braziller, 1971, pp. 41-43.
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interpretations of it to the geological and geomorphological background of the East China Sea. The first is that the .natural prolo~g~
tion of a coastal state's territory is co-terminous wtth the outer hm1t
of the continental margin (the shelf, the slope, and the rise), or at
least with the base of the continental slope; that the Okinawa Trough
is just such an outer limit of East Asian continental margin, or base
of slope, where the seabed abruptly drops off to a depth exceeding
2,000 meters; and that the Okinawa Trough constitutes the boundary
between the East Asian continent and the Pacific Ocean, with the
shelf to its west being "continental" in crustal structure and the Ryukyu Islands to its east being "oceanic" in origin-volcanic outcroppings rising from the ocean floor. Under this interpretation, the
natural prolongations of both the Chinese and Japanese territories in
the East China Sea meet and end in the Okinawa Trough.
A second interpretation places the continent-ocean boundary
(or the base of the slope) not in the Okinawa Trough but in the Ryukyu Trench in the Pacific Ocean east of the R yukyu Islands (Map 1).
The shelf, the Trough, and the island arc in the East China Sea landward of the R yukyu Trench are considered but constituent parts of a
highly irregular continental margin. The whole seabed of the continental shelf, the Trough, and the insular shelf therefore is subject to
national jurisdiction and to boundary delimitation. However, as this
theory affirms, the Okinawa Trough is such a distinct geomorphological feature that it marks the end of the natural prolongation of the
territories of both China (and Korea) and Japan.
The first interpretation emphasizes the geological implication of
the natural prolongation principle and bases its whole theory on the
assumption that the Okinawa Trough marks the natural boundary of
the East Asian continental crust and the Pacific oceanic crust. The
second interpretation stresses more the geomorphological import of
the natural prolongation principle and disregards the underlying
crustal structure of the East China Sea and beyond.
The ICJ did not define specifically, in the North Sea Cases or
the Tunisian-Libyan Case, how far or to what extent a coastal State's
territory should or could prolong "naturally." One reason may be
that the whole disputed areas were sitting on the geological shelf of
the North Sea and the Pelagian Sea respectively and hence there was
no need for the Court to elaborate on this question. But the Court's
dicta seems to admit of both interpretations suggested above. 234 It
234. When discussing the question of adjacency, the Court did refer to "localities
'where, physically, the continental shelf begins to merge with the ocean depths" I.C.J.
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seems that the application of the natural prolongation principle, with
its geological and geomorphological underpinnings, really depends
on how earth scientists characterize and classify certain submarine
relief features such as the Okinawa Trough.
Some geologists who have studied the area do not treat the Okinawa Trough as part of the Asian continental shelf.2 35 Nor do they
specify precisely the crustal structure underlying the Trough, though
they tend to believe that it is underlain by oceanic crust. 236 Others 237
regard the Trough, on the basis of its remarkably high heat flow, as
"an embryo of a marginal sea basin," 238 thus identifying it with more
than 40 marginal ocean basins of the world. 239 The crustal structures
of these marginal basins are, however, far from uniform. Some are
definitely continental, e.g., the North Sea and the Yellow Sea, or
definitely oceanic, e.g., the Gulf of Mexico. Others belong to neither
type, but have an intermediate character, e.g., the Sea of Japan. 240
Still other geologists think of the Trough simply as a continental borReports 1969, p. 30. Despite the obvious error in that the geological continental shelf
does not "merge with the ocean depths" immediately (could it be that what the Court
meant was the legal continental shelf?), the Court was certainly aware of the issue in
general and might have intended to include the whole slope as part of the natural prolongation of the coastal state. On the other hand, the Court did not make that point clear
enough. And its reference to the Norwegian Trough, ibid., p. 32, strongly implied that
natural prolongation of the coastal state would terminate at the edge of the geological
shelf in its narrowest sense. Commentators are widely divided on this question. See
supra note 233.
235. See K.O. Emery et a!., supra Chapter I, note 7, pp. 13-38; John M. Wageman,
W.C. Hilde & K.O. Emery, ibid., pp. 1611, 1612-40.
236. Ibid. In a letter to this author dated April 30, 1980, Emery wrote [hereinafter
cited as the Emery Letter]:
So far as I know the structure of the crust beneath the Okinawa Trough is
unproven, but I am reasonably sure that it will turn out to be oceanic, not continental. It is beyond the continental slope (generally the oceanward limit of the
continental crust) and it is limited by volcanic islands of oceanic origin. Seismic refraction is needed to prove the origin. (emphasis added)
237. A. Sugimura and S. Uyeda, Island Arcs: Japan and Its Environs, Development in
Geotectonics 3, Amsterdam-London-New York: Elsevier Scientific Publishing Company, 1973, p. 64. S. Uyeda "Northwest Pacific Trench Margins," in C. Burk and C.L.
Drake ed., The Geology of Continental Margins, New York: Springer-Verlag, 1974, pp.
477, 483.
238. A. Sugimura and S. Uyeda, supra note 237, pp. 64-65; Uyeda, supra note 237, p.
477.
239. Hedberg (1970), supra Chapter I, note 10, pp. 27-28.
240. H.W. Menard, "Transitional Types of Crust under Small Ocean Basins," Geophysical Research, Vol. 72 (1967), pp. 3061, 3063-64, 3071 [hereinafter cited as Menard
(1967)].
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derland, 241 a highly irregular relief feature in th~ continental ~argin
with de~ths "well in excess of those typtcal of contmental
shelves." 42 A textbook example exists off the southern California
coast.
All the above theories suffer from the same defect-they do not
respond to the legally relevant question with certainty: what type of
crust, continental or oceanic, does the Okinawa Trough overlie? But
if the Pacific oceanic crust slides, as the plate-spreading theory postulates, under the Asian continental crust via the chain of trenches
(including the Ryukyu Trench), then the Okinawa Trough could
well overlie a crust of an intermediate character243 belonging to
neither the continental or oceanic origin.
The above discussion plainly shows that even the earth scientists
do not speak with a certain voice on the proper classification of the
Okinawa Trough. Still less can lawyers agree upon its legal status in
seaward delimitation, for they have to base their opinion, at least in
part, on geological and geomorphological findings under the natural
prolongation principle. Indeed, nature does not lend itself to classifications and to definition of strict borderlines as desired by man.
However inconclusive the geological answer to the question may be,
international efforts to rewrite the law on continental shelf virtually
may have made that question moot. The LOS Convention provides
in Article 76, Paragraphs 1 and 10:
1. The continental shelf of a coastal State comprises the
seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas that extend
241. Hollis D. Hedberg, "Political Boundaries and Economic Resources of the
Oceans," in Marine Technology and Law: Developmenl of Hydrocarbon Resources and
Offshore Structures, Proceedings of the 2nd International Ocean Symposium, Ocean Association of Japan, Tokyo, 1977, p. 39 (1978). Emery disagreed. He said:
The Okinawa Trough is not part of the continent like the continental borderland off California. The latter is landward of the continental slope and is
known to be underlain by continental crust.
Emery Letter, supra note 236.
242. Scientific Considerations Relating to the Continental Shelf, Memorandum by the
Secretariat of the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization
(UNESCO), UN Doc. A/CONF.l3/2 and Add. I (20 September 1957), UNCLOS I,
Official Records, Vol. I (Preparatory Documents) (1958), pp. 38, 39 [hereinafter cited as
the UNESCO Memo (1957)). This memorandum is noted further in infra text accompanying note 246.
243. Northcutt Ely and Robert F. Pietrowski, "Boundary of Seabed Jurisdiction off
the Pacific Coast of Asia," Natural Resources Lawyer, Vol. 8 (1975), pp. 622-23; Note,
"Delimitation of Continental Shelf Jurisdiction Between States: The Effect of Physical
Irregularities in the Natural Continental Shelf," Virginia Journal of International Law,
Vol. 17 (1976), pp. 96-102 [hereinafter cited as Virginia Note (1976)).
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beyond its territorial sea through the natural prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the
continental margin, or to a distance of 200 nautical
milesfrom the baselines from which the breadth of the
territorial sea is measured where the outer edge of the
continental margin does not extend to that distance.
10. The provisions of this article are without prejudice to
the question ofdelimitation of the continental shelf between States with opposite or adjacent coasts. 244 (emphasis added)
The rest of that article deals at length with the technical delimitation
of the outer limits of the continental margin. For our purpose,
Paragraphs 1 and 10 are sufficient. The second sentence of Paragraph 1 grants to a coastal state 200 miles of shelf jurisdiction irrespective of the submarine geology or geomorphology in the area. In
other words, no matter where the real continental margin ends, the
Ryukyu Islands would be entitled, at least theoretically, to 200 miles
of continental shelf on each and every side of their coasts. As noted
earlier, the width of the semi-enclosed East China Sea nowhere exceeds 400 miles; so that the Ryukyus could not possibly have a maritime zone of more than 200 miles (probably much less), given the
need for delimitation under Paragraph 10. The issue thus changes
from one of seaward delmitation under Article 76 ( 1) to one of interstate delimitation under Article 83. The pertinent question then becomes: how much weight should the Okinawa Trough, as a geologically or geomorphologically relevant circumstance, have in the SinoJapanese seabed delimitation?
The Legal Status of Troughs in Continental She!f
J)elimitation between Opposite States
In ascertaining the legal status of troughs in shelf delimitation,
we again shall look for guidance from various sources of international law, including the Shelf Convention, state practices, the North
Sea Cases, theAnglo-French Arbitration, the Tunisian-Libyan Case,
and the LOS Convention.
2.

(a)

The Shelf Convention

The main travaux preparatoires of the Shelf Convention,
namely, the deliberations at the United Nations International Law
Commission, contain only casual references to submarine relief fea244. A/CONF.62/122, 7 October 1982, pp. 33-34.
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tures similar to troughs. In the Comments on its 1953 Draft Artic~e
on the Continental Shelf, the ILC stated, with respect to the definition of continental shelf:
Thus, although the depth of two hundred meters as a limit
of the continental shelf must be regarded as the general
rule, it is a rule which is subject to equitable modifications
in special cases in which submerged areas, of a depth less
than two hundred meters, situated in a considerable proximity to the coast are separated by a narrow channel deeper
than two hundred meters from the part of the continental
shelf adjacent to the coast. Such shallow areas must, in
these cases, be considered as continuous to that part of the
shelf. It would be for the State relying on this exception to
the general rule to establish its claim to an equitable modification of the rule. In case of dispute, it must be a matter
for arbitral determination whether a shallow submarine
area falls within the rule as here formulated. 245 (emphasis
added)
Except for the fact that the word "must" was replaced by "could,"
virtually the same language appeared in the ILC's 1956 Commentary246 to Draft Article 67, which later became Article I of the Shelf
Convention. The ILC did not elaborate on the exact contents of
such a formulation. Nor was this question seriously discussed in the
Conference or addressed by the Shelf Convention.
It is of interest to note that the ILC's comments were attached to
the legal definition of the continental shelf rather than to the rules of
delimitation between states. The fact that both the 1953 and 1956
Comments suggested "arbitral determination" in case of dispute
clearly indicates the ILC's awareness of this problem in both situations. In any case, given its sketchy formulation, the comment does
not seem to be amenable to actual application, apart from the fact
that it was but a weakly-worded comment to a draft article.
It also may be noted that the problem of geomorphological irregularities in the continental shelf was discussed in detail in a technical memorandum prepared by a group of geologists convened by
the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESC0)247 shortly before the Geneva Conference in 1958.
245. YBILC (1953), Vol. 2, supra Chapter 4, note 12, p. 214.
246. YBILC (1956), Vol. 2, supra Chapter 4, note 14, p. 297.
247. Supra note 242, p. 39.
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Three types of marked geological depressions, other than the shallow
and small submarine valleys, were considered:
(a) [T]he depressions that communicate with the deep sea
beyond the ouer edge of the shelf only over a sill at the
level, or nearly at the level of the shelf floor; (b) wide flatfloor troughs lacking a sill in the outer part; and (c) the
narrow canyon-like valley which slope out to the deep-sea
floor.2 48
The Norwegian Trough, cited as an example of the first type, was
regarded as constituting a part of the geological shelf adjacent to it.
The canyons off California, falling under the third type, were considered more controversial. But the geologists, interestingly enough, argued that "from the point of view of convenience for international
legislation," it should be treated as part of the surrounding shelf. No
mention was made of the Okinawa Trough which, on its merits, fits
into none of the three types.
(b)

State Practice

There have been very few cases in which distinct geomorphological features are present and capable of being used directly as a
shelf boundary or influencing the potential boundary. The vast majority of shelf boundaries delimited to date are located in enclosed or
semi-enclosed seas with relatively shallow waters and a single, continuous geological shelf, such as the Persian Gulf, the Baltic Sea, and
the North Sea. Minor discontinuities sometimes exist (such as the
Hurd Deep to be discussed in connection with the Anglo-French Arbitration below), but they by no means disrupt the essential unity of
the shelf of the respective seas as a whole. For those areas with more
distinct features, such as submarine areas well in excess of 200 meters, few have the necessary channel-like shape and parallel location
even to be considered for a boundary. For instance, there are such
large deeps exceeding 1,000 meters in the Adriatic Sea, yet they are
so evenly distributed in relation to the Italian and Yugoslav coasts
that their effects on the boundary, if any, are equalized. 249 The same
can be said of almost all the shelf boundaries involving Italy in the
Mediterranean Sea250 and India in the Bay of Bengal, Gulf of Man248. Ibid., pp. 43-44.
249. See supra Chapter 4, note 38.
250. Italy-Yugoslavia shelf boundary, ibid.; Italy-Tunisia shelf boundary, supra Chapter 4, note 40; Italy-Spain shelf boundary, supra note 173, Italy-Greece shelf boundary,
Senato della Repubblica (vii Legislatura), No. 1443. [1977).
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nar, and Arabian Sea251 as well as the Canadian-Danish shelf
252
boundary in the Davis Strait between Canada and Greenland.
One possible exception may be the Northeast Channel in the
Gulf of Maine that divides the Georges Bank on the U.S. side and
the Browns Bank on the Canadian side. The delimitation of maritime boundary between the U.S. and Canada is now pending before
a special chamber of the ICJ. 253 The boundary claimed by the U.S.
roughly follows the mid-channel line of the Northeast Channel. 254
The Northeast Channel extends 70 km. (38 miles) long and 40
km. (22 miles) wide, with an average water depth of less than 300
meters, as compared to 90 meters of average depth in waters over the
Georges Bank and the Browns Bank. 255 Geomorphologically, it
connects the Georges Basin in the Gulf and the outer edge of the
continental margin bordering the Atlantic ocean fl.oor. 256 Geologically, the Channel was formed by fluvial erosion effected by a welldeveloped pre-Tertiary drainage system in the Gulf of Maine at the
site of the Georges Basin and the Channel itself. 257
Considered as a whole, the Northeast Channel, distinct as it is
compared to nearby submarine relief features, is nevertheless a minor depression of the continental shelf not on the same plane as the
Norwegian, Timor and Okinawa Troughs to be discussed infra. (See
Table 6.) Moreover, there is as yet no boundary based on the presence of the Channel; it is only a claim by the United States. In his
search for distinct belief features in state practice on shelf delimita251. E.g., India-Indonesia shelf boundary, supra Chapter 4, note 42; India-Sri Lanka
historical water boundary, supra Chapter 4, note 44. Another maritime boundary was
delimited in 1976. Agreement on the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Mannar and the
Bay of Bengal and Related Matters, India-Sri Lanka, March 23, 1976. "Maritime
Boundaries: India-Sri Lanka,'' Limits in the Seas, No. 77, February 16, 1978. In the
same year India also delimited its maritime boundary with Maldives. Agreement on
Maritime Boundary in the Arabia Sea and Related Matters, India-Maldives, 28 December 1976. See "Maritime Boundary: India-Maldives and Maldives' Claimed Economic
Zone," Limits in the Seas, No. 78, July 24, 1978.
252. "Continental Shelf Boundary: Canada-Greenland", Limits in the Seas, No. 72,
August 4, 1976.
253. Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (U.S. v. Canada), Order of 20 January 1982 Constituting the Chamber, I.C.J. Reports 1982, p. 3.
254. United States Department of State, Maritime Boundaries between the United
Stales and Canada, Public Notice 506, reprinted in Federal Register, VoL 41 (1976), pp.
48,619.
255. See J. Allan Ballard and F.H. Sorensen, "Preglacial Structure of Georges Basin
and Northeast Channel, Gulf of Maine", AAPG Bulletin, VoL 52 (1968), p. 494.
256. Ibid., p. 495 (figure).
257. Ibid., pp. 498-99.
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tion eligible for the present purpose, this author has been able to find
only three boundaries and one joint development zone that lie near
such eligible features: the Norway-United Kingdom258 and Denmark-Norway259 boundaries near the Norwegian Trough, the Australia-Indonesia boundary260 near the Timor Trough, and the JapanROK Joint Development Zone near the Okinawa Trough. 261
The Norway-United Kingdom Shelf Boundary
The North Sea262 (Map 13) has an area of 222,000 sq. miles.
Other than the Norwegian Trough and a few small and isolated
deeps, the water depths are less than 200 meters. The Norwegian
Trough is a well-defined submarine depression lying 2 to 10 miles off
the south and west coasts of Norway. It has a depth ranging from
200 to 670 meters, a width from 20 to 81 miles, and a length of
around 430 miles. Norway and the United Kingdom delimited their
shelf boundary in 1965 by a true median line measured from their
respective coasts.
The boundary is a pioneer of its kind in several aspects. 263 The
parties' disregard of the presence of the Norwegian Trough in drawing the median line is but one of them. With respect to the reasons
for ignoring the Trough, note the following:
(a) Conclusive geological evidence264 has long established that
the Trough, like numerous fjords along the Norwegian coasts, is but
a result of deeper planning activities by glaciation during the Glacial
Epoch when the sea level was much lower than it is today. So its
geological continuity with the rest of the North Sea shelf has never
(1)

258. Supra Chapter 4, note 34.
259. Ibid., note 37.
260. Supra note 127.
261. "Continental Shelf Boundary and Joint Development Zone: Japan-Republic of
Korea," Limits in the Seas, No. 75, September 2, 1977.
262. The geography and geomorphology of the North Sea is based on the Encyclopedia of Oceanography, supra Chapter I, note 5, p. 543 (North Sea).
263. The other important contribution of this agreement was its provision on unitization of common mineral deposits (Article 4). For details, see Lagoni ( 1979), supra Chapter 3, note 3, pp. 229-33.
264. 0. Holtedahl, The Submarine Re/iif off the Norwegian Coast, (Oslo, 1940); Hans
Holtedahl, On the Norwegian Continental Terrace, Primarily Outside More-Romsda/, Bergen: John Griegs Boktrykkeri, 1955, cited in the UNESCO Memo (1957), supra note 242,
pp. 41, 43. See also Hedberg (1970), supra Chapter I, note 10, p. 28. It was stated:
Some of these marginal semi-enclosed seas are definitely epicontinental, such as
the North Sea, Persian Gulf, Irish Sea, Yellow Sea . .. These are underlain by
continental crust and generally have thick sedimentary fillings. Most of them
have water depths of no more than a few hundred meters. (emphasis added).
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been changed, despite the fact that it is much deeper (up to 670 meters) than the rest of the shelf (up to 200 meters).
(b) The United Kingdom has always taken the view that the
equidistance principle should apply in the North Sea, given the
broad equality between its coast and that of Norway. The two states
also had been in agreement on ignoring the presence of the N orwegian Trough long before they negotiated the 1965 boundary agreement. During the 1958 Geneva Conference, delegates from the two
states specifically supported the geological finding that the Trough
was a part of the North Sea shelf. 265 When the United Kingdom
unilaterally declared its continental shelf jurisdiction in 1964, 266 the
outer limits of the claim actually lay 2 to 12 miles west of the true
median line267 (i.e., more landward to the British than to the Norwegian coast). According to one publicist who has studied Britain's
shelf law and policy:
The British restraint arose from the pragmatic desire to
proceed as quickly as possible and to avoid time-consuming disputes, and an acknowledgment that equity would
appear to be on the side of opposition to a greatly extended
British claim reaching to the Norwegian Trench [sic]. 268
In any event, the Anglo-Norwegian boundary was the result of
a variety of legal and extra-legal considerations. But it seems fair to
conclude that the conclusive geological evidence about the shelf and
the Trough provides the primary justification and makes any contrary argument difficult.
(2)

The Denmark-Norway Shelf Boundary269

Denmark and Norway face each other across the bay-like Skag265. See UNCLOS I, Official Records, Vol. 6 (1958), pp. 41 (statement of Miss Gutteridge, delegate of the United Kingdom), 48 (statement of Mr. Stabell, the Norwegian
delegate).
266. Continental Shelf Act of 1964, UNLS/15, p. 445; Continental Shelf (designation
of Areas) Order 1964 (12 May 1964), ibid., p. 447.
267. Richard Young, "Offshore Claims and Problems in the North Sea," American
Journal of International Law, Vol. 59 (1965), pp. 505, 511.
268. L.F.E. Goldie, "A Symposium on the Geneva Conventions and the Need for
Future Codifications," in Lewis M. Alexander ed., The Law ofthe Sea: Offihore Boundaries and Zones, Proceedings of the First Conference on the Law of the Sea sponsored by
the Law of the Sea Institute, University of Rhode Island, Columbus, Ohio: The Ohio
State University Press, 1967, pp. 273, 277 [hereinafter cited as Goldie (1967)].
269. The geographical and bathymetrical descriptions of the Denmark-Norway shelf
boundary is based on Europe: The North Sea (U.S. Naval Chart, H.O. 4840, 18th ed.,
Nov. 1945, rev. Mar. 1966) which is attached to "Continental Shelf Boundaries: The
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errak with an average width of 60 miles (Map 13). In the northern
half of the seabed, the Norwegian Trough closely follows the Norwegian coastline and runs nearly throughout the Skagerrak for a distance of 100 miles. It then turns north at where the Skagerrak opens
to the North Sea. The southern half of the seabed in the Skagerrak,
with supeijacent water less than 200 meters in depth, is continuous
from the vast North Sea continental shelf.
Denmark and Norway delimited their shelf boundary in 1965
by a true median line. The eastern terminal of the boundary begins
in the Skagerrak where the Norwegian-Swedish shelf boundary
ends, and extends all the way to the North Sea until it reaches the
trijunction point of the Anglo-Norwegian and Anglo-Danish boundaries. Of the 255-mile boundary, 31 percent, or 80 miles, is in the
Skagerrak where the Trough is present and 69 percent, or 175 miles,
is in the North Sea where the seabed is relatively continuous. In the
Skagerrak, the 200-meter isobath and the median line lie side by side
and intersect nearly at the mid-point of the latter.
A few observations are in order. Geologically, as noted in connection with the Anglo-Norwegian shelf boundary, the Norwegian
Trough is an integral part of the North Sea continental shelf. Geological continuity of the whole seabed in the North Sea renders irrelevant the Norwegian Trough qua geological circumstances in shelf
boundary delimitation in the region. Geographically, the coasts of
Denmark and Norway present a textbook case of opposite coasts.
Broad equality of coasts in the Skagerrak is self-evident. In the
North Sea where the shelf lies "off' rather than "between" the
coasts, the basic opposite relationship and broad equality continue.
An equidistant boundary seems, therefore, prima facie, equitable.
Possible alternative boundaries based on geomorphological features
such as the 200 meter isobath or the mid-channelline of the Trough
are justified neither by any "special circumstances" nor by any other
equitable consideration.
In conclusion, the geological unity of the seabed in the NorwayUnited Kingdom and Denmark-Norway cases seems to be a condition precedent to the application of the equidistance principle. A
trough is, after all, a geological feature. Geographical factors may
constitute a sufficient condition and make the median line boundary
imperative. It is only natural that the three states involved disreNorth Sea," Limits in the Seas, No. 10, June 14, 1974. Unfortunately this chart is too big
to be reproduced here.
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garded the Norwegian Trough, which had become a neutral factor in
light of conclusive scientific evidence.
(3)

The Australia-Indonesia Shelf Boundary270

Australia fronts Indonesia across the Timor Sea in the west and
the Arufura Sea in the east where vast shelves and deep trenches
coexist (Map 18). The two seas are semi-enclosed, with Timor,
Tanimbar, Aru, New Guinea, and other Indonesian islands forming
a chain in the north and the Australian continent in the south. The
shelves, known as the Sohul Shelf in the west and the Arufura Shelf
in the east, slope gently north for a distance of roughly 170 and 350
miles, respectively, from the northern coast of Australia. The superjacent water has a depth of 50 to 140 meters. The shelves abruptly
decline to the Timor Trough and Arufura Trough with maximum
depths of 3,200 and 3,650 meters, respectively. The Arufura Trough,
which is surrounded by Indonesian islands, and the Timor Trough,
which lies much closer to the Indonesian than Australian territories,
intersect at an angle of about 120 degrees near the Indonesian island
of Tanimbar. They are in fact part of the arc of deep troughs and
trenches extending from the Ceram Sea in central Indonesia to the
Java Trench in the Indian Ocean. Geologically, the Timor Trough
is an elongate submarine basin of young age classified by geologists
as a marginal deep. The whole Timor Sea and the southwestern part
of the Arufura Sea will be the focus of the following analysis.
In 1971 and 1972, two shelf boundary agreements 271 were
signed between Australia and Indonesia (not including the one in
1973 272 with Australia acting on behalf of the then dependent Papua
New Guinea) in the area just described (Maps 19 and 20). At the
time East Timor was still a Portuguese colony and disputes between
Lisbon and Canberra on the legal character of the Timor Trough
had prevented any shelf delimitation in that area. A "gap" thus exists. By 1978 East Timor had been incorporated by Indonesia and
difficult negotiations between Canberra and Jakarta have been
270. The descriptions of geography, geomorphology, and geology of the AustraliaIndonesia shelf boundary area are based on Encyclopedia of Oceanography, supra
Chapter 1, note 5, pp. 44 (Arufura Sea), 755 (Sahul Shelf), 923 (Timor Sea), and Limits in
the Seas, No. 87 supra note 171.
271. Limits in the Seas, No. 87, supra note 171.
272. Agreement Concerning Certain Boundaries between Indonesia and Papua New
Guinea, Indonesia-Australia, 26 January 1973, UNLS/18, p. 444. The text of this agreement is reprinted nearly in full, and the boundary is analyzed, in Limits in the Seas, No.
87, supra note 171, pp. 4, 11.
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under way since then to delimit the gap area. 273 Constructed with 25
turning and terminal points, the existing boundary has two segments
with 133°23'E longitude as the dividing line on which Pont Al2 is
located. The segment of the boundary delimited by the 1971 agreement (hereinafter referred to as the Eastern Segment) begins at Point
A2 and ends at point Al2. Point A3 is the trijunction point of the
median line boundaries of Australia, Indonesia, and Papua New
Guinea (Map 19).
The boundary delimited by the 1972 agreement (hereinafter referred to as the Western Segment) begins at Point Al2 and ends at
Point 25 (Map 20). The entire Eastern Segment lies in the Arufura
Shelf (200 meter or less) whereas the Western Segment rests, with
minor exceptions, either in the sill (1,400 meters or more) that separates the Arufural Trough from the Timor Trough or in the Timor
Trough (2,000 meters or more). The Eastern Segment, 378 miles
long, is a true median line drawn between the normal baselines between the two coasts. 274 Indonesia's straight baselines were ignored. 275 The Western Segment was delimited in accordance with
equitable principles, taking into account the existing Australian oil
concession blocks and the submarine geomorphology. 276 The Western Segment, 551 miles long, is located from 20 to 80 miles north of
the hypothetical true median line and 20 to 65 miles south of the
deepest-water line between the two 200-meter isobaths contiguous
from the respective coasts. 277 The boundary thus delimited is said to
be negotiated between the true median line and the deepest-water
line, resulting in unequal proportions appertaining to each state. 278
The ratio is roughly three to one or two to one in favor of Australia.
A number of observations can be made with respect to the
choice of delimitation principles, the weight given to regional geomorphology, and the macrogeography. First of all, Australia and
Indonesia had applied the equidistance principle only to the Arufura
Shelf which geologically is continuous from New Guinea and Australian continent. In areas beyond the 200-meter isobath where the
273. Limits in the Seas, No. 87, supra note 171, pp. 4, II. See also Ron Richardson,
"Drawing the Seabed Line," Far Eastern Economic Review, March 10, 1978, p. 79; R.D.
Lumb, "The Delimitation of Maritime Boundaries in the Timor Sea," Australian Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 7 (1981), p. 72.
274. Limits in the Seas, No. 87, supra note 171, p. 7.
275. Ibid.
276. Ibid.
277. Ibid.
278. Ibid.
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deep Timor Trough separates the two geological shelves continuously from the two parties' coasts, the equidistance principle w~s employed merely for reference in negotiating a boundary acco~dmg to
equitable principles. An innovative combination of medtan and
deep-water lines produced an intermediate boundary. Second, the
geomorphology of the Timor Sea, particularly the presence .of the
Timor Trough, appears to be the most important "relevant cucumstance" considered by the parties. 279 The notion of a deepest-water
line drawn between the two 200-meter isobaths clearly shows that
the presence of the deep Timor Trough was taken fully into account
and given considerable weight, although it was not the only decisive
factor in the delimitation. Finally, the boundary seems, in terms of
macrogeography, to have been delimited pursuant to the notions of
broad equality of coasts and proportionality (Maps 18 and 19). The
Eastern Segment lies between the coasts of New Guinea (the second
largest island on earth) and the Aru Islands on the one hand, and the
coast of northern Australia on the other. Each coast has large bays
or bights as well as promontories facing each other (Map 18); the
broad equality of coasts seems obvious. The Western Segment, however, is situated between the western part of the Australia coast and a
chain of Indonesian islands interrupted by a number of water gaps
ranging in distance from 10 to 50 miles. The delimitation of the
Western Segment seems to have brought about a reasonable degree
of proportionality between the lengths of the parties' respective
coasts in the particular area (Australia: 751 miles (67 percent); Indonesia; 365 miles (33 percent) and the continental shelf areas appertaining to them (Australia: 67-75 percent; Indonesia: 33-25
279. The observation is in part supported by a statement of Australia's Foreign Minister, Mr. W. McMahon, made on October 30, 1970, in Australia's House of Representatives. Australian Yearbook of International Law 1970-1973, (1975), pp. 145, 145-48. He
first interpreted the natural prolongation concept, recently declared by the ICJ in the
North Sea Cases, as a morphological one which, when applied to the seabed, would
include the "lower edge of the (continental] margin". He then defended the Australian
claim in the following words:
(T]he rights cla~ed by Australia in the Timor Sea are based unmistakably on
the morphological structure of the sea bed. (He then described the Timor
Trough.] The Timor Trough thus breaks the continental she!( between Australia
and Timor, so that there are two distinct shelves, and not one and the same shelf
separating the two opposite coasts. The fall-back median line between the tw~
coasts, provided for in the Convention in the absence of agreement, would not
apply for there 1s no common area to delimit. This Australian view is of course
~ell known to Indonesia. There has in fact been recent exchange of views, still
mcomplete, between Indonesian and Australian officials (emphasis added).
Ibid., p. 146.
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percent). 280 The striking resemblance of physical conditions between the Timor Sea and the East China Sea will be analyzed further below.
(4)

The Japan-ROK Joint Development Zone

It was pointed out in Chapter 2 that the JDZ falls entirely on
the Japanese side of the Japan-ROK hypothetical median line.
While the JDZ's northeastern rim largely follows this median line,
its eastern rim actually coincides with the eastern rim of the ROK's
Block K-7 (Maps 5 and 6), which is the easternmost limit of the
ROK's continental shelf claim based on the natural prolongation
principle. Approximately half of the JDZ's eastern rim lies right in
the middle of the Okinawa Trough, roughly following the deepestwater line (Map 1).
Thus, the JDZ is located between the ROK's claimed shelf limit
based on the natural prolongation principle and Japan's claimed
shelf limit based on the equidistance principle. It is a typical compromise,281 with each party's claimed limit being given roughly half
effect in delimiting the ultimate zone which, as suggested earlier in
this Chapter, functions as a de facto shelf boundary zone.
In this sense, the presence of the Okinawa Trough, as represented by the deepest-water line, did influence the delimitation of the
JDZ. The fact that Japan was willing to recognize the presence of
the Okinawa Trough as a relevant circumstance and to give it partial
effect in shelf zone delimitation will have significant implications for
Sino-Japanese shelf delimitation.

(c)

The North Sea Cases

This case involved no question of distinct geological depression.
When the tripartitie dispute was brought before the ICJ, the Norwegian Trough had been dealt with satisfactorily, as discussed above.
The Court nevertheless addressed the question of the Trough:
Without attempting to pronounce on the status of that feature, the Court notes that the shelf areas in the North Sea
280. The coastal length of Australia (902 miles) is measured in the general direction of
the coastline whereas the lengths of the Indonesian islands (516) by their total maximum
lengths. The maximum length of the coast of Portuguese Timor (151 miles) is subtracted
from both figures since that part of the shelf remains undelimited.
281. For a similar view, see Sang-Myon Rhee, "The Application of Equitable Principles to Resolve the United States-Canada Dispute Over East Coast Fishery Resources,"
Harvard International Law Journal, Vol. 21 (1980), p. 678, note 48.
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separatedfrom the Norwegian coast by the 80-100 kilometers
of the Trough cannot in any physical sense be said to be adjacent to it, nor to be its naturalprolongation. They are nevertheless considered by the States parties to the relevant
delimitations ... to appertain to Norway up to the median
line [Map 12]. True these median lines are themselves
drawn on equidistance principles; but it was only by first
ignoring the existence of the Trough that these median
lines fell to be drawn at all. 282 (emphasis added)
The context of this passage was that the Court was then discussing notions of "proximity," "adjacency," "equidistance," and "natural prolongation." 283 The Court indicated that notions of
"proximity" or "adjacency" were not as fundamental to the continental shelf doctrine as the natural prolongation principle. By using
the Norwegian Trough as an example, the Court was able to show
that but for the parties' disregard of the Trough, a part of the shelf
areas west of the Trough, although nearer to Norway than to the
United Kingdom, could not have been properly appurtenant to Norway because neither was it adjacent to, nor a natural prolongation
of, the Norwegian coast.
Having no direct bearing on the outcome of the case, this passage is clearly dictum. But because the doctrine of stare decisis is
unknown in international law, the "distinction between the ratio of a
judgment and obiter dicta is less important than it usually is in municipal law," 284 and the weight of this passage cannot be dismissed
lightly as such.

(d)

The Anglo-French Arbitration

It was briefly noted earlier that apart from the general geologi-

cal continuity of the English Channel, an irregular relief feature was
a source of a minor controversy. This was an alleged distinct fault or
series of faults, known as the Hurd Deep. With a width of one to
three miles, a depth of over 100 meters, and a length of 80 miles, it is
situated in the middle of the Channel to the north of the Channel
282. I.C.J. Reports 1969, p. 32. In his dissenting opinion, Judge Morelli also regarded
the shelf in the North Sea west of the Trough as not appertaining to Norway. The Norway-United Kingdom delimitation was said to have "transferred" certain shelf areas in
favor of Norway which would not otherwise constitute a part of Norway's geological
shelf. Ibid., p. 199.
283. Ibid., pp. 29-32.
284. See Brown (1971), supra Chapter 4, note 129, p. 32.
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Islands285 (Map 14). In its alternative and final submissions, 286 the
United Kingdom considered it as major and persistent rifts, deserving the denomination of the "Hurd Deep Fault Zone" and marking
the limits of the respective natural prolongations of the two states in
the Channel. The United Kingdom further proposed that the axis of
this fault zone be used as the shelf boundary, as an alternative to the
median line, in the English Channel as well as in the Atlantic
region. 287
The Court of Arbitration rejected the British proposal on two
grounds. First, the Hurd Deep was but a minor fault(s), as compared to the Norwegian Trough which the United Kingdom itself
ignored in shelf delimitation with Norway, and could not disrupt the
essential unity of the continental shelf in question. 288 Second, given
such a unity, discarding the equidistance or any other delimitation
method in favor simply of a boundary along the axis of the Hurd
Deep (or Hurd Deep Fault Zone) would find no legal justification
either under the "special circumstances" exception of Article 6 of the
Shelf Convention or under customary international law in order to
remedy any particular inequity.2 89
The Hurd Deep was in fact noted in the UNESCO memorandum mentioned earlier as one of the "isolated deeps [forming] part
ofthe shelf in which they are embedded" 290 and should not have any
limiting effect. In other words, there has been strong scientific evidence to disregard the presence of these minor and isolated depressions in an essentially continuous continental shelf.
Two inferences may be drawn from a close examination of the
Court's opinion. First, if the geological depression in question, be it
a deep or a trough, is substantial enough to disrupt the essential geological unity or continuity of the continental shelf in question, then
the deep or trough could be used as a basis for delimiting a shelf
boundary. Thus, by emphasizing the physical character of the
trough, the Court in fact threw the question back again to geologists
who, however, do not always have the answer. Second, even if the
trough constitutes no rift of the geological unity of the continental
shelf, a shelf boundary based on the trough still could be justified if
the presence of the trough constitutes a "special circumstance" under
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.

Anglo-French Award, paras. 9, 12.
Ibid., para. 104.
Ibid., para. 105.
Ibid., para. 107.
Ibid., paras. 108, 109.
UNESCO Memo (1957), supra note 242, p. 43.
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Article 6 of the Shelf Convention, or if a boundary following the
trough is needed to redress an inequity in the delimitation area. ~his
formulation places the role of the trough in its proper per~pective.
But it appears too general to be of much help elsewhere, smce the
controversy over the denotation of "special circumstances" and "inequity" is no less substantial than the legal status of troughs itself.
To sum up, the Anglo-French Court of Arbitration went a step
further than the ICJ in the North Sea Cases in laying down guidelines with respect to the legal status of troughs in shelf delimitation.
Given the geologically insignificant nature of the Hurd Deep-Hurd
Deep Fault Zone, the Court's dismissal of it clearly did not negate
the relevance of troughs in general in shelf delimitation. Rather, a
trough could be used as shelf boundary in cases where it separates
two geological shelves, constitutes a special circumstance, or is
needed to remedy a particular inequity.
(e)

The Tunisian-Libyan Case

During the major debate over the natural prolongation principle mentioned earlier, Tunisia and Libya flooded the Court with geological facts and arguments concerning the delimitation area that
nearly turned this battle of international lawyers to that of earth
scientists. 291 The Court, unimpressed, ended the debate by concluding that
despite the confident assertions of the geologists on both
sides that a given area is "an evident prolongation" or "the
real prolongation" of the one or the other State, for legal
purposes it is not possible to define the areas of continental
shelf appertaining to Tunisia and to Libya by reference
solely or mainly to geological considerations. 292
Again, the role of geological circumstances is set in proper
perspective.
The Court then turned to the parties' arguments based on geomorphology and bathymetry where submarine depressions, among
other features, were examined and evaluated. 293 Tunisia contended
that the marine topography of the Pelagian Block, on which the present delimitation area lies, showed the presence of three major fea291. I.C.J. Reports 1982, pp. 49-58; Continental Shelf, Separate Opinion of Jimenez
de Arechaga, ibid., p. 110.
292. Ibid., p. 53.
293. Ibid., p. 54.
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tures, one of which is of interest here. 294 It is known as Tripolitanian
Furrow, a submarine valley running roughly parallel to the Libyan
coast between 13° and 15° east. Tunisia considered it a continuation
under the sea of the Gulf of Gabes and contended that it was a "natural submarine frontier" of Libya's natural prolongation in the Pelagian Sea. 295
Again unconvinced, the Court opined:
As for the features relied on by Tunisia, the Court . . is
unable to find that any of them involve such a marked disruption or discontinuance of the sea-bed as to constitute an
indisputable indication of the limits of two separate continental shelves, or two separate natural prolongations. As was
noted in argument, so substantial a feature as the Hurd
Deep was not attributed such a significance in the FrancoBritish Arbitration of 1977 concerning the Delimitation of
the Continental Shelf. The only feature of any substantial
relevance is the Tripolitanian Furrow; but that submarine
valley does not display any really marked relief until it has
run considerably further to the east than the area relevant
to the delimitation. . . . 296 (emphasis added)
Since the Hurd Deep discussed above is insubstantial as compared to either the Norwegian Trough, the Okinawa Trough, or the
Timor Trough (Table 6), the Tripolitanian Furrow rightly was given
no weight. Like the Anglo-French Court of Arbirtration, the ICJ
seems to imply that a genuinely substantial geomorphological feature which disrupts or discontinues the seabed to such an extent as to
indicate indisputably two continental shelves may well serve as a basis for shelf boundary delimitation. Of course, the Court cannot be
expected to come up with, in the abstract, any specific or quantitative
criteria regarding the "substantiality" of a given geomorphological
feature. Such a feature has to be identified individually on the merits of each case.
(f)

The LOS Convention

The legal continental shelf as defined in Article 76 of the LOS
Convention was noted earlier, as was the article on shelf delimitation
(Article 83). Other than those general references to geomorphology
in UNCLOS Ill by delegates noted earlier, no specific reference is
294. Ibid., p. 55.
295. Ibid., p. 56.
296. Ibid., p. 57.
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made in the LOS Convention or its travaux preparatoires to the legal
status of troughs or depressions.
(g)

Summary

The above survey of various sources of conventional and customary international law yields no definite rules on the legal status
of troughs or depressions in regard to delimitation of continental
shelf, due primarily to their diversity of physical characteristics (Table 6). While the presence of the Hurd Deep and the Norwegian
Trough was ignored, the presence of the Timor Trough and the Okinawa Trough was given substantial weight. Although the small
number of precedents to date permits one to make no final conclusion, some general observations are possible.
Geologically, the Norwegian Trough, the Hurd Deep and the
Tripolitanian Furrow are underlain by the continental crust of the
earth's surface with its geophysical properties (such as seismic velocity, density, thickness, and heat flow) distinctly discernible from
those of the ocean crust underlying the oceans and some marginal
ocean basins. Geomophologically, these depressions either are surrounded by the adjacent shelf or separated from the ocean depths by
a submarine sill comparable in level with the rest of the shelf.
Bathymetrically, the water depths in these depressions are at the
most a few hundred meters greater than those superjacent to the
shelf. The physical circumstances thus overwhelmingly support the
view that these depressions are part of the geological shelf around
them. There appears to be little room for contrary scientific argument, despite the ICJ's legal arguments (on the Norwegian Trough)
to the contrary.
The Timor Trough presents an entirely different situation. Geologically, its origin is neither clearly continental nor oceanic. It
may be in a transition from one to the other. 297 Geomorphologi297. See generally Menard (1967), supra note 240, where he concluded:

Small ocean basins are underlain by crustal types that are generally unlike
those of typical continents or oceans. The basins can be considered to be in
different stages of development.
Ibid., p. 3072. There are two sequences of crustal development of those ocean basins:
one is from continental crust to oceanic crust, e.g., the Japan Sea basin; the other is the
reverse, e.g., the Gulf of Mexico. Menard also stated:
[l]t appears that ~he crust in regions of complex island arcs has been changed in
ways that cause 1t to have characteristics intermediate between normal oceanic
and continental crust. Nevertheless, it is much more similar to an oceanic than to
a continental crust (emphasis added).
Ibid., p. 3064.
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cally, it is connected with other deeper troughs or trenches by a submarine sill more than 1,400 meters in depth, much deeper than the
adjacent shelf. Bathymetrically, the water depth in the Trough is 15
to 30 times that of the shelf, but about two-thirds or one-half of that
of the nearby oceans (5,000 to 6,000 meters). The Trough, with its
intermediary geophysical character, appears to have received correspondingly intermediary legal treatment in the shelf delimitation. Its
presence was not the only decisive factor, but it significantly influenced the course of the boundary.
Nearly the same comments made above can apply to the Okinawa Trough except that it is slightly shorter, narrower, and shallower, with slightly lower submarine sills, and situated in a slightly
less open environment, than the Timor Trough (Table 6). But physical characteristics aside, it should not be forgotten that the presence
of the Okinawa Trough was taken into account in delimiting a joint
development zone and not a shelf boundary, as was the case with the
Timor Trough.
Given the imperfect (and by no means concurrent) understanding of troughs by geologists, lawyers can only tentatively conclude
that the legal status of troughs is determined primarily by their individual physical characteristics. But the presence of some troughs
with substantial length, width, and depth did get considerable weight
in influencing the shelf boundary or de facto boundary zone.

3.

Concluding Remarks: The Okinawa Trough and the SinoJapanese Seabed Delimitation

The above discussion demonstrates that there has been no conclusive scientific evidence either supporting or refuting the proposition that the Okinawa Trough marks the outer limits of the East
Asian continental slope. Having neither continental nor oceanic geophysical properties, the Okinawa Trough, like the Timor Trough,
could well be an intermediate feature. In any case, the consensus of
the international community, as reflected by Article 76 of the LOS
Convention, on the legal definition (or seaward delimitation) of the
continental shelf has rendered the geological debate on the Okinawa
Trough largely moot. Ceasing to be an "Article 76 problem" makes
the Trough no less a problem under Article 83-inter-state delimitations-that arises from its distinct geomorphological, if not geological, features. The pertinent question, then, shifts to: should the
presence of the Trough nevertheless be allowed to mark an interstate shelf boundary (and not just a joint development zone)?
The foregoing search for guidance from various sources of in-
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temationallaw indicates that the answer to this question has to be
sought by looking into the physical characteristics of a particular
trough or depression involved. It seems useful, therefore, to compare the physical characteristics of the Okinawa Trough to those of
other troughs or depressions which have been addressed by international tribunals or shelf boundaries treaties.
A glance at Table 6 should quickly dismiss the relevance of the
Hurd Deep for purposes of comparision. The distinction in physical
dimensions between it and the rest is too obvious to deserve elaboration. The Anglo-French Arbitral Court's correct disregard of it thus
sheds little light on the legal significance of the Okinawa Trough.
The Norwegian Trough presents, at least, a case where a comparison with the Okinawa Trough makes sense. Geographically,
both are located in marginal, semi-enclosed seas. But in terms of
length, width, and depth, they are quite distinct from each other, if
one considers the distances between coasts and the average water
depth in the surrounding shelves. Geologically, the whole North
Sea, including the Norwegian Trough, is definitely underlain by continental crust whereas the nature of the underlying crust of the Okinawa Trough is still disputed among geologists.
Geomorphologically, the Norwegian Trough is connected with the
Atlantic Ocean by a submarine sill (less than 300 meters in depth)
nearly at the level of the adjacent shelf whereas the sill connecting
the Okinawa Trough and the Pacific Ocean is 500 to 1,000 meters or
more. In sum, the two troughs have more differences than similarities. The observation is in accord with the consensus among commentators who have compared the two troughs.2 98
On the other hand, the Timor Trough bears striking resemblances to the Okinawa Trough, as Table 6 clearly shows, in geography, physical dimensions (length, width, and depth), geological
structure, and geomorphology. Even more striking are a few other
aspects worthy of elaboration. First, both cases involve a mainland
state (Australia and China (PRC and ROC)) and an island state (Indonesia and Japan). The former has a vast shallow geological shelf
continuous from its coast and the latter is fronted within a short distance seaward by a deep and substantial trough more than 2,000 meters in depth. Second, both cases, in macrogeographical terms, have
parallel coastal configurations with a mainland facing an island
chain cut off by a number of water gaps. Third, both Australia and
298. E.g., Park (1972), supra Chapter I, note 18, p. 34; Goldie (1973), supra Chapter 4,
note 36, pp. 254-57.
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China (at least the ROC) have unilaterally extended their shelf jurisdictions to the middle of the trough, taking the regional geomorphology as the only decisive factor in shelf delimitation. Meanwhile,
both Indonesia and Japan have based their continental shelf claims
on the equidistance principle and advocated the disregard of the
trough in shelf delimitation.
It is crystal-clear that the only precedent in shelf boundary delimitation comparable to the Okinawa Trough is that of the Timor
Trough. Such a comparison exists, as just noted, in a much larger
context as well. It is submitted that as a matter of law, the Australian-Indonesian treatment of the Timor Trough is not binding on
third parties. Furthermore, a portion of the Timor Sea between the
former Portuguese East Timor and Australia has yet to be delimited.
None of these considerations, however, should preclude the Australian-Indonesian case from becoming the most relevant precedent for
China (PRC and ROC) and Japan to consider or to follow. Besides,
the notion of a "deepest-water line" adopted by Australia is not entirely without foundation in international law. As used in delimiting
boundaries in border rivers, the "thalweg" principle, 299 1: e., using the
middle of a navigable channel instead of that of the whole river as
the international boundary, long has been established in customary
international law. That principle occasionally has been applied by
analogy to international straits and to the oceans by
commentators. 300
On the other hand, the Okinawa Trough itself has played an
important role in the delimitation of the Japan-ROK Joint Development Zone. Although Japan always may distinguish a joint development zone from a shelf boundary as such, the relevance of the
Okinawa Trough as a distinct geomorphological feature appears to
have been firmly established.
In conclusion, the relevance of regional geology and geomorphology of the East China Sea consists in the presence of the Okinawa Trough, which may be represented by a deepest~water line or a
mid-channel line. This line per se should not be the only decisive
299. For a discussion of the thalweg principle, see Justice Cardozo's opinion in New
Jersey v. Delaware, 291 U.S. 361 (1934); James W. Gamer, ''The Doctrine of the
Thalweg as a Rule oflntemational Law,'· American Journal ofInternational Law, Vol. 29
(1935), p. 309; L. Oppenheim. International Law, Vol. I, 8th ed. by H. Lauterpacht,
London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1955, p. 532; Daniel P. O'Connell, International
Law, Vol. I, London: Sevens & Sons, 1970, p. 429.
300. E.g., Daniel P. O'Connell, International Law, supra note 299, p. 496; Goldie
(1967), supra note 268, p. 275.
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factor in the Sino-Japanese seabed delimitation, b~t rather shou~d be
considered as a relevant circumstance or as an rmportant bas1s or
starting point in the course of negotiations.
F. Summary and Suggestions
1. Summary
A summary of this chapter, in view of its length, is necessary
before suggestions are presented. In the introduction of this chapter,
the methodology for analyzing the delimitation problem was set out.
Following the prevailing trend of customary international law in this
regard, various sources of international law were scrutinized to ascertain the specific denotation of the concept "relevant circumstances." Recognizing that according to equitable principles the
choice of any delimitation principle is but a function or reflection of
the "relevant circumstances" of the particular case, the chapter then
identified them and determined their relevance and weight in the
setting of the East China Sea. Some were dismissed as irrelevant
while others appeared partially or potentially relevant. This exercise
served to narrow the focus on a few vital circumstances, i.e., geography, geology, and geomorphology. In order to isolate each circumstance for convenience of discussion, an assumption was made in the
discussion on geography, whereas in the discussion on geology (and
geomorphology) this geographical consideration generally was
downplayed.
As the equidistance principle is always identified with oppositestate situations, we began the discussion on geography with the applicability ofthe equidistance principle. A detailed survey of various
sources of international law, particularly dozens of existing boundaries, suggested that the physical circumstances most amenable to the
application of the equidistance principle were the presence of two
geographical elements: comparable coastal configurations and broad
equality of coasts. This seems to be the case in the North Region of
the East China Sea, defined as the shelf areas north of the 30°N
parallel, which is the trijunction area of the three states' claimed continental shelf. Absence of both of these circumstances in the South
Region of the East China Sea led to the discussion of the proportionality test, which, on the basis of the length of coastlines of China (the
mainland and Taiwan) and Japan (the Ryukyus), produced a ratio
of approximately 64 to 36. This ratio, as emphasized repeatedly, is
intended to be a guideline, not a rule, for conducting negotiations. It
represents a reasonable proportionality which an equitable delimitation should bring about, as suggested by the ICJ in the North Sea
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Cases and the Tunisian-Libyan Case, in the East China Sea. The
equidistance principle, though rejected for the South Region, nevertheless could be used for reference purposes.
The discussion on the geology (and geomorphology) of the East
China Sea took a similar course. The natural prolongation principle,
as expounded by the ICJ in the North Sea Cases and the TunisianLibyan Case, seemed to imply a rather elastic seaward limit of the
continental shelf depending on various legal and geological interpretations of the seabed. While a more precise definition has emerged
with the advent of the LOS Convention, the state practice and judicial decisions to date, albeit at an embryonic stage, largely seemed to
have followed the consensus of geologists with respect to the origin
of distinct geological or geomorphological features. Simply stated,
where the predominant geological view suggests that certain deeps or
troughs are part of the surrounding geological shelf, they are allowed
no influence on shelf delimitation; where the origin of these features
is still unclear, they are allowed some effect on the shelf boundary.
Since the Okinawa Trough falls into the latter category, it was suggested that either the mid-channel line or the deepest-water line of
the Trough be used as one of the bases for constructing the ultimate
shelf boundary between China (PRC and ROC) and Japan, but not
as an absolute factor.
2.

Suggestions

If the geographical and geological (and geomorphological)

dimensions are considered together, the division of the North and
South Regions along the 30°N parallel still seems valid. Geographically, the North Region is dominated by the presence of substantial
landmass of the three littoral states with comparable coastal lengths.
Geomorphologically, the Okinawa Trough has its shallowest part in
this region in which it nowhere exceeds 900 meters as compared to
1,000 to 2,714 meters in the South Region. The geological structure
of the Trough near K yushu also is different from that of the rest of
the Trough (Map 3). In any case, if the geological and geomorphological evidences are not strong enough to warrant a separate treatment, they and the geographical considerations are. Hence the
strong justification for applying the equidistance principle in the
North Region, to be adjusted, of course, by the proportionality ratio
of 64:36. The significance of the Trough is subordinated, though it
still should be considered. Admittedly, the North Region will be a
troublesome area given the added complication of the Japan-ROK
JDZ, the bulk of which is in that region. And considerations of real-
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politik could, as noted earlier, delay a final legal solution
indefinitely.
The addition of the geological (or geomorphological) dimension
to the South Region means that the presence of the Okinawa Tro~gh
would in some way affect the ultimate shelf boundary. A possible
solution is for Japan and China (PRC and ROC) to negotiate a
boundary on the basis of either the median line (Map 1) which is
mid-way between the two coasts, or the mid-channel (or deepestwater) line of the Okinawa Trough (Map 1), which is closer to the
Ryukyus than to mainland China or Taiwan, taking into account the
reasonable proportions suggested. Adoption of one over the other
would reflect the parties' emphasis on geographical or geological factors. The result, however, should be comparable insofar as the ultimate division is concerned. Alternatively, they could use both the
median line and the mid-channel line as a starting point and negotiate an intermediary boundary as did Canberra and Jakarta in 1972.
The boundary so delimited probably would lie somewhere along the
200-meter isobath (Map 1), a result again similar to the AustraliaIndonesia shelf boundary in the Timor Sea. Exchanges of minor areas may be necessary for convenience, as is common in state
practice.
The solutions suggested reject the single-method or single-principle approaches adopted by China (PRC and ROC) and Japan. Japan's insistence on applying the equidistance principle across-theboard in the whole East China Sea regardless of the geophysical reality clearly is not supported by either international law as intimated
by international tribunals, state practice, or the emerging norms of
the law of the sea. An equitability test for delimitation, t:e ., proportionality, thus is applied to bring about an equitable result. On the
other hand, the insistence of China (the PRC and ROC) on applying
the natural prolongation principle does more to restate the problem
than to offer a solution, since it is clear that one of the sticky issues
here precisely is whether the seabed of the Okinawa Trough constitutes a part of the natural prolongation of either state's coast. To
treat the Okinawa Trough as an absolute limiting factor may derive
support from findings of some geologists, as well as from the North
Sea Cases. But subsequent developments, in particular the LOS
Convention, have defined the legal continental shelf in a way that
makes the submarine geomo~hological features within 200 miles
from shore virtually irrelevant. 01 The implications for the legal sta301. For a related discussion, see Choon-Ho Park, "The Sino-Japanese-Korean Sea
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tus of geologically undetermined troughs is that in inter-state delimitations it becomes not an absolute limit of national jurisdiction,
barring conclusive geological evidence to the contrary, but a relevant
circumstance to be considered in the course of negotiations. Simply
stated, the suggested solutions modify the equidistance principle by
the notion of proportionality and treat the presence of the Okinawa
Trough as but one of the factors that influence the ultimate SinoJapanese shelf boundary.
The East China Sea finds itself in a complex geographical, geological, and geomorphological setting. Equitable principles require
that it be treated accordingly without "refashioning nature." 302 The
suggested differentiation of the regions and the multi-method or
multi-principle approach simply are a reflection of this complex reality of nature.
Resources Controversy and the Hypothesis of a 200-Mile Economic Zone," Harvard In·
ternational Law Journal, Vol. 16 (1975), p. 27. The PRC and ROC might argue that their
shelf claims are protected as "acquired rights" under the then prevailing customary internationa1law-the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, particularly the Court's opinions
on the natural prolongation principle and on the legal character of the Norwegian
Trough. This arguable position suffers from several difficulties. First, the interpretation
of the North Sea Cases is not completely without controversy in respect of the seaward
extent of the natural prolongation principle noted earlier. In other words, under another
interpretation the whole seabed landward of the Ryukyu Trench could constitute the
legal continental shelf and the Okinawa Trough therefore does not necessarily delimit
the Japanese claims of shelf jurisdiction. Second, absent an agreement between China
and Japan or a binding adjudication on the delimitation of their respective continental
shelf in the East China Sea, unilateral claims of either the PRC or the ROC alone could
hardly constitute any acquired rights when such claims, when made, were strongly excepted to by Japan as noted in Chapter 2.
302. Supra note 220 and accompanying text.

CHAPTER 6 RELEVANCE OF THE PEKING-TAIPEI
RIVALRY: THE "DOMESTIC ASPECT" OF THE
SEABED DISPUTE

A. The Scope of Inquiry
Chapter 3 demonstrated that the potentially overlapping concession areas of the PRC and the ROC (Map 11 ), primarily in the
Taiwan Strait, could give rise to a host of questions: Which government has the exclusive sovereign rights to exploit the seabed? Which
concessionaire has the exclusive mining rights? If oil is found there,
who has title to it? If the oil is shipped to a foreign country by the
concessionaire of the PRC or ROC or its assignee, how successfully
can the other side contest the title in the court of that country? If
that country has switched recognition from Taipei to Peking, would
the outcome of the litigation be different accordingly? Would the
forum simply follow the foreign policy of the executive branch or
take a more realistic view of the situation? In the absence of diplomatic recognition, to what extent would the legal acts of the ROC,
particularly those dealing with seabed exploitation, receive judicial
cognizance? Are they acts of state? Or nullities? Is the title question
between two rival governments at all justiciable?
These questions clearly are not matters of domestic law of the
PRC or ROC. Nor can they be treated as purely questions of international law of, say, continental shelf delimitation. Objectively,
each side has "a defined territory and population under the control
of a government [engaging] in foreign relations." 1 But a subjective
element, i.e., that each views the other as equal, is lacking entirely.
Claiming that it alone represents China, each sees the relationship
with the other not as one between states but as one between a legitimate government and a rebel group engaging in an unfinished civil
war.
A third approach focuses on the attitude of foreign governments
and courts toward the PRC or ROC qua recognized or unrecognized
governments. This approach seems to be the most profitable one
within the present context, for a foreign court is the only place where
a legal battle possibly could take place. As long as the oil recovered
from the overlapping zone remains in the hands of the ROC or PRC,
I. American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law, Second· Foreign Relations Law

ofthe Untied States, St. Paul, Minn.:

American Law Institute Publishers, 1965, § 4 (state

defined).

(195)
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the title problem continues to be a "domestic" issue between Peking
and Taipei. It is only susceptible of political or military solutions,
ranging from a negotiated settlement to armed conflict. The former
is out of the question, given Taipei's adamant refusal to negotiate
with Peking on any issue. The latter is not impossible, but would
occur only as part of the resumed civil war which is quite unlikely, as
we shall discuss below. In any event, no law will play any important
part at this stage.
In contrast, if the oil found in the overlapping zone changes
hands and reaches a foreign soil, the title issue could be litigated in
the courts of that country, since considerable private interest would
be at stake. 2 Moreover, the courts in a number of states have had
many occasions to adjudicate similar issues and to build up a solid
body of case law. 3 In most countries, recognition of foreign governments is a political question reserved for the executive branch of the
government. But recognition has various legal consequences which
fall within the exclusive domain of the judicial branch.
In this chapter, the relevance of the Peking-Taipei rivalry is defined along these lines. Based on a number of considerations, 4 the
United Kingdom, Japan, and the United States are chosen as forum
states where a legal battle may be fought. Before plunging into the
practices of these three states, we shall first review the state of rivalry, in both historical and contemporary perspectives, between Peking and Taipei.
B.

The Peking-Taipei Rivalry: Two Aspects

The Peking-Taipei rivalry involves various dimensions. For
purposes of this study, we shall deal only with those that have direct
bearing on the legal personality of the rivals and which affect their
claim to the title to oil litigated in a foreign court; that means the
2. See, e.g., Occidental of Umm al Qaywayn, Inc. v. A Certain Cargo of Petroleum
Laden Aboard the Tanker Dauntless Colocotronis, 577 F.2d 1196 (1978), cerl. denied,
442 U.S. 928 (1979). This case is discussed infra in the text.
3. See generally Daniel P. O'Connell, Inrernaliona/ Law, Vol. I, 2d ed. London: Stevens & Sons, 1970, pp. 166-92.
4. The considerations include the following: Oil companies from these three states
are engaged by the ROC and PRC in their respective offshore programs. They are likely
candidates for a legal battle. Secondly, all three states have held, and two are still holding, the position that the legal status of Taiwan is undetermined despite their recognition
of the PRC. This position has material bearing on the question under consideration.
Thirdly, the courts of all three states have dealt with cases involving Peking and Taipei
or similar questions. These cases provide a reasonable basis for discussing the present
question.
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question of recognition and diplomatic relations. To appreciate the
intensity of the rivalry, it is useful briefly to relate the military
dimension:

1.

The Suspended Civil War

The establishment of the PRC on the Chinese mainland and the
retreat of the ROC to Taiwan in 1949 concluded the first phase of
the Chinese Civil War which had raged on the mainland since 1946
but had its origin dating back to the 1920s. 5 From 1949 to 1979,
tension remained between the forces of the two rivals but hosilities
were erratic and largely confined to a few offshore islands off the
Chinese mainland and their coastal waters and air space. 6 The
PRC's heavy bombardment of the Quemoy and Matsu Islands,
which drew world attention in 1958, has subsided ever since with the
inauguration of an "even-number-day" cease-fire. 7 Exchanges of artillery barrages involved shells containing propaganda leaflets instead of high explosives. Even this token reminder of the unfinished
civil war was removed in 1979 when Washington and Peking established diplomatic relations. 8 Technically the civil war continues, although the resumption of hostilities seems unlikely, given the new
political reality in East Asia. Having a local military superiority, 9
the ROC's navy and air force regularly patrol the Taiwan Strait; so
do the PRC forces in coastal waters near the mainland. Both sides
seem to have honored tacitly a de facto demarcation line in the
Strait, though its precise location remains undefined. The ROC's oil
concession blocks are presumably located on the ROC (east) side of
that line (Map 9).
Unlike the civil war in Spain 10 and Nigeria, 11 the Chinese civil
5. See generally John K. Fairbank, United States and China, 4th ed., Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1979, and the references cited therein.
6. See Hungdah Chiu, "China, the United States, and the Question of Taiwan," in
China and the Question of Taiwan, edited by Hungdah Chiu, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1973, pp. 142-51.
7. Ibid., p. 151.
8. New York Times, January I, 1979, p. I.
9. Ralph N. Clough, Island China, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978, p.
99.
10. See generally Norman J. Padelford, International Law and Diplomacy in the Spanish Civ1l Strife, New York: The Macmillan Company, 1939.
II. See generally John J. Stemlau, The International Politics of the Nigerian Civil War
1967-70, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1977, pp. 74-76 (dealing with the
law of governmental succession and oil concessions).
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war has given rise to few questions of internationallaw. 12 The establishment of the PRC in 1949 apparently prompted many states to
conclude that the civil war was over and the relevant question was
whether to extend recognition to the new regime in Peking. But the
continued existence in Taiwan of another Chinese government,
claiming to represent all China, a situation unprecedented in international relations, greatly complicated the question and posed a
challenge to conventional rules of international law and practices of
diplomatic intercourse.
2.

Competition for International Recognition

This competition between Taipei and Peking consists in establishing diplomatic relations with pre-existing and emerging members
of the international community, for diplomatic ties between two governments imply mutual recognition. 13 Since neither Peking nor
Taipei accepts a "two China" concept, no state has ever been able to
maintain diplomatic relations with both. 14 There is presented below
an overview of the diplomatic gains and losses of the two rivals, followed by a descriptive analysis of the international community's attitude towards Peking's claim of sovereignty over Taiwan.
(a)

The Three-Decade Contest

The Soviet Bloc and other communist states, some of which
were themselves newly independent, promptly extended recognition
to the PRC shortly after its establishment in October 1949.1 5 Fourteen non-communist states (half were European) followed suit in six
months. 16 By April 1950, the PRC had been recognized by 26 states
12. One exception may be the ROC's proclaimed "closure" of Chinese mainland
ports and territorial waters during 1949-1954. Over 70 foreign vessels were stopped, fired
upon, turned away, or sunk. For a legal discussion, see Wu Tang, Chung-kuo Yu Kuochija [China and International Law], Taipei: Committee on Chinese Cultural Enterprise Publishers, 1957, pp. 264-68. L.H. Woolsey, ''Closure of Ports by the Chinese Nationalist Government," American Journal of International Law, Vol. 44 (1950), p. 352.
13. Green H. Hackworth, Digest of International Law, Vol. I Washington D.C.:
Government Printing Offices, 1940, pp. 166-67.
14. Nigeria before 1971 recognized both Peking and Taipei but was unable to have
diplomatic ties with either. Senegal recognized the PRC but established diplomatic relations with the ROC. The PRC thus refused to recognize Senegal. See James C. Hsiung,
Law and Policy of China's Foreign Relations, New York: Columbia University Press,
1972, p. 223.
15. Ibid., pp. 209, 391 note 29.
16. Ibid.
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and had diplomatic relations with all but Israel. 17 At the same time,
the ROC still maintained relations with 53 states. 18
The PRC's intervention in the Korean War in late 1950 and the
subse~uent condemnation of it as an aggressor by the United Nations1 arrested this trend in its favor unti11955. The following decade saw the emergence of many newly independent nations in
Africa, which became subsequently a major diplomatic battleground
for the PRC and ROC. As of 1966, the PRC almost doubled its
diplomatic ties to 50, whereas the ROC's also climbed slightly to
60.2° Out of 21 states having diplomatic ties with neither, six recognized the PRC, two recognized both, and two had consular relations
with the ROC. 21
The devastating Cultural Revolution (1966-69) on the Chinese
mainland considerably disrupted the PRC's foreign relations. During that period, it gained only one state (51) while the ROC picked
up ei~ht more (68). 22 Canada's recognition of the PRC in October
1970, 3 however, set in motion a new surge of diplomatic gains for
Peking. The shift of the United States' China policy in 1971 and the
PRC's admission to (and the ROC's expulsion from) the United Nations in the same year made the momentum unstoppable. By August, 1984, 132 states had recognized the PRC while the ROC's
diplomatic ties had shrunk to 25. 24
The 1970's indeed witnessed the biggest diplomatic success for
the PRC with more than half of its diplomatic ties established during
that decade. Meanwhile, in addition to losses of bilateral diplomatic
ties, the ROC also has been expelled from virtually all the important
inter-governmental organizations. 25 The wave of diplomatic setbacks forces Taipei to adopt a variety of unorthodox ways of con17. Cohen & Chiu,supra Introduction, note II, Vol. I, p. 213.
18. Ralph N. Clough, supra note 9, p. 153.
19. General Assembly Resolution 498 (V), UNGAOR, Vol. 5, Supplement (No.
20A), p. I, UN Doc. A/1775/Add.l (1951).
20. Ralph N. Clough, supra note 9, p. 153.
21. United Nations Association of the United States of America, China, the United
Nations, and the United States Policy, New York: U.N. Association of the U.S.A., 1966,
p. 54 (Appendix C).
22. This is the author's count based on Ralph N. Cough, supra note 9, pp. 153-54.
23. New York Times, October 14, 1970, p. I.
24. This is the author's count based on various sources. Among the 132 states that
have recognize the PRC, four (Bahrain, Bhutan, Indonesia, and Israel) have not yet established diplomatic ties with Peking.
25. Ralph N. Clough, supra note 9, pp. 155-60. The latest expulsions were from the
International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and its affiliated institutions. New York
Times, April 18, 1980, p. Dl.
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ducting its foreign relations with the rest of the world. 26 Despite lack
of formal diplomatic ties, the ROC now has "substantive" relations
(trade, cultural exchange, etc.) with over 140 states, each having various degrees of officiality.
(b)

Peking's Claim to Taiwan

The recognition of the PRC by a state and the establishment of
diplomatic relations with it are, as a rule, announced in a joint communique issued simultaneously in Peking and the capital of the recognizing state. Prior to 1970, the joint communiques invariably
restated, with few exceptions, the PRC's claim to be the sole legal
government of China. 27 This formulation does not commit necessarily the recognizing state to the PRC's claim to Taiwan, however.
Since 1970, the PRC has insisted that its sovereignty over Taiwan be
recognized expressly as such. 28 States desiring to establish relations
with the PRC generally have been reluctant to do so at the possible
expense of their informal ties with the ROC. Eventually six compromise formulations dealing with this ~uestion were developed in 83
joint communiques issued since 1970. 9 They are presented below in
descending order according to the extent of commitment.
Ten states, including PortugaP0 and Jordan, 31 "recognize" that
"Taiwan (or Taiwan Province) is an inalienable part of the PRC."
These states seemed to have accepted unequivocally the PRC's
position.
In a second formulation, the PRC's position was "acknowledged" by eight states, including the United Kingdom. 32
26. See generally Thomas J. Bellows, Taiwan's Foreign Policy in the 1970's: A Case
Study of Adaptation and Viability, Occasional Papers/Reprints Series in Contemporary
Asian Studies, No.4, Baltimore: University of Maryland Law School, 1977 (Hungdah
Chiu ed.).
27. James C. Hsiung, supra note 14, p. 223. The France-PRC joint communique was
an important exception in which no mention was made of either the "sole Chinese government" question or the legal status of Taiwan. For the text, see Peking Review, January 31, 1964, p. 10.
28. Canada was the first state to indicate its position, or lack of it, on the status of
Taiwan. Ibid, October 16, 1970, p. 12.
29. Lyushun Shen, "The Taiwan Issue in Peking's Foreign Relations in the 1970s: A
Systematic Review," Chinese Yearbook of International Law and Affairs, Vol. 1 (1981),
pp. 77-78. Eight more joint communiques have been issued since then.
30. Beijing Review [formerly Peking Review], February 16, 1979, p. 3.
31. Peking Review, April 22, 1977, pp. 10-11.
32. Ibid., March 17, 1972, p. 3.
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Another three states including Japan33 "understand and respect" or "respect" this PRC position.
The fourth model, employed only by the United States,34 stipulates that Washington "acknowledges" the "Chinese position" that
"there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China."
In a neutral tone, Canada, Italy, 35 Belgium36 and twelve other
European and South American states merely "take note of' the PRC
position.
Still another 46 states having diplomatic (or consular) relations
with the PRC omitted the Taiwan question in the joint communiques.37 Thirteen of them even failed to mention that the PRC was
the "sole legal government of China. " 38
Two things merit attention. The first is the language used in
reflecting the recognizing state's cognizance of the PRC's position.
"Recognize" undoubtedly connotes "accept," but "understand and
respect," "respect," or "acknowledge" seem to imply something
short of acceptance, though certainly more than just awareness,
which "take note of' reflects. 39 The other variable is the object of
cognizance. In most cases it was the PRC's position that was being
considered. The object was, however, the Chinese position in a few
other cases. Since it is well-known that the ROC also regards itself
as the only Chinese government and Taiwan as its province, the verbal nuance could be significant in different contexts. This semantic
game of diplomacy admittedly tells only part of the recognizing
states' intent. Much depends on their subsqeunt practice.
As the ROC still maintains extensive commercial relations with
those states that have recognized the PRC, their cognizance or acceptance of Peking's sovereignty over Taiwan could legally affect
their "substantive" ties with Taipei. Supposedly, legal effects of recognition and non-recognition are to be determined by the courts.
Yet in a number of countries the views of the executive branch have
influenced heavily judicial decisions. An examination of the executive and judicial practices of the three countries chosen as forum
33. Ibid., October 6, 1972, pp. 12-13.
34. Ibid., December 22, 1978, p. 8.
35. Ibid., November 13, 1970, p. 6.
36. Ibid., October 29, 1971, p. 4.
37. Lyushun Shen, supra note 29.
38. Ibid.
39. Webster's New International Dictionary of the English Language Unabridged,
1976, pp. 17, 1934, 2490.
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states for our hypothetical legal battle, namely, the United Kingdom,
Japan, and the United States, is therefore warranted.
C.

The Peking-Taipei Rivalry in Foreign Courts with Special
References to the United Kingdom, Japan, and the
United States
1.

Scenario of the Hypothetical Legal Battle

Litigation between Taipei and Peking over title to undersea oil
in foreign courts may be less conceivable as long as the oil remains
under the seabed. But the intensity of the oil hunt offshore by Taipei
and Peking in the past few years makes such an eventuality less and
less hypothetical. It is helpful to envision the most likely scenario
from which legal consequences flow. We first look into the possible
plaintiff and defendant.
The ROC has been a net oil importing country in the past decades.40 By no stretch of imagination can one expect it to export oil,
even if the ROC found a bonanza on the seabed. Domestic consumption would eat up the bulk, if not the whole, of the oil find.
Moreover, no marketing network can be set up overnight, even if
there is surplus oil for export. One therefore can assume with confidence that Chinese Petroleum Corporation (the state oil enterprise)
itself would not market the oil abroad. It most likely would be distributed through the existing sales outlets of the CPC's foreign partners or assignees. In fact, under the joint venture contract, the
foreign partner may export its share of the oil production after commercial discovery. 41 The potential litigant therefore would be either
CPC's foreign co-venturer or its assignee.
To the extent of government control of the oil industry, the
same is true with respect to the PRC. The administration of its oil
production and export are vested in two state enterprises under the
Ministry of Petroleum Industry and the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade, respectively. 42 Since the latter has no
marketing outlets of its own abroad, the potential party to the legal
battle would be either the foreign concessionaire, who brings the oil
40. See generally, Petroleum History of China, supra Chapter 2, note 85.
41. E.g., the CPC/Conoco Contract, art. VII (right to export petroleum). The contract is in the author's possession.
42. Randall W. Hardym, China's Oil Future: A Case of Modest Expectations, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, !979, p. 101. It is unclear as of this writing in August
1984 whether the newly established China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC)
may market oil directly abroad. It is assumed that it cannot.
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into the forum state, or the assignee of the PRC's state enterprise in
charge of oil export. So the legal battle would be fought by two f?reign oil or trading companies rather than by two governmental mstrumentalities of the PRC and the ROC. For convenience, the
litigants hereafter are referred to as the "PRC's assignee" or the
"ROC's assignee," respectively. Thus, questions of locus standi of
unrecognized government and sovereign immunity would not
arise. 43 Also, the defendant would logically possess the oil in
question.
The central issue of the lawsuit would be the title to oil recovered from the overlapping concession blocks. That either foreign assignee holds a valid title to the disputed oil can be assumed since
transactions that effect the granting of concession or assignment
would take place within the territory under the effective control of
the PRC or the ROC and under their respective laws. The question
posed to the foreign court is, rather, which title should be recognized
under the law and policy of the forum state. This of course would
lead to a host of other legal issues.
Since all the three forum states chosen here have recognized the
PRC, derecognized the ROC, and in varying degrees acknowledged
the PRC's claim to Taiwan, the legal issues before the courts may be
threefold. First, to what extent is the judiciary bound by the executive's recognition policy and practice? Second, to what extent would
the courts take judicial cognizance of the legislative and administrative acts of a recognized or unrecognized government? Third, if the
legal acts of two rival governments are in conflict, are such conflicts
justiciable?
2.

United Kingdom Practice
(a)

Practice of the British Government

The United Kingdom was the first Western nation to recognize
the PRC as the de jure government of China on January 6, 1950.
Thereupon, it ceased to recognize the ROC as such. London continued to maintain, however, a consulate in Taiwan. This British practice, understandably offensive to the PRC, led to the latter's adamant
refusal for 22 years to raise their bilateral relationship from the level
of charge d'a.ffaires to that of ambassadors. Prompted by America's
shift of China policy, London decided in March 1972 to exchange
43. For a discussion of these questions, see generally Daniel P. O'Connell, supra note
3, pp. 166-83.
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ambassadors with Peking. 44 The joint communique announcing the
move stated:
The Government of the United Kingdom, acknowledging
the position of the Chinese Government that Taiwan is a
province of the People's Republic of China, have decided
to remove their official representation in Taiwan on 13th
March 1972.45 (Emphasis added.)
Thus, the United Kingdom reversed its position on Taiwan's legal
status, held for 22 years. Britain's acceptance of the PRC's position
was further confirmed by the accompanying statement of Sir Alec
Douglas-Home, the British Foreign Secretary, in the House of Commons on the same day. 46
It is clear that the United Kingdom has, since March 13, 1972,
acknowledged the de jure sovereignty of the PRC over Taiwan. A
question arises, however, as to the legal status of the ROC in the eyes
of the British Government between January 6, 1950 and March 13,
1972. The stationing of a British consul in Taiwan during that period further complicates the question. Did the United Kingdom implicitly recognize the ROC as the de facto government of Taiwan?
The answer to this question will have material bearing on the question of seabed rights because all the laws and regulations of the ROC
dealing with seabed exploitation and all but one of CPC's joint venture contracts had become effective before 1972. If the ROC was
recognized as the de facto government of Taiwan, the validity of its
laws and regulations would be judicially recognized by English
courts; otherwise, the courts are free, and in some cases bound, to
declare them as nullities. We shall review below the British practice
in search of the answer.
In CiVIl Air Transport v. Central Air Transport Corporation ,47 the
44. New York Times, March 14, 1972, p. I.
45. Supra note 32.
46. He said:
Both the Government of the People's Republic of China and Taipeh [sic] maintain that Taiwan is part of China. We held the view both at Cairo and at Potsdam that Taiwan should be restored to China. That view has not changed. We
think that the Taiwan question is China's internal affair to be settled by the
Chinese people themselves.
Great Britain, Parliament, Parliamentary Debates (House of Commons), 5th Ser., Vol.
833 (March 13-24, 1972), p. 32.
47. [1953] A. C. 70; [1952] All E.R. 733; British lntemationa/ Law Cases, Vol. 7 (1969),
p. 523. This case was discussed in F.A. Mann, "Recognition of Sovereignty," Modem
Law Review, Vol. 16 (1953) p. 226; Comment, Michigan Law Review, Vol. 52 (1953), p.
307; 'Aristerides', "The Chinese Aircraft in Hong Kong," lntemationa/ Law Quarterly.
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British Foreign Office, in reply to questions put to it by the Hong
Kong trial court respecting China, stated on February 11, 1950 that
Britain had switched de facto as well as de jure recognition from the
Nationalist Government to the Communist Government of China.
It specifically drew the Court's attention to the fact that
H.M. Government recognize that the Nationalist Government has ceased to be the de facto government of the Republic of China. It ceased to be the de facto government of
different parts of the territories of the Republic of China as
from the dates on which it ceased to be in eff"ective control of
those parts .48 (emphasis added.)
With respect to the status of Taiwan, the Foreign Office continued:
On October 25, 1945, as a result of an order issued on the
basis of consultation and agreement between the Allied
Powers concerned, the Japanese forces in Formosa [i.e.,
Taiwan] surrendered to Chiang Kai-shek. Thereupon, with
the consent of the Allied Powers, administration of Formosa [i.e., Taiwan] was undertaken by the Government of
the Republic of China. At present [the governor of the island] has not repudiated the superior authority of the Nationalist Government. 49
Britain's position on Taiwan's status further was clarified by
Foreign Secretary Eden in the House of Commons on February 4,
1955:
Under the Peace Treaty [between Japan and the ROC] of
April, 1952, Japan formally renounced all right, title and
claim to Formosa [i.e., Taiwan] and the Pescadores; but
again this did not operate as a transfer to Chinese sovereignty, whether to the People's Republic of China or to the
Chinese Nationalist authorities. Formosa [i.e., Taiwan] and
the Pescadores are therefore, in view of Her Majesty's Government, territory the de jure sovereignty over which is uncertain or undetermined. 50 (Emphasis added.)
Vol. 4 (1951), p. 159; [Note), British Yearbook oflntemationa/ Law, Vol. 29 (1952), p.
464.
48. [1953) A.C. 87.
49. Ibid.
50. Great Britain, Parliament, Parliamentary Debates, (House of Commons), 5th
Ser., Vol. 536 (Jan. 25-Feb. II, 1955), pp. 159-60; Majorie M. Whiteman, Digest of International Law, Vol. 3, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1964, p. 565.
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In Luigi Monta of Genoa v. Cechofracht Co ., 51 the Foreign Office certified in 1956 that " ...Her Majesty's Government did not
recognize that any government was located in Formosa [i.e., Taiwan]
in July and August, 1953." 52
In June 1964, London's relations with Taiwan were explained
by Robert Mathew, Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, in the
House of Commons in the following terms:
Our senior consular officer in Taiwan holds the rank of
Consul. As he does not have diplomatic status, no question
of accreditation arises. His relations are only with the local
provincial authorities, and he has no contact with the Central Nationalist authorities. . . . As we do not recognize
any of the authorities in Taiwan as constituting a Government, Her Majesty's Government do not consider that it
would be appropriate to accept consular officers appointed
by these authorities. 53
Since no material political change has occurred in Taiwan since
1949, the above British position vis-a-vis Taiwan remained valid until March 13, 1972.
Since 1972, the British Government has had only one occasion
to summarize its position: that occurred in an executive certificate in
Reel v. Holder and Another 54 decided in 1979:
HMG [Her Majesty's Government] do not, and have never
regarded Taiwan as a state. Nor do we regard the Chinese
Nationalist authorities in Taiwan as a Government and
have not done so since 1950, when we ceased to recognize
them as the Government of China. . . The Government of
the United Kingdom acknowledge the position of the Chinese Government that Taiwan is a province of the People's
Republic of China. 55
It is generally agreed that recognition, de jure or de facto, is a
matter of intent on the part of the recognizing state. 56 Here the
United Kingdom's intent in denying the ROC as the de jure or de
51. [1956] 2 Q.B. 552; [1956] 2 All E.R. 769; British International Law Cases, Vol. 7
(1969), p. 540.
52. [1956] 2 Q.B. 553.
53. Great Britain, Parliament, Parliamentary Debates (House of Commons), 5th Ser.,
Vol. 696 (June 8-19, 1964), p. 908.
54. [1979] 3 All E.R. 1041; (1979) 1 W.L.R. 1252.
55. [1979] 3 All. E.R. 1050-51.
56. Green H. Hackworth, supra note 13, Vol. 1, p. 166.
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facto government of China (not including Taiwan) is beyo~d doubt.
The British position on the undetermined legal status of Taiwan an~
the "military occupation" of it by the ROC also precludes the possibility of a British recognition of ROC as the de jure government of
Taiwan. But Britain's intent, or lack of it, in recognizing the ROC as
the de facto government of Taiwan seems less clear as a result of
continued British official representation on the island. Yet London's
repeated denials of recognition of the authorities in Taiwan as a
"government" should preclude any implication to the contrary, even
though the kind of recognition (de jure or de facto) being denied was
not specified. Actually, even if the British mission were accredited to
the central government of the ROC, the circumstances probably
would still have barred the implication of de facto recognition. British practice abounds in instances where British missions were sent to
unrecognized states with express denial of recognition, de facto or de
jure .57 Even in the absence of the excuse of a legally uncertain Taiwan, the United Kingdom still could have maintained a consul in
Taiwan, as a part of China, without conferring recognition on the
ROC as the de facto government of Taiwan.
On the other hand, the existence of the ROC as a government
exercising sovereignty in Taiwan is a fact Britain has not denied. Its
non-recognition of the ROC, a policy not entirely consistent with its
recognition practice based on the effectiveness of the government, 58
obviously is dictated by its policy toward the PRC.

(b)

Practice of English Courts

It has been an established practice of English courts to seek information from the Foreign Office regarding certain international
facts, 59 such as whether a foreign state or government is recognized
by Britain or whether a state of war exists. The information, issued
in a statement known as the "executive certificate," is generally binding on the courts. 60 But in cases where the Foreign Office feels reluc57. Hersch Lauterpacht, Recognition in International Law, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1947, pp. 346-47.
58. Ibid., pp. 116-24. Britain may, however, argue that the State of China could not
obtain sovereignty over Taiwan merely as a result of military occupation without a peace
treaty with the defeated Japan which was still the de jure sovereign of that island. Since
the 1951, 1952 peace treaties with Japan did not specify the new de jure sovereign of
Taiwan, Britain was bound by its treaty obligation to withhold recognition to the ROC
despite its effective control of the island.
59. Daniel P. O'Connell, supra note 3, pp. 113-19.
60. Ibid. Insofar as recognition of government is concerned, Britain decided in 1980
to cease according recognition to government but only to reveal its dealings with regimes
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tant to be conclusive in an uncertain or delicate situation, the
certificate tends to be "temporizing" and the courts are at liberty to
admit additional evidence in drawing their own conclusions. 61 In
recent decades, English courts have occasionally departed, in the
name of justice, from the views of the Foreign Office in cases where
the existence of an unrecognized government and its legal acts were
at issue. It is useful to review a number of cases on recognition of
states or governments in appreciating the prevailing trend in this
regard.
English courts traditionally have been hostile toward unrecognized governments. 62 Believing that the King cannot speak with two
voices, 63 they invariably withheld judicial cognizance from governments unrecognized by the British government. In Luther v. Sagor, 64
a decree of the newly established Soviet government in Russia purporting to nationalize the plaintiffs company was denied validity in
the King's Bench for lack of recognition by Britain. Pending appeal,
London extended de facto recognition to Moscow. Judgment was
reversed on appeal. 65 This case reinforced the long English tradition
and demonstrated the sharp distinction in legal effects between recognition and non-recognition.
The Italian annexation of Ethiopia in 1936 gave rise to the coincidence of two governments: one recognized by Britain as de jure
government and the other as de facto. In a litigation over public
funds abroad, the Ethiopian emperor, who had been recognized as
the de jure sovereign of Ethiopia, lost when such recognition was
withdrawn by the British government. The Court of Appeal in Haile
Selassie v. Cable and Wireless Limited (No. 2)66 reasoned that since
the British government had switched de jure recognition from the
that come to power unconstitutionally. For details, see Clive R. Symmons, "United
Kingdom Abolition of the Doctrine of Government: A Rose by Another Name?" Public
Law, 1981, p. 249.
61. See A.B. Lyons, "Judicial Application of International Law and the 'Temporizing' Certificate of the Executive," British Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 29
(1952), p. 227.
62. Daniel P. O'Connell, supra note 3, pp. 167-72.
63. Ibid., pp. 116-17.
64. [1921] 3 K.B. 532; [1921] All E.R. 138; British International Law Cases, Vol. 2
(1965), p. 97.
65. Accord: White, Child and Beney Ltd. v. Eagle Star & British Dominions Insurance Company, (1922) 38 T.L.R. 616; [1922] All E.R. 482; Princess Paley Olga v. Weisz
and Others, [1929]1 K.B. 718; [1928) All E.R. 513.
66. [1939) 1 Ch. 182; [1938) 3 All E.R. 677; British International Law Cases, Vol. 2
(1965), p. 171.
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Ethiopian Emperor to the King of Italy, the latter, as Emperor of
Abyssinia, "is entitled by succession to the public property of the
State of Abyssinia, and the later Emperor of Abyssinia's title thereto
is no longer recognized as existent."67 The Court stated that "it is
not disputed that that right of succession is to be dated back at any
rate to the date when the de facto recognition ... took place." 68
The right of succession to public property abroad will have important bearing on the discussion below.
In the Civil Air Transport case cited earlier the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council dealt squarely with the question of conflicting claims of the two Chinese governments to public property in
Hong Kong. The issue before the court was whether Britain's recognition of the PRC on January 5, 1950 had the retroactive effect of
invalidating the sale of government aircraft located in Hong Kong
by the ROC to two Americans prior to that date. The Privy Council
upheld the validity of the sale on the ground that recognition worked
retroactively only to validate the acts of the erstwhile unrecognized
government but not to invalidate those of the de jure government
prior to de-recognition. 69 No question, however, was raised as to
either the succession rights of the PRC government or the status of
the ROC and its legal acts after British de-recognition.
The first case that dealt with the ROC's legal personality was
Luigi Monta, referred to earlier. The issue was whether the ROC,
which was regarded in the British Foreign Office's executive certificate as a nongovernment, nevertheless should be considered as a
government for the purpose of construing a war risks clause in a
charter party. The Court declared that the certificate neither was
conclusive nor exclusive of other evidence. 70 It went on to say that
the "government" referred to in a war risks clause need not be a
government recognized by Britain. Mr. Justice Seller, refuting the
proposition that "if there is no recognition there is on government,"
opined:
Apparently the government situated and functioning in
Formosa [i.e., Taiwan] was at one time recognized by this
country, and it does not follow because recognition has
ceased that the government, once recognized, has in any
way altered its activities or lost such powers or authority as
67.
68.
69.
70.

[1939] I Ch. 182.
Ibid.
[1953] A.C. 93.
[1956] 2 Q.B. 565.
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it had been exercising. 71
The de-factoism of Luigi was absent in a 1965 patent case, the
In Re Harshaw Chemical Company's Patent .12 The patentee applied
for an extension of the term of his patent, relating to a chemical
method using nickel, on the ground of war loss (including loss of
opportunity) based on the difficulty of developing the invention over
the period of nickel scarcity during the Korean War. Under the Patent Act of 1949, if such loss were occasioned by reason of hostilities
between Britain and "any foreign state", extension may be granted.
The Court, based on a brief and conclusive certificate from the Foreign Office stating that North Korea was unrecognized as a sovereign
state, took a restrictive view of the statutory language and rejected
the application.
But the de facto legal personality of another satellite state of the
Soviet Union was recognized, in an unorthodox fashion, by the
House of Lords in Carl Zeiss St!ftung v. Rayner and Kee/er. 73 The
12-year passing-off battle was initiated by the Carl Zeiss St!ftung
(Foundation), an optical instrument firm in East Germany, to enjoin
the use of its trade name by a West German firm, also known as Carl
Zeiss St!ftung, and its British distributors. The Foreign Office certified that East Germany was unrecognized/ 4 but added:
Her Majesty's Government have recognized the State and
Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as
de jure entitled to exercise governing authority in respect of
[East Germany]. 75
Following this curious formulation, the House of Lords held that
although the German Democratic Republic is not recognized by Her Majesty's Government, its acts should be recognized by the courts as lawful, not as the acts of a
sovereign state, but as acts done by a subordinate body
which the U.S.S.R. set up to act on its behalf, since a de
jure governing body cannot disclaim responsibility for the
acts of subordinate bodies set up by it?6
It seems that the House of Lords invented from the executive
71.
72.
73.
(1971),
74.
75.
76.

Ibid., p. 567.
[1965] R.C.P. 97. Curiously, Luigi was not even mentioned in the opinion.
(1967] A.C. 853; [1966] 2 All E.R. 536; British International Law Cases, Vol. 8
p. 207.
[1967] A.C. 854.
Ibid., p. 855.
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certificate a theolf, under which East Germany acts as the agent of
the Soviet Union. 7 The decision was, on its face, in full accord with
the Luther v. Sagor rule, but the House of Lords (per Lord Wilberforce) did express its doubts on the rigidity and sweeping effect of
that rule. 78 In this sense, the reasoning of this decision could be
viewed as an effort to by-pass the unpalatable effect of that rule.
The de-factoism of Luigi was revived in a 1970 case with the
same factual pattern as in Harshaw Chemical. In In ReAl-Fin Corporation "S Patents 79 the Court, citing Luigi, construed the Patent Act
in a way that North Korea was regarded as a "foreign state" within
the meaning of the statute. It must be remembered that the Foreign
Office, though denying British recognition of North Korea, did note
in its certificate that North Korea controlled the area of Korea north
of the 38th ParalleP0 The Foreign Office also advised the Court to
draw its own conclusion oflaw. It may be said that given the Court's
reliance on Luigi, even if the executive certificate had been intended
to be conclusive, as in Harshaw Chemical, the case would have come
out the same way.
In a more recent case, Hesperides Hotels v. Aegean Turkish Holidays and Muftizade, 81 decided in 1978, all the issues that concern us:
77. Daniel P. O'Connell, supra note 3, p. 170.
78. Lord Wiberforce stated:
In the United States some glimmerings can be found of the idea that non-recognition cannot be pressed to its ultimate logical limit and that where private
rights, or acts of everyday occurrence, or peifunctory acts of administration are
concerned (the scope of these exceptions has never been precisely dtjined) the
courts may, in the interest of justice and common sense, where no consideration
of public policy to the contrary has to prevail, give recognition to the actual
facts or realities found to exist in the territory in question.
No trace of any
such doctrine is yet to be found in English law, but equally in my opinion, there
is nothing in those English decisions, in which recognition has been refused to
particular acts of non-recognized governments, which would prevent its acceptance or which [would] prescribe the absolute and total invalidity of all laws and
acts fiowing from unrecognized governments. . . I should wish to regard it as an
open question, in English law . .. (emphasis added).
[1967] A.C. 954.
79. (1970] I Ch. 160; [1969] 3 All E.R. 396; British International Law Cases, Vol. 9
91973), p. I. For a discussion on exceptions to traditional English law on recognition
(including the AI- Fin case), see J.G. Merrills, "Recognition and Construction," International & Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 20 (1970), p. 476.
80. [1970] I Ch. 160.
81. (1978] 3 W.L.R. 378, H.L.; [1978] I All E.R. 277. This case was noted in British
Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 49 (1978), p. 259; Cambridge Law Journal, 1978, p.
48; Malcolm Shaw, "Legal Acts of an Unrecognized Entity," Law Quarterly Review, Vol.
94 (1978), p. 500; J.G. Merrills, "Trespass to Foreign Land," International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 28 (1979), pp. 523-25; Zaim M. Nedjati, "Acts of Unrecognized
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the conclusiveness of the executive certificate, judicial cognizance of
an unrecognized government, and justiciability of the question in
our hypothetical case, were squarely dealt with. Plaintiffs were
Greek-Cypriot companies that owned hotels in Northern Cyprus,
which were taken over by Turkish-Cypriots after the Turkish invasion in 197 4 and were run by the latter under a lease from the new
authorities calling themselves the "Turkish Federated State of Cyprus" (TFSC). Owners of the plaintiff companies fled to southern
Cyprus where a Greek-Cypriot administration was in control. Plaintiffs sought to enjoin the defendants, an English Travel Agent and
the London representative of TFSC, from promoting holidays in the
plaintiffs' hotels.
One of the issues before the Court was what law, as lex loci
delicti, should apply to make the alleged trespass actionable in England. In reply to an inquiry by the Court, the Foreign Office stated
that Britain did not recognize the TFSC either as the de jure or de
facto government of Cyprus and that the only lawful government
recognized in Cyprus was the Republic of Cyprus set up by the Cyprus Act of 1960. 82
Lord Denning of the Court of Appeal, in response to the argument that the Court should follow the executive certificate and regard as nullities the laws of TFSC that authorized the occupation of
the premises, made an elaborate discussion of this issue. His views
are worth quoting at length:
That doctrine is said to be based on the need for the
executive and the courts to speak with one voice. If the
executive do not recognise the usurping government, nor
should the courts: see The Arantzazu Mendi by Lord Atkin.
But there are those who do not subscribe to that view.
They say that there is no need for the executive and the
judiciary to speak in unison. The executive is concerned
with the external consequences of recognition, vis-a-vis
other states. The courts are concerned with the internal
Governments,'' ibid., Vol. 30 ( 1981 ), pp. 388, 391, 397. This issue of judicial cognizance
was dealt with only in Lord Dennings' opinion in the Court of Appeal. The other two
law judges, while expressing some sympathy with Lord Denning's views, focused on the
question of trespass on foreign land. [1978] I All E.R. 277, 291, 293. On appeal to the
House of Lords, their Lordships considered it unnecessary to decide this issue which was
fully argued. [1978]3 W.L.R. 378, 382, 388. The House of Lords allowed the appeal in
part to permit the action to continue as regards the chattels (contents of the two hotels)
but not land or immovable property. Ibid., p. 387, 395.
82. [1978] I All E.R. 281.
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consequences of it, vis-a-vis private individuals. So far as
the courts are concerned, there are many who hold that the
courts are entitled to look at the state of affairs actually existing in a territory, to see what is the law which is in fact
effective and enforced in that territory, and to give such effect to it in its impact on individuals as justice and common
sense require, provided always that there are no considerations of public policy against it. 83 (original footnote
omitted)
If it were necessary to make a choice between these
conflicting doctrines, I would unhesitatingly hold that the
courts of this country can recognise the laws or acts ofa body
which is in effective control of a territory even though it has
not been recognized by Her Majesty's Government de jure or
de facto, at any rate in regard to the laws which regulate
the day to day affairs of the people, such as their marriages,
their divorces, their leases, their occupations and so forth;
and furthermore that the courts can receive evidence of the
state of affairs so as to see whether the body is in effective
control or not. 84 (emphasis added)
He then concluded on the question of justiciability:
Although this case has involved much discussion on
many points, I think it could be disposed of on a broad
ground of public policy. Underlying this case is a divergence of view between two autonomous administrations in
Cyprus. The northern administration sets itself up as an
administration entitled to pass laws requisitioning this
property. The southern administration denies the claim
and says that the requisitioning was unlawful. It is not the
province of these courts to resolve such a dispute. It is a dispute which should be settled by negotiation between the
two administrations aided, we hope, by intermediaries of
good will. It is indeed, we hope, being settled at this very
moment by negotiations in Vienna. If a settlement is
reached it should deal with all questions relating to the taking of property, compensation and so forth. But, whether it
is settled or not, it is not for these courts to decide between
these conflicting views. The dispute, in my view, is not justi83. Ibid., p. 282.
84. Ibid., p. 283.
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ciab/e here. The action should be struck out as not sustainable. I would allow the appeal accordingly. 85 (emphasis
added).
In Reel v. Holder and Another 86 decided in 1981, the English
courts were faced with a direct confrontation between national athletic bodies of the PRC and ROC regarding membership in the England-based International Amateur Athletic Federation (IAAF).
Under Rule 1(2) of the IAAF, membership is open to "national governing body" of any "country," and it is expressly provided that the
jurisdiction of IAAF members is limited to the "political boundaries
of the country they represent." In 1954, the IAAF accepted the application for membership of the PRC body from the Chinese mainland while it also extended an invitation to the ROC body from
Taiwan to apply. The ROC applied in 1956 and was accepted as a
member in due course. The PRC body then withdrew in protest in
1958. Twenty years later, in the IAAF's 1978 meeting, a resolution
was passed to re-admit the PRC body as the sole representative of
the country "China" with jurisdiction covering Taiwan. This, in effect, amounted to excluding the ROC body from membership. The
ROC body thereupon sued the IAAF in English courts to annul the
resolution.
Judge Forbes of the Queens Bench Division, finding no reason
for equating "country" with "nation" and noting that neither the
PRC body nor the ROC body had control of athletes in the other
body's territory, found the resolution in violation of the IAAF Rule
1(a) and thus void. 87 On appeal, judgment was affirmed. Lord Denning of the Court of Appeal opined:
In the rule, "the jurisdiction of members of the Federation shall be limited to the political boundaries of the
country they represent", the governing word is "country".
One "country, is Taiwan. Another "country, is mainland
China. The jurisdiction of the Athletic Association of Taiwan
is limited to Taiwan. The jurisdiction ofAthletic Association
of mainland China is limited to mainland China. 88 (emphasis added)
And Law Judge Eveleigh concurred:
85. Ibid., p. 286.
86. Reel v. Holder and another, [1981] 3 All E.R.; [1981] 1 W.L.R. 1226, C.A. affirming [1979] 3 All E.R. 1041; 1 W.L.R. 1252.
87. [1979] 3 All E.R. 1052.
88. [1981] 3 All E.R. 325.
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The word "country" has been used in the rules in order to
delineate the area of authority. They do not use the word
in the sense of sovereign state.
That rule clearly contemplates that there may be an
existing member of the IAAF which is a colony and not
itself a sovereign state. I think that the word is used in the
rules in the sense of an area or part of the world where the
applicant has authority in relation to athletics and an area
to which the word "country" is appropriate because the inhabitants share the right to live there in common as one distinct people. This is a question to be answered broadly and
not on a political basis alone. Political status may have
some relevance. It may perhaps help to see the inhabitants
as being one people, but is is not the decisive factor. 89 (emphasis added)
In restoring the ROC body's lost membership, both courts were
carefully confining themselves to interpreting the rules of the IAAF,
which are legally a contract among its members, without touching
upon the sensitive issue of who represents the state of China in the
IAAF. Yet it still is significant that the ROC and PRC were, for the
purpose of contract interpretation, considered two distinct "countries," mutually exclusive of each other. In no cases other than colonies has the word "country" ever been interpreted as something less
than a sovereign state. Given the British Foreign and Commonwealth Relation Office's certificate cited earlier, such a decision
could not have been reached without a strong sense of de factoism
on the part of the judges concerned. In fact, the Court of Appeal
showed the same degree of de factoism earlier in solving a similar
problem in relation to badminton in an unreported 1977 case Shen
Fu Chang v. Ste//an Mohlin (July 5, 1977). 90 In that case, Judge
Robert Goff made a declaration that Taiwan could be a member of
the International Badminton Federation. 91 Although the question of
judicial cognizance of an unrecognized government's legal acts was
not involved in either cases, both cases will help the new trend of
judicial realism take shape in England.
In sum, the above cases show a gradual but definite departure
by English courts from their traditional rigid position on unrecog89. Ibid., pp. 326-27.
90. Ibid., p. 324.
91. Ibid.
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nized governments and their legal acts. As a result, English courts
are less inclined to follow unreservedly the views of the Foreign Office and have become increasingly independent in these matters. Yet
the old tradition remains strong. 92 Although more judicial development of the new de-factoism is needed before a definite rule could
emerge, the view that a government, not recognized de jure or at
least de facto by the British Government, should be regarded by
English courts as non-existent, is being totally abandoned.
(c)

Implications for the Peking-Taipei Contest for Seabed

Oil
If the PRC's or ROC's assignee brings an action to contest the
other's title to oil in question in an English court, how would the
court decide? The court would, as usual, consult the Foreign Office,
which can be expected to issue a certificate outlining the position of
the British government. However conclusive that certificate might
purport to be, the Court probably would not accept it blindly in exclusion of other evidence, as a number of recent cases have shown.
One therefore may assume with some confidence that the Court
would consider the parties' arguments and the authorities on which
they rely in reaching its own conclusion. It is thus useful to look into
the potential contentions of the PRC's and ROC's assignees.
(1)

The "Public Property" Argument

The PRC's assignee, either as plaintiff or defendant, would argue, citing Haile Selassie, that since Britain has recognized the PRC
as the only de jure government of all China, including Taiwan, and
since the oil in question is a public property belonging to the Chinese
State, only the PRC has title to it. He further would contend that
since Britain does not recognize the ROC as a government, the validity of all the ROC's legal acts, including those that effected the assignment of the oil to the ROC's assignee, should be denied by
English courts. He would invoke a chain of authorities in his support prior to and after Luther v. Sagor.
This argument deserves scrutiny. Transfer of public property,
e.g., land, buildings, bank accounts, from a displaced government to
its successor regime within the dispossessed territory occurs as a matter of course in cases of governmental succession effected either
92. Lord Denning was criticized for having gone too far and for his alleged misunderstanding of Lord Wilberforce's dictum in Carl Zeiss which he quoted. Malcolm
Shaw, supra note 81, p. 502.
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through normal or revolutionary means. This is what actua~y h~p
pened on the Chinese mainland after 1949. If the property 1s situated abroad and the title thereto is contested by the rival regimes,
usually the court of the state in which the property is located will
determine the rightful owner of it on the basis of recognition by that
state. Haile Selassie and Civil Air Transport are precedents in
point. 93 But is the oil in dispute a "public property?"
The oil is not property before it is recovered from the subsoil of
the continental shelf. If the PRC recovers it, then the PRC has title
to the oil because it, as a government recognized by Britain, has sovereign rights under international law over resources in its continental
shelf. The ROC's assignee would have little basis to claim the oil,
regardless of whether the oil has been assigned by the PRC to a private party. However, if the oil is recovered by the ROC and assigned to a private assignee, the "public property" argument seems
questionable even though the oil is now under English jurisdiction.
In this context, the date of Britain's acknowledgment of the PRC's de
jure sovereignty over Taiwan, ie., March 13, 1972, becomes critical.
Since Britain before that date did not consider Taiwan as part
of China, the PRC may not claim any property in Taiwan owned by
the ROC, including the oil in question, as public property belonging
to the State of China. After the oil was assigned to a private party
and shipped to England, it ceased to be public property. Moreover,
neither the PRC nor its assignee can claim it under Haile Selassie.
However, the PRC's assignee would assert that the PRC may
claim title to all public property situated in Taiwan after March 13,
1972, including the oil in question, on the ground that Britain has
acknowledged the PRC's sovereignty over Taiwan at that time. He
further would assert that since the ROC long has been derecognized
by Britain as a government of China, it has no authority to assign
any public property of China in Taiwan after that date to a private
party. As a result, the argument continues, the ROC's assignee holds
no legal title to the oil in question. If the court accepts this line of
argument, the impact on the ROC would be devastating. From then
on, not only would the ROC be a non-entity in the eyes of English
courts, but title to all properties owned or acquired by the ROC automatically would become vested in the PRC as far as English law is
93. There are a number of American cases in this regard. Eg., The Rogdai, 278 F.
294 (N.D. Cal. 1920); Bank of China v. Wells Fargo Bank and Union Trust Company,
104 F. Supp. 59 (N.D. Cal. 1952); Republic of China v. American Express Co., 195 F.2d
230 (2d Cir. 1952).
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concerned. The disruption of international transactions involving
the ROC as a party would be eqormous and far-reaching.
There seems to be no rule in English law that gives such sweeping and unjust effect to recognition by the British government, especially when the property in question has been transferred to private
hands. The rule of Haile Selassie, where the property remained in
the hands of the derecognized government, does not apply here.
More importantly, if the recent emergence of judicial de factoism
toward unrecognized governments makes any sense, the English
court would not be blind to the reality in Taiwan, as Reel v. Holder
has shown, where the ROC continues to exercise de facto sovereignty. More likely than not, the court would look into additional
evidence and determine to what extent it would recognize legal acts
of the ROC which underlie the validity of the title of the ROC's
assignee.
(2)

The De Facto Doctrine

To determine whether the ROC's legal acts warrant judicial
cognizance the court would have to consider whether such cognizance would violate the public policy of the forum as well as the
nature of the legal acts in question. It is clear that Britain's derecognition of the ROC did not result from any inherent illegality, as
in the case of Rhodesia, 94 or Britain's international obligation of
non-recognition, as in the case of Transkei and Bophuthatswana in
South Africa. 95 This absence of objection on public policy grounds
does not solve the problem, however. Difficult questions remain re94. Rhodesia's unilateral independence in 1965 was illegal in that it was ultra vires,
since independence could only be granted by an act of the British Parliament. See J.E.S.
Fawcett, "Security Council Resolutions on Rhodesia," British Yearbook of International
Law, Vol. 41 (1965-1966), pp. 103, 105.
95. Transkei declared its independence from South Africa on October 26, 1976. New
York Times, October 26, 1976, p. 1. Bophuthatswana, another one of the nine bantustans, or tribal homelands, in South Africa, did so in December 1977. The United Nations General Assembly passed, immediately after Transkei's declaration of
independence, a resolution declaring that independence null and void because it consolidated South Africa's Apartheid policies, and condemned the establishment of all bantustans. General Assembly Resolution 31/6, UNGAOR, Vol. 31, Supplement (No. 39) p.
10, UN Doc. A/31/39 (1977). The resolution was passed unanimously. Other than
south Africa, no U.N. member state has granted recognition to Transkei. The international obligation of non-recognition derives its authority from the U.N. Charter, customary international law of human rights, and multilateral treaties to which Britain is a party
(e.g., the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights). For a discussion on
Transkei, see Merrie F. Witkin, "Transkei: An Analysis of the Practice of RecognitionPolitical or Legal?" Harvard International Law Journal, Vol. 18 (1977), p. 605.
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specting whether to limit judicial cognizance to "perfunctory acts of
administration," as stated by Carl Zeiss (per Lord Wilberforce), 96
such as certification of marriage or divorce, or to include other exercises of governmental authority, as intimated in Hesperides (per
Lord Denning in Court of Appeal), 97 which presumably include the
power to exploit seabed oil and dispose of it.
On the other hand, the PRC, as a recognized government,
should have little difficulty getting judicial cognizance of its law and
decrees that validate the title of its assignee. 98 If the H esperides rule
prevails, which is not unlikely in view of the new trend of realism in
English cases, a real conflict would emerge before the court, namely,
one between the legal acts of two rival governments of the same
state. The situation bears considerable resemblance to that of Cyprus where two mutually independent administrations co-exist and
effectively control their respective territories. More complicated
than Hesperides is the fact that the Peking-Taipei rivalry involves oil
recovered from an area of the seabed over which they both lack sovereignty, stricto sensu, under customary intemationallaw. 99 A further attempt by the court to ascertain the respective de facto
jurisdiction of the ROC and PRC practically would require a determination of the shelf boundary in the Taiwan Strait between the
ROC and the PRC. At this point, even the most liberal judge would
find the task formidable, since no law exists regarding the delimitation of continental shelf between two rival governments of the same
state. A logical step for the court to take would be to declare the
dispute non-justiciable, as Lord Denning did in Hesperides. This
means that the plaintiff's contest would fail and that the defendant
would retain the oil which he must have had already in possession.
If the Hesperides rule did not prevail, then the ROC's legal acts
dealing with seabed exploitation would not be recognized. Regardless of who sues, the ROC's assignee would lose.
In conclusion, the newly emerged de factoism on the part of
English courts could benefit the ROC's assignee, but only if the assignment took place before March 13, 1972, and only if he has the oil
and is sued as defendant. The best outcome he can hope for is a
dismissal of the suit for lack of jurisdiction under Hesperides. If he
96. See his opinion quoted in supra note 78.
97. See the quotation in text accompanying note 84 supra.
98. On judicial cognizance of recognized governments, see Daniel P. O'Connell,
supra note 3, p. 183.
99. A state has, under Article 2 of the Continental Shelf Convention, only sovereign
rights to the natural resources in the continental shelf, but not to the shelf itself.
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sues as a plaintiff, his chances for winning in all circumstances are
slim.
3.

Japanese Practice
(a) Practice of the Japanese Government

Japan's post-war China policy was influenced heavily by the
United States. Having regained full sovereignty from the Allied
Powers under the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty, Japan in 1952
signed a separate peace treaty with the ROC, 100 a country which
was, like the PRC, not invited to the peace conference. 101 The 1952
treaty terminated the state of war between China and Japan 102 and
the Japanese sovereignty over Taiwan 103 and served as the basis for
a host of other bilateral treaties. 104 Exchange of ambassadors in that
year between Tokyo and Taipei marked the resumption of diplomatic relations.
In the next two decades, Tokyo, following the American lead,
continued to recognize Taipei and support the ROC's seat in the
United Nations until the latter's expulsion in 1971. On the other
hand, Japan managed to maintain unofficial economic relations with
the PRC. The reversal of Washington's China policy in 1971
shocked Tokyo and accelerated the process of "normalization of relations" between Tokyo and Peking. In the joint communique of
September 29, 1972, establishing diplomatic relations between them,
it was declared:
The government of Japan recognizes the government
of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal government of China.
The Government of the People's Republic of China
reaffirms that Taiwan is an inalienable part of the territory
of the People's Republic of China. The government of Japan fully understands and respects this stand of the government of China and adheres to its stand of complying with
Article 8 of the Potsdam Proclamation. 105 (emphasis
100. Treaty of Peace, Republic of China-Japan, April28, 1952, UNTS, Vol. 138, p. 38.
101. This was due to disagreement between the U.S., which recognized the ROC, and
the U.K., the U.S.S.R. and other countries that had recognized the PRC, with respect to
which government should represent China in the peace conference. The compromise
reached was that neither would be invited. Hungdah Chiu, supra note 6, p. 125.
102. ROC-Japan Peace Treaty, art. 1.
103. Ibid., art. 2.
104. Ibid., arts. 7, 8, 9.
105. Peking Review, October 6, 1972, pp. 12-13.
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added)
In a subsequent press conference, Japanese Foreign Minister
Ohira said:
The Japanese government holds that as a result of the normalization of Japan-China relations, the Japan-China
peace treaty has lost the meaning of its existence and is declared to be terminated, although this question is not mentioned in the joint statement. 106 (emphasis added)
On the same day, Japan and the ROC severed diplomatic relations. 107 But Taipei and Tokyo soon set up functional substitutes of
embassies in the capitals of each country to carry on trade and other
unofficial relations. 108
One important question left open is Japan's position on the
legal status of Taiwan. While Peking regarded the joint communique as committing Japan to the former's sovereignty over Taiwan,
Tokyo held a different view. 109 The Japanese view that Taiwan's
legal status remains undetermined is consistent with the peace trea106. Ibid., p. 15.
107. Free China Weekly, October I, 1972, p. I.
108. The Japanese embassy in Taipei was replaced by the branch office of a private
entity known as Interchange Association (ICA) whereas the ROC's embassy in Tokyo
was superseded by the branch office of the East Asia Relations Association (EARA), a
similar entity. On December 26, 1972, an agreement was signed between ICA and
EARA to provide for the continuance of extensive trade, cultural and other unofficial
relations between the two countries. Most of the staff of ICA and EARA were drawn
from the foreign ministries and other governmental agencies of the ROC and Japan. On
the post-1972 Japan-ROC relations, see David N. Rowe, "Informal Diplomatic Relations: The Case of Japan and the Republic of China, 1972-1974," Hamden, Connecticut:
Shoe String Press, 1975; James W. Morley, "The Japanese Formula for Normalization
and Its Relevance for U.S. China Policy, in Hungdah Chiu ed. Normalizing Relations with
the Peoples Republic oj China: Problems, Analysis and Documents, Occasional Papers/
Reprints Series in Contemporary Asian Studies, No. 3, Baltimore: University of Maryland Law School, 1978 (Hungdah Chiu ed.), p. 121.
109. According to Takakazu Kuriyama, the then Head of the Treaties Division,
Treaty Bureau, Foreign Ministry of Japan, the Japanese government was, in the joint
communique, addressing what the status of Taiwan should be rather than what it is. He
said:
[The Japanese Government] has consequently no objection to the islands becoming part of the territory of the People's Republic of China and has no intention whatsoever to support the independence of Taiwan.
Takakazu Kuriyama, "Some Legal Aspects of the Japan-China Joint Communique,"
Japanese Annual oj International Law, Vol. 17 (1973), pp. 42, 45.
Contrary to the popular impression that Japan had recognized Peking's claim to
Taiwan, Tokyo denied that it was the Japanese position. New York Times, November
6,1972, p. 22.
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ties and its official statements prior to 1972.ll 0 Moreover, the Japanese government did not regard the joint communique as a treaty. 111
It seems fair to say that by "fully understand[ing] and respect[ing]"
the PRC's position, Japan neither opposed nor endorsed that position, despite the contrary views of some Japanese publicists. 112
Another question is the legal status of the ROC vis-a-vis Japan.
Unlike the United Kingdom, Japan did not indicate expressly its
withdrawal of recognition, but merely advised the ROC that Japan
could no longer maintain diplomatic ties with it. Nevertheless, such
an implication seems obvious. In addition to Japan's recognition of
the PRC as the sole legal government of China, the termination of
the ROC-Japan Peace Treaty, which was largely dispositive and declaratory in nature and could have survived a mere rupture of diplomatic relations, 113 was another indication. A third instance involved
the embassy premises of the ROC in Tokyo. The Japanese government, which had been asked by the ROC to take these premises into
110. For the official pronouncements of Japan's position on the legal status of Taiwan,
see the statement of the Director of the Treaties Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Af·
fairs in the Japanese House of Representatives on February 2, 1961, Japanese Annual of
International Law, Vol. 8 (1964), p. 101, and the statement of the same ministry on
March 12, 1964 in the House of Councillors, ibid., Vol. 10, 64-65 (1966). Japan considered that only the Allied Powers who defeated Japan in World War II had the authority
to determine Taiwan's status.
Ill. Takakazu Kuriyama, supra note 101, p. 50.
112. E.g., Keishiro Iriye, "The Joint Communique of Japan and the People's Republic
of China and the Taiwan Issue," Japanese Annual of international Law, Vol. 17 (1973),
pp. 52, 55-61. Mr. Iriye, professor of international law at Waseda University, argued that
Taiwan was "tacitly recognized as having been returned to Chinese sovereignty" when
the 1952 ROC-Japan peace treaty came into force. Therefore, when Japan recognized
the PRC as the only legal government of China, sovereignty over Taiwan became vested
in the PRC. He went so far as to conclude that all natural and juridical persons in
Taiwan should be treated as nationals of the PRC. Ibid.
113. The Japanese government considered that, as was obvious from Foreign Minister
Ohira's statement quoted above, the termination of the Japan-ROC peace treaty was a
result of derecognizing the ROC as the government of the State of China with which the
treaty was concluded. Kuriyama, supra note 101, pp. 48-49. In fact, the declaratory and
dispositive provisions, such as termination of the state of war between China and Japan
and Japan's renunciation of its claim to Taiwan, were considered by the Japanese government to have survived de-recognition of the ROC. This was why Japan did not conclude a second peace treaty with the PRC in order to terminate the state of war. (The
1978 Japan-PRC Peace and Friendship Treaty had nothing to do with the termination of
the state of war.) But in order to accomodate the PRC's demand that Japan renounce the
Japan-ROC peace treaty which the PRC regarded as null and void ab initio, the joint
communique referred to the termination of "abnormal state of affairs" that had existed
between Japan and the PRC. Peking Review, October 6, 1972, p. 12.
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its custody, 114 handed over the properties to the PRC in March 1973
on the ground that the PRC, as the sole legal government of China
recognized by Japan, was entitled to any diplomatic property of the
State of China. 115
(b)

Practice of Japanese Courts

The emergence, right at Japan's doorstep, of two pairs of rival
governments in China and Korea and the presence of large numbers
of persons of Chinese and Korean origin in Japan have given Japanese courts ample opportunity to deal with legal questions affiliated
with unrecognized governments, notably the lex patriae of these
aliens in matters of marriage, divorce, and other legal acts of domestic relations. 116 Japanese courts generally follow the theory of "one
state, two governments" or that of "two states" to apply the Japanese
choice-of-law rules with largely similar results. 117 Of importance
here is that despite the approaches employed, judicial cognizance of
the validity of the laws of the PRC, which were not recognized by
Japan until 1972, and of the DPRK (North Korea), which is still
unrecognized, invariably has been granted. 118 That governmental
recognition {public international law) and choice-of-law problems
(private international law) should be kept separate is a generally accepted judicial belief. A typical formulation appeared in the opinion
of the Patent Tribunal of the Japanese Patent Agency, in the Japanese version of the Carl Zeiss case, in regard to the validity of East
German law:
But the capacity of a person is to be determined by lex patriae under the principle of private international law, and it
is widely recognized that the law in a territory of which the
person in question has his origin can be designated as lex
patriae as long as the territory possesses an effective legal
order, [regardless of] whether it is not recognized as a State
or whether its legal status is not yet finally determined in
the eyes of Japan. 119
114. Chung-yang Jih-pao, December 28, 1972, p. I.
115. Mainichi Shimbun, March 15, 1973, p. 2. The ROC's Foreign Ministry protested
the action, but did not challenge it in Japanese courts. Chung-yang Jih-pao, March 16,
1973, p. I.
116. See generally Yoshiro Hayata, "The Lex Patriae of Chinese and Koreans [sic],"
Japanese Annual of International Law, Vol. 9 (1965), p. 57.
117. Ibid., pp. 60-67.
118. Ibid., p. 59, note 8.
119. Award of July 17, 1963, The Patent Tribunal, translated in ibid., pp. 132, 134.
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In a more recent case, 120 East Germany also was treated as a state
and its laws recognized judicially for purposes of Japanese trademark and patent laws.
Since Japan's switch of recognition from Taipei to Peking in
1972, there only have been two municipal cases that touched upon
the question of recognition and its legal consequences. One, decided
in 1975, 121 related to the constitutionality of Japan's termination of
the peace treaty with the ROC, and has no material bearing on the
question under discussion. The other case, Republic of China v. Yu
Ping-huan eta/., 122 decided in 1982, concerned the transfer of a Chinese student dormitory acquired by the ROC in 1952 to the PRC as
a result of Japan's recognition of the latter. Initially, the Kyoto District Court upheld the transfer, reasoning that
[a]ccording to the facts found, the land and building
thereon are public property for public use, considering the
source of money alloted for the purchase thereof and the
purpose of the use thereof, which China purchased in order
to continuously use as a dormitory for Chinese students in
Japan.123
It also said that the PRC, recognized by Japan as the sole legal government of China, was entitled to the public property in question
owned by the ROC since 1952 in the name of the State of China. 124
The Court clearly relied on the theory of governmental succession in
international law to justify the transfer. More interesting than the
ratio decidendi was the fact that the ROC, as plaintiff and represented by its former ambassador Chen Chih-mai to Japan, was
granted locus standi. The Court said:
Furthermore, the plaintiff's capacity to be a party must be
examined, since the Japanese government [has) recognized
the People's Republic of China as the sole legitimate Government in China; however, it is an unquestionable fact that
the plaintiff still dominates {Taiwan} and the surrounding islands and constitutes a de facto State, and such would encounter no problem in seeking settlement by the Japanese
120.
121.
159.
122.
151.
123.
124.

Decision of June 3, 1973, Tokyo High Court, ibid., Vol. 19 (1975), p. 187.
Decision of September 11, 1975, Hiroshima High Court, ibid., Vol. 21 (1977), p.
Decision of September 16, 1977, Kyoto District Court, ibid., Vol. 22 (1978), p.
Ibid., p. 155.
Ibid.
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Court of disputes arising from international private transactions and others, and thus it is not necessary to deny the
capacity of the plaintiff to be a party. 125 (emphasis added)
On appeal to the Osaka High Court, the judgment upholding
the transfer was reversed and remanded to the Kyoto District Court.
However, Osaka High Court accepted the Kyoto District Court's
view on the locus standi question, theorizing that
whether the plaintiff has the capacity to sue depends on
whether it is a de facto government and whether the litigation concerns private legal dispute. 126
It went on to state that although Japanese courts must, like all
government agencies, fully understand and respect the PRC's position regarding Taiwan, that does not mean "Japan is obligated to
ignore the existence of the plaintiff or to prevent Japanese national
from entering into private legal relationships with the plaintiff." 127
The Court reasoned that since the plaintiff actually ruled and dominated Taiwan and the surrounding islands and the property in question did not have direct state functions, the plaintiff had the capacity
to sue.
On the question of transfer of public property as a result of governmental succession, the Court opined:
The fact that the plaintiff still actually rules and dominates
Taiwan and the surrounding islands as a de facto government makes the succession of government from the plaintiff
to the People's Republic of China as a result of JapanChina normalization of relations an incomplete succession.
The retroactive legal effect of Japan's switch of recognition
to the People's Republic of China as the sole legal government of China does not affect ownership of the property in
question which, having no direct state functions, was acquired by the plaintiff in 1952 when it was still the government recognized by Japan. The People's Republic of
China therefore cannot claim ownership of the property in
question on the ground of governmental succession (which
it has not done). Consequently, the plaintiff has not, as a
matter of course, lost the ownership of the property in
question after the Japan-China normalization of rela125. Ibid., p. 156.
126. Decision of Aprill4, 1982, Osaka High Court, p. 10 (A copy of the decision and
its Chinese translation are in the author's possession.).
127. Ibid.

226

CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES

tions. 128 (emphasis added)
The concept of "incomplete governmental succession" and the
characterization of the property in question were both innovative
and enlightening. Both points gave the Court enough leeway to bypass the unrealistic and undesirable effects of recognition of government under traditional rules of international law. Of particular
significance is the confirmation of the rule, long established in the
United States and England, 129 that recognition works retroactively
only to validate acts of the erstwhile unrecognized government but
not to invalidate those acts of the de jure government prior to
derecognition.
Regardless of whether the ROC, if sued, would be able to claim
sovereign immunity, the strong de factoism of Japanese courts toward unrecognized governments and their legal acts seems obvious
and consistent.
(c)

Implications for the Peking-Taipei Contest for Seabed
Oil

Ifthe legal battle between the assignees of the ROC and PRC is
fought in a Japanese court, the scenario probably would be different
from that in an English court. The Japanese court would not consult
the Foreign Ministry, but merely take judicial notice of the switch of
recognition and the attending developments, as did the two courts in
the two cases noted above. The contentions of the parties would be
similar but their reception by the Japanese courts may be quite
different.
Since Japan had recognized the ROC before September 29,
1972, Japanese courts probably would not, under the act of state doctrine, sit in judgment on the validity of the ROC's legal acts (including those relating to oil exploitation and sale) prior to that date
unless they violate international law or the public policy of the forum.130 Japan's recognition of the PRC may not invalidate retroac128. /hid., pp. 14-15.
129. E.g., Guaranty Trust Co., v. United States, 304 U.S. 126 (1938); Gdynia Ameryka
Linie v. Boguslawski, [1953) A.C. 11; Civil Air Transport Inc. v. Central Air Transport
Corporation, [1953) A.C. 70.
130. It is submitted that the act of state doctrine is not generally regarded as a rule of
international law. L. Oppenheim, International Law, Vol. 1, 8th ed. by H. Lauterpacht,
London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1955, p. 267. Various considerations underlie the
application of this doctrine in state practices, including constitutional requirements, comity between nations, and municipal contlict of law rules. Under Article 98 of the 1946
Japanese Constitution, Japan will abide by ''treaties concluded" by it and the "estab-
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tively any of them. 131 The fact that the Japan-ROC Peace Treaty
was declared "terminated" rather than "null and void ab initio," as
demanded by the PRC, is indicative of Japan's policy to minimize
disruption of the legal relationship that existed between Toky? and
Taipei between 1952 and 1972. If the ROC recovered the ml and
assigned it to a private party before September 29, 1972, validity of
the assignment hardly could be challenged. The PRC's assignee thus
would not be able to claim the oil in question as public property.
Ifthe above assignment took placetifier September 29, 1972, the
PRC's assignee could argue that since title to the oil in question
passed from the ROC to the PRC as a result of Japan's recognition
of the latter, the assignment became invalid. This argument bases its
strength on two possible propositions. First, Japan, through recognition of the PRC, has accepted its de jure sovereignty over Taiwan.
Second, the PRC is entitled to whatever property belonged to the
State of China, now represented by the PRC. The Japanese have, as
noted earlier, made it clear that they did not accede to the first proposition in 1972. The second proposition, based on the governmental
succession theory in international law, seems acceptable to both the
Japanese government and courts, which have actually employed it
with respect to the ROC and PRC. Yet this theory does not seem to
apply in the present case, as in the Yu Ping-huan case. The "public
property" as conceived by the Japanese government and courts appears to include only that owned by the ROC in Japan for direct
state functions, such as embassy premises. In the present case,
before the oil in question left Taiwan, it was, regardless of whether
the assignment had taken place, beyond the reach of the PRC for
lack of de jure jurisdiction. After it reached Japanese soil, unless the
assignment had not been effective, it had become private property on
which the PRC could lay no claim.
It is not impossible, however, that the Japanese Courts might
construe the Japanese position in the joint communique of September 29, 1972 as accepting the PRC's de jure sovereignty over Taiwan, 132 a step the Japanese government refused to take. The
situation then would be identical to that in the English court where
lished law of nations" Japanese courts are thus free not to recognize foreign law, in this
case, the ROC law. But Japanese judicial practice to date points to the contrary conclusion, as discussed above.
131. Supra note 129. This is the established rule in the United States and the United
Kingdom.
132. This seems to be a possible but unlikely scenario for two reasons: First, it is in
contravention of the intention of the Japanese Government; second, the joint communi-
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the assignment of the oil from the ROC to a private party took place
after Britain's acknowledgement of the PRC's de jure sovereignty
over Taiwan, as discussed above. How would a Japanese court decide? Unlike their English counterparts, Japanese courts have no
tradition of animosity toward unrecognized governments. The fact
that both the Kyoto District Court and the Osaka High Court treated
the ROC as a "de facto State" and accorded it locus standi, which
would have been unthinkable in an English court, 133 bespeaks the
strong judicial realism. Moreover, an unreserved acceptance of the
PRC's claim to Taiwan, construed literally, would lead to unjust and
absurd results, as noted earlier. Therefore, even if a Japanese court
should construe the Japanese position in the joint communique more
strongly than it was intended, the court probably would not determine the resulting legal consequences as the PRC desires. But just
how far a Japanese court would go in adjusting the conflicting claims
of a de jure and a de facto government actually controlling separate
territories is unclear, for there has been no judicial precedent similar
to Hesperides. If the de facto doctrine in Yu Ping-huan is any guide,
a declaration of nonjusticiability is not an unlikely result.
In sum, it seems that the ROC's assignee would be in a stronger
position vis-a-vis the PRC's assignee in a Japanese court than he
would be in an English court. If he has the oil, and the assignment
took place before 1972, he definitely would be able to keep it. If the
assignment was effected after Tokyo had switched recognition from
Taipei to Peking, in most cases he still would win, unless the Japanese courts reverse their strong realist tradition. On the other hand,
Japanese judicial realism would help the PRC's assignee as a defendant if the oil was assigned to him before September 29, 1972,
when the PRC was unrecognized. And after that date his likely success of defense would be assured. In conclusion, whoever has the oil
in his possession is likely to resist successfully the legal challenge
from the other side.
(4)

United States Practice
(a)

Practice of the Executive Branch and Congress

The outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 dramatically
que, in particular the statement on Taiwan, not being a treaty, cannot be applied as
positive law by Japanese courts. See note 129 and accompanying text.
133. The City of Berne v. The Bank of England, (1804) 9 Yes. Jun 347; (1804) 32 E.R.
636; British International Law Cases, Vol. 2 (1965), p. I. See generally Daniel P.
O'Connel, supra note 3, p. 168.
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changed the United States' hands-off policy toward the Chinese
Civil War. Washington immediately sent in the Seventh Fleet to
"neutralize" the Taiwan Strait. 134 In an accompanying statement,
President Truman declared that the status of Taiwan was undetermined, 135 a reversal of the American position held since 1945. 136
The United States subsequently managed to bring Japan into line on
this question 137 in the San Francisco Peace Treaty in which Japan
renounced its sovereignty over Taiwan in favor of no one. In 1954, a
mutual defense treaty was signed between Taipei and Washington 138
in which the ROC's "territories" were defined as Taiwan and the
Pescadores. 139 In the following years the U.S. continued to recognize the ROC and supported its seat in the United Nations until
1971.
President Nixon's trip to the PRC, announced in mid-1971, signified a fundamental change. At the end of his visit in February
1972, President Nixon, along with the PRC's Premier Chou En-lai,
issued a joint communique in Shanghai which stated:
The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either
side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China
and that Taiwan is part of China. The United States Government does not challenge that position. It reaffirms its
interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by
the Chinese themselves. 140 (emphasis added)
The document admits of various interpretations. While the State
134. Prior to that, the U.S. Government ceased all military assistance to the Nationalist Government and expected Taiwan to fall into communist hands. Hungdah Chiu,
supra note 6, p. 2115.
135. President Truman's Statement on the Mission of the U.S. Seventh Fleet in the
Formosa Area, June 27, 1950, American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955, Vol. 2, Basic Documents, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, p. 2468, excerpted in Hungdah
Chiu, supra note 6, p. 228.
136. As late as January 5, 1950, President Truman still accepted the Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan, at least implicitly. Hungdah Chiu, supra note 6, p. 115.
137. Ibid., pp. 122-27.
138. Mutual Defense Treaty, United States-Republic of China, December 2, 1954,
UST, Vol. 6, p. 433; TIAS No. 3178; UNTS, Vol. 248, p. 213.
139. Art. 6. In a subsequent exchange of notes, however, the ROC's territory was
understood to be "all territory now and hereafter under its control". UST, Vol. 6, p. 450;
UNTS, Vol. 248, p. 226.
140. Department State Bulletin, Vol. 66 (1972), pp. 435, 437-38.
At the time of negotiating the Shanghai Communique, Secretary of State Kissinger
reportedly intended to use the word "accepts" rather than "does not challenge" in the
text. But he was rebuffed, possibly by President Nixon, in that attempt. Stanley Karnow,
"Our Next Move on China," New York Times, August 14, 1977 (Magazine), p. 34, re-
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Department officials denied that it represented any change of the
U.S. position on the status ofTaiwan, 141 held since the Korean War,
Peking expectedly interpreted it as evidencing Wasington's recognition of Taiwan as part of China's territory. 142
In Feburary 1973 the U.S. and the PRC set up a "liason office"
in each other's capitals with full diplomatic privileges and immunities.143 On December 15, 1978, President Carter announced that the
U.S. and the PRC had agreed to establish diplomatic relations as of
January 1, 1979. 144 The joint communique issued at the time
declared:
The United States of America recognized the Government
of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal Government of China. Within this context, the people of the
United States will maintain cultural, commercial, and other
unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan.
The United States of America and the People's Republic of
China reaffirm the principles agreed on by the two sides in
the Shanghai Communique and emphasize once again
that. ..
The Government of the United States of America acknowledges the Chinese position that there is but one China and
Taiwan is part of China. 145 (emphasis added)
While the U.S. deliberately chose to use the word "acknowledge," as
it did in the Shanghai Communique, the PRC's text 146 used ch'engjen ("recognize" in English). The linguistic disparity reflects their
different positions on Taiwan's status.
In a separate statement 147 issued the next day, the United States
declared that it would terminate diplomatic relations with the ROC
as of Janua!I 1, 1979 and the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty a year
from then. 14 Meanwhile, the Carter Administration submitted to
ferred to in Hungdah Chiu, "Certain Legal Aspects of Recognizing the People's Republic
of China," Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law, Vol. 11 (1979), p. 409.
141. "Transcript of ['Meet the Press'] TV Interview with [Marshall] Green" [in Tokyo], Mainichi IJaily News, March 29, 1972, p. 2. Mr. Green was the then Assistant
Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs.
142. Peking Review, March 9, 1973, p. 11.
143. New York Times, February 23, 1973, p. 1; ibid., p. 14.
144. Ibid., December 16, 1978, p. 1.
145. Ibid., p. 8; Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 79 (1979), p. 25.
146. Jen-min Jih-pao, December 16, 1979, p. 1.
147. New York Times, December 17, 1978, p. A22.
148. Article X of the ROC-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty provided that either party
may terminate the treaty on one year's notice.
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Congress a bill purporting to provide a le~al framework forma~
taining unofficial relations with the ROC. 1 9 The bill underwent ~
tensive debates in Congress before passing both Houses with
substantial modifications that favored the ROC. 150 It was signed
into law in early April. 151 The legislation, known as the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, 152 keeps intact all but formal diplomatic ties with
the ROC. Most existing diplomatic and consular establishments remain unchanged except their names; 153 so do several dozens of bilateral treaties. 154 As one commentator amazingly noted, the Act in
149. U.S. Congress, Senate, A Bill to Promote the Foreign Policy of the United States
through the Maintenance of Commercial, Cultural, and Other Relations with the People on
Taiwan on An Unofficial Basis, andfor Other Purposes, S.245, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 1979.
150. See, e.g., U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Taiwan, Hearings, before the Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate on S.245, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.,
1979.
151. United States, Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. 15 (1979), pp.
640-41.
152. Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-8; 93 Stat. 14 (1979); 22 U.S.C.A.
§ 3301 (Supp. I 1979).
153. A non-profit organization incorporated under the District of Columbia law,
known as the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), set up branch offices in Taiwan to
replace the former U.S. embassy and consulates. The AIT's counterpart, the Coordination Council for North American Affairs (CCNAA), maintains more than half of the
ROC's former diplomatic and consular establishments in the U.S. through its branch
offices. Governmental business between the ROC and the U.S., such as sale of arms, is
transacted via these two entities. For a political discussion on how the post-1978 relations between the ROC and the U.S. have been conducted, see Leonard Unger, "Derecognition Worked", Foreign Policy, No. 36 (Fall 1979), p. 105. Mr. Unger was the last
U.S. ambassador to the ROC.
154. The Taiwan Relations Act allows all treaties between the U.S. and the ROC to
continue "unless and until terminated in accordance with law" 22 U.S.C.A. § 3303(c)
(Supp. I 1979). A number of these existing treaties require updating or modification. If
major changes are needed, then they may have to be renegotiated between AIT and
CCNAA. For a discussion, seeR. Sean Randolph, "The Status of Agreements between
the American Institute in Taiwan and the Coordination Council for North American
Affairs," International Lawyer, Vol. 15 (1981), p. 249.
President Carter's authority to terminate the 1954 ROC-U.S. Mutual Defense
Treaty was challenged in court by 24 members of Congress. The U.S. Supreme Court
eventually ordered the trial court to dismiss the suit without oral argument. 48 U.S.L.W.
3402 (S. Ct. 1979). The year-long litigation has spawn a body of legal literature. See,
e.g., J. Terry Emerson, "The Legislative Role in Treaty Abrogation," Journal of Legislation, Vol. 5 (1978), p. 309; David J. Scheffer, "The Law of Treaty Termination as Applied to the United States Derecognition of the Republic of China,'' Harvard
International Law Journal, vol. 19 (1978), p. 931; Michael Resiman and Myres S.
McDouglas, "Who Can Terminate Mutual Defense Treaties?" National Law Journal,
May 21, 1979, p. 19; Edward M. Kennedy, "Normal Relations with China: Good Law,
Good Policy," American Bar Association Journal, Vol. 65 (1979), p. 194; Barry Goldwater, "Treaty Termination Is A Shared Power,'' ibid., p. 198; Herbert J. Hansell, "Memo-
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effect constituted a "legislative re-recognition" of the ROC after the
Executive Branch's derecognition. 155
On August 17, 1982, the U.S. and the PRC restated, in yet another joint communique intended to settle the thorny question of
U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, part of the 1979 joint communique regarding the recognition of the PRC as the sole legal government of
China and the acknowledgement of the Chinese position that there is
but one China and Taiwan is part of China. 156 To the extent of the
above two questions, this new document, known as the "August 17
Communique", merely reiterates the U.S. position held since 1972
and adds nothing new.
(b)

Implications for the Peking-Taipei Contest for
Seabed Oil

Although initially influenced by the English courts' rigid adherence to the distinction between recognition and non-recognition of
foreign governments, American courts have departed not infrequently from that doctrine since the Civil War. 157 In this century,
the executive hostility, indifference, or friendliness toward an unrecognized government in various circumstances also has played an important part, since American courts normally consult the State
Department before making decisions in recognition cases. 158 It is
difficult to generalize the American judicial practice, for it has not
always been consistent. Nevertheless, the special circumstances surrounding the situation of the ROC, which is unrecognized but
friendly, should prompt the courts to take a realistic attitude toward
its de facto existence and its legal acts.
But the Taiwan Relations Act has made such legal inquiry unrandum for the Secretary of State: President's Power to Give Notice of Termination of
the U.S.-ROC Mutual Defense Treaty, reprinted in Hearings on S.254, supra note 150, p.
189.
155. Carl I. Gable, "Taiwan Relations Act: Legislative Re-recognition," Vanderbilt
Journal of Transnational Law, Vol. 12 (1979), p. 511.
156. U.S. Department of State, U.S.-China Joint Communique, Current Policy, No.
413, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1982. For a concise background
analysis, see Lyushun Shen, "The Washington-Peking Controversy over U.S. Arms Sales
to Taiwan: Diplomacy of Ambiguity and Escalation," Chinese Yearbook of International
Law and Affairs, Vol. 2 (1982), p. 98.
157. Daniel P. O'Connel, supra note 3, pp. 172, 175-76. The decisive case in the postCivil War era was Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897).
158. A.B. Lyons, "The Conclusiveness of the 'Suggestions' and Certificate of the
American State Department," British Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 24 (1947), p.
116; Daniel P. O'Connell, supra note 3, pp. 119-22.
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necessary. Anticipating potential adverse legal _effects 159 _flo":'ing
from the derecognition of the ROC, Congress has, m that leg1slat10n,
taken care of nearly all the uncertainties. Insofar as the ROC and
the U.S. are concerned, the Act supersedes the American case law
respecting the effects of non-recognition. Consequently, we need
only to consider the hypothetical case before us in the light of the
executive practice and provisions of the Act.
The first question one might ask is: Has the U.S. merely severed
diplomatic relations with the ROC or has it withdrawn recognition
from (or derecognized) it? Nowhere did the PRC-U.S. joint communique mention this. Nor does the Taiwan Relations Act make this
point clear. 160 However, as we suggested earlier, recognition or nonrecognition in international law is essentially a matter of intent. On
the political plane, the intent of the U.S. executive branch to derecognize the ROC as the government of China is obvious from its
recognition of the PRC as such. In fact, derecognition may be effected implicitly, as the American Law Institute puts it:
Ordinarily changes in recognition of a government occur
only when another regime is recognized. Usually there is
no declaration by the recognizing state, at the time it recognizes the displacing government, that it withdraws its recognition from the government displaced. The withdrawal
is assumed. 161
The continuation of all existing treaties, except the Mutual Defense
Treaty, between the U.S. and the ROC despite absence of recognition also is not without precedent in international relations. 162 Since
virtually all the legal consequences of non-recognition have been insulated effectively by Congress from the political act of derecognition
of the ROC by the Executive Branch, the traditional distinction between recognition and non-recognition has lost much of its practical
significance insofar as ROC-U.S. relations are concerned.
159. These adverse effects have been dealt with in Victor H. Li, De-Recognizing Taiwan: The Legal Problems, Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, 1977.
160. In four out of five instances in which the Act characterizes the state of relations
between Taipei and Washington as being "absence of diplomatic relations or recognition" (emphasis added). In the fifth instance "or" is replaced by "and". 22 U.S.C.A.
§ 3303(a), (b)(3)(A), (b)(5), (b)(7), (b)(8).
161. American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law, Second: Foreign Relations Law
of the United States, St. Paul, Minn.: American Law Institute Publishers, 1965, § 96,
Comment c.
162. See generally Bernard R. Bot, Nonrecognition and Treaty Relations, Leiden, the
Netherlands: Sijtholf, 1968.
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The second question concerns the PRC's sovereignty, or lack of
it, over Taiwan. The U.S. did not accept the PRC's position in the
Shanghai Communique, as was obvious from the language in that
document, the negotiations leading to it, 163 and the subsequent denials by American officials. The PRC-U.S. joint communique of January 1, 1979 employed slightly different wording, but since it was
expressly intended to reaffirm the principles of the Shanghai Communique, the Shanghai Communique should govern. The same can
be said of the August 17 Communique of 1982. Therefore, the PRC
hardly can invoke any of these documents in an American court as
evidencing U.S. recognition of its sovereignty over Taiwan.
The Taiwan Relations Act leaves no doubt that the ROC will be
protected fully by U.S. law in an American court in the absence of
recognition: the ROC will be treated as a foreign state or government, 164 for the purpose of American law, capable of suing or being
sued in American courts. 165 More unequivocal is the provision on
property rights:
For all purposes under the laws of the United States, including actions in any court in the United States, recognition of the People's Republic of China shall not affect in
any way the ownership or other rights or interest in properties, tangible and intangible, and other things of value,
owned or held on or prior to December 31, 1978, or thereafter acquired or earned by the governing authorities on
Taiwan.r66
This provision obviously covers properties which the PRC considers
as belonging to the State of China and to which, accordingly, it has
succession rights. Before this provision is tested in court, its validity
should be assumed. 167 In any event, the accumulated effects of the
163. See supra note 140.
164. The Act provides:
Whenever the laws of the United States refer or relate to foreign countries,
nations, states, governments, or similar entities, such terms shall include and
such laws shall apply with respect to Taiwan.
U.S.C.A. § 3303(b)(l) (Supp. I 1979).
165. Ibid., § 3303(b)(7).
166. Ibid., § 3303(b)(3)(B).
167. The position of the U.S. Government with respect to public property owned by
the ROC in the U.S. was that real estate acquired by China prior to the establishment of
the PRC (Oct. l, 1949) should be transferred to Peking whereas properties subsequently
acquired by the ROC should remain in the hands of Taipei. Carl I. Gable, supra note
155, p. 529 (interview with State Department officials). The ROC's embassy premises
obviously fall within the first category. Shortly after President Carter's announcement of
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Act amount to at least de facto recognition of the ROC as the government of Taiwan. What does this "most recognized unrecognized
government" 168 status mean to the dispute over title to seabed oil?
During the period between 1949 an 1979, the U.S. recognized
the ROC as the de jure government of China, but on various occasions the U.S. implied that it did not recognize the ROC's de jure
sovereignty over the Chinese mainland not under ROC control. 169
Meanwhile, Washington's dealings with Peking in the 1970s, including the visits of U.S. presidents and high officials, the signing of joint
communiques, and the exchange of quasi-diplomatic missions,
clearly implied de facto recognition of the PRC as the government of
the Chinese mainland. The legal status of Peking and Taipei in relation to Washington was switched after January 1, 1979. The only
difference was that while the ROC's de facto status was guaranteed
by the Taiwan Relations Act, the PRC's status prior to 1979 would
have to depend largely on case law, the courts' judicial notice of
events, and advice from the State Department. An American court
may well regard them as two de facto sovereigns despite the "one
China" concept held by them and, less whole-heartedly, by the U.S.
Government. The implication for the seabed oil dispute is obvious:
American courts will refrain from exercising jurisdiction over the
U.S. recognition of the PRC but before it came into effect on January I, 1979, the ROC
assigned these properties to an American organization known as Friends of Free China
at a nominal price of ten dollars. Congressional Record, Vol. 125, (daily ed. March 12,
1979), p. S2474. The State Department was said to have indicated that it regarded this
transaction as invalid and would support the PRC's claim if the PRC chose to challenge
the transaction in court. Ibid., p. S2473. This question was hotly debated in the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee. Ibid., p. S2472-84. By a vote of 49 to 36, the present
provision was adopted. Ibid., p. S2484. Senator Hatch during the debate cited in support of the present provision the American and English cases referred to in note 129
supra and the fact that Ottawa did not support Peking's claim to Taipei's embassy premises sold to friendly hands. Ibid., p. S2476. After the passage of the Act, the State Department seemed to have quietly dropped the idea of supporting the claim of Peking
which showed little interest in an uncertain legal battle.
168. Words of Professor Detlev F. Vagts of Harvard Law School in a conversation
with the author.
169. The 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty, as noted earlier, defined the ROC's territory as
"Taiwan and the Pescadores." All the existing treaties have limited their territorial application in respect to the ROC to Taiwan. Victor H. Li, supra note 159, p. 32. In a joint
communique issued on October 23, 1958 after the visit of Secretary of State John Foster
Dulles to Taiwan, it was stated that "(t]he United States recognizes that the Republic of
China is the authentic spokesman for Free China and of the hopes and aspirations entertained by the great mass of the Chinese people". (emphasis added) American Foreign
Policy, Current Documents, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1958, pp.
1184-85, cited in Hungdah Chiu, supra note 6, p. 287.
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dispute on the ground that it is a political, and thus non-justiciable,
question.
The legal situation is best illustrated in a 1978 case in which
offshore oil concessionaires and assignees in two Persian Gulf countries fought over title to oil recovered from overlapping parts of their
concessions. In Occidental of Umm a! Qaywayn v. A Certain Carfo of
Petroleum Laden Aboard the Tanker Dauntless Coloctronis, 17 the
Court of Appeals reasoned that the appellant's title to the oil in question depended on his ownership of the concession block. Since the
block was situated within the newly declared 12-mile territorial sea
of an island the sovereignty of which was in dispute, the Court considered that a determination of the boundary between the claimants'
concession blocks was impossible without first solving the territorial
dispute and delimiting the adjacent continental shelf between these
states. Relying in part on a State Department letter suggesting "unquestionable U.S. neutrality" 171 in the sensitive Middle East, the
Court held that the issue sub judice was a political question with
respect to which it had no jurisdiction. 172
More recently, courts in the state of New York also had a
chance to appreciate an intractable "Two-Chinas" case with a fact
pattern similar to that of Reel v. Holder decided by the English court,
discussed earlier. In the February 1980 Liang Ren-Guey v. Lake
Placid 1980 Olympic Games, Inc. case, 173 the plaintiff, a skier from
the ROC, sought a permanent injunction to stay the Winter Olympic
Games at Lake Placid, New York unless the defendant, a non-profit
operator of the games, allowed the plaintiff to use the flag, emblem,
name, and anthem of the Republic of China. The Supreme Court
(Special Term) granted the motion for injunction. On appeal, the
Appellate Division allowed the United States Attorney to file a statement of interest of the United States. In it, the Court was urged to
refrain from exercising jurisdiction to resolve a dispute which has at
its core the international "Two-Chinas" problem. The Appellate Division took the advice and denied the plaintiffs motion, and the
Court of Appeals affirmed. Behind the ratio decidendi again was the
political question doctrine.
In the present case, the State Department can be expected to
discourage the courts from taking jurisdiction because of the sensitivity of the issue. The court, faced with the formidable task of de170.
171.
172.
173.

577 F.2d 1196 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 928 (1979).
577 F.2d 1204.
Ibid., p. 1204-05.
72 App. Div. 2d 439 (N.Y.S. Ct. 1980), ajf'd 49 N.Y.2d 771 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1980).
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termining the respective continental shelf jurisdictions of the R_OC
and PRC, can also be expected to follow the Occidental rule, particularly if the executive branch intervenes. Accordingly, whoever possesses the oil will remain the holder of title.
D. Concluding Remarks
The rivalry between Peking and Taipei has expressed itself in
various forms: from civil war, to the contest for diplomatic relations
and, potentially, to the title of seabed oil. No principle of international law is capable of resolving the present conflict conceived by
the parties as one between a legitimate government and a rebel
group. Since each side has engaged a number of Western oil companies in its respective offshore oil program, the rivalry could well find
its way into a foreign courtroom.
If the legal battle is fought in an English court, the ROC's assignee probably would lose, either as plaintiff or defendant, in most
cases, unless the recently developed judicial realism toward unrecognized governments as shown in Hesperides is followed vigorously.
In both Japanese and American courts, whichever assignee has the
oil in his possession probably would be able to keep it essentially for
the same reason-the court would find that the resolution of the dispute entails handling judicially unmanageable issues. The ROC will
be, however, better protected in U.S. courts under the Taiwan Relations Act, the equivalent of which is lacking in Japanese law.
The analysis of the hypothetical legal battle incidentally reveals
the fundamental inadequacy of traditional rules of international law
of recognition in dealing with the China puzzle. The ROC became
an unrecognized government as a result of derecognition. In all
cases the move was not based on legal grounds such as loss of elements of statehood, but policy considerations of the derecognizing
state. These policy considerations should be distinguished further
from those that underlie the non-recognition of allegedly illegal regimes such as Rhodesia and Transkei. Therefore, treating the China
puzzle simply as a "representation" question, as in the case of
China's U.N. seat, is most unsatisfactory because it disregards reality. On the other hand, recognition of two governments representing
the same state but ruling different parts of its territory remains a
fantasy in political theory. A possible solution to the dilemma is a
separation of executive and legislative (and likely judicial) recognitions along the lines of the Taiwan Relations Act. This approach
thus far has proved to be a workable middle ground between the
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rigidity of the one-state-one-government doctrine and the reality of
international politics.
How relevant is the Peking-Taipei rivalry to the East Asia oil
dispute? We noted earlier that for all practical purposes the dispute
exists only between China (the ROC and the PRC) and Japan. It
seems fair to say that the rivalry is legally irrelevant to Japan except
that the legal battle may be fought in Japanese courts. A reconciliation between Taipei and Peking would not alter materially their
largely common legal position on seabed issues vis-a-vis Japan; nor
would the resumption of hostilities between them. As long as each
side maintains its "one-China" policy and China in its foreign relations consistently is represented by one one government, the rivalry
remains largely a domestic issue.

CONCLUSIONS
The East China Sea oil controversy has the most formidable
possible elements of international conflicts in maritime bound~ries.
Geographically, this semi-enclosed sea is surrounded by a contment
with irregular coasts and islands of all possible sizes, locations, and
economic utilities. Geomorphologically, the generally vast and flat
seabed possesses, before it plunges into the Pacific ocean floor, multifarious relief features, including a deep, long undersea trough with
controversial legal status. Geologically, the crustal origin of the Okinawa Trough, which has crucial legal implications on the seaward
limit of continental shelf, is still debated among geologists. As if the
geophysical environment were not enough, there are five governments within the three coastal nations, two of which are the so-called
"divided states". Most of these governments have laid claims toessentially the same seabed. Confrontations between rival governments in the two divided states have made impossible any regional
effort to bring about a pacific settlement of the seabed disputes.
Vague rules of existing international law on seabed delimitation only
aggravated the situation.
Despite the multiplicity of claimants, the East China Sea oil
controversy is basically a Sino-Japanese conflict. One reason is that
Korea has the same geophysical environment as does China in relation to that of Japan. A more important factor is that the ROK and
Japan have successfully delimited their seabed boundary in the Korea Strait and established a Joint Development Zone covering the
whole area where their claims and concessions used to overlap. Absent future animosity between Seoul and Tokyo, the seabed dispute
will be shelved indefinitely.
The Sino-Japanese conflict has two dimensions: the territorial
dispute over the Taio-yu-t'ai (Senkaku) Islands and the question of
delimiting the vast continental shelf of the East China Sea. Many
commentators have considered the issues inseparable; settlement of
the first is seen as a conditio sine qua non to that of the second. This
author has argued that this view is untenable in view of recent legal
developments in state practice, international adjudications, and the
UN CLOS III on the regime of islands. Various sources of the international law of the sea indicate that islands which have size, location, economic utility, and legal status comparable to those of the
Tiao-yu-t'ais have been invariably ignored in seabed boundary delimitations between opposite states. This suggests that regardless of
(239).
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their ultimate owner, the Tiao-yu-t'ais will only have a maximum
12-mile territorial sea around them. They will not be permitted to
generate their own continental shelf or exclusive economic zone beyond that limit. The implication of this conclusion to the Sino-Japanese maritime conflict is obvious: the territorial and the seabed
issues are separable; the latter may be dealt with before the former is
finally resolved.
Establishing the irrelevance of the Tiao-yu-t'ai territorial dispute to, and detaching it from, the Sino-Japanese seabed controversy
makes the latter at last more manageable, if not any easier. The
rules of international law on continental shelf delimitation have
been in flux. Yet a discemable consensus among nations was been
building up in the past decade through the North Sea Continental
She!f Cases, the Anglo-French Continental She!fArbitration, and the
Tunisian-Libyan Continental She!f Case, the mounting state practice,
and deliberations at UNCLOS III as crystallized in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. That consensus calls for
delimitation of seabed boundaries by agreement between the disputing parties according to equitable principles, taking into account all
the relevant circumstances.
In the context of the East China Sea, the applicable "equitable
principle" for seabed delimitation could be the equidistance principle, as advocated by Japan, or the natural prolongation principle, as
advocated by China (the ROC and the PRC), or a combination of
both and/or other principles. In fact, the thrust of state practice,
judicial decisions, and the LOS Convention is that the applicable
principle is to be determined by the geophysical realities of the delimitation area rather the reverse. It is therefore necessary to first
identify and assess the relevant circumstances of the East China Sea.
This process reveals that they are circumstances relevant to other
dispute settings but irrelevant here; there are also circumstances that
are only partially or potentially relevant. The most relevant circumstances, the analysis shows, are macrogeography and geology (and
geomorphology) of the region under study.
The macrogeography of the East China Sea is underscored by
the lack of broadly comparable coastlines of China (mainland and
Taiwan) and Japan in terms of coastal configuration and length. It
renders inequitable the application of the equidistance principle in
areas south of the 30°N latitude. On the other hand, the proportionality test, formulated by the ICJ in the North Sea Cases and the
Tunisian-Libyan Case, provides a sensible approach. It calls for a
boundary that brings about a reasonable proportionality between the
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lengths of the coastal states' respective coastlines and their continental shelf entitlements in a given region. Though somewhat controversial in delimitation theory among international jurists, the test
offers a practical and equitable guideline. The percentage proportions (64% for China (mainland and Taiwan) and 36% for Japan)
resulting from applying that test in the East China Sea south of the
30°N latitude set such a guideline (rather than a rule) for future
Sino-Japanese seabed delimitations.
Considerations of the geology and geomorphology of the East
China Sea are centered on the natural prolongation principle and the
legal status of the deep Okinawa Trough. Since the exact seaward
extent of continental shelf allowable under the natural prolongation
principle has been much debated among lawyers, the insistence of
China (the ROC and the PRC) on applying this principle does no
more than restate the problem. Moreover, the new definition of continental shelf in the 1982 LOS Convention in effect neutralizes that
principle. Japan's insistence, on the other hand, on applying the
equidistance principle across-the-board not only finds little support
from the regional macrogeography but also ignores the submarine
geophysical reality. The approach suggested by this author modifies
the unpalatable effect of the equidistance principle by applying the
proportionality test and treat the Okinawa Trough as but one of the
important factors, rather than the only one, that influence the future
course of the seabed boundary. This approach rejects the two extremes and puts the issue back in perspective.
The expected product of this approach, with certain allowance
for negotiation by the parties, is a boundary composed of two segments separated by the 30°N latitude (Map 1). North of the parallel
in the North Region the application of the equidistance principle is
justified by the presence of the broadly equal coastlines of China,
Korea, and Japan. This result is in fact dictated by extensions of the
two median lines, one existing and the other imaginary, in the Korea
Strait between Japan and Korea and in the Yellow Sea between Korea and China. South of the 30°N latitude in the South Region
neither the mid-channel line of the Okinawa Trough, as advocated
by the ROC under the natural prolongation principle, nor the median line drawn between the Ryukyus (excluding the Taio-yu-t'ais)
and China (mainland and Taiwan), as advocated by Japan under the
equidista~ce principle, should_ be determinative of the boundary.
R~ther, either o~e. of the two lines shou~d be u~ed only as a starting
pomt for negotiatiOn between the part1es, taking into account the
guideline for proportions (64:36). The final boundary would lie
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somewhere between the above two lines, probably closer to the midchannel line of the Okinawa Trough than to the median line, so as to
bring about the stated proportions. In this regard, the 1972 Australia-Indonesia seabed boundary in the Timor Sea, which is strikingly
comparable geophysically to the East China Sea in almost every aspect, would shed much light on the delimitation process here.
The Peking-Taipei rivalry injected an uncertain but interesting
element into the seabed discussion which has hitherto proceeded on
the basis of an one-China assumption. Politically, its relevance to
the final seabed settlement is beyond doubt, since both sides are
dead serious about their seabed claims. That Taipei keeps making
claims of sovereignty over the Tiao-yu-t'ais and adjacent continental
shelf every time it gets wind of a reported Peking-Tokyo negotiation
on this matter is illustrative of the ROC's concern. The legal relevance, if any, of the rivalry would probably find itself only in unusual scenarios where a legal battle is fought over the ownership of oil
produced from the disputed seabed. The question posed to the court
would be which government is entitled to the oil under international
and municipal laws of recognition and government succession. The
survey of judicial practices and executive policies (to the extent they
influenced judicial attitudes) of the United Kingdom, Japan, and the
United States shows that the courts in all three states probably will
disqualify themselves from passing judgment on what they consider
essentially a political question. The practical result would be that
whichever party has actual possession of the oil would be able to
retain title. The analysis only confirms the foregone conclusion that
the Peking-Taipei rivalry is politically crucial but legally irrelevant
to the seabed delimitation in the East China Sea.
This study has primarily focused on the legal aspects of the East
China Sea oil controversy. It is, of course, not a pure legal problem;
political and economic forces at work may be more important in
shaping and resolving the conflict. This observation should not,
however, deter lawyers from tackling the legal problems involved
because a clear understanding of the legal issues helps to clarify
them and facilitates political negotiations.
Adoption by UNCLOS III of the LOS Convention in 1982 does
not provide immediate answers to questions discussed here. But
since both the two Chinese governments and Japan are likely to accept the LOS Convention,* it would at least have some impact on
• The ROC will probably abide by the Convention although Taipei cannot formally accede to it. For details, see text accompanying notes 81-91 in Chapter 4 supra.
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the legal arguments they employ in making political and economic
trade-offs. This study has in fact relied heavily on provisions of the
LOS Convention as a basis for analysis. Arguments advanced in the
analyses and suggestions could prove relevant for the parties to
reach agreement.
Admittedly, the Peking-Taipei rivalry remains a major stumbling block to any peaceful settlement of the Sino-Japanese seabed
dispute. Cooperation between the two Chinese governments on seabed issue vis-a-vis Japan will not come without overall rapproachement between them in a much larger context. Predicting future
development in this regard which will also determine the fate of the
four remaining joint ventures CPC has with U.S. oil companies, is of
course beyond the scope of this study.
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Table 1
Japan, the ROK and the ROC*: Overlapping
Concession Blocks and the Japan-ROK Joint
Development Zone (JDZ) in the
East China Sea as of Dec. 31, 1983
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* The PRC's claims, vague but extensive, could overlap with most, if not all, of the
concession blocks in the East China Sea.
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Table 2
Outline of Legal Positions of the Japan, ROK, the ROC, and the PRC on Key Issues of the
East China Sea Continental Shelf Delimitation
Issue
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Ja~an

ROC

PRC

Claiming

Claiming

I. Sovereignty of the
Tiao-yu-t'ais

Not applicable

2. Definition (seaward
extent) of continental
shelf

Natural prolongation;
minimum 200 n. miles

Maximum 200 n. miles

Natural prolongation; no
fixed limit

Natural prolongation;
maximum limit determined by agreement;
may exceed 200 n. miles

3. Principle for interstate shelf delimitation

Natural prolongation &
equidistance principles

Equidistance principle

Natural prolongation
principle

Multi-state consultation
under equitable principles

4. Seabed rights for
mid-ocean islets

No (beyond 12 n.
miles)•

Same as continents

No (in inter-state delimitation)

Uncertain; inclined
toward no rights

5. Limiting effect of
Okinawa Trough

Yes•

Claiming

No ..

Yes•

Yes•
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• Implicit in official statement or related actions.
•• Japan was flexible in practice as shown in the Japan-ROK JDZ delimitation.
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Table 3
Physical Geography of the Tiao-yu-t'ai (Senkaku) Islets*
Name (Chinese/
Jaeanese}
l. Tiao-yu

(Uotsuri)

2. Huang-wei
(Kuba)
3. Nan-hsiao
(Minami-kojima)
4. Pei-hsiao
(Kita-kojima)
5. Ch'ih-wei
(Taisho)
6. Ch'ung-pei-yen
(Okinokitawa)
7. Ch'ung-nan-yen
(Okinominamiiwa)
8. Fei-1ai
(Tobise)
Total Area:

Area••
kJn2/mi2/acres

Maximum
elevation
{meters} Vegetation Remarks

4.5
1.7
1,088

383

1.1
0.4
256
0.465
0.18
115
0.303
0.12
75
0.15
0.06
37
0.014
0.005
3.5
0.005
0.002
1.2
0.0006
0.0002
0.014
6.5
2.5
1,575

117

Palm
trees,
prickly,
pear, and
Statice
arbuscu/a
Same as
above

149

Little

135

Little or
none

Potable
water
available

No potable water
Nickname
"Snake
Island"
Nickname
"Bird
Island"
Barren
rock

84

None

(est.)

28

None

Barren
rock

(est.)

13

None

Barren
rock

(est.)

N.A.

None

Barren
rock

sq. km
sq. mi
acres

• Sources: See the references cited in Chapter 4, note 6.

** I sq. mi=640 acres=2.59 sq. km; I sq km=247 acres=0.39 sq. mi.

Table 4
State Practice on Continental Shelf Delimitation between Opposite-Coast States
Location & State
Parties

Year•

Delimitation Broad Equality
Principle ..
of Coastline• ••

(")

North Sea
Norway-UK
Denmark-Norway
Denmark-UK
Netherlands-UK
W. Germany-UK
[France-UK)

Baltic Sea
Finland-USSR

Norway-Sweden
Finland-Sweden

Mediterrenean Sea
Italy-Yugoslavia
Italy-Tunisia

..
•••

0

Remarks

EUROPE

*

N

Vo

0
1965
1965
1971
1965
1971
1971
1977
I965
1967
1967
1968
1972

E
E
E
E

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Norwegian Trough ignored.
Norweigan Trough ignored.
Boundary only 11 miles long.
Continent v. large island.

Other
SE

Yes
Yes

Boundary only 8 miles long.
Delimited by arbitration.

E

Yes

Adjacent and opposite coasts.

~

~
~

s
~

~

~
c:::

0
.....
SE
Other

Yes
Yes

Adjacent and opposite
Continent plus large coastal island v. continent.

Islands specially treated.
Yes
1968
SE
Islands specially treated.
Yes
SE
1971
(1978)
Year of signature. Multiple years show subsequent amendment or extension of existing boundary. Year in parenthesis is date of
ratification beyond one year from date of signature.
Abbreviations: £: Equidistance principle (true or simplified); S£: Selective equidistance; Other: Other principle or principles
excluding the equidistance principle; ?: Information unavailable; NIF: Not in force.
See text of note 166 and accompanying text in Chapter 5 for details .

t'l1

til

00

t'l1
:;l:l

iii

til

Location & State
Parties
EUROPE (cont.)
Italy-Tunisia
Italy-Spain
Italy-Greece
Black Sea
Turkey-USSR

Year*
1971
(1978)
1974
1977

Delimitation Broad Equality
Principle**
of Coastline**•
SE

Yes

E
SE

Yes
Arguably yes

Remarks
Islands specially treated.
Islands v. islands.
Peninsula and island v. Peninsula and island.
til

1978

?

Yes

Continent v. continent.

tr1

0

ASIA
Persian Gu(f
Bahrain-Saudi
Arabia
Iran-Saudi Arabia
Iran-Qatar
Bahrain-Iran
Iran-Oman
Iran-United Arab
Emirates (NIF)
Red Sea
Saudi ArabiaSudan
Arabian Sea & Bay
of Bengal
India-Sri Lanka
India-Indonesia

~
~

C;j

1958

SE

Yes

Large island v. continent.
Islands specially treated.
Continent v. peninsula.
Boundary only 28 miles long.
Concave continent v. portuding peninsula.
Various considerations.

1968
1969
1971
1974
1974

SE
E
SE
SE
Other

Yes
Arguably yes
Yes
Arguably yes
Yes

1974

Other

Yes

No single boundary delimited; a "Common Zone" established.

1974
1976
1974
1977

SE

Yes

Continent v. very large island.

SE

Yes

Islands v. islands.

0

c::

z
>
)!:'
-<

0

0
tr1
t""'
....
a::
....

..,
>
..,....
0

z

-

N

Vl

Location & State
Parties
ASIA (cont.)
India-Maldives
Andaman Sea
Indonesia-Thailand

India-Thailand

Year•

Delimitation
PrinciEle••

Broad Equality
of Coastline • • •

1976

SE

Arguably yes

1971
1975
1978
1978

SE

Yes

SE

N

Continent and islands v. islands.
Part of peninsula v. part of large island.

(')

Arguably yes

Large island v. continent.

z

t-i
t'!1

a::

1969
1971

Other

Korea Strait
Japan-Rep. of
Korea

1974

SE

Australia-Papua
New Guinea

Vl

0

South China Sea
Indonesia- Malaysia
(Malacca Strait
included)

Arufura & Timor
Seas
Australia- Indonesia

N

Remarks

"tt

Yes

Large island v. peninsula.

0

~
-<

:::c

>
00

Yes

Large islands v. peninsula (in the Korean Strait); Joint Development
Zone in the East China Sea.

>
z
til
t-i

c::

1971
1972
1978

SE

Yes

Continent v. large islands chain; Timor Trough taken into account.

SE

Yes

Protruding peninsula v. very large island (the two meet at right angle).

0

t'!1

00

t/.l
t'!1

:::c
t'!1

00

THE AMERICAS
Caribbean Sea
Trinidad &
TobagoVenezuela
Colombia-Panama

1942

Other

No

Continent v. large island.

1976

Other

Yes

Adjacent and opposite coasts.

Location & State
Parties
THE AMERICAS
(cont.)

Caribbean Sea
(cont.)
Colombia-Costa
Rica
Cuba-Haiti
Netherlands
(Antilles) Venezuela
ColombiaDominican
Republic
Colombia-Haiti
US (Puerto Rico) Venezuela
Dominican
RepublicVenezuela

Year•

Delimitation Broad Equality
Principle••
of Coastline•••

1977

Other

Arguably no

1977
1978

?
Other

Arguably yes
Arguably no

Remarks

t/)

Island v. island with highly concave coast.
Islands v. continent with concave coast and islands.

~
t:l:l
m

0
ttl

1978

E

Yes

Large island v. continent.

1978
1978
(1980)
1979

E
E

Yes
Yes

Large island v. continent.
Large island v. continent.

?

Yes

Large island v. continent and small islands.

0

zc:::0

>
:;g

><
0
m

--z
t"'

~

o-j

>
o-j

Gu(f o.f Mexico
US-Cuba (NIF)
US (Eastern Gulf)Mexico (NIF)

1977
1978

Other
E

No
Yes

Large island v. peninsula (the two meet at 120° angle).
Small Mexican islets taken into account.

Labrador Sea
Canada v.
Denmark
(Greenland)

1973

SE

Yes

Very large island v. very large island.

0

N

Vl
VJ

Location & State
Parties
THE OCEANS
Pacific Ocean
US (American
Somoa)Cook Islands (NIF)
US (American
Somoa)New Zealand
(Tokelau) (NIF)
Indian Ocean
France (Reunion)Mauritius

IV

Year*

1980

Delimitation Broad Equality
of Coastline***
Principle**

E

Yes

V'o

Remarks

~

Islands v. islands; all islands used as basepoints.
()

1980

E

Yes

Islands v. islands; all islands used as basepoints.

z0o-l
~
<3

1980

E

Yes

Islands similarly shaped and sized.

~
~
~

~

Vl
o-l

c::

C)

rn
Vl

~

m
1:11

Delimitation-Principle Index to Table 4
True/Simplified
Equidistance

Selective
Equidistance

Colombia-Dominican Rep.
Colombia-Haiti

Australia-Indonesia
Australia-Pauper New Guinea
Bahrain-Iran
Bahrain-Saudi Arabia
Canada-Denmark (Greenland)
France-UK
Greece-Italy
India-Indonesia
India-Maldives
India-Sri Lanka
India-Thailand
Indonesia-Thailand
Iran-Oman
Iran-Saudi Arabia
Italy-Tunisia
Italy-Yugoslavia
Japan-Rep. of Korea
Norway-Sweden

Denmark-Norway
Denmark-UK
Finland-USSR
France (Reunion)-Mauritius
Iran-Qatar
Italy-Spain
Netherlands-UK
Norway-UK
US
US
US
US

(Samoa)-Cook Islands
(eastern Guli)-Mexico
(Samoa)-New Zealand (Tokelau)
(Pueno Rico)-Venezuela

Subtotal: 14

Subtotal: 18

Other

Unknown

Colombia-Costa Rica
Colombia-Panama

Cuba-Haiti
Dominican Rep.-Venezuela

Finland-Sweden

Turkey-USSR

German, W.-UK

tf.l

~
t:l:l
t'l1

Indonesia-Malaysia
Iran-United Arab Emirates

0

=
0

Netherlands (Antilles)-Venezuela

~
~

Saudi Arabia-Sudan
Trinidad & Tobago-Venezuela
US-Cuba

~
t;:j
t'l1
!""

~

Subtotal: 10

TOTAL: 45

Subtotal: 3

8
0
z

N

VI
VI
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Index to Sources Consulted in Table 4
Abbreviations
AJIL: American Journal of International Law.
ILM: International Legal Meterials.
LIS: Limits in the Seas series (97 issues as of 1984)
UNLS: United Nations Legislative Series (four related volumes as
of 1984: UNLS/15 (1970), UNLS/16 (1974), UNLS/18 (1976),
and UNLS/19 (1980)).
NDLOS: New Directions in the Law of the Seas (11 volumes as of
1984)
Smith: Robert W. Smith, "The Maritime Boundaries of the United
States," Geographical Review, Vol. 71 (1981), pp. 395-410.
Feldman: Mark B. Feldman & David Colson, "The Maritime
Boundaries of the United States," AJIL, Vol. 75 (1981), pp. 72963.
Nweihed: Kaldone G. Nweihed, "EZ (Uneasy) Delimitation in the
Semi-Enlcosed Caribbean Sea: Recent Agreements Between
Venezuela and Her Neighbors," Ocean Development and International Law Journal, Vol. 8 (1980), pp. 1-33.
Note: Unless otherwise indicated, all the sources cited below contain
text of the shelf boundary agreements. All LIS issues have excellent charts attached. ILM and NDLOS sometimes have
maps or sketches. UNLS have texts only. The other three private sources have some maps and discussions.
Australia-Indonesia: LIS, No. 87 (1979); UNLS/18, pp. 433, 441.
Australia-Papua New Guinea: LIS, No. 87 (1979), NDLOS, Vol. 8
(1980), p. 215.
Bahrain-Iran: LIS, No. 58 (1974); UNLS/16, p. 428.
Bahrain-Saudi Arabia: LIS, No. 12 (1970); UNLS/16, p. 409.
Canada-Denmark (Greenland): LIS, No. 72 (1976); UNLS/18, p.
447.
Colombia-Costa Rica: LIS No. 84 (1979);NDLOS, Vol. 8 (1980), p.
93.
Colombia-Dominican Republic: NDLOS, Vol. 8 (1980), p. 78;
Nweihed, p. 8 (Map) and p. 33, note 37.
Colombia-Haiti: NDLOS, Vol. 8 (1980), p. 76;Nweihed, p. 8 (Map).
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Index to Sources Consulted in Table 4 (cont.)
Colombia-Panama: LIS, No. 79 (1978); NDLOS, Vol. 8 (1980), p.
88.
Cuba-Haiti: NDLOS, Vol. 8 (1980), p. 69; Nweihed, p. 8 (Map).
Denmark-Norway: LIS, No. 10 (1974 Revised); UNLS/15, p. 780.
Denmark-UK: LIS, No. 10 (1974 Revised); UNLS/15, p. 780.
Dominican Republic-Venezuela, NDLOS, Vol. 8 (1980), p. 80.
Finland-Sweden: LIS, No. 71 (1975).
Finland-USSR: LIS, Nos. 16 (1970), 56 (1973); UNLS/ 15, p. 777.
France-UK: Anglo-French Arbitral Award, ILM, Vol. 18 (1979), p.
397.
France (Reunion)-Mauritius: LIS, No. 95 (1982).
Germany, West-UK: LIS, No. 10 (1974 Revised); UNLS/18, p.
435.
Greece-Italy: LIS, No. 96 (1982).
India-Indoinesia: LIS Nos. 62 (1975), 93 (1981).
India-Maldives: LIS, No. 78 (1978).
India-Sri Lanka: LIS, Nos. 66 (1975) and 77 (1978); UNLS/19, pp.
396, 402, 412-15.
India-Thailand: LIS, No. 93 (1981).
Indonesia-Malaysia: LIS No. 1 (1970); UNLS/16, p. 417.
Indonesia-Thailand: LIS, Nos. 81 (1978), 93 (1981);NDLOS, Vol. 6
(1977), p. 746.
Iran-Oman: LIS, No. 67 (1976); UNLS/19, p. 450.
Iran-Qatar: LIS, No. 25 (1970).
Iran-Saudi Arabia: LIS, No. 24 (1970); UNLS/18, p. 433.
Iran-United Arab Emirates: LIS, No. 63 (1975).
Italy-Spain: NDLOS, Vol. 5 (1977), p. 261; LIS, No. 90 (1980).
Italy-Tunisia: LIS, No. 89 (1980).
Italy-Yugoslavia: LIS, No. 9 (1970).
Japan-Republic of Korea: LIS, No. 75 (1977).
Netherlands-UK: LIS, No. 10 (1974 Revised); UNLS/15, p. 778;
UNLS/16, p. 430.
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Index to Sources Consulted in Table 4 (cont.)

Netherlands (Antilles)-Venezuela: Nweihed, p. 5 (Map) and pp. 2329 (restatement of text and discussion).
Norway-Sweden: LIS, No.2 (1970); UNLS/16, p. 413.
Norway-UK: LIS, No. 10 (1974 Revised); UNLS/16, p. 775.
Saudi Arabia-Sudan: UNLS/18, p. 452.
Trinidad & Tobago-Venezuela: LIS, No. 11 (1970).
Turkey-USSR: Rainer, Lagoni, "Oil and Gas Deposits across National Frontiers," AJIL, Vol. 73 (1979), p. 230, note 62 (no text
included).
US (Samoa)-Cook Islands: Text of treaty in Message from the President of the United States Transmitting the [Treaty between the
U.S. and Cook Islands], Senate Executive Document P, 96th
Congress, 2nd Session (1980); Map in Smith, p. 409.
US-Cuba: ILM, Vol. 17 (1978), p. 110; NDLOS, Vol. 8 (1980), p.
66; Smith, pp. 401-402 (Map on p. 403); Feldman, p. 746.
US (eastern Gulf)-Mexico: ILM, Vol. 17 (1978), p. 1073; NDLOS,
Vol. 8 (1980), p. 63; Smith, pp. 402-405 (Map on p. 404); Feldman, pp. 743-45 (Map on p. 745).
US (Samoa)- New Zealand (Tokelau): Department of State Bulletin,
Vol. 81, No. 2049 (April 1981), p. 48 (no text included); Smith,
pp. 407-10 (Map on p. 409); Feldman, pp. 748-49.
US (Puerto Rico)-Venezuela: TIAS, No. 9890; NDLOS, Vol. 8
(1980), p. 84; LIS, No. 91 (1980).
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Table 5
The Proportionality Test: The Lengths of Coastlinest of
the Chinese and Japanese Territories in
Relation to Their Continental Shelf
Areas in the East China Sea
(Lengths in nautical miles)
I. Coastline Measured by Its General Direction

China (PRC & ROC)
Mainland2

383

Mainland3
Taiwan4

284
81

Total:
Ratio:
China (PRC & ROC):
Ratio:

Japan
North Region (north of 30°N)
182
Kyushus & Goto Retto
28
Osumi Gunto
South Region (south of 30°N)
(R yukyu Islands)
11
Tokara Gunto
64
Amami Gunto
74
Okinawa Gunto
56
Sakishima Gunto
415
35.7(%)

748
64.3(%)
365
64%

South Region Only
Japan:

205
36%

II. Coastline Measured by Straight Lines (Coastal Front)
China (PRC & ROC):
Ratio:

680
65%

Japan:

360
35%

1 The coasts of the Chinese mainland are measured in the general direction of the coastline instead of following all their sinuosities. The coasts of islands are measured by their
maximum lengths except those of Taiwan and Kyushu which are treated as mainlands
for the present purposes. The PRC's straight baselines are disregarded.
2. From 33°l7'N to 30°N latitude (approximately the headland of the Hangchow Bay).
3. From 30°N latitude to Hai-t'an Island in the Fukien Province opposite Taiwan.
4 · Measured in the general direction of its northern and northeastern coasts bordering
the East China Sea. Those bordering the Philippines Sea and the South China Sea are
excluded. See Map I.
s. Measured in the general direction of its western coast facing the East China Sea.
Those coasts of Kyushu bordering the Korea Strait and the Pacific Ocean are excluded.

N

Table 6
Physical Characteristics of the Hurd Deep, the Norwegian Trough, the Okinawa Trough, and
the Timor Trough

Location
Distance
beg. opp. coasts
(n. miles)

Norwegian Trough

Okinawa Trough

Timor Trough

English Channel

North Sea

East China Sea

Timor Sea

0

50-90

60-300

60-280

175-300

:::..,
~
~
-<

zo-i

0

470

620

625

Width
(n. miles)

1-3

20-81

65-100

70-100

102-167

200-670

Depth
(meters)

Geomorphology

()

t'l1

80

Underlying crust structure

0

Hurd Deep

Length
(n. miles)

Average Depth of surrounding shelves
(meters)

0\

500-2, 717
Over I /2 of area
exceeds I ,000; over I /5
exceeds 2,000

500-3, 200
Over 2/3 of area
exceeds 1,000; Over 1/4
exceeds 2,000.

>

en

;;
z

tl.l

o-i

c::

0......
t'l1

76
Continental

Isolated deep wholly
surrounded by shelves

90
Continental
Communicating with
ocean depths by a sill
comparable in depth
with adjacent shelves

90

95

Oceanic or transitional

Oceanic or transitional

(?)

(?)

Communicating with ocean depths by sills much
deeper than the adjacent shelves (Okinawa Trough:
500-1,000 meters; Timor Trough: 1,400 meters).

en
til
t'l1
~
....
t'l1

en

Table 7
Certain Data Relating to the Chinese Petroleum Corporation's Joint Ventures with Six U.S. Oil
Companies

Amoco

Contract Dates
Signature
Approval
Expiration

Location
of Contract
Area

7-27-70
9-21-70

Zone I
Taiwan
Strait
(north)

10-35

Zone I
Taiwan
Strait
(south)

10-120

Sept. '78
Conoco

3-37-71
7-23-71

--Sept. '78

Gulf

7-28-70
9-21-70

--Mar. '80

Oceanic

8-13-70
9-21-70
Mar. '79

Clinton

9-22-70
9-26-70
Mar. '78

Texfei

Shortest and
Longest
Distances
from Taiwan
(n. miles)

6-17-72
8-29-72
Aug. '80

Zone II
E. China
Sea
Zone III
E. China
Sea

Shortest Distance from
Chmese
mainland
(n miles)

Shortest Distance from
Japan incl.
Ryukyus
(n. miles)

Present Status
of Contract
(as of
Dec. 31. 1983)

til

tT1

>
tl:'
tT1

0
Terminated
Sept. '78

35

CCI

0

c::

z
0

10-195

110-280

Terminated
Sept. '78

60

55

70

35

85

Suspended
under.force

250-390

Zone V
E. China
Sea

290-415

110

70

-<
0

clause

-

Suspended
under.force

>
>-!

majeure

majeure

clause

Zone IV
E. China
Sea

>
::c
tT1
t""'

~

::j

0
z

Suspended
under.force
majeure

clause

--

--

120
- - · - - - - ·

80

Suspended
under.force
majeure

clause

N

0\
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List of Maps

Map
1. East China Sea: Geography
2. East China Sea: Geomorphology
3. East China Sea: Geology
4. East China Sea: Unilateral Claims and Concession Areas (as
of 1971)
5. Republic of Korea: Offshore Oil Concessions (as of December 31, 1982)
6. Japan-Republic of Korea Joint Development Zone and
Subzones 1-9 (as of December 31, 1979)
7. Japan and the Republic of China: Offshore Oil Concessions
8. Japan: Offshore Oil Concessions in the East China Sea (as of
December 31, 1979)
9. Republic of China: Five "Reserved Offshore Petroleum
Zones" (delineated October 15, 1970) and Oil Concessions (as
of mid-1977).
10. Republic of China: Offshore Oil Concessions (as of December 31, 1982)
11. People's Republic of China: Geophysical Survey and Offshore Oil Exploration Areas
12. The Tiao-yu-t'ai (Senkaku) Islets
13. North Sea Continental Shelf Boundaries
14. Anglo-French Continental Shelf Boundaries
15. Tunisian and Libyan Coasts Facing the Mediterranean Sea
16. Tunisian and Libyan Unilateral Claims
17. The Tunisian-Libyan Continental Shelf Boundary as Decided
by the International Court of Justice
18. Timor Sea and Arufura Sea
19. The Australia-Indonesia Equidistant Shelf Boundary (the
"Eastern Segment") as Delimited in the Agreement of May
18, 1971
20. The Australia-Indonesia Equitable Shelf Boundary (The
"Western Segment") as Delimited in the Agreement of
October 9, 1972
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Note on Permission to Reproduce Certain Maps
1. Permission to reproduce maps 6, 8 and 10 was kindly granted
by American Association of Petroleum in a letter dated
September 12, 1984.
2. Permission to reproduce maps 7 and 9 was kindly granted by
the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in a letter
dated November 8, 1984.
3. Permission to reproduce map 14 was kindly granted by
Oxford University Press in a letter dated October 4, 1984
(Reference no. A/BYBIL/ AMM).
4. Permission to reproduce map 18 was kindly granted by
International Hygrographic Bureau in a letter dated September 21, 1984.
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Map 1:

East China Sea: Geography
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Map 2: East China Sea: Geomorphology
(contours in fathoms)
Source: K.O. Emery et al.,"Geological Structure and
Water Characteristics of the East China Sea
and Yellow Sea~ UNECAFE/CCOP Technical
Bulletin, Vol. 2(1969), pp. 3, 15 (Fig. 2).
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Map 4:

East China Sea: Unilateral Claims and
Concession Areas (as of 1971)
0

z
l>

•
PETROLEUM CONCESSION AREAS
- - Republic of Chii\G
- - South Korea

- - Ryukyu

---Japan
.t-1 - - SekJU~n Kalraot ..

,HI- Tei~u ond Gulr
.t-W- Nlhon.-,u ond TIIGCO
.I-IV- Hi.,..,. hot! S•IIJU GniJ SP*I

0
.. ILE:S

Source: u.s. State Dep•t Map No. 267 7-71 (State RGE).
Notes: 1. "SOCAL/TEXACO" is referred to elsewhere as "Caltex".
2. "Sekiyu Shigen Kaihatsu" (J-I) means "Japan Petroleum
Exploration company" or "Japex".
3. "Teikoku" {J-II) means "Imperial". Some of Teikoku's
concessions appear in Map 6 under Teseki, a Gulf-Teikoku
joint-venture.
4. "Nihonsekiyu" {J-III) means "i:Japan Oil".5. "Nishi Nihon Sekiyu" {J-IV) means "West Japan Oil"
Block J-IV was assigned to New West Japan Oil, a subsidiary of West Japan Oil, in 1977. See Chapter 2, note 70
and accompanying text.
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3: East China Sea: Geology
(Contours indicate thickness of sediment (hundreds
of meters) beneath the East china Sea.)

Source: K.O. Emery et al., "Geological Structure and
Some Water Cliaracteristics of the East China
Sea and Yellow Sea, UNECAFB/CCOP Technical
Bulletin, Vol. 2 (1969), pp. 3, 40 (Fig. 17).
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I
I

I

I
I

I

I

Ex-Texaco/Chevro~

I

•

AREA REUNO. IN 1982
JAPAN-SOUTH I<OAEA

JOINT DEVELOPME:NT AMA

SOUTH KOREA

....,

..

Map 5: Republic of Korea: Offshore Oil Concessions (as of Decet'lber
31, 1982)

Source: G.L. Fletcher, .. Oil and Gas Developments in Far East
in 1982: South Korea,'" AAPG Bulletin, Vol. 67 (1983),
p. 1924 (Fig. 24).
- - - - The ROK's 1952 continental shelf claim. See Chapter 2, note ll,
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Map 6: Japan-Republic of Korea Joint Development Zone and
Subzones 1-9 (as of December 31, 1979). (For new
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Source: G.L. Fletcher,"Petromeum Developments in Far East,
1979: South Korea," AAPG Bulletin, Vol. 64 (1980),
p. 1955 (Fig. 30).
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Source: Selig S, Harrison, China, Oil and Asia: Conflict Ahead?
(New York: Columbia university Press, 1977), p. 46
et seq. (Fig. 6).
Note:

Compare this map to Maps 8 and 9 to get a clearer picture
of Japan's claims and concessions. This map does not
show colors in Harrison's original. For details of concession holders and overlapping zones, see Table 1 supra.
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Japan: Offshore Oil Concessions in the East China
Sea (left bottom corner)(as of December 31, 1979)

Source:

G.L. Fletcher, "Petroleum Developments in Far East,
1979: Japan," AAPG Bulletin, Vol. 64 (1980), p.
1941 (Fig. 16)

Note:

For details about concession holders, see Table 1
supra and Chapter 2 supra under "Japan".
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Selig S. Harrison, China, Oil, and Asia: Conflict
Ahead? (New York: Columb~a un~vers~ty Press, 1977},
p. 46 et seg. (Fig. 5).
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December 31, 1982)
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G.L. Fletcher, "Oil and Gas Developments in Far East
in 1982: Taiwan," AAPG Bulletin, Vol. 67 (1983), p.
1927 (Fig. 27), with updates supplied by this author.
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Map 12:

~Iiles

Tiao-yu-t'ai (Senkaku) Islets [Japanese names in parenthesis]

l.Tiao-yu (Uotsuri)
2.Huang-wei (Kuba)
3.Nan-hsiao (Minami-kojima)
4.Pei-hsiao (Kita-kojima)

5.Ch'ih-wei (Taisho)
6.Ch'ung-pei-yen (Okinokitawa)
7.Ch'ung-nan-yen (Okinominamiiw~)
B.Fei-lai (Tobisej

Source: Sha Hsueh-chun, Tiao-yu-t•ai Lieh-yu T'u [A Map of the
Tiao-yu-t•ai Islets](Taipel 1972). Seei:hapter 4, note 6,
This sketch is an integral part of that map. The 200meter and 1,000-meter contour lines are added by this
author on the basis of T.Chase et al., Bathymetry of the
North Pacific, Chart No. 5 (Scripps Institution of--oceanography & Institute of ~arine ~esources, La Jolla,
California,l970). See Chapter 1, note 6.
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Map 13: North Sea Continental Shelf Boundaries
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Scale:
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North Sea Continental Shelf Cases,
I.C.J. Reports 1982, p. 15 (Map 1).
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Map
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Anglo-French Continental Shelf Boundaries

Fa

0
0

M

Z><
0 0

.;.J.;.J

<><
Source;

..····....

Derek w. Bowett, .. The Arbitration between the United
Kingdom and France concerning the Continental
Shelf Boundary in the English Channel and SouthWestern Approaches, .. British Yearbook of International
~·Vol. 49 (1978), p. 2.
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Map 15:

TUnisian and Libyan Coasts Facing the

Mediterranean Sea
Source:

Case Concerning the Continental Shelf
{Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya)
I.C.J. Reports 1982, p. 36
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Sheaf of lanes resulting from Tunisian methods of dclimilalion.

Source:

Case Concerning the Continental Shelf
(Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiraya)
I.C.J. Reports 1982, p~ 81.
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Map 17:

The TUnisian-Libyan Continental Shelf Boundary'
as Decided by the International Court of Justic

Source:

Case Concerning the Continental Shelf
{Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiraya)
I.C.J. Reports 1982, p. 90.

Map 18: Timor Sea and Arafura Sea (Source: Special Publication
No. 23""Limits of Oceans and Seas", 3rd Edition 1953,
published by the International Hydrographic Bureau,
Monaco, solely for hydrographic purposes.

6

Vl

~o;
tTl

4 8

5"

(g) "

0

~

0

c::

z

SEA

0

·?

>

~

t)
ur

tTl
t""

~

8
0
z

45
n·

N

00

11"

120"

125"

130"

135"

140''

145"

..........

Map 19:

,._

""'
~

IJrs•
.r::

01

:

::l

~
1-<;
..:.

....

~-

.

!r[j"'-1~

g

~ ~

...
•

~·-

~NEW

~Indonesia

uu

,:-:-v'

r:-o- .•.

I

r
r

~ WE 511 i/
•>.:::..
\
~ IRIAN :

G''"'~.,J
r~~

¥ .....

---· .. -

··~---

-

~-

..

.,...,

, • • • • •· . . - - .

...

~

....

(')

Papua New Guinea

0

~

I

·-

n

:e
:o
··~

-..... -- -·-......................---....-----...

G U I. N E A

--:~-·

00

N

,..

:\

c;~:.\.;:;:T

---..,._c-- ..
~

'\I SLANO'

J

N

The Australia-Indonesia Equidistant Shelf Boundary (the "Eastern
Segment") as Delimited in the Agreement of May 18, 1971.
(Source: International Legal Materials, Vol. 10 (1971), p, 834)

ARUFURA

~

I

TERRITORY

r

:>

r
l
I

It

J~(
S H E L F

~
'I -·\..;.:'[.;.
\\..._,-.;
.....\
~-:~

"'

OF'

S"
..,..,.,
.::.·.,

I

I
I

~

>
en

PAPUA~~

~

c:ll

t0

=-

...

~I

...
ARAFUF?A

•• s £A
A3

'
'-'•

~·

Gulf of Carpentaria

"1"

~~·

Al

._~~

oo

·r

~AvST

.....
ttl
en
rJ'.l
ttl

~
.....
ttl
en

tis•

Map 20:

I

The Australia-Indonesia Equitable Shelf Boundary (the "l~cstC'rn
Segment") as Dclimit.ed in the A9recmcnt of October 9, 1972
(Source: International Legal Materials, Vol. 12 (1973), P• 3S7)

_,
-,-

'"

TAN!MVOAR/
~iu",
ISI.ANDS• •
•
.-;;P" /~'

Q

~

1-•

-'\J'

l),
(I

~::$)

.:2Q9) . .

/

=9tj_~'·

c:>• /-----·

-'If>·

'-'"'I

, I

((.?:.···/

1:1:'

g)

\
\

~

...................
-----~. i\12

A I< ll

f-oo•

____/,!

-·;/

.--cJ~L{-----. . . _·
··.... ....

2· ooo"'

?
:.-r' J_,v
. . '~"" :\.)'?·"

r-:\
I

/ A25

...... -···

1--•r •···

...

1\17

.·.·

F

0

c::

z

II I< l\

,, If

,o·l

E I

f

0

s \\ \'. '\_,

~

f

::::;

•r-l

~

Seabed
Austra1ia
V

f-u·

•:··

.L

~
~

!!l

sonD'-'

&J•UID-1

~

----z()o"'

..-.
'··

til

!:

,y~AusTRALIA

TIMOR

AND

Boundary

os

and

Indonesia

0

N

ARAFURA

Delineated

..

signed

.

'"

.J..

'"

<M

·~·
.L

~

SEAS

in

Agreemant

on

9Jh

~~

between

October 1972 .
-

L...,_..__.......,.____L___-...J,....,._ _ _ _ .J_ _ _ -----.J_

--.---.---

~

--'------

~~.;:.-------:..--.;..-;._
Ill"

.L

,,.

N

"

w

00

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
Author's Note: Listed here are selected portion of the
documents, hooks and articles consulted during the course of
writing this hook. All treaties, oil contracts, maps and navigation charts, newspaper articles, letters, and interviews are
omittedfor saving space. Full citations of those omitted references may he found in footnotes of each chapter.

I.

I.

2.

3.

4.

5.

PRIMARY SOURCES: DOCUMENTS AND
PUBLICATIONS OF STATES AND
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

Republic of China. Legislative Yuan. Li-fa-yuan Kung-pao
[Gazette of the Legislative Yuan]. Vol. 59, No. 64, August 22,
1970. Taipei, 1970.
Republic of Korea. "Law No. 2184: Submarine Mineral Resources Development Law, January 1, 1970; Presidential Decree No. 5020: Enforcement Decree of the Submarine Mineral
Resources Development Law, May 30, 1970; Regulations of the
Ministry of Commerce and Industry No. 343: Enforcement
Regulations of the Submarine Mineral Resources Development
Law, May 6, 1971." The Law for Development of Submarine
Mineral Resources. Seoul: Korea Petroleum Industry Development Center, 1971.
- - - - - . "Presidential Proclamation of Sovereignty over
Adjacent Seas, 18 January 1952." UNLS/6, 30-31.
U.N. ECAFE/CCOP Technical Advisory Group. "Marine
Geologic Investigations of the Offshore Area around the
Senkaku Islands, Southern Ryukyu Islands." Report of the
Seventh Session ofCCOP(Agenda Item 4(b)) 99-111. UN Doc.
C/CN.ll/L. 278 (1970).
United Nations. Official Records of the Second United Nations
Conference on the Law of the Sea, Geneva, 17 March-26 April
1960, Committee ofthe Whole. Verbatim Records ofthe General
Debate. A/CONF.l9/9. UN Pub. Sales No. 62.V.3. New
York, 1962.
- - - - - . Third United Nations Conference on the Law
of the Sea. Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea (Informal
Text). A/CONF.62/WP.l0/Rev.3, 27 August 1980.
The Law ofthe Sea: United Nations Convention
(285)

286

6.

7.
8.

9.

10.

11.
12.

13.

14.
15.

16.

17.

CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES
on the Law of the Sea with Index and Final Act of the Third
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, U.N. Pub.
Sales No. E.83.V.5, New York, 1983.
. Third United Nations Conference on the Law of
the Sea, Official Records. 15 vols. (U.N. Pub. Sales Nos.
E75.V.3,4,5,10; E76.V.8; E77.V.2; E78.V.3,4; E79.V.3,4;
E80.V.6; E.80.V.l2; E8l.V.5; E82.V.2; E83.V.4. New York
1975-83.
. United Nations Conference on the Law of the
Sea, Official Records. 7 vols. A/CONF.B/37-43, UN Pub.
Sales No. 58.V.4, Vols. I-VII. Geneva, 1958.
. Yearbook of the International Law Commission
1949. UN Pub. Sales No. 1957.V.l. New York, 1956.
. Yearbook of the International Law Commission
1951. 2 vols. A/CN.4/SER.A/1951 and Add. I. UN Pub. Sales
No. 1957.V.6, Vols. I & II. New York, 1957
. Yearbook of the International Law Commission
1953. 2 vols. A/CN.4/SER.A/1953 and Add.l. UN Pub.
Sales No. 59.V.4, Vols. I & II. New York, 1959.
. Yearbook of the International Law Commission
1956. 2 vols. A/CN.4/SER.A/1956 and Add.l. UN Pub.
Sales No. 1956.V.3, Vols. I & II. New York, 1956.
United Nations, General Assembly, 28th Session. Report of the
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean
Floor beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, A/9021. 6
vols. New York, 1973.
United Nations Library. The Sea: Legal and Political Aspects:
A select Bibliography. [1960-1973] ST/LIB/SER.B/14. UN
Pub. Sales No. E/F.74.1.9. New York, 1974.
. The Sea: Economic and Technological Aspects:
A Select Bibliography. ST/LIB/SER.B/15. [1960-1973] UN
Pub. Sales No. E/F.74.1.16. New York, 1974.
. The Sea: A Select Bibliography on the Legal,
Political, Economic and Technological Aspects, 1974-75. ST/
LIB/SER.B/16. UN Pub. Sale No. E/F.75.1.7. New York,
1975.
. The Sea: A Select Bibliography on the Legal,
Political, Economic and Technological Aspects, 1975-76.
ST/LIB/SER.B/21. Un Pub. Sales No. E/F.76.1.6. New York,
1976.
. The Sea: A Select Bibliography on the Legal,
Political, Economic and Technological Aspects, 1976-1978.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

18.

19.

20.
21.
22.

23.

24.
25.
26.
27.

287

ST/LIB/SER.B/25. Un Pub. Sales No. E/F.78.1.3. New York,
1978.
. The Sea: A Select Bibliography on the Legal,
Political, Economic and Technological Aspects, 1978-1979.
ST/LIB/SER.B/29. Un Pub. Sales No. E/F.80.1.6. New York,
1980.
United Nations Secretariat. Multilateral Treaties in Respect of
Which the Secretary-General Performs .Depository Functions,
List of Signatures, Ratifications, Accessions, etc. as at 31 December 1978. UN Doc. ST/LEG/SER.D/12. UN Pub. Sales
No. E.80.V.l0. New York, 1979.
. Laws and Regulations on the Regime ofthe High
Seas. United Nations Legislative Series. ST/LEG/SER.B/1.
UN Pub. Sales No. 195l.V.2. New York, 1951.
. Laws and Regulations on the Regime of the Territorial Sea. United Nations Legislative Series. ST /LEG/
SER.B/6. UN Pub. Sales No. 1957.V.2. New York, 1957.
. Supplement to Laws and Regulations on the Regime of the High Seas (Vols. I & II) and Laws Concerning the
Nationality of Ships. United Nations Legislative Series. ST/
LEG/SER.B/8. UN Pub. Sales No. 1959.V.2. New York,
1959.
. National Legislation and Treaties Relating to the
Territorial Sea, the Contiguous Zone, the Continental Shelf, the
High Seas and to the Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the Sea. United Nations Legislative Series. STI
LEG/SER.B/15. UN Pub. Sales No. E/F.70.V.9. New York,
1970.
. National Legislation and Treaties Relating to the
Law of the Sea. United Nations Legislative Series. ST/LEG/
SER.B/16. UN Pub. Sales No. E/F.74.V.2. New York, 1974.
. National Legislation and Treaties Relating to the
Law of the Sea. United Nations Legislative Series. ST/LEG/
SER.B/18. UN Pub. Sales No. E/F.76.V.2. New York, 1976.
. National Legislation and Treaties Relating to the
Law of the Sea. United Nations Legislative Series. ST /LEG/
SER.B/19. (Preliminary issue). New York, 1978.
U.S. Congress. Senate. A Bill to Promote the Foreign Policy of
the United States through the Maintenance of Commercial Cultural, and Other Relations with the People on Taiwan on An Unofticial Basis, and for other Purposes. S. 245, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1979).

288
28.
29.

CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES
. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations.
Hearings on S. 245. 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
U.S. Department of State. Bureau of Intelligence and Research. Office of the Geographer. Limits in the Seas. International Boundary Study, Series A, Nos. 1-97. Washington D.C.,
1970-.
II.

SECONDARY SOURCES

1. Books
1. American Law Institute. Restatement of the Law, Second [:J
Foreign Relations Law of the United States. St. Paul, Minn.:
American Law Institute Publishers, 1965.
2. Boggs, S. Whittemore. International Boundaries: A Study of
Boundary Functions and Problems. New York: Columbia University Press, 1940.
3. Bowett, Derek W. The Legal Regime of Islands in International
Law. Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana Publications, Inc., 1979.
4. Brown, Edward Duncan. The Legal Regime of Hydrospace.
London: Stevens and Sons, 1971.
5. Buzan, Barry. A Sea of Troubles? Sources of Dispute in the
New Ocean Regime. Adelphi Papers, No. 143. London: The
International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1978.
6. Ch'en, Ti-ch'iang. The International Law of Recognition. Edited by L.C. Green. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc.,
1951.
7. Cheng, Chu-yuan. China's Petroleum Industry: Output Growth
and Export Potential. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1976.
8. Chinese Petroleum Corporation. Petroleum History Editing
Committee. A Petroleum History of China. 2 Vols. Taipei:
Chinese Petroleum Corporation, 1976.
9.
. Annual Reports 1976-79. Taipei, 1976-79.
10. Chiu, Hungdah. Chinese Attitude toward Continental Shelf and
Its Implication on Delimiting Seabed in Southeast Asia. Occasional Papers/Reprints Series in Contemporary Asian Studies,
No. 1-1977. Baltimore: University of Maryland Law School,
1977.
11.
, ed. China and the Taiwan Issue, New York:
Praeger, a division of Holt, Rinehart and Winston/CBS, Inc.,
1979.
12. Clough, Ralph N. Island China. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978.
13. Cohen, Jerome Alan, and Chiu, Hungdah. People's China and

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

289

International Law: A Documentary Study. Princeton, University Press, 1974.
Colombos, John C. The International Law of the Sea. 6th ed.
London: Longmans, 1967.
Crawford, James. The Creation of States in International Law.
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979.
Dam, Kenneth W. Oil Resources: Who Gets What How? Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1976.
Dubner, Barry Hart. The Law of Territorial Waters of MidOcean Archipelagos and Archipelagic States. The Hague: M.
Nijhoff, 1976.
The Fourth Department, Kuomintang Central Committee. ed.
Tiao-yu-t'ai Lieh-yu Wen-t'i Huei-pien [A Collection of Materials on the Tiao-yu-t'ais Question]. Taipei, 1972.
Fairbridge, Rhodes W., ed. The Encyclopedia of Geomorphology. Encyclopedia of Earth Sciences Series, Vol. 3. New York:
Reinhold Book Corporation, 1968.
. The Encyclopedia of Oceanography. Encyclopedia of Earth Sciences Series. Vol. 1. New York: Reinhold
Book Corporation, 1966.
Galloway, L. Thomas. Recognizing Foreign Governments: The
Practice of the United States. Washington, D.C.: American
Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1978.
Greenfied, Jeanette. China and the Law of the Sea, Air and Environment. Alphen aan den Rijn, the Netherlands: Sijthoff &
Noordhoff, 1979.
Hackworth, Green Haywood. JJigest of International Law. 8
Vols. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1940-43.
Hardy, Randall W. China's Oil Future: A Case of Modest Expectations. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1978.
Harrison, Selig S. China, Oil and Asia: Conflicts Ahead? New
York: Columbia University Press for Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, 1977.
Henkin, Louis; Pugh, Richard C.; Schachter, Oscar; and Smith,
Hans. International Law: Cases and Materials. St. Paul,
Minn.: West Publishing Co., 1980.
Hodgson, Robert D. Islands: Normal and Special Circumstances. Research Study RGE-3, Bureau of Intelligence and
Research, Department of State. Washington, D.C.: 1973.
Hodgson, Robert D. and Alexander, Louis M. Towards An Objective Analysis of Special Circumstances: Bays, Rivers, Coastal
and Ocean Archipelagos and Atolls. Occasional Paper No. 3.

290

29.
30.

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

37.
38.
39.

40.
41.
42.

CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES
Kingston, R.I.: Law of the Sea Institute, University of Rhode
Island, 1972.
Holtedahl, Hans. On the Norwegian Continental Terrace, Primarily outside Mpre-Romsdal' Its Geomorphology and Sediments. Bergen: John Griegs Boktryk.k.eri, 1955.
Hong, Song Yook. The Sino-Japanese Fisheries Agreements of
1975: A Comparison with Other North-Pac!fic Fisheries Agreements. Occasional Papers/Reprints Series in Contemporary
Asian Studies, No. 6-1977. Baltimore: University of Maryland
Law School, 1977.
Hsiung, James C. Law and Policy of China's Foreign Relations.
New York: Columbia University Press, 1972.
Japan Petroleum Consultants, Ltd. Japan Petroleum and Energy Yearbook 1978. Tokyo, 1978.
Jessup, Philip C. The Law of Territorial Waters and Maritime
Jurisdiction. New York: G.A. Jennings Co., Inc., 1927.
Knight, H. Gary. The Law of the Sea: Cases, Documents, and
Readings. 1980 ed. Baton Rouge, Louisiana: Claitor's Law
Books & Publishing Division, 1980.
Lauterpacht, Sir Hersch. Recongnition in International Law.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1947.
Lay, S. Houston; Churchill, Robin; Nordquist, Myron; Welch,
Jane; and Simmonds, Kenneth R. ed. New Directions in the
Law of the Sea. 11 Vols. London, Rome, New York: Oceana
Publications, Inc. for the British Institute of International and
Comparative Law, 1973-1981.
Li, Victor H. De-Recognizing Taiwan: The Legal Problems.
Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, 1977.
Mouton, Martinus Willem. The Continental Shelf. The Hague:
Martinus Nijhoff, 1952.
Nordquist, Myron H. and Choon-ho Park (ed.). Reports of the
United States Delegation to the Third United Nations Conference
on the Law ofthe Sea. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Law of
the Sea Institute, 1983.
O'Connell, Daniel P. International Law. 2 Vols. 2nd ed.
London: Stevens & Sons, 1970.
. International Law of the Sea. Edited by I.A.
Shearer. 2 Vols. London: Oxford University Press, 1983-1984.
Oda, Shigeru. The Law of the Sea in Our Time. Vol.l: New
Developments, 1966-1975; Vol II: The United Nations Seabed

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

43.
44.
45.

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

291

Committee, 1968-1973. Leiden, the Netherlands: Sijthoff,
1977.
. The International Law of Ocean Development: Basic
Documents. 2 Vols. Leiden, the Netherlands: Sijthoff, 1972
and 1975.
Oppenheim, L. International Law. Edited by H. Lauterpacht.
London, New York, Toronto: Longmans, Green and Co.,
1955.
Park, Choon-ho. Continental She!f Issues in the Yellow Sea and
the East China Sea. Occasional Paper No. 15. Kingston,
Rhode Island: Law of the Sea Institute, University of Rhode
Island, 1972.
Petroleum Legislation: Basic Oil Laws and Concession Contracts
[Series]. New York: Barrows Company, Inc., 1959-.
Sampson, Anthony. The Seven Sisters: The Great Oil Companies and the World They Shaped. New York: Viking Press,
1975.
Shalowitz, Aaron L. Shore and Sea Boundaries. 2 Vols. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Commerce, Coast and Geodetic Survey, 1962 and 1964.
Shepard, Francis P. Marine Geology. 3rd ed. New York, Evanston, San Francisco, London: Harper & Row, for the Scripps
Institution of Oceanography, 1973.
Sohn, Louis B. ed. (Assisted by Paul C. Irwin). Law ofthe Sea:
Problems, Cases and Materials. 3rd preliminary ed. Unpublished textbook for the private use of students of the Harvard
Law School and the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy,
1980.
and Gustafson, Kristen. The Law of the Sea in a
Nutshell. St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co., 1984.
Symmons, CliveR. The Maritime Zones of Islands in International Law. The Hauge: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1979.
Tang, Wu. Chung-Kuo Yu Kuo-chifa [China and International
Law]. Taipei: Committee on Chinese Cultural Enterprise Publishers, 1957.
Whiteman, Majorie M. Digest of International Law. 15 Vols,
Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1963-73.
Yeh, Su-yu, and Liu, Hsiang-tien. Chung-kuo Tsu-jan Ti-li
Tsung-lun [A General Treatise on China's Physical Geography]. Peking: Commercial Press, 1959.
Yang, Chung-Kwei. Chung-kuo, Liu-ch'iu, Tiao-)'U-t"Oi [China,

292

CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES

Ryukyu, and Tiao-yu-t'ai]. Hong Kong: Union Research Institute, 1972.
2.

1.

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

9.
10.
II.
12.

13.

Articles
Adede, A.O. "Toward the Formulation of the Rule of Delimitation of Sea Boundaries between States with Adjacent or Opposite Coasts." Virginia Journal of International Law, Vol. 19
(1979), pp. 207-55.
Allen, Donald R. and Mitchell, Patrick H. "The Legal Status
of the Continental Shelf of East China Sea." Oregon Law Review, Vol. 51 ( 1972), pp. 789-812.
Auburn, F.M. "The North Sea Continental Shelf Settlement."
Archiv des Volkerrechts, Vol. 16 (1974/1975), pp. 28-36.
Baxter, Richard R. "Treaty and Custom." Hague Academy,
Recueil des Cours, Vol. 129, Sec. I (1970), pp. 25, 104.
Bennett, Amanda. "BP Signs Accord for Oil Rights Offshore
China." Asian Wall Street Journal, May 11, 1983, p. I, col. 6.
Blecher, M.D. "Equitable Delimitation of Continental Shelf."
American Journal of International Law, Vol. 73 (1979), pp. 6088.
Boggs, S. Whittemore. "Delimitation of Seaward Areas under
National Jurisdiction." American Journal of International Law,
Vol. 45 (1951), pp. 240-66.
Bowett, Derek W. "The Arbitration between the United Kingdom and France concerning the Continental Shelf Boundary in
the English Channel and South-Western Approaches." British
Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 49 (1978), pp. 1-29.
Brown, Edward Duncan. "The Anglo-French Continental
Shelf Case." Yearbook of World Affairs 1979, pp. 304-27.
. "The Tunisia-Libya Continental Shelf Case: A
Missed Opportunity." Marine Policy, Vol. 7 (1983), pp. 142-62.
Charney, Jonathan I. "Ocean Boundaries between Nations: A
Theory for Progress." American Journal of International Law,
Vol. 78 (1984), pp. 582-606.
Cheng, Tao. "The Sino-Japanese Dispute over the Tiao-yu-t'ai
(Senkaku) Islands and the Law of Territorial Acquisition."
Virginia Journal of International Law, Vol. 14 (1974), pp. 22166.
Chiu, Hungdah. "Certain Legal Aspects of Recongnizing the
People's Republic of China." Case Western Reserve Journal of
International Law, Vol. II (1979), pp. 389-419.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

14.
15.

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

22.
23.
24.
25.

293

. "China and the Question of Territorial Sea."
International Trade Law Journal, Vol. 1 (1975), pp., 29-77.
. "Exploration and Exploitation of Ocean Resources in the Western Pacific: The Legal and Political Implications for Regional Cooperation and Joint Prosperity."
Korean Journal of International Studies, Vol. 15, No. 1 (1983/
84), pp. 17-37.
. "South China Sea Islands: Implications for
Delimiting the Seabed and Future Shipping Routes." China
Quarterly, No. 72 (December 1978) pp. 742-65.
. "Tiao-yu-t'ai Lien-yu Wen-t'i Yen-chiu [A
Study of the Tiao-yu-t'ai Islands Problem]." Chengchi Law Review, Vol. 6 (1972), pp. 1-30 (with 11 maps).
Collins, E. Jr., and Rogoff, M.A. "International Law of Maritime Boundary Delimitation." Maine Law Review, Vol. 34
(1982), pp. 1-62.
Ely, Northcutt. "Seabed Boundaries between Coastal States:
The Effect to be Given as 'Special Circumstances'." International Lawyer, Vol. 6 (1972), pp. 219-36.
, and Pietrowski, Robert F., Jr. "Boundaries of
Seabed Jurisdiction off the Pacific Coast of Asia." Natural Resources Lawyer, Vol. 8 (1974), pp. 611-29.
Emery, K.O., Hayashi, Yoshikazu; Hidle, Thomas W.C.;
Kobayashi, Kazuo; Koo, Ja Hak; Meng, C.Y.; Niino, Hiroshi;
Osterhagen, J.H.; Reynolds, L.M.; Wageman, John M.; Wang,
C.S., and Yang, Sung Jin. "Geological Structure and Some
Water Characteristics of the East China Sea and the Yellow
Sea." UNECAFE/CCOP Tech. Bull. Vol. 2 (May 1969), pp. 343.
. "Geological Limits of the 'Continental Shelf' "
Ocean Development and International Law Journal, Vol. 10
(1981), pp. 1-11.
Feldman, Mark B. "The Tunisia-Libya Continental Shelf
Case: Geographical Justice or Judicial Compromise." American Journal of International Law, Vol. 77 (1983), pp. 219-38.
Friedmann, Wolfgang. "The North Sea Continental Shelf
Cases-A Critique." American Journal of International Law,
Vol. 64 (1970), pp. 229-40.
Goldie, L.F.E. "The International Court of Justice's 'Natural
Prolongation' and the Continental Shelf Problem of Islands."
Netherlands Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 4 (1973), pp.
237-61.

294
26.

27.
28.
29.
30.

31.

32.

33.

34.
35.

36.

37.

CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES
Grisel, Etienne. "The Lateral Boundaries of the Continental
Shelf and the Judgment of the International Court of Justice in
the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases." American Journal Of
International Law. Vol. 64 (1970), pp. 562-93.
Harrison, Selig S. "Oil Rush in East Asian Waters Part II;
Claims in Conflict." Asia, July-Aug., 182, pp. 8-11.
Hedberg, Hollis D. "Continental Margin from Viewpoint of
the Petroleum Geologist." AAPG Bull, Vol. 54 (1970), pp.3-43.
. "Ocean Floor Boundaries." Science, Vol. 204,
(No. 438, Apr. 1979), pp. 135-44.
. "Political Boundaries and Economic Resources
of the Oceans." Marine Technology and Law: Development of
Hydrocarbon Resources and Offshore Structures. Proceedings
of the 2nd International Ocean Symposium, sponsored by the
Ocean Association of Japan, Tokyo, 1977. Tokyo: Ocean Association of Japan, 1978, pp. 29-41.
Hodgson, Robert D., and Cooper, E. John. "The Technical
Delimitation of a Modem Equidistant Boundary." Ocean Development and International Law Journal, Vol. 3 (1976), pp. 36188.
Huang, Kang. "Chung-hua-min-kuo Yu Ta-lu-chiao-ch'en
Chih-tu" (The Republic of China and the Regime of the Continental Shelf). Jen Yu She-hui (Man and Society). No. 2 ( August 1973), pp. 47-58.
Jennings, Robert Yewdall. "The Limits of Continental Shelf
Jurisdiction: Some Possible Implication of the North Sea Case
Judgment." International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol.
18 (1969), pp. 819-32.
Karl, Donald E. "Islands and the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf: A Framework for Analysis." American Journal of
International Law, Vol. 71 (1977), pp. 642-73.
Kim, Byung-Chin. "The Northeast Asian Continental Shelf
Controversy: A Case Study in Conflict Resolution among
South Korea, Japan, China (PRC) and Taiwan (ROC)." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Florida State University, 1980.
Ma, Ying-jeou; Carnell, Richard S.; Tavrow, Beth; and Edwards, Hart. "Greek-Turkish Conflict over the Continental
Shelf of the Aegean Sea: An Analysis of the Problem and A
Proposed Solution." Unpublished paper (written under the supervision of the late Professor Richard R. Baxter) Harvard Law
School, 1978.
. "Foreign Investment in the Troubled Waters of

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

38.
39.
40.
41.

42.

43.

44.
45.

46.
47.
48.

49.

295

the East China Sea," Chinese Yearbook of International Law
and Affairs, Vol. 1. (1981), pp. 35-73.
Menard, H.W. "Transitional Types of Crust under Small
Ocean Basins," Journal of Geophysical Research, Vol. 72 (June
1967), pp. 3061-73.
Lumb R.D. "The Delimitation of Maritime Boundaries in the
Timor Sea." Australian Yearbook of International Law. Vol. 7
(1981), pp. 72-86.
Note. "The East China Sea: The Role of International Law in
the Settlement of Disputes." Duke Law Journal, 1973, pp. 82365.
Note. [Feulner, Gary R.]. "Delimitation of Continental Shelf
Jurisdiction between States: The Effect of Physical Irregulartities in the Natural Continental Shelf." Virginia Journal of International Law, Vol. 17 (1976), pp. 77-105.
Note. [Terr, Leonard B.]. "The 'Distance plus Joint Development Zone' Formula: A Proposal for the Speedy and Practical
Resolution of the East China and Yellow Seas Continental
Shelf Oil Controversy." Cornell International Law Journal,
Vol. 7 (1973), pp. 49-71.
Note. [Upton, Peter N.]. "International Law and the Sino-Japanese Controversy over Territorial Sovereignty of the Senk.aku
Islands" Boston University Law Review, Vol. 52 (1972), pp. 76390.
Oda, Shigeru. "The Delimitation of the Continental Shelf in
Southeast Asia and the Far East." Ocean Management, Vol. 1
(1973), pp. 327-46.
Okuhara, Toshio. "The Territorial Sovereignty over the
Senkaku Islands and Problems on the Surrounding Continental
Shelf." Japanese Annual of International Law, Vol. 15 (1971),
pp. 97-106.
Park, Choon-ho. "Les Jurisdictions Maritimes dans laMer de
Chine: Les Pratiques etatiques actuelles." Revue Generate de
Droit International Public, Vol. 84 (1980), pp. 328-39.
. "Oil under Troubled Waters: The Northeast
Asia Seabed Controversy." 14 HILJ 212-60 (1973). Harvard
International Law Journal, Vol. 14 (1973), pp. 212-60.
. "The Sino-Japanese-Korean Sea Resources
Controversy and the Hypothesis of a 200-Mile Economic
Zone." Harvard International Law Journal, Vol. 16 (1975), pp.
27-46.
- - - - - . "Offshore Oil Development in the China Seas:

296

50.

51.
52.

53.

54.
55.

56.
57.

58.

CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES

Some Legal and Territorial Issues." Ocean Yearbook 2 ed. by
Elizabeth Mann Borgese and Norton Ginsburg, Chicago and
London: The University of Chicago Press, 1980 pp. 302-316.
People's Republic of China. "Chueh-pu Jung-hsu Mei-jih Fantung-p'ai Lueh-tuo Wuo-kuo Hai-ti Tze-yuan" (Plunder of
China's Sea-bed and Subsoil Resources by U.S. and Japanese
Reactionaries Will Never Be Allowed). Jen-min Jih-pao, December 29, 1970, p. 1; English translation in Peking Review,
Vol. 14, No. 1, January 1, 1971, p. 22.
. "U.S. and Japanese Reactionaries Out to Plunder Chinese and Korean Sea-bed Resources." Peking Review,
Vol. 13, No. 50, December 11, 1970, pp. 15-16.
Rhee, Sang-Myon. "Equitable Solutions to the Maritime
Boundary Dispute between the United States and Canada in
the Gulf of Maine." American Journal of International Law,
Vol. 75 (1981), pp. 590-628.
Takaoka, Daisuke. "Senkaku Retto Shuhen Kaiiki no
Gakujytsu Chosa ni Sanka Shite" (I participated in the Academic Survey in Offshore Areas Surrounding the Senkaku Islands). Okinawa (in Japanese), No. 56 (March 1971), pp. 42-56.
Tretiak, Daniel. "The Sino-Janpanese Treaty of 1978: The
Senkaku Incident Prelude." Asian Survey, Vol. 18 (Deceomber
1978), pp. 1235-49.
Van Dyke, Jon M. and Brooks, Robert A. "Uninhabited Islands: Their Impact on the Ownership of the Ocean's Resources." Ocean Development and International Law Journal,
Vol. 12 (1983), pp. 265-300.
Wageman, John M.; Hilde, Thomas W.C.; and Emery, K.O.
"Structural Framework of East China Sea and Yellow Sea."
AAPG Bull Vol. 54 (January 1970), pp. 1611-43.
Willums, Jan-Olaf. "China's Offshore Oil: Application of
Framework for Evaluating Oil and Gas Potentials." Unpublished Sc.D. dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1975.
. "China's Offshore Petroleum." China Business
Review, July-August 1977, pp. 6-14.

INDEX
Abu Dhabi, 104n
Abu Musa, 8ln, 99, 100
Adriatic Sea, 85n, 97, 174
Aegean Sea Islands, 107, 124
Al-' Arabiyah Islet, 8ln, 99
Aleutian Trench, II
Allied Powers, 220
Amami Gunto (Islands), 36, 37, 64, 132, 133
American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), 23ln
Anambas Island, 95n
Arabian Sea, 175
Argentina, 116n
Aru Islands, 179, 181
Arufura Sea, 179
Arufura Shelf, 179, 181
Arufura Trough, 179, 180
Atlantic Ocean, 129
Australia, 116, 179, 180, 181, 182, 189
Aves Isle, 95n, 96n
Baltic Sea, 174
Bahrain, 80n, 98
basepoints, 36, 37, 42, 73, 134
bathymetry, 9
Baxter, Richard R., 88
Bay of Bengal, 175
Bay of Biscay, 85n
Bay of Granville, 118
Belgium, 20 I
Boputhatswana, 218
Browns Bank, 175
Canada, 115, 175n, 199, 201
Canberra, 180, 193
Cenozoic Era, 14
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 20, 21
Ceram Sea, 179
Channel Islands, 73n, 83, 101, 107, 110, 118, 119, 126, 127, 130, 132,
152, 153, 184
Cheju Island, 9, 28, 97 155
Chekiang Province, 55
(297)

298

CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES

Chen Chih-mai, 224
ch'eng-jen ("recognize"), 230
Cherbourg, 129
Chiang Kai-shek, 51, 205
Chih-wei Island (Raleigh Rock), 50, 71, 92, 93, 95
China, international recognition, 198-200
Ch'ing dynasty, 93
Chiungchow Strait, 135
Chou En-lai, 2n, 229
Ch'ung-nan-yen (Rock), 71, 92
Ch'ung-pei-yen (Rock), 71, 92
Civil war, China, 197-98, 228
continental shelf, 13, 14, 23, 24, 25, 31, 35, 36, 39, 40, 50, 53, 54, 60,
72, 73, 74, 75, 80, 81, 83, 84, 91, 107, 108, 138
continental shelf delimitation, 4, 6, 36, 81, 84, 107, 109, 110, 113, 117,
125, 130, 152, 153
Coordination Council for North American Affairs (CCNAA), 23ln
Cultural Revolution, 199
Danjo Gunto, 10, 28, 37, 140, 141, 142, 157
Davis Strait, 175
Dayyinah Islet, 104n
De Facto doctrine in international law, 218-20
Denmark, 110, 116, 117, 147, 149, 176, 178
Dongtai-I well, 19n, 51, 55, 59, 64, 65, 66, 129
Douglas-Home, Sir Alec, 204
Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea, 76, 123
Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea (Informal Text), 76, 123,
124
East Asia, seabed research, 15
East Asia Relations Association (EARA), 221
East Timor, 179
Emery, K.O., 15, 16, 37
Emery Report, 17-19, 24, 26, 30, 39, 44, 48, 50, 168
English Channel, 101-02, 112, 117-18, 127, 147, 153, 183, 184
"equidistance principle," 6, 28, 36, 54, 62, 64, 73, 75, 109, 110, 115,
117, 119, 123-24, 134, 145-58, 177, 181-82, 184, 191, 192, 194
"equitable principles," 6, 53, 76, 83-84, 86, 109, 110, 114, 118, 123-24,
151, 152, 156, 167, 180-81, 191, 194
ex aequo et bono, 111-12
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), 4, 5, 6, 53, 54, 72-73, 77, 88, 108,
124-25, 126, 129, 131-32
Farsi Islet, 8ln, 99

INDEX

Fei-lai Island, 71, 92
force majeure, 46, 47
France, 101, 109, 118-19, 126, 152, 162
Friedmann, Wolfgang, 112
Fukien, 9, 144
Fukien-Reinan Massif, 17
Fukue Shima (Island), 9, 141
geography, 9
geology, 9, 166-88
geomorphology, 9, 10-11, 166-88
Georges Bank, 115, 129, 175
Germany, 110, 117
Glacial Epoch, 177
Goto Retto, 36, 140, 141
Gould, H.R., 15
Goff, Robert, 215
Greece, 109, 124, 175n
Greenland, 175
guano, 93, 94
Gulf of Gabes, 121, 154, 186
Gulf of Maine, 175
Gulf of Mannar, 175
Gulf of Mexico, 170
Gulf of Tonkin (Beibuwan), 67
Haifu-jung (Statice arbuscula), 92
Hai-t'an Island, 9, 144
Hangchou Bay, 144
Helgoland Island, 1OOn
Hodgson, Robert D., 146, 148
Hong Kong, 48, 67
Hua-p'ing Islet, 72, 142
Huang-wei Island, 50, 71, 72, 92, 93, 94
Hurd Deep (Hurd Deep Fault Zone), 118-19, 174, 183-87
Iceland, 82n, 128
Imperial Russia: continental shelf, 23n
India, 99, 175
Indian Ocean, 181
Indonesia, 116, 140, 175n, 176, 179, 181, 182, 190
Informal Composite Negotiating Text (ICNT), 78, 123
Informal Single Negotiating Text (ISNT), 77, 78, 90n, 122
Interchange Association (ICA), 221
International Amateur Athletic Federation (IAAF), 214

299

300

CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES

International Badminton Federation, 215
International Hydrographic Bureau, 9
International Law Commission (ILC), 150
Iran, 74, 98, 99, 116n
Ireland, 126
Israel, 199
Italy, 74, 97, 98, 99, 121, 148, 174-76, 201
Jakarta, 180, 193
Japan: claims of concession areas, 33-35, 58, 59, 62, 63, 64, 65; joint
development with the ROK, 38; Law of the Sea, 35-37; off-shore
exploration, 37-38; practice of international law, 220-28
Japan Trench, 11
Japan-ROK Joint Development Agreement, 31, 34, 51, 58-59,62,67,
133n
Japan-ROK Joint Development Zone (JDZ), 30, 51-52, 58-62, 133,34, 144, 176, 182, 190, 192, 239
Java Trench, 179
Jerba Island, 85, 86, 121
Kachchativu Islet, 81n, 99, 100
Kajola, 97
Keelung, 71
Kenya, 125
Kerkennah Islands, 85, 86, 102, 103, 112, 121, 154
Klenova, M.B., 15
Koga, (Tatsushiro), 93
Kogashima Prefecture, 133
Koh, Tommy T.B., 108
Korea, Democratic Republic of, 4, 5n, 25n, 26, 31, 210-11, 223
Korea Strait, 31, 36, 58, 96, 97, 140, 141, 156, 165
Korean War, 199, 209, 228, 230
Kuril Trench, 11
Kyushu, 9, 10, 18, 36, 37, 129, 132-33, 140-42, 144, 158, 164, 168, 192
Lampedusa Island, 97
Lampione Island, 8ln, 98
Leichou Basin, 67
Libya, 102, 120-21, 125, 154, 162, 182
Linosa Island, 97
Lisbon, 180
locus standi, 203, 224, 225, 228
Longjing wells, 19n, 51, 55, 59, 61, 64, 65, 66, 129
Macao, 66, 67

INDEX

301

Macrogeography, 80-81, 97-99, 101-03, 118-19, 143-45, 147, 152, 157,
165, 180, 181, 189, 240
Malaysia, 116n, 140
Maldives, 175n
Malta, 121, 122
marine geology, 11, 12-14
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 21
Matsu Island, 197
Matthew, Robert, 206
Mediterranean Sea, 85, 115, 175
Menard, H.W., 170n, 187n
Mesozoic Era, 17, 18
Meyerhoff, A.A., 20-22
microgeography, 145
Mien-hua Islet, 72, 142
Ming dynasty, 93
Naha, 71
Nan-hsiao Island, 50, 71, 92, 93
Natuna Island, 95n
"natural prolongation," 27-28, 29, 40, 42, 52, 60, 62, 84, 101-03, 110,
134, 150-51, 166-88, 192-93
Neogene (Neocene) Age, 14, 18-19, 44, 72
Netherlands, 110, 117, 149
New England, 129
New Guinea, 179, 181
Nigeria, Civil War, 197
Niino, Hiroshi, 16, 18, 37
Nixon, Richard M., 229
normal baseline(s), 134-35
North Korea, see Korea, Democratic Republic of
North Sea, 15, 96, 97, 110, 115, 129, 138, 169-70, 174, 176-77, 178,
182, 189
Northeast Channel, 175
Norway, 96, 116, 135, 138, 147, 176-77, 178, 183, 184
Norwegian Trough, Sin, 96, 116, 170n, 174-75, 176-79, 182-86, 18487, 189
ocean thermal energy conversion (OTEC), 13ln
offshore oil exploration, 11, 14-15
Oil Companies: Alaska, 35, 37, 63; Amoco (Standard Oil of Indiana), 43-45, 48, 67; British Petroleum (BP), 66; Chevron/Texaco
Oil, 66; China Petroleum Corporation (CPC), 33, 39-41, 44-48,
5ln, 60, 66-67, 204, 206, 245; Clinton International Corporation,

302

CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES

47-48; Continental Oil Company (Conoco), 44-45, 67; Energy
Reserve Group, 47; Exxon Oil, 66; Gulf Oil, 26, 30, 34, 38, 4549; Japan National Oil Corporation (JNOC), 34; Japan Petroleum Development Corporation (JPDC), 34-35; Japan Petroleum Exploration Company (Japex), 35, 37, 57n, 63; Korean
American Oil (Koam), 29, 30, 32; Mitsubishi, 34; Nippon Oil,
32, 34, 38, 62; Oceanic Exploration Company, 46-48; "Seven
Sisters," 29n, 45, 49; Shell Oil, 26, 34; Socal/Texaco (Caltex)
Oil, 26, 30, 60; Standard Oil of Indiana, see Amoco; Superior
Oil, 47; Teik.oku Oil, 34, 35, 37-38, 45, 62-63; Texfel Pacific Corporation, 47, 60, 66; Uruma, 35, 37, 63; Wendall Phillips Oil, 26,
29, 66-67; West Japan Oil, 34, 37-38, 62; Zapata Oil, 30, 60
Okinawa, 1, 71
Okinawa Gunto (Islands), 132-33, 158
Okinawa Prefecture, 133
Okinawa Reversion Treaty (1971), 2
Okinawa Trough, 5, 10-11, 17-18, 28-29, 34-37, 42-43, 53, 64, 72,
101-02, 107, 129, 141-42, 144n, 146, 156, 165, 168-72, 174-76,
182, 186, 187-90, 192-94, 239, 241-42
opinio juris, 95
Osumi Gunto (Islands), 36, 140, 144n, 158
Pacific Ocean, 11, 169
Paleozoic Age, 18
Palk Bay, 99
Palk Strait, 99
Papua New Guinea, 179, 180, 181
Pearl River, 48
Pei-hsiao Island, 50, 71, 92
Pelagian Block, 85, 185
Pelagian Sea, 85, 169, 185-86
Pelagrus Islet, 97
P'eng-chia Islet, 72, 142
Penghu Island, 136
Pentelleria Island, 97
People's Republic of China: claims and concession areas, 50-52, 60,
61-62, 64-67; China National Offshore Oil Corporation
(CNOOC), 49; Declaration on China's Territorial Sea (1958),
135-36; Law of the Sea, 52-54; Ministry of Foreign Economic
Relations and Trade, 202; Ministry of Geology, 51; Ministry of
Petroleum Industry, 202; offshore exploration, 54-55; Regulation of the People's Republic of China on the Exploitation of

INDEX

303

Offshore Petroleum Resources in Cooperation with Foreign Enterprises (1982), 52; sovereignty, 51
Persian Gulf, 15, 99, 115, 174
Pescadore (Penghu) Islands, 135-36
petroleum geology, 11, 14-15
Philippine Sea, 9, 164
Philippine Trench, 11
Pohai Bay, 48-49, 63, 135
Portugal: continental shelf, 23n
Potsdam Proclamation, 220
"proportionality," 112, 117, 121-22, 138-40, 157-65, 181, 191-93
"Public Property" in international law, 216-218, 227
Qatar, 104n
Quemoy (Kinmen) Island, 197
Ras Ajdir, 85, 120, 122, 154
Ras Kaboudia, 139, 162
Ras Tajoura, 139, 162
regime of islands in international law, 4, 71-86
"relevant circumstances," 84, 109, 111-18, 123-24, 127, 155, 181-82,
191
Republic of China: Claims and concession areas, 39-42, 59-60, 62-67
Law of the Sea, 42-43; Ministry of Economic Affairs, 40, 46n;
offshore zones, 59, 63, 66
Republic of Korea: claims and concessions in East China Sea, 2632, 58-60;joint development with Japan, 31-32; Law ofthe Sea,
27-29; offshore exploration, 29-31
Reserved Offshore Petroleum Zones, 41-43
Revised Single Negotiating Text (RSNT), 78, 84, 123
Rhodesia, 218, 237
ROC-ROK-Japan Liaison Committee, 50-51
Rockall Bank, 115
Rockall Rock, 116n, 126
Romania, 124, 125n
Ryukyu Folded Zone, 17
Ryukyu Islands, 9-11, 32, 35, 37, 64, 72, 93, 95, 102-03, 132-33, 142,
144, 146, 157-58, 164-65, 168-69, 172, 191, 241
R yukyu Kingdom, 93
Ryukyu Trench, 11, 17, 169, 171
Sagono Shima (Island), 14ln
Sahul shelf, 181n
Sakishima Gunto (Islands), 132-33, 142, 158
Salmanov, F., 20

304

CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES

San Francisco Peace Treaty (1952), 220, 229
Saudi Arabia, 98, 99, 116n
Scilly Islands, 84, 111, 119, 153
Sea of Japan, 25n, 170
Seabed Committee, see United Nations
Shanghai, 66
Shanghai Communique (1972), 229-30, 234
Sharjah Emirate, 99
Shen, Ch'eng-nan, 94n
Shepard, F .P ., 15
Shetland Islands, 81n, 96-97, 99
Shih-ts'ung-jung, see Hai-fu-jung
Shiro-se, 143n
Skagerrak, 85n, 147, 178
Sohul Shelf, 179
South China Sea, 48-49, 54, 63, 66, 164
Spain, Civil War, 199
"special circumstance(s)," 73, 75, 84, 113-116, 118-19, 124, 126, 153,
178, 185
Spratly Islands, 136
Sri Lanka, 99,100, 175n
standing in international law (see locus standr)
Statics arbuscula, see Hai-fu-jung
Statute for Exploration and Exploitation of Petroleum in Offshore
Areas, 41
Statute of the International Court of Justice, 95, 109
straight baseline(s), 134-39, 141, 158, 180
Strait of Hormuz, 99
Submarine Mineral Resources Development Law ( 1970), 26
Sweden, 116n
"Taiwan Basin," 17, 18
Taiwan Relations Act (1979), 231-32, 234-35, 237
Taiwan-Sinzi Folded Zone, 17, 18
Taiwan Strait, 9, 19, 22, 41-44, 48, 50, 52, 66, 164, 195, 197, 229
Tanimbar, 179
Teng Hsiao-p'ing, 3n
Tertiary Period, 14, 17-18
thalweg principle, 29, 43, 190
Tiao-yu Island, 71, 92-94
Tiao-ye-tai Islands (Senkaku Gunto), 1-3, 7, 10, 20, 32-34, 37, 45, 50,
62-64, 68-105, 107, 112-13, 142, 239-40, 242
Timor Sea, 179, 181-82, 193, 242

INDEX

305

Timor Trough, 116, 175-76, 179-81, 186-90
Tokara Island, 36-37, 64, 144n
Tori Shima, 10, 28, 37, 140-41, 157
Transkei, 218, 237
Tripolitanian Furrow, 120, 121, 168, 186-87
Truman, Harry S., 229
Truman Proclamation (1945), 23, 81
Tsushima Island, 36, 96-97, 99
Tsushima Strait, 18
Tunisia, 97, 102, 120-21, 125, 153, 162, 168, 185
Turkey, 109, 124, 125
United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.), 99, 100, 116n
Unis (of Libya), 125
United Kingdom, 96, 97, 101, 107, 115-16, 118-19, 126, 132, 135, 137,
138, 152, 162, 176, 177, 183-84, 196, 200, 202
United Kingdom, practice of international law, 203-220, 226, 227
United Nations, 5, 113, 199, 220, 229; Committee for Coordination
of Joint Prospecting for Mineral Resources in Asian Offshore
Areas (CCOP), 16, 26, 43, 44; Committee on the Peaceful Uses
of the Seabed and the Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction (Seabed Committee), 35, 52, 76, 126; Conference on the Law of the Sea (1958) (UNCLOS 1), 24, 39, 40, 74,
75, 113-15; Conference on the Law ofthe Sea (1982) (UNCLOS
III), 4-7, 28, 35-36, 53, 65, 68, 76, 78, 84, 87-88, 91, 103, 107-109,
120, 122-26, 131, 171, 186-88, 192, 239-43; Convention on the
Continental Shelf, 24, 27, 39, 40, 70, 71, 74, 75, 77, 79, 84, 87-89,
91, 109, 113-14, 117-19, 129, 137, 142-43, 149, 151, 153, 162, 17274, 184, 185; Convention on the High Seas, 129n; Convention
on the Law of the Sea (LOS) (LOS Convention), 87-89, 91, 93,
103, 107-08, 122-23, 171, 186-87, 192-93; Convention on the
Territorial Sea and Continguous Zone, 77, 130, 136n, 144n;
Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE), 16;
General Assembly, 24, 76, 87, 113-14; International Court of
Justice (ICJ), 27, 71, 75, 85-86, 102, 109-12, 117, 120, 122, 135,
138, 145, 149-52, 153-56, 157, 159-61, 163, 175, 191; International Law Commission, 24, 73, 113-14, 135, 145, 150, 174; Statute of the International Court of Justice, 95; United Nations
Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO),
174, 184
United States, 78, 115, 133, 137, 176, 196, 199, 202
United States, practice of international law, 226-27, 228-37

306

CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES

United States Department of State, 30, 39, 45, 47, 136, 146, 147,230,
232, 235-36
Uruguay, 116n
U.S.-ROC Mutual Defense Treaty, 230-31, 235n
U shant Islands, 84, Ill, 119
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 90n, 91n
Willums, J.O., 20, 21, 22
Yangtze River, 17, 66, 144
Yellow River, 17
Yellow Sea, 9, 16, 17, 19, 25n, 28, 48, 49, 52, 59, 63, 85n, 140, 156,
165, 170, 241
Yonogami Island, 9
Yugoslavia, 85n, 97, 99, 148, 174

LIST OF CASES

307

LIST OF CASES
(References are to pages)
I.

Decisions of International Tribunals

Abu Dhabi Arbitral Award (Petroleum Development Ltd. v. Sheikh
Dhabi), 58n.
Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case (Greece v. Turkey), 82n.
Case Concerning the Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya) (1982), 82, 85-86, 100, 102-103, 109, liOn, 111, 12022, 128n, 138, 139, 153-56, 157, 158, 159, 161, 162-63, 167, 169,
172, 185-86, 192, 240.
Delimitation of the Continental Shelf Arbitration (United Kingdom
v. France), 29, 77n, 81, 82, 84-85, 88, 100, 103, 109-11, 117-19,
127, 130, 132, 147, 152-53, 156-59, 161-63, 161-163, 172, 174,
183-86, 189, 240.
Delimitation of Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine (U.S. v.
Canada), 82n, 175n.
Fisheries Case (United Kingdom v. Norway), 8ln, 82n, 135, 137.
Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (United Kingdom v. Iceland), 82n, 126,
135, 137.
Grisbadama Arbitration (Norway v. Sweden), 116n.
Island of Palmas [Miangas] Case (United States v. The Netherlands), 70n.
North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany1
Denmark; Federal Republic of Germany/Netherlands), 27, 71,
75,78-79,81-82,84-85,88,95,100-01,103,107,110, Ill, 112,
117, 118, 126, 128, 129, 149-152, 153, 154, 156, 157, 158-59, 161,
162, 166-67, 169, 172, 18ln, 182, 185, 191, 192-93, 194n, 240.

II.

United States Cases

Bank of China v. Wells Fargo Bank and Union Trust Company,
217n.
Goldwater v. Carter, 23ln.
Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 286n.
Liang Ren-Guey v. Lake Placid 1980 Olympic Games, Inc., 236.
Occidental of Umm al Qaywayn, Inc. v. A Certain Cargo of Petroleum Laden Aboard the Tanker Dauntless Colocotronis, 19n,
236-37.
Republic of China v. American Express Co., 217n.
The Rogdai, 217n.
(307)

308

CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES

Underhill v. Hernandez, 232n.
III. Decision of Foreign Tribunals
Aksionairnoye Obschestvo A.M. Luther v. James Sagor & Co., 208,
210, 216.
The Anna, 8ln, 179n.
Award of July 17, 1963 [Carl Zeiss (Betrieb) ofHeidenheim-Brens v.
Nichimen Trading Co.], [Japanese] Patent Tribunal, 223.
Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. Rayner and Keeler, 210, 216n, 218, 223.
Civil Air Transport v. Central Air Transport Corporation, 204, 209,
217, 226.
The City of Berne v. The Bank of England, 228n.
Decision of Sept. 11, 1975 [Kushimoto v. Government of Japan], Hiroshima High Court, 224.
Decision of Sept. 16, 1977 [Republic of China v. Yu Ping-huan et
al], Kyoto District Court, 224, 227, 228.
Decision of Apr. 14, 1982 [Republic of China v. Yu Ping-huan eta/.],
Osaka High Court, 225-28.
Gdynia Ameryka Linie v. Boguslawski, 226n.
Haile Selassie v. Cable and Wireless Limited (No.2), 208, 216, 217,
218.
Hesperides Hotels Limited and Another v. Turkish Holidays and
Muftizade, 211, 219, 228, 237.
In ReAl-Fin Corporation's Patent, 211.
In Re Harshaw Chemical Company's Patent, 209, 211.
Luigi Monta of Genoa v. Cechofracht Co., 205, 209, 211.
Princess Paley Olga v. Weisz and Others, 208n.
Reel v. Holder and Another, 206, 214, 218, 236.
Shen Fu Chang v. Stellan Mohlin, 215.
White, Child and Beney Ltd. v. Eagle Star & British Dominions Insurance Co., 208n.

